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FOREWORD
The President, Secretary of Defense, and the Army’s Chief of
Staff have all stated that the United States is a “Nation at War.” This
fundamental fact is key to what we do at the U.S. Army War College.
Because of our continued emphasis on the Global War on Terrorism,
we face signiﬁcant strategic challenges as we continue to transform
the force, improve interagency integration into joint operations, and,
all the while, engage in active combat operations.
This collection of outstanding essays―three of which won
prestigious writing awards―by the students enrolled in the Army
War College Advanced Strategic Art Program (ASAP) highlights
some of these strategic challenges and offers thoughtful solutions.
The authors provide insights that undoubtedly will prove useful
to decisionmakers at the highest levels of our national security
establishment. Our ASAP graduates continue to make their mark
as outstanding theater strategists in the Ofﬁce of the Secretary
of Defense, the Joint Staff, the Army Staff, and in the Combatant
Commands.

DAVID H. HUNTOON, JR.
Major General, U.S. Army
Commandant
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CHAPTER 1
OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM:
LESSONS FOR THE FUTURE
Dr. Williamson Murray
INTRODUCTION
It is a pleasure to once again have the opportunity to write
an introductory essay for the collection of essays written by the
students of the U.S. Army War College’s Advanced Strategic Arts
Program (ASAP). This year’s students, as their essays suggest, more
than lived up to the standards of their predecessors in the program.
Last year, two of the essays won prizes at the U.S. Army War
College’s Graduation. This year, three students received writing and
research awards at the college’s graduation ceremonies. Commander
Steven W. Knott’s essay on the importance of intellectual effort in
transformation received the second place award in the Chairman’s
essay contest, while Lieutenant Colonel John D. Nelson’s essay on
the problems in transitioning from combat operations to stabilization
operations won the AUSA’s Land Warfare Award. Finally, Lieutenant
Colonel Thomas C. Riddle’s examination of the implications of the
Electromagnetic Pulse Threat to Homeland Security won the Armed
Forces Communications-Electronics Association award.
Not surprisingly, a number of this year’s essays address the
problems of transition operations after conventional military
victory. This is a problem that will confront the American military
for the remainder of the 21st century. The concerns of the students
in the Advanced Strategic Arts Program thus reﬂect the realities that
they and their fellow ofﬁcers in Iraq already confront. There is, and
will be, no easy route to political and strategic success in the conﬂicts
that America will confront over coming decades.
LESSONS LEARNED FROM THE IRAQ WAR
There have been a number of observers within and outside
the Services who have suggested that the American military has
1

little to learn from Operation IRAQI FREEDOM, since the Iraqi
military, as in the Gulf War, for the most part put up such a poor
showing. Nothing could be more dangerous in the years ahead.
Whatever the weaknesses of the Iraqi Army, military operations
in this war suggested a number of issues that the services and the
joint world need to address. If these weaknesses showed up during
Operation IRAQI FREEDOM, there is every reason to believe that
more effective and adaptive enemies will be in a position to take
advantage of American mistakes in a fashion that will have a direct
and painful impact on the lives and well being of young soldiers,
marines, sailors, and airmen―the life blood of this nation.
What has been particularly encouraging about the reaction of
the American military to this conﬂict has been willingness not only
of the Services, but the Joint world as well, to address the whole
business of lessons learned in an honest and forthright fashion.1
The difﬁculty now confronting the American military is the reality
that no conceivable power is going to challenge its power directly.
Instead, throughout the world military organizations and others are
thinking about asymmetric challenges that could address American
military power indirectly. U.S. forces are already seeing the results of
such thinking and adaptation in the streets and along the highways
of Iraq. Technology alone will not address the challenges of the 21st
century, because man is an inventive and adaptive animal to the
ever changing conditions and context of his environment.
Above all, the victory over Saddam Hussein’s forces underlined
that the fundamental nature of war is not going to change, whatever
the technological superiority that American forces bring to the
battleﬁeld. The technological monism that has molded so much of the
debate about transformation and military technological revolutions
has quite simply foundered on the realities of the battleﬁelds in Iraq.
Unfortunately, there is little evidence that those realities have had
an impact on the technophiles, since they have so little interest in
history, including even the history of the recent past.
In fact, the head of the Ofﬁce of Force Transformation has recently
argued that the American military can discard the traditional
approach of the inductive method of learning from experience (i.e.,
history and experience) in favor of the deductive method, where
one can derive the future from assumptions. In other words, the
2

Department of Defense (DoD) has supposedly reached a position
where it can posit what the future is going to look like without
reference to the past and thus determine what capabilities are
transformational and which are not.2 Interestingly, such an approach
ﬂies in the face of everything that historians have uncovered about
successful and unsuccessful transformations in the past, where
careful analysis of military experience and past history by armies,
navies, and air forces was crucial to keeping innovations relevant
and effective on future battleﬁelds.3
The conﬂict also suggests that the American military needs to
think in a more holistic fashion about the conduct of war at the
operational level. Since war is a political act, the defeating of enemy
military forces in combat operations only represents a portion
of the far larger mosaic that must include not only the planning
stages, but the transition stages from war to peace as well. In fact, as
Americans are discovering in Iraq and Afghanistan, the latter may
represent as important a component of operational art as the direct
battleﬁeld confrontations in securing the political ends for which the
United States has waged war. And those political aims are the only
conceivable reason that the U.S. military will engage in war.
Americans should not believe that all their opponents in future
wars will prove as militarily inept and ineffective as did the
Iraqis.4 And here lies perhaps the most dangerous lesson of the
war. American intelligence provided a clear picture of numbers
of tanks, artillery pieces, and divisions that the Iraqis possessed.
But in the largest sense, it failed to provide what matters most:
an understanding of the enemy as a human, dynamic polity. That
failure, of course, was not conﬁned alone to America’s intelligence
agencies. The general framework of planning and preparation for
the war reﬂected a general ahistoricism and lack of knowledge of
the cultural and historical framework within which Iraqi society and
Saddam’s tyranny were coexisting. Not surprisingly, that failure
had a devastating impact on the implementation of the transition
from war to stabilization in an explosive and dynamic situation that
came with the collapse of the Ba’ath regime.
This introductory chapter then aims to suggest some of the wider
and more complex lessons of recent military operations. And those
lessons form the only reasonable framework for thinking about what
3

kinds of military forces the United States will need for both the short
term and the long term. There is no easy road for America’s military
to the future. Yet the signposts are there from the conduct and the
fallout of the Iraq War. Americans can delineate those lessons now
and adapt their thinking to what the past suggests. Or, they can wait
and relearn those lessons in the future, but then only at the cost of
the lives of young Americans.
LESSONS FROM THE BATTLEFRONT:
THE ANCIENT VERITIES MATTERS
Much of what the military operations against Iraq suggest, one
can argue, simply boils down to a reafﬁrmation of the old verities.
The “western way of war” ﬁrst began to emerge with the Greeks,
came to full ﬂower under the Romans, and then was rediscovered
by the Europeans at the beginning of the 17th century.5 Through
the centuries it has relied on three basic pillars: discipline, training,
and cohesion.6 The ﬁrst has provided the glue that makes tough,
realistic preparation possible, while discipline and training have
provided the glue that has not only kept soldiers and marines under
the trauma of battle, but enabled them to ﬁght as a part of a coherent
and effective killing machine.
The historian of the Roman-Jewish War of the ﬁrst century AD,
Flavius Josephus, depicted the interplay of those factors with an
economy of words that would do justice to the military forces of 21st
century America:7
And, indeed, if anyone does but attend to the other parts of their military
discipline, he will be forced to confess, that their obtaining so large a
dominion hath been the acquisition of their valour, and not the bare gift
of fortune: for they do not begin to use their weapons ﬁrst in time of war,
nor do they put their hands in motion, having been idle in times of peace;
but as if their weapons were part of themselves, they never have any
truce with warlike exercises; nor do they stay [their hands] till times of
war admonish them to use them; for their military exercises by no means
fall short of the tension of real warfare, but every soldier is every day
exercised, and that with real diligence, as if it were in time of war, which
is the reason they bear the fatigue of battles so easily; . . . nor would he be
mistaken that would call those their exercises unbloody battles, and their
battles bloody exercises.8
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For all the enabling advantages that modern technology
provided U.S. forces, the real superiority that U.S. soldiers and
marines brought to combat in the Mesopotamian Valley in March
and April 2003 had to do with their discipline and training regimen.
One can see that discipline etched in the thousands of photographs
of soldiers and marines engaged in combat, and yet unless ﬁring
their weapons, every one with his index ﬁnger on the trigger guard,
not on the trigger.9 Indeed one might not be going too far in claiming
that had the equipment of the two forces been reversed, and the
Iraqis possessed the technologically superior equipment, the results
would still have been the same: an Iraqi defeat―although admittedly
at considerably higher cost to American forces.
The ﬁrst steps in the recovery of American military forces after
the catastrophe of the Vietnam war came not with new technology,
but with the restoration of military discipline in the barracks in the
1970s.10 Only when America’s military forces again reﬂected the
norms of discipline could the revolution in training begin. Here the
technologies that supported the creation of realistic training ranges
at the National Training Center and on the ranges of Nevada and
southern California allowed for the creation of training regimens
that slowly but surely turned the U.S. military into the deadly
tactical forces that have devastated America’s opponents in the wars
since the ending of the Cold War.
LESSONS FROM THE BATTLEFIELD:
CLAUSEWITZ IS ALIVE AND WELL
One of the sadder aspects of recent military literature has been the
minimization of Clausewitz’s understanding to the understanding
of war in the modern world not only by military pundits, but by
military historians as well.11 The anti-Clausewitzian tide in the
American military reached fever pitch in the 1990s, with claims
about the supposed ability of future technologies that would soon be
available to the American military to see everything and understand
everything in the battlespace. The foremost exponent of such views
was and remains Admiral Bill Owens, former Vice-chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS).12
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Unfortunately for such views the Iraq War suggests that the
removal of Clausewitzian concepts such as friction and the fog of
war―in other words that uncertainty and ambiguity will always
dominate the battlespace―is simply never going to happen in the
real world. In fact, everything that modern science is telling us about
the nature of the universe has suggested that such views are simply
incompatible with reality.13 Virtually everything in the planning and
preparation, the conduct, and the results of the Iraq War underline
that Clausewitz’s understanding of the fundamental nature of war is
much closer to reality than the technological dreams produced in the
last decade, a century and three-quarters after his death.14
The American military brought the 21st century’s technology to
the battleﬁeld. But they were never able to escape the reality not only
that their enemies were attempting to kill them, but that the physical
debilities that accompany intense experiences affected everything
that they attempted to do. Danger, fear, and anger all molded the
views of those involved in combat―factors that the realities of
extreme physical exertion and fatigue only served to exacerbate. As
Clausewitz suggests:
In the dreadful presence of suffering and danger, emotion can often
overwhelm intellectual conviction, and in this psychological fog it is . . .
hard to form clear and complete insights . . . It is the exceptional man who
keeps his power of quick decision intact.15

Extreme physical exertion and fatigue accompanied the dangers
of war. There is a recurring theme in the accounts of soldiers and
marines: the bone-deep weariness of day-after-day tension during
the movement to contact. Fatigue and fear, along with sleep
deprivation, hunger, ﬁlth, the brutal climate, an alien landscape,
and the terrifying sight of the dead and wounded led to mistakes,
miscalculations, and accidents. Technology could alleviate some of
the suffering of the wounded, but it could do little to mitigate the
dismal conditions under which those living on the sharp end must
inevitably live.
For those at the higher levels of decisionmaking, the technology
of the information age brought in its wake a ﬁre hose that spewed
forth data in almost inﬁnitive amounts. However, those technologies
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brought in their wake precious little knowledge. In some case
technology helped to remove old frictions, such as the difﬁculties
commanders often have in communicating with their subordinates,
their superiors, or their colleagues. But at the same time, by
providing so much information, technology may have introduced
even more uncertainty into the equation. Information did not, as was
the case in previous wars, translate into useable knowledge either
easily or smoothly. Those in command of coalition forces had to
make decisions of life and death under this unprecedented barrage
of information that was often ambiguous, uncertain, contradictory,
or even wrong.16
Moreover, senior commanders found themselves bombarded
by demands from Washington at hours that were entirely outside
their own body rhythms. At best, information technologies allowed
commanders to make decisions more quickly, but still in an uncertain
and ambiguous universe. There was a real reason why Lieutenant
Commander of V Corps General William Wallace and Major
General Jim Mattis spent most of their time in forward headquarters
where they could gain a direct sense of what was happening on the
battleﬁeld. Ikons simply do not represent reality―especially in terms
of a human endeavor like combat, where psychological factors are,
in many cases, the most important.
Like the best generals in World War II, Wallace and Mattis felt that
intuition, gained by being immediately in touch with the battleﬁeld,
was crucial. The worst contribution that technology could make to
the U.S. military would be to recreate the chateau generalship of the
First World War, where military leadership remained out of touch
with the realities of the battleﬁeld, happily ensconced in the belief
that technology could provide both safety and knowledge to those
in command.
LESSONS FROM THE BATTLEFIELD:
THE INTELLIGENCE PROBLEM
The Iraq War underlined some signiﬁcant weaknesses in the
whole framework of American intelligence. This is not to say that
the United States does not possess some extraordinary intelligence
capabilities, or that in some areas intelligence did not contribute
7

signiﬁcantly to the triumph of American arms. Situational awareness
of where Iraqi units were and what there strength was remained at
a high level throughout most of the campaign. As one battalion
commander commented after the war, he could not have been
better informed about the disposition and capabilities of the units
immediately to his front.17
However, knowledge of physical realities such as the number of
tanks, armored personnel carriers, and artillery pieces that the enemy
possesses does not equate to perfect knowledge, because it does not
tell combat commanders much about the human dimensions of
the units that their opponents have put in the ﬁeld. How will they
ﬁght? What is their morale? What is their tactical effectiveness and
what is the competence of their leaders? How does the enemy view
the coming war? How well does he know and understand how
U.S. forces will ﬁght? The battalion commander, quoted above,
also commented that, while his understanding of the placement
of enemy equipment was outstanding, he possessed virtually no
understanding of the cultural and ideological framework within
which his Iraqi opponents would ﬁght. Thus, when he reached
Baghdad, his unit still possessed nearly all the anti-tank rounds
that he had begun the campaign with, but that he was in condition
“black” with regards to anti-personnel ammunition―a condition
which no one in the division had expected at the beginning of the
campaign.18
In the end, it is not the number of tanks, or armored personnel
carriers, or soldiers that matter; it is the soul of a military
organizations―the morale, training, and cohesion that they bring to
the ﬁght―that matter in determining the outcome of war.19 And little
of that is calculable before and often during war. In Tolstoy’s great
novel about the French invasion of Russia in 1812, War and Peace, the
nobleman Pierre comments to Prince Andrei that war is like a game
of chess. To which the Prince answers in the afﬁrmative:
[B]ut with the slight difference that in chess you can think over each
move as long as you please, unrestricted by conditions of time and
with the further difference that the knight is always stronger than
a pawn, and two pawns always stronger than one, while in war a
battalion is sometimes stronger than a division, and sometimes weaker
than a company. No one can ever be certain of the relative strength of
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armies. . . . Success [in war] never has and never will depend on position
or equipment, or even on numbers . . .20

It is in the area of cultural understanding that considerable
failures in intelligence occurred.21 The intelligence agencies of the
United States did not understand the culture and framework within
which not only the Iraqi opponent, but the Iraqi people would
operate. This was true at the strategic and political levels as well as
at the operational and tactical levels. And that ﬂawed understanding
played a major role in the huge problems―many of them self
inﬂicted―that the Coalition confronted in the transition phase after
major combat operations had ended.
History, culture, and language still matter in intelligence.
The United States confronts a wholly new strategic and political
environment since the ending of the Cold War. That said, neither
its intelligence agencies nor its military organizations have adapted
to that reality. In the end, intelligence is not just about counting
things, but understanding living, adaptive opponents. And in the
future, the United States will inevitably confront opponents who are
smarter and more adaptive than Saddam’s thuggery proved to be.
LESSONS FROM THE BATTLEFIELD: OPERATIONAL ART
In addition to the traditional human capabilities that played such
a key role in the American victory, there was an additional factor:
a system of professional military education that produced senior
ofﬁcers deeply knowledgeable in their profession at the operational
level of war. The second war against Iraq was by far and away more
successful than the ﬁrst in terms of the operational performance of
American military forces. The ﬁrst war saw an enormous buildup
of air, ground, and naval forces. It began with a stunning blow
that entirely deconstructed Iraq’s air defense system in a matter of
hours.22
But that success was followed by an interminable air campaign
that lasted for over a month before the ground campaign began on
February 24. While the advance of V Corps and XVIII Airborne
Corps in the west were supposed to be coordinated with the Marine
advance toward Kuwait City, there was, in fact, no ground component
9

commander. Thus, there was no coordination between soldiers and
marines. Thus, one can hardly speak of a truly joint effort outside
of the air campaign under Air Component Commander Lieutenant
General Chuck Horner and his planners in the “Black Hole.”
The ground campaign took few risks; III Corps’ advance against
a badly beaten and retreating foe proceeded at a snail’s pace,
stopping on the initial night after advancing for a few hours. The
result was that the great left hook, which was supposed to slam
shut on Saddam’s Republican Guard divisions, failed to close fast
enough. The Republican Guard divisions escaped through Basra
and then played a crucial role in putting down the rebellions that
broke out through Iraq, particularly in the Shi’ite and Kurdish areas,
and in 1994 almost re-invaded Kuwait at Saddam’s instigation.
On the tactical level, American soldiers and marines performed in
exemplary fashion, which the action at 73 Easting exempliﬁed.23
Nevertheless, the campaign at the operational level was less than a
singular success, while relations among the generals appear to have
been less than impressive.24 As for air-ground jointness, that factor
never really received a fair test because the ground campaign was
so short, while severe weather conditions prevented air attacks for
much of the period.
The performance of soldiers and marines during Operation
IRAQI FREEDOM was as impressive on the tactical level as it had
been during the ﬁrst conﬂict against Iraq. What was signiﬁcantly
more impressive about this war was the performance of U.S. forces,
both in the joint arena and in the conduct of the operational level of
war. It is impossible to separate out the direct contribution made
by air and ground forces to the destruction of Iraq’s Army and
Republican Guard formations from the overall wreckage of defeat
which underlines the full triumph of jointness. Commander of the
101st Airborne Division Major General David Petraeus commented
that throughout the war he never knew what service, including his
own, was providing the ﬁre power that decimated the Iraqi enemy.25
Equally signiﬁcant in terms of jointness and combined operations
was that there was an overall ground component commander in the
second war against the Iraqis. Lieutenant General David McKiernan
was the Coalition Forces Land Component Commander, with Major
General “Rusty” Blackman, USMC, as his chief of staff. Directly
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under McKiernan was V Corps, commanded by Lieutenant General
William Wallace, and I MEF, commanded by Lieutenant General
James Conway. In addition to its marines, I MEF had under its
command the British 1st Armoured Division, which itself was
formed from units of the British Army and Royal Marines.
Moreover, during the initial days of the campaign, the British
division had under its control the U.S. Marine Corps’ 15th Marine
Expeditionary Unit.26 What is so impressive about the conduct of
operations by the Coalition Land Forces Component Commander
was the smoothness with which the individual pieces cooperated in
a rapid and devastating articulation of force to achieve the overall
effects, which led to the fall of Saddam’s tyranny in less than 3
weeks. That performance reﬂected the educational and intellectual
framework that has taken hold in the American military over the
past 2 1/2 decades.
Thus, it was the conduct of the campaign that suggests a true
masterpiece in joint, combined operational art. Tactical proﬁciency,
technology, and jointness were clearly all signiﬁcant enablers to the
victory, but the articulation of the main drives of the 3rd Infantry
Division and the 1st Marine Division represented a far more daring
and effective utilization of operational art than was the case in the
ﬁrst war against Iraq. One British ofﬁcer in the Coalition Forces Land
Component Commander headquarters commented that watching
the 1st Marine Division’s use of its three regimental combat teams
to slice through the Mesopotomian Valley, entrap signiﬁcant Iraqi
forces, and then drive up to the east of Baghdad was “a thing of
beauty.”27 The performance of the 3rd Infantry Division was equally
impressive in its dash up the western bank of the Euphrates and then
through the Karbala Gap, with its drive straight at Baghdad’s airport
and then the city itself. The result was the complete destruction of
Iraq’s military forces in less than 3 weeks, all accomplished with
minimal U.S. casualties.
In retrospect, the performance of American military forces lived
up to the expectations of the military thinkers of the 1980s, who ﬁrst
argued for the study of operational art as the fundamental heart
of the military profession. That thinking led to the two greatest
doctrinal manuals that the American military has ever produced:
the U.S. Army’s 1986 edition of Field Manual 100-5 and the Marine
11

Corps Fleet Marine Field Manual 1, Warﬁghting.28 The extent of
that intellectual contribution is suggested by a comparison of their
intellectual content and vigor with what passes for doctrine today.
In fact, the diminution of intellectual vigor in the doctrinal manuals
reﬂects an unfortunate decline within the services of serious debate
and study of the military profession. Undoubtedly, part of the
problem has been the increasing operations tempo that has made
the services increasingly unwilling to devote their human capital
to the intellectual preparation of future warﬁghters. That decline
has also been reﬂected in professional military education, where
the senior leaders of the American military, themselves the product
of professional military education, are exhibiting less interest in
the education of the next generation than was the case of their
predecessors over the past 2 decades.
Thus, for all the impressive nature of the campaign’s conduct at
the operational level, there were problems with how the American
military is, at present, thinking about and preparing for operational
art in future campaigns. As one perceptive commentator noted in
the late 1990s: “That too little of this debate and discussion still goes
on is, perhaps, indicative of the need to continue pressing for further
development of the operational art concept in an armed forces
once more caught up in a perceived technology-based revolution
in military affairs.”29 Serious intellectual debate within and outside
DoD has almost entirely dried up, to be replaced by power point
brieﬁngs that are remarkable for their lack of content.
The success at the operational level in the Iraq War rested to a
great extent on the intellectual preparation and education of today’s
senior leaders that took place throughout the 1980s. In other words,
the intellectual climate of that time formed the thought processes of
those who led the Coalition to victory in the Iraq War of 2003. The
question, then, remains: What intellectual framework is forming the
mental horizons of the majors who will be leading America’s military
forces in 15 years? One senior retired four-star Army general has
suggested to this author that the state of professional education is as
bad as it was in the mid-1970s, when he and a number of other senior
army generals attempted to improve the position of education in the
Army.
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What capital the American military is willing to devote to
preparing the horizons of its ofﬁcers to deal with an increasingly
complex world will exercise an enormous inﬂuence on the nation’s
military effectiveness in the coming decades of the 21st century. It is
a situation analogous to the television commercials for frequent oil
changes in which the car dealer comments: “You can pay me now,
or you can pay me later.” And the great difﬁculty is that the results
of penny-wise, pound-foolish educational policies will not be clear
until well after those who are responsible for such an approach have
passed from the scene.
TRANSITION OPERATIONS: TOWARD
A WIDER UNDERSTANDING OF OPERATIONAL ART
The interest in operational art in the late 1970s and early 1980s lay
in a growing realization among military thinkers and analysts that
there was an area of war that the study of war at the tactical level
or at the strategic level simply failed to address. Both the German
and Soviet military had been addressing that gap by studying what
they called “the operational level of war,” which helped to push
the American military toward a new paradigm for understanding
war.30 Unfortunately, for a variety of reasons, the understanding of
operational art as it evolved in the American military over the course
of the last 2 decades of the 20th century has remained almost entirely
focused on combat operations.
Admittedly, the American understanding as it has evolved is far
broader in scope than was the case with Germans. The Wehrmacht’s
generals, for cultural reasons, left logistics as well as intelligence
out of their understanding of operational art.31 The Americans, on
the other hand, have had to address logistics and intelligence as the
ﬁrst step in projecting military power abroad.32 And the services
have confronted over the past decade―especially in the run up to
Operations ENDURING FREEDOM and IRAQI FREEDOM―the fact
that the United States increasingly depends on projecting its military
power from North America as its military forces return from bases
abroad.
Nevertheless, for all the skill U.S. military forces have displayed
in conducting tactical and military operations over the course of the
13

period since the ending of the Cold War―including Operation JUST
CAUSE―the period that has followed the ending of major hostilities
has been less than satisfactory. Yet, the only reason that states are
supposed to ﬁght wars―at least according to Clausewitz―is to
achieve a satisfactory political outcome.
No one starts a war―or rather, no one in his senses ought to do so―
without ﬁrst being clear in his mind what he intends to achieve by that
war, and how he intends to conduct it. The former is its political purpose;
the latter its operational objective. This is the governing principle which
will set its course, prescribe the scale of means and effort which is
required, and make its inﬂuence felt throughout down to the smallest
operational detail.33

Looking at the experiences of the past 2 centuries, Clausewitz would
certainly include the period after major military operations have
concluded as being essential to the achievement of the political
objective. This was certainly the case in the period after April 15.
Others are already apportioning the blame, but that is not the issue
here. What is crucial is what the American military services learn
from the post-conﬂict difﬁculties of the past decade.34 Operational
planning and execution must include serious attention to the postconﬂict phase, as well as the political goals for which the United
States is engaging in military operations. There is considerable
interest at present in the conduct of “effects-based operations.” If
such an approach is to mean anything, effects-based operations
must take into account the political ends above all. Within such a
framework, the bombing of the Iraqi ministries during the initial
“shock and awe” portion of the war against Saddam’s regime made
no sense at all. In fact, in terms of the ﬁnal political goal of bringing a
more equitable government to Iraq, the destruction of the ministries
and their records inevitably damaged the future running of the
country as well as the potential to bring Saddam’s thugs to justice.
Thus, the American military must never think of operational
art as the purely military portion of a campaign. Operational art
must involve a holistic approach in which planning, major military
operations, and the inevitable clean up and restoration of government
all are considered together. In the world of the 21st century, transition
or post-conﬂict operations may be more important than the conduct
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of major military operations in the achievement of the political goals
for which the United States will ﬁght its wars.
CONCLUSION
The Iraq War may well represent a milestone in the projection
of American military power to achieve national goals. It is unlikely,
given the results, that any nation will directly take on the American
military in the fashion that Saddam’s Iraq was willing to do. But
already the enemies of the United States are looking for other
alternatives: low intensity conﬂict, weapons of mass destruction,
cruise missiles and mines, new technologies, dispersed operations
with highly disciplined forces, and extensive use of special forces
and/or terrorists. Nor is it likely that future opponents of the U.S.
military will be as badly trained, prepared, and led as were the Iraqis.
Above all, the American military must think in terms of ﬁghting the
next war as an enterprise where the political goals receive the fullest
of attention. No deus ex machina of the United Nations or reformed
interagency processes will save military organizations which have
failed to plan for the reconstitution of politics after the noise of battle
has ceased.
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CHAPTER 2
“KNOWLEDGE MUST BECOME CAPABILITY”:
INSTITUTIONAL INTELLECTUALISM AS AN AGENT
FOR MILITARY TRANSFORMATION
Commander Steven W. Knott
While academics and military professionals have debated the
value of intellectual pursuits to the profession of arms in recent
years, that dialogue to date has failed to address the salient issue:
the concept of institutional intellectualism and its catalytic role as
an agent for transformation. Leading advocates of the military as
an intellectual profession have attempted―with varying success―to
convince their community that there exists an historic bias against
intellectuals (thinkers) in favor of individuals of action (doers). The
commonly held opinion that intellectuals provide little of practical
value and fail to function effectively as combat leaders serves as
the origin of that bias.1 These proponents further argue that despite
examples to the contrary―including Joshua L. Chamberlain and
George S. Patton―such individuals succeed “in spite of and not
because of ofﬁcial encouragement,” their intellectual talent largely
ignored and veiled in the shadow of their battleﬁeld achievements.2
The opinion of Dwight D. Eisenhower, who disdainfully
characterized an intellectual as one “who takes more words than are
necessary to tell more than he knows,” best represents the traditional
military view of intellectualism.3 This typical and pervasive bias has
compelled current advocates of military intellectualism to caution
the uniformed services against rejecting or marginalizing individual
thinkers, thereby depriving themselves of “precious intellectual
capital” and the innovative capacity required to adapt successfully
to the evolutionary character of war.4 One cannot dispute the merit of
this conclusion; the warning is germane. Nevertheless, the prevailing
debate over whether intellectual bias exists or not remains largely
superﬁcial and serves only to obscure the far more important issue
of institutional intellectualism.
It is irrelevant that Joshua Chamberlain and George Patton were
gifted intellectuals; as military professionals, their intellect had
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no inﬂuence on doctrine or in catalyzing change, transformation,
or a revolution in military affairs (RMA). While it is possible for
exceptional combat leaders like Chamberlain and Patton to employ
their intellect in solving battleﬁeld challenges, this is far different
from the individual who uses his intellect to drive institutional
change that results in transformation throughout the organization as
a whole. And herein resides the salient point: only institutionalized
military intellectualism can achieve successful transformation or,
on rare occasion, revolutionize warfare; conversely, individual
intellectualism that remains outside of an institutional context is
largely impotent.
One can best deﬁne institutional intellectualism as systemsponsored critical thinking that focuses intellectual capital to
effect transformational change and continual renewal within an
organization. First, and of paramount signiﬁcance, it operates within
and as a function of the military system; this means that institutional
intellectualism resides (formally or informally) within the
organization’s ofﬁcial structure, and that it is capable of inﬂuencing
mainstream thought and processes. Yet thinkers working within the
system will always encounter opposition to change from entrenched
traditional elements. This phenomenon offers an interesting paradox:
the nature of the military system ideally produces and empowers
the traditionalists, while simultaneously affording legitimacy and
sanctuary to the intellectual progressives―in turn preventing their
marginalization. Second, institutional intellectualism can only
exist―and succeed―in an organizational climate that promotes
free-thinking and a critical exchange of ideas. Not only is such an
environment a prerequisite for creating institutional intellectualism,
but it is indispensable for catalyzing change within a system and
for overcoming inevitable resistance from ensconced traditionalists.
Third, institutional intellectualism achieves a synergistic effect that
focuses intellectual energy in a highly disciplined, organized, and
coordinated fashion. As a result, collective ideas are transformed
more effectively into reality―and resulting military capability.
Moreover, individual efforts working within an institutional
context contribute to this intellectual synergy rather than remaining
disconnected from the process. Lastly, institutional intellectualism
is not military orthodoxy. In order for focused intellectual energy
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to push the envelope of convention, it must remain dynamic and
be infused periodically with fresh perspective. This is best achieved
by ensuring the system embraces new intellectual capital, while
simultaneously replacing those veteran thinkers whose former
ideas or theories now constitute established operating doctrine―or
orthodoxy.
Man is a problem-solver. By nature, he applies intellectual energy
to overcome current―and anticipated―challenges. The complex,
ﬂuid environment of war demands the institutionalization of this
intellectual energy to affect the necessary organizational and doctrinal
changes required to inﬂuence the nature and alter the character of
armed combat. Simply illustrated, institutional intellectualism gives
birth to theory and corresponding organizational-doctrinal change.
New systems and doctrine in turn act as the primary determinates
for successful transformation, and transformation historically will
constitute one of two forms: it will be in response to an RMA, or it will
prove the catalyst for such a revolution itself. Moreover, in contrast
to prevailing military beliefs, transformation remains primarily the
product of intellectual energy, and is rarely borne of technology.5
Technology is a powerful military tool, but it traditionally remains
ineffective until wedded to a doctrinal system on the battleﬁeld.
The English longbow6 and the tank, for example, failed to catalyze
transformational change in the military art simply as a result of
their invention; rather it required the innovative and systematic
application of these weapons to realize their full potential.7
Two historic case studies will serve to illuminate more clearly
the role of institutional intellectualism in producing successful
transformation. The ﬁrst provides an example of a specially
constituted team of intellectuals responsible for transforming an
entire military organization in response to an adversary’s military
revolution: the Prussian reforms following catastrophic defeat
by Napoleon at Jena-Auerstädt in 1806. The second example
demonstrates how individual intellectuals collectively can propel
transformation within an institutional context―and in this case
also initiate an RMA: the creation of the German armor force
(Panzerwaffe) during the inter-war period. Prusso-German examples
especially are relevant, given the traditional success that nation’s
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military has enjoyed in fostering a culture embracing intellectualism
(thinkers) and tactical-operational excellence (doers) within the same
institutional framework.8 Moreover, as military transformation can
inﬂuence only tactical-operational events and remains divorced from
the realm of strategy,9 the Germans again provide a valid example as
their land forces historically (in the wake of Prussian reforms) have
maintained an exceptional level of professional skill, ingenuity, and
combat effectiveness at the tactical and operational levels of war.
THE PRUSSIAN MILITARY REORGANIZATION
COMMISSION
Following the destruction of the Prussian Army at Jena-Auerstädt
in 1806, Carl von Clausewitz sardonically observed that “it was not
just a case of a style [of warfare] that had outlived its usefulness, but
the most extreme poverty of imagination to which routine has ever
led.”10 Indeed, the Prussian Army had arrived on the ﬁeld woefully
ill-prepared for battle against Napoleon. Yet few in the ranks or
among the senior leaders realized that the character of war had
changed fundamentally until they were overwhelmed so swiftly and
decisively by Napoleon’s Grand Army. Despite a self-conﬁdence
securely rooted in the military achievements of Frederick the Great,
the Prussian Army of 1806 was ﬂawed institutionally. The ofﬁcers,
more concerned with status and social affairs than professional
matters, were of inconsistent talent and inadequately schooled. A
considerable percentage of soldiers were poorly trained, and many
were well over 40 as the Prussian state required up to 30 years of
service before granting military exemption. More signiﬁcantly, the
soldiers lacked patriotic and military spirit because their interests
were not one with the king; simply put, the fate of the nation in
war had little inﬂuence on their day-to-day lives as disenfranchised
subjects of the crown. Compounding these moral deﬁciencies,
the Prussian Army also suffered from poor administration and
equipment; speciﬁcally, the troops lacked proper uniforms and the
weapons, ﬁeld gear, and rations were the worst in Europe. Moreover,
the military organization and tactical doctrine employed by the
Prussians were obsolete as well.11 In retrospect, given the atrophied
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state of Prussian arms and the transformational nature of the French
military revolution, the decision at Jena-Auerstädt was inevitable.
The French Revolution had bequeathed Napoleon the
unprecedented military potential of the world’s ﬁrst modern nationstate; once harnessed, molded, and exploited in the hands of genius,
such power-in-being gave birth to the ﬁrst truly modern army and
ushered in a new age of warfare across Europe:
. . . In 1793 a force appeared that beggared all imagination. Suddenly
war became the business of the people―a people of thirty millions, all
of whom considered themselves to be citizens . . . The people became
a participant in war; instead of governments and armies as heretofore,
the full weight of the nation was thrown into the balance. The resources
and efforts now available for use surpassed all conventional limits;
nothing now impeded the vigor with which war could be waged, and
consequently the opponents of France faced the utmost peril.12

Acknowledging the need for change (if not the socio-political
implications of the French transformation), Prussian King Frederick
William III convened a military commission in 1807 to investigate
the debacle at Jena-Auerstädt and propose reforms to the existing
military structure. While the king failed to recognize that Prussia’s
defeat lay beyond the sole realm of military concerns, the individuals
he appointed to the commission fortunately possessed far greater
intellectual vision.13 The principal members were Prime Minister
Baron Carl vom und zum Stein, General Gerhard von Scharnhorst,
Colonel August von Gneisenau, Major Carl von Grolman, and
Major Hermann von Boyen; Clausewitz, as a young captain and
administrative assistant to Scharnhorst, also became a de facto
participant of some inﬂuence.14 Stein and Scharnhorst were selected
to lead the commission because the prime minister was one of the
king’s most trusted political advisors and the general proved one
of the few senior military leaders who had performed well on the
ﬁeld against Napoleon. Moreover, Scharnhorst had gained universal
respect as a military scholar and thinker while serving as director
of the highly regarded Militärische Gesellschaft (Military Society), the
ﬁrst institution of its kind devoted exclusively to the academic study
of war. Signiﬁcantly, Scharnhorst chose the remaining members
of the commission based on their intellectual contributions to the
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Militärische Gesellschaft and their recent performance in combat―in
short, they were the “best and brightest” the Prussian Army had to
offer.15 Despite a diverse range of experience and political inﬂuence
among the reformers, they shared a common belief that the nature
of the problem transcended military organizational deﬁciencies.
Each possessed a keen intellect and a progressive worldview
that enabled the commission to discern the need for institutional
transformation across a broad societal, political, and military
spectrum.16 Consequently, the reformers recognized the signiﬁcance
of the fundamental shift in the relationship between government,
the people, and military power that had occurred in France. Similar
reforms―short of revolution―would have to occur in Prussia to
reverse the results of 1806.
The Military Reorganization Commission began by correcting
straightforward organizational discrepancies. The army received
improved uniforms and equipment, state-of-the-art weapons, and
new tactical procedures (authored in part by Clausewitz).17 Once the
means were in place to correct these deﬁciencies, the commission
turned its attention to more difﬁcult challenges. In addressing the
pervasive socio-political faults within the army, the commission
embarked on a more radical path that led to the creation of a new
ofﬁcer corps, the citizen-soldier, and a revolutionary general staff
system. The reformers’ guiding objective in pursuing these initiatives
was to imbue the Prussian army with “institutionalized military
excellence”; speciﬁcally, “organizational genius . . . led in battle
by operational genius.”18 Scharnhorst and his associates believed
fervently that to achieve this ambitious transformational goal was
to provide the nation with its best insurance against revisiting JenaAuerstädt.
Prior to overhaul by the reorganization commission, the state had
reserved admission to the Prussian ofﬁcer corps almost exclusively
to members of the aristocratic landed gentry, or Junker class.
Commissions rested on the basis of political inﬂuence and patronage
rather than an ofﬁcer candidate’s actual merit or military potential. As
a result, inconsistent talent, insularism, and professional stagnation
had characterized the Prussian ofﬁcer corps before 1807. Moreover,
the Junkers discounted the value of formal education (believing that
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it made one “soft”―a thinker rather than a doer); as a result, the
intellectual capacity of the ofﬁcer corps remained limited as well.
The reformers transformed the ofﬁcer corps ﬁrst by persuading the
king to grant eligibility to all elements of society. New ofﬁcers―
whether Junker or commoner―would receive appointment through
a universal examination process blind to station or inﬂuence. This
measure alone served to expand signiﬁcantly the talent pool from
which candidates came, and it proved to be the principal foundation
upon which the new Prussian ofﬁcer corps would rest. Secondly,
Scharnhorst, recognizing the value of education, supervised the
creation of three military schools to provide basic instruction to all
newly commissioned ofﬁcers prior to assignment with the active
force. Compulsory military education was also unprecedented in
Prussian military tradition; yet it proved equally successful and
ensured standardization of quality while promoting intellectual
growth among the new ofﬁcer corps.19
In tandem with reforms to the ofﬁcer corps, the commission
also pursued signiﬁcant transformational objectives in recasting the
Prussian soldier. At Jena-Auerstädt the men in the ranks did not
constitute a peoples’ army whose common interests were coupled with
those of the state; in fact, most viewed the war as solely the concern of
King Frederick William (and the Junker class), thereby resulting in an
alarming popular indifference to the French invasion. Consequently,
the average soldier was bereft of esprit de corps or patriotic spirit,
and, equating service in the king’s army with unjust coercion, he
was likely to desert at the ﬁrst opportunity.20 The reformers pursued
a twofold scheme to transform the Prussian commoner-in-arms
into a citizen-soldier. The ﬁrst was through a system of egalitarian
universal conscription which denied exemption to any element of
society and mandated a shorter period of obligation. The goal of
universal conscription was to ensure that the military “burden . . .
was carried on all shoulders” and that service in the Prussian Army
became “a proud civic duty . . . that turned the cause of the state
into the cause of every man.” An additional advantage would be
in promoting a new nationalistic spirit in which fealty to the king
also encompassed a growing loyalty to the state―or Fatherland.21
Secondly, primarily through the work of Stein, the reformers wished
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to expand markedly the powers of the constitutional element of the
government vis-à-vis the king. They hoped this would encourage a
feeling of general enfranchisement among the people to combat the
pervasive sense of alienation from government resident throughout
Prussia. Moreover, included in this initiative was an attempt to
transfer control of the army from the king to constitutional civilian
authorities.22 While the reorganization commission was extremely
successful in implementing universal conscription in 1808, the king
rejected initiatives to expand constitutional powers or surrender
control of his army.23 Nevertheless, sufﬁcient measures were in place
to transform the existing system and produce Prussia’s ﬁrst citizensoldiers as the reformers envisioned.
Having addressed successfully basic organizational deﬁciencies
as well as implemented initiatives to transform the ofﬁcer corps
and the Prussian soldier, the commission members likewise created
the means to administer, train, and lead this new army with
“institutionalized genius”―the general staff system. This measure
proved the most unprecedented and intellectually revolutionary of
all the reforms in the commission’s efforts to counterbalance France’s
military revolution (as well as Napoleon’s genius). Best described as
“the intellectual center of the army,”24 this new general staff concept
far transcended traditional European staff organizations responsible
primarily for executive clerical and courier functions. The Prussian
Army meticulously selected, organized, and empowered the best
ofﬁcers―intellectually and professionally―to function collectively:
. . . as a single, coordinated brain, but always be fully responsive to
the commands and desires of the Commander-in-Chief . . . This was
to be done in both systematic and dynamic ways. New General Staff
ofﬁcers . . . would be educated carefully and intensively to replace older
ofﬁcers as they lost their sharpness and faded into retirement. The chief
of this elite group would be the individual who combined the best in
experience, education, imagination, vigor, and intellect. He would not be
the Commander-in-Chief, since that post would still be reserved for the
monarch . . . But the advice and information that the Chief of the General
Staff could give the king, and the assistance that he and the Staff could
also provide in the exercise of command, were expected to assure that
wise decisions could and would be made by the least able of monarchs,
and that even if a headstrong ruler were to make a blunder, the Staff
would be able to retrieve it.25
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Moreover, the general staff’s organization encompassed
operational, mobilization, and logistical planning functions, as
well as responsibility for the coordination of operations once
hostilities commenced. General staff ofﬁcers routinely transferred
between assignments with ﬁeld units (where they assisted the unit
commander and facilitated coordination with higher echelons)
and the Great General Staff (at the War Ministry) to broaden their
experience and perspective. Of signiﬁcance, selection to the general
staff was competitive and entailed exceptionally high standards.
A system of examination selected only 150 candidates per year to
attend the Kriegsakademie (war academy―founded by Scharnhorst in
1810). On graduation, each ofﬁcer served with the general staff for a
2-year trial period; at the conclusion of this probationary assessment,
only three or four ofﬁcers received permanent assignment to the
general staff.26 In its unprecedented ability to create and promote
institutionalized military excellence, this unique general staff system
remains the most signiﬁcant initiative born of the reorganization
commission―and its success underlies the fact that every major
European army would eventually attempt to emulate it in one form
or another.
The achievements of the reorganization commission provide a
persuasive example of institutional intellectualism as an agent for
military transformation. Working under a mandate from the army
commander-in-chief (King Frederick William III), the reformers
operated within and as a function of the military system. Moreover,
they enjoyed a degree of intellectual freedom and engaged in a
critical exchange of ideas that were remarkable for the time. This
climate in turn allowed for the synergistic union of Prussia’s leading
military thinkers―and their focused intellectual energy achieved
a level of societal, political, and military reform that truly was
transformational.
Admittedly, concerted elements of the Junker Class―both civil
and military―remained convinced that organizational military
reforms were sufﬁcient alone to cure the ills of Jena-Auerstädt
and opposed the commission’s initiatives.27 These traditionalists
attempted at every turn to counter the reformers’ efforts at
socio-political change. Signiﬁcantly, only within the system can
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intellectual energy achieve the necessary cohesion and inﬂuence to
overcome this traditional opposition. One easily can imagine that
even the extraordinary intellect and vigor of Scharnhorst would
have failed had he waged a crusade alone, disconnected from the
political and military institutional framework. Furthermore, the
commission’s work did not constitute military orthodoxy; indeed,
one of the functions it envisioned for the general staff system was to
prevent organizational stagnation and promote fresh perspectives
that would challenge convention well into the future.
One ﬁnal observation is germane: the immutable factor of time.
Even institutional intellectualism takes years―possibly decades―to
reap the fruit of its transformational seeds. The Prussian reformers
put sweeping socio-political-military changes in place between 1807
and 1812. As a result, the Prussian Army performed signiﬁcantly
better in the campaigns of 1814 and 1815 against Napoleon; yet the
full return on their intellectual labor was not realized fully until the
wars of 1866 and 1870, in which the Prussian Army defeated Austria
and France, respectively, and established the Prusso-German nation
as the greatest power in Europe.
THE CREATION OF THE PANZERWAFFE
In 1933 Adolf Hitler witnessed a rather modest military
demonstration which proved to be the harbinger of profound
transformation within the German Army and, in time, was to usher in
an RMA. This exhibition introduced the militarily ambitious German
Chancellor to the basic components of the newly created mechanized
army and included coordinated maneuvers by motorcycle, anti-tank,
and armored reconnaissance units in cooperation with a platoon of
light tanks. Hitler was so impressed by the demonstration that he
announced enthusiastically to the assembled ofﬁcers and political
leaders: “That is what I need! That is what I want to have!” While it
is doubtful that Hitler recognized the true military potential of this
infant force, he did provide an important institutional impetus to its
further development and incorporation in the operational doctrine
of the German Army;28 signiﬁcantly, it is this doctrinal change that
transformed the character of war in 1939.
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Unlike the Prussian Military Reorganization Commission, the
thinkers most responsible for the creation of the German armor force
(Panzerwaffe)―and its revolutionary application to Blitzkrieg―had no
formal organization. Instead, they achieved transformation through
their collective individual actions, albeit working in an institutional
context and within a system that encouraged innovation. The ﬁrst of
these individuals whose achievements warrant discussion is General
Hans von Seeckt. Seeckt, in his position as chief of the Army Command
Troop Ofﬁce, served as a clandestine chief of the general staff and
led the German Army between 1919 and 1926. A progressive thinker
who recognized the need for military reform, Seeckt’s ﬁrst initiatives
involved purging many traditionalist elements from the ofﬁcer corps
and undertaking a comprehensive analysis of lessons-learned from
the First World War. Not only was he successful in creating “a very
different ofﬁcer corps from that which had existed before World
War I, one whose cultural ethos emphasized intellectual as well as
tactical and operational excellence,” but his investigation into the
causes of Germany’s defeat (conducted by over 500 ofﬁcers working
in specialized committees) yielded tangible results and provided the
genesis for a revolutionary new doctrine.29 Army Regulation 487,
entitled Führung und Gefecht der verbundenen Waffen30 (Leadership and
Battle with Combined Arms) and published in 1921-23, ﬁrst articulated
this doctrine. Written under Seeckt’s supervision, this regulation
described in great detail combined arms operations emphasizing
offensive action, speed of maneuver, penetration and exploitation,
and decentralized command and control.31 Signiﬁcantly, Army
Regulation 487 devoted an entire section to the use of tanks and
other armored vehicles and recognized their potential for massed
operations and deep penetration; likewise, “using tanks in small
numbers or on a narrow front was emphatically discouraged.”32
Seeckt initiated several other measures during his tenure as
army chief aimed speciﬁcally at cultivating the ﬂedgling panzer
force. He created the Inspectorate of Motor Troops in 1924 and
assigned an armor ofﬁcer to all units and garrisons. This ofﬁcer
was to indoctrinate and train ofﬁcers and noncommissioned
ofﬁcers throughout the army in armor technology and procedures;
additionally, he advised unit commanders in matters pertaining
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to mechanized warfare and assumed command of mock tank
units during ﬁeld exercises. The importance Seeckt placed on this
program is evident in the fact that assignment and transfer of these
armor ofﬁcers had to be approved by the Inspector of Motor Troops.
Seeckt also personally directed every year between 1920 and 1925
that more training and emphasis be devoted to armored warfare.
Moreover, the army commander further insisted that tanks and
motorized elements take part in all ﬁeld exercises to the maximum
extend possible.33 While these initiatives certainly were beneﬁcial
to the early development of the Panzerwaffe and subsequent armor
doctrine, Seeckt’s primary contribution was in creating an intellectual
environment that encouraged free-thinking and the critical exchange
of ideas. Signiﬁcantly, he enabled key armor theorists and advocates
to work within a system that provided institutional legitimacy to
their continuing efforts at doctrinal reform.
The leading German armor theorist during the formative years
of the Panzerwaffe was Lieutenant Ernst Volckheim. A tanker during
the First World War, Volckheim had the opportunity to observe
ﬁrst-hand the success of Allied armor in reversing 4 years of
stalemate on the Western Front in 1918. Consequently, following the
war he began a concerted study of mechanized warfare, becoming
Germany’s leading authority during the 1920s. Volckheim was a
proliﬁc professional writer, authoring over two dozen articles on
armored warfare between 1923 and 1927, as well as publishing
two comprehensive books on the subject during the same period:
one an autobiographical account of the German tank corps during
the First World War; the second a theoretical work on armor
technology, tactics, and doctrine that became a standard army text.
Convinced that future operations would entail armored spearheads
to effect penetration (with the requirement to destroy enemy armor),
Volckheim was the ﬁrst theorist to discount the value of light tanks in
favor of more heavily armored and gunned medium battle tanks. He
also stressed the need to maintain a mobile armor reserve, believing
this to be the best doctrinal solution for defeating a successful
enemy tank penetration through friendly defenses. Additionally,
Volckheim was the ﬁrst German to advocate equipping all armored
vehicles and supporting arms with radio gear, recognizing that
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wireless communications would enhance command and control
functions and greatly increase the tempo of operations.34 The young
theorist devoted his considerable intellectual energies to the pursuit
of these concepts―all of which were included in subsequent German
armored doctrine.
Following the First World War, two schools of thought emerged
governing the employment of armor in battle. The majority view,
advocated by the traditional ofﬁcer corps of every major military
power, recognized the tank as simply another supporting arm for
the infantry; the minority school, championed by a small number of
independent thinkers, envisioned the tank as the principal combat
arm to be supported instead by the infantry (as well as the other
traditional supporting arms).35 In Germany, the leading intellectual
champions for independent armored units were Colonel Werner
von Fritsch, Colonel Werner von Blomberg, and Colonel Ludwig
Beck (all destined to be senior leaders in the German Army). During
the mid-1920s these ofﬁcers advocated the creation of independent
mechanized units which possessed the inherent capability to breach
or envelope an enemy position and then achieve rapid penetration
in depth. In this manner, with powerful armored forces ranging
throughout the enemy’s vulnerable rear areas, victory would prove
inevitable, providing the mechanized formations maintained a
rapid tempo of operations and retained the initiative. Moreover,
they envisioned a totally mechanized force in which the supporting
infantry, artillery, reconnaissance, engineer, and staff units also
would be motorized and capable of maintaining pace with the
tank formations. Fritsch wrote in 1927 as Army Command Troop
Ofﬁce operations chief that “armored, quickly moving tanks most
probably will become the operationally decisive offensive weapon.
From an operational perspective this weapon will be most effective
if concentrated in independent units like tank brigades.”36 While
the Germans possessed no tanks during the 1920s, these ofﬁcers
validated their views concerning the potential for combined arms
armor operations by closely observing British maneuvers during
this period and extrapolating their own conclusions:
. . . one can now clarify what will happen with tanks behind the enemy’s
main line of resistance after a successful breakthrough. Tanks can be used:
for attacks on the enemy’s rear positions, against advancing reserves, as
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well as against command posts and artillery emplacements. For such
tasks, present- day tanks are far more capable than older models.37

Fritsch, Blomberg, and Beck’s vision began to be realized in 1928
with the creation of the ﬁrst independent mechanized battalion with
permanently assigned armored car, motorcycle, and mock tank units
(actual tanks would be added in 1933). This was accomplished under
the able direction of two inﬂuential armor pioneers in the Inspectorate
of Motor Troops: Colonel Oswald Lutz and Colonel Alfred von
Vollard-Bockelberg. These two ofﬁcers were also responsible for the
design of Germany’s ﬁrst generation of light and medium tanks, as
well as for expanding the technical curriculum at the Panzer Troops
School to include formalizing training in mechanized warfare
doctrine and combined arms tactics.38 Given the conviction and
vigor of all these ofﬁcers in pursuing transformation, it will come
as no surprise that Fritsch and Lutz later supervised the creation of
the ﬁrst three panzer divisions in 1935 as the army’s Commander-inChief and Commander of Panzer Troops, respectively.39
An observation concerning the contributions of General Heinz
Guderian is necessary at this point. While active in the development
and expansion of the mature Panzerwaffe in the late 1930s as
Commander of Panzer Troops, Guderian played little intellectual
role in the creation of the armored force and associated doctrine
despite subsequent assertions to the contrary. In fact, Guderian
later claimed authorship for virtually all of the innovations and
achievements described in the preceding paragraphs!40 Nevertheless,
in 1937 Guderian published a credible overview of German armored
warfare doctrine in a widely circulated work, Achtung-Panzer!41
This book reiterated the conviction that “. . . tanks would only
be able to play their full part within the framework of a modern
army when they were treated as that army’s principal weapon and
were supplied with fully motorized supporting arms.”42 Moreover,
Guderian emphasized the need to concentrate the panzer divisions
at the “decisive point of action” in order to maximize their advantage
in mobility, ﬁrepower, and shock value; conversely, operational
dispersion of the Panzerwaffe would undermine its inherent
strengths and negate its decisiveness.43 Consequently, as Guderian
concluded: “In an attack that is based on a successful tank action the
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‘architect of victory’ is not the infantry but the tanks themselves; for
if the tank attack fails, then the whole operation is a failure, whereas
if the tanks succeed, then victory follows.”44 The concept of the
independent panzer division as described by Guderian in AchtungPanzer!, with its potential for massed action against the enemy’s
front or ﬂank―followed by relentless exploitation in the rear―made
the transformation of German operational doctrine possible.
In the wake of the creation of the ﬁrst three panzer divisions
in 1935, Beck (now a general and Fritsch’s Chief of Staff) initiated
a study to determine the feasibility of panzer corps and panzer
armies. Subsequent ﬁeld exercises and operational experience in
the occupation of Austria in 1938 prompted the general staff to
make ongoing improvements to the organization, training, and
tactical procedures of the panzer divisions: “The result was a
process of steady incremental improvement and innovation that
amounted over the long term to systematic change, but without the
risk of following false paths due to the misplaced enthusiasms of
reformers or the troglodytic opposition of conservatives.”45 During
the operation in Austria, the panzer divisions were employed
piecemeal with subordinate units attached to infantry corps; the
seizure of Czechoslovakia in 1939, however, witnessed the panzer
divisions operating independently, though still under the control
of an infantry corps commander. In short order, with procedures
and doctrine further reﬁned, the panzer divisions were organized
in dedicated armor corps and teamed exclusively with motorized
infantry divisions for combat operations against Poland.46 As such, by
the outbreak of war in September 1939, the intellectual vision begun
by Seeckt and Volckheim had been institutionalized successfully
within the organizational and operational framework of the army―
transformation was a reality. And in a devastating endorsement of
the validity of German armored doctrine, the Panzerwaffe proved a
revolution in military affairs and made possible in 4 weeks in MayJune 1940 what had eluded German arms for 4 long years during
World War I―the total defeat of France.
The creation of the Panzerwaffe offers another persuasive
example of institutional intellectualism as an agent for military
transformation. The collective efforts of several individuals―Seeckt,
Volckheim, Fritsch, Blomberg, Beck, Lutz, and Vollard-Bockelberg―
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achieved organizational and doctrinal change within the system
solely as a result of synergistic, focused intellectual energy. Seeckt
set the conditions for transformation and sponsored progressive
intellectual activity within an environment that encouraged a
critical exchange of ideas; moreover, his endorsement assured that
contemporary and follow-on reformers remained shielded within
the system and never forfeited their institutional legitimacy. Of
course, they faced inevitable opposition from old school advocates;
General Gerd von Rundstedt clearly expressed the opinion of the
traditionalists when, at an exercise involving the new tank units, he
declared: “All nonsense, all nonsense, my dear Guderian.”47 Yet―
signiﬁcantly―the conservative element never seriously impeded
the development of the Panzerwaffe or associated organizational/
doctrinal reform because debate remained protected within the
system where it could inﬂuence mainstream thought and processes.
Additionally, it is important to note that the march of intellectual
progress never stagnated into premature orthodoxy; the vision
was continually renewed by succeeding generations of progressive
thinkers who refused to stop short of real transformational success.
Consequently, orthodoxy emerged only over time―when Blitzkrieg
became relegated to the realm of convention.
Two ﬁnal observations are worth reemphasizing: While the
German achievements in France certainly included a signiﬁcant
technological dimension, the RMA was not born simply of new tank
designs and ubiquitous radios; instead, it resulted from the correct
(and decisive) application of technology through a transformational
doctrine. The doctrine was revolutionary, not the tank.48 Secondly,
the factor of time again is apparent; it took nearly 2 decades for the
collective intellectual vision of Seeckt, Volckheim, and the other
progressive thinkers to mature into actual operational capability―
illustrating well that military transformation, by its nature, is never
a timely or efﬁcient process.
“KNOWLEDGE MUST BECOME CAPABILITY”
The catalytic role of the Prussian Reorganization Commission
and the architects of German armored doctrine in promoting
transformation within their respective military organizations should
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be apparent; as such, one can garner several instructive themes from
these case studies that are relevant and applicable to current―and
future―efforts by the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) to embrace
transformation.
Intellectualism must work within an institutional context to succeed.
Transformation is born of intellectual energy, but as demonstrated in
the preceding case studies, it can only thrive within an institutional
framework which is wedded to the system. Organizational
endorsement―as witnessed by King Frederick William III and
Seeckt―provides indispensable legitimacy and intellectual freedom.
The recent creation of the Ofﬁce of Force Transformation under
the direct purview of the Secretary of Defense offers a potential
institutional framework for intellectualism to ﬂourish and exercise
inﬂuence within DoD. Similarly, the Army’s Doctrine Command,
coupled with Joint Forces Command’s responsibility for the creation
of Joint doctrine, afford additional opportunities for institutional
intellectualism to work within and for the system. Unfortunately,
these organizations to date largely have been incapable of catalyzing
signiﬁcant and enduring institutional change because they remain
culturally divorced from the mainstream of events within the
armed forces. Simply, while the structure is in place, the intellectual
capital it houses is not integrated within the system in the manner
achieved by Scharnhorst or Seeckt. Moreover, this structure fails to
promote effective innovation, free-thought, or a critical exchange of
ideas within and throughout the organization as a whole; instead,
these endeavors are conﬁned to “think tanks” and reside within the
walls of academia―well outside the organizational and professional
mainstream. Perhaps in time the Ofﬁce of Force Transformation will
correct these deﬁciencies; if not, substantive transformation will
prove impossible until intellectual endeavor is institutionalized in a
way Scharnhorst and Seeckt would recognize.
The absolute best intellectual capital must be assigned to transformation
duties. The Ofﬁce of Force Transformation, Doctrine Command,
and Joint Forces Command must be staffed with the “best and
brightest” to ensure the highest caliber of intellectual power, energy,
and vigor is applied to transformation activities. Furthermore,
these individuals primarily should be military professionals with
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operational experience. Successful transformation requires critical
thinkers demonstrating exceptional “agility of the mind.”49 At
present, it remains highly questionable whether those organizations
responsible for transformation are staffed with the proper
intellectual capital. Are the contemporary intellectual peers of
Scharnhorst, Clausewitz, and Seeckt in residence at the Ofﬁce of
Force Transformation or Doctrine Command? They are not, because
the system resists assigning them to duties presently considered
“non career-enhancing.” Additionally, a concerted effort is required
to identify and employ young ofﬁcers of exceptional intellectual
talent as demonstrated by the personnel selections of Scharnhorst
and Seeckt; intellectual renewal and avoidance of orthodoxy are
possible only when the system empowers young critical thinkers
such as Clausewitz, Grolman, Boyen, and Volckheim to temper the
experience of senior ofﬁcers and press the envelope of convention.
Again, in the absence of our best intellectual capital (of all ranks),
transformation will prove chimerical.
Technological achievement does not constitute transformation.
As illustrated in both case studies, transformation is born
almost exclusively of organizational, systemic, and/or doctrinal
innovation; therefore, while there is frequently a technological
component to transformation, technology is incapable of catalyzing
transformational change or an RMA until it is subordinated to effective
ideas. Consequently, there is an intellectual danger in stafﬁng the
Ofﬁce of Force Transformation, Joint Forces Command, or Doctrine
Command with technocrats rather than critical thinkers. Given the
current euphoria surrounding modern military technology, it is
logical to assume that technocrats hold great inﬂuence within these
organizations―and transformation efforts dominated by technocrats
will not succeed regardless of how revolutionary their technological
achievements may be.
Transformation takes time to achieve. Presently, there exists a
pervasive misconception throughout all levels of the American
military establishment that transformation can be accomplished
in short order. As described previously, the Prussian Military
Reorganization Commission required decades for its sweeping
transformational goals to be realized, while the creation of the
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Panzerwaffe and associated doctrine consumed nearly 20 years in
catalyzing less ambitious transformation. Of course, the complexity
and scope of the transformation process will dictate the time required
to achieve the desired end state―but the duration likely always will
be measured in years. Therefore, since historical experience dictates
that military reform is a laborious, time-consuming process, it would
be logical to conclude that current transformation efforts within DoD
will likely not reach maturation in less than several years.
Transformation will always face concerted opposition from
traditionalists. “Transformation requires changing culture and
attitude.”50 It is human nature to resist change; as such, intellectual
efforts to drive transformation will always have to contend with
traditional conservative elements supporting the status quo and
resisting change. Nevertheless, as demonstrated in the preceding
case studies, this opposition can be overwhelmed by ensuring the
intellectual impetus for transformation remains institutionalized
and resides within the system. Therefore, conservative opposition
to present American efforts at military transformation, while extant,
does not pose any real challenge as long as the transformation
effort is driven by institutional intellectualism, continues to work
within the organization, and retains administration and Secretary of
Defense patronage.
The purpose of transformation is to turn intellectual vision into
military capability. Whether this transformation is in response to
an RMA or constitutes a revolution itself, the driving force will―
and must―remain institutional intellectualism; and this is why
professional debate on intellectualism in the military must conﬁne
itself to this salient issue. To do otherwise is to lose sight of the most
important aspect of intellectualism and its exclusive role as an agent
for military transformation. Clausewitz emphatically reminds us in
On War that “knowledge must become capability.”51 We must never
forget that, without institutional intellectualism, this is not possible,
and professional stagnation and atrophy must eventually result.
ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 2
1. Lloyd J. Matthews, “The Uniformed Intellectual and His Place in American
Arms, Part I,” Army Magazine, July 2002, pp. 18-20.

39

2. Ibid., pp. 20-23.
3. Richard Hofstadter, Anti-intellectualism in American Life, New York, 1963, p. 10.
4. Lloyd J. Matthews, “The Uniformed Intellectual and His Place in American
Arms, Part II,” Army Magazine, August 2002, p. 40.
5. Williamson Murray and MacGregor Knox, “The Future Behind Us,” The
Dynamics of Military Revolution, 1300-2050, eds. MacGregor Knox and Williamson
Murray, Cambridge, 2001, pp. 175-180.
6 Clifford J. Rogers, “As If a New Sun Had Risen’: England’s FourteenthCentury RMA,” The Dynamics of Military Revolution, pp. 18-22.
7. Williamson Murray, “May 1940: Contingency and Fragility of the German
RMA,” The Dynamics of Military Revolution, pp. 172-174.
8. David. E. Johnson, Fast Tanks and Heavy Bombers, Ithaca, NY, 1998, pp. 8-15.
9. Murray and Knox, “The Future Behind Us,” p. 193.
10. Jehuda L. Wallach, The Dogma of the Battle of Annihilation, Westport, CT,
1986, p. 5.
11. Carl von Clausewitz, Historical and Political Writings, ed. and trans. by
Peter Paret and Daniel Moran, Princeton, NJ, 1992, pp. 39-42.
12. Carl von Clausewitz, On War, ed. and trans. by Michael Howard and Peter
Paret, Princeton, NJ, 1989, pp. 591-592.
13. Gordon A. Craig, The Politics of the Prussian Army 1640-1945, New York,
1956, pp. 38-39.
14. Trevor N. Dupuy, A Genius for War: The German Army and General Staff,
1807-1945, Toronto, 1977, pp. 20-24.
15. Charles E. White, The Enlightened Soldier: Scharnhorst and the Militärische
Gesellschaft in Berlin, 1801-1805, New York, 1989, pp. xiii, 128-131.
16. Peter Paret, Understanding War, Princeton, NJ, 1992, pp. 78-80.
17. Peter Paret, “Clausewitz,” Makers of Modern Strategy, Princeton, NJ: 1986,
pp. 192-193.
18. Dupuy, A Genius for War, p. 24.
19. Ibid., pp. 27-29.
20. Ibid., p. 26.
21. Peter Paret, Clausewitz and the State, Oxford, 1976, p. 138.
22. Dupuy, A Genius for War, pp. 27, 29.
23. Paret, Clausewitz and the State, pp. 138-139.
24. Walter Goerlitz, History of the German General Staff 1657-1945, New York,
1995, p. 35.

40

25. Dupuy, A Genius for War, p. 28.
26. Ibid., pp. 30, 46-48.
27. Craig, The Politics of the Prussian Army 1640-1945, p. 39.
28. Barry R. Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain, and Germany
Between the World Wars, Ithaca, NY, 1984, pp. 210-211.
29. Johnson, Fast Tanks and Heavy Bombers, pp. 8-9.
30. James S. Corum, The Roots of Blitzkrieg: Hans von Seeckt and German Military
Reform, Lawrence, KS, 1992, p. 254.
31. Johnson, Fast Tanks and Heavy Bombers, p. 9.
32. Corum, The Roots of Blitzkrieg, p. 125.
33. Ibid., pp. 132-133.
34. Ibid., pp. 126-130.
35. Charles Messenger, The Blitzkrieg Story, New York, 1976, pp. 64-65.
36. Corum, The Roots of Blitzkrieg, pp. 130-131.
37. Williamson Murray, “Armored Warfare: the British, French, and German
Experiences,” Military Innovation in the Interwar Period, eds. Williamson Murray
and Allan R. Millett, Cambridge, 1996, pp. 39-40.
38. Corum, The Roots of Blitzkrieg, pp. 134-136.
39. Larry A. Addington, The Blitzkrieg Era and the German General Staff, 18651941, New Brunswick, NJ, 1971, pp. 34-35.
40. Corum, The Roots of Blitzkrieg, pp. 136-143.
41. Kenneth Macksey, “Guderian,” Hitler’s Generals, ed. Correlli Barnett, New
York, 1989, p. 445.
42. Heinz Guderian, Panzer Leader, trans. by Constantine Fitzgibbon, New
York, 1952, p. 31.
43. Kenneth Macksey, Guderian: Panzer General, London, 1992, p. 59.
44. Guderian, Panzer Leader, p. 43.
45. Murray, “May 1940: Contingency and Fragility of the German RMA,” pp.
161-162.
46. Ibid., p. 162.
47. Ibid., p. 161.
48. Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine, pp. 218-219.
49. Arthur K. Cebrowski, dialogue with Advanced Strategic Art Program
students, Carlisle Barracks, PA, U.S. Army War College, October 29, 2003.
50. Ibid.
51. Clausewitz, On War, p. 147.
41

CHAPTER 3
SWIFTLY DEFEAT THE EFFORTS, THEN WHAT?
THE “NEW AMERICAN WAY OF WAR” AND THE
TRANSITION FROM DECISIVE COMBAT OPERATIONS
TO POST-CONFLICT SECURITY OPERATIONS
Lieutenant Colonel John D. Nelson
Since the ﬁrst Gulf War, the United States has fought three
major campaigns: Operation ALLIED FORCE in Kosovo, Operation
ENDURING FREEDOM in Afghanistan, and Operation IRAQI
FREEDOM in Iraq. The principles of rapid decisive operations
have inﬂuenced the pattern and conduct of operations in all three
conﬂicts. These principles evolved from early work by Harlan
Ulman and James Wade, Jr., in Shock and Awe: Achieving Rapid
Dominance, published in 1996.1 The principles of rapid decisive
operations created such success in Operation IRAQI FREEDOM that
Max Boot called the approach a “New American Way of War.”2
It was the promise of rapid decisive operations that served as the
lynchpin for the revision of the two Major Theater of War (MTW)
force sizing constructs during the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review.3
This revision resulted in a new force sizing, one that mandated
. . . forces be shaped to defend the United States; deter aggression and
coercion forward in four critical regions; swiftly defeat aggression
in overlapping major conﬂicts while preserving for the President the
option to call for a decisive victory in one of those conﬂicts―including
the possibility of regime change or occupation; and conduct a limited
number of smaller scale contingency operations.4

The Ofﬁce of the Secretary of Defense embraced the new concept of
“swiftly defeat the efforts” of an adversary, in large part, on the hope
that this would yield force savings with no discernable risk.5
The last three combat operations undertaken by the United States
in the period since the ﬁrst Gulf War suggest that the assumptions
postulated in the concept of Rapid Decisive Operations to justify
the force sizing choices made in the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review
were justiﬁed. However, the authors of the concept, those who
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operationalized the concept in Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq, and
most especially the policymakers in the Ofﬁce of the Secretary of
Defense, have failed to include post-conﬂict operations as part of
their calculus. The notion of rapid decisive operations was one of “hit
and run” rather than “ﬁght and stay.” Yet ﬁght and stay is precisely
what happened in Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq. Paradoxically, it
now takes more ground forces to secure the peace in periods after
war than to carry out decisive operations.6
This condition would not be much of a problem were it not for
the rules associated with the Quadrennial Defense Review’s forcesizing construct, which allows the sizing of forces only for the
conduct of the decisive operations. It considers other force structure
“lesser included” and, for analytical purposes, to be extracted from
a stability operation to conduct decisive operations.7 However,
during Operation IRAQI FREEDOM, the United States did not
extract forces from on going stability operations in the Sinai, Bosnia,
Kosovo, or Afghanistan. The post-conﬂict operations that the nation
has committed the U.S. Army to exceed the forces sized to meet the
decisive operations needs envisioned under the two major theater
war concept. A force improperly sized, if not corrected, can lead to
symptoms of increased force stress and result in decreased readiness,
increased retention problems, and larger institutional problems.
This chapter will examine the paradox created by the “New
American Way of War,” as represented by the concept of rapid
decisive operations and the increased need for ground forces to
secure the peace compared to the conduct of decisive operations.
To examine this paradox, this chapter will compare the concepts
associated with rapid decisive operations and the “New American
Way of War.” The primary focus will be on the period of time
in a campaign when decisive operations transition from conﬂict
termination to post-conﬂict stability operations. It will compare the
concepts in the previous sections to the cases of Kosovo, Afghanistan,
and Iraq to provide conclusions and recommendations for use in
force-sizing discussions in the 2005 Quadrennial Defense Review.
A NEW AMERICAN WAY OF WAR
The “New American Way of War,” as described by Max Boot in
Foreign Affairs, is a method of war characterized by rapid maneuver
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and precision ﬁrepower to achieve quick victory with minimum
casualties. This new style of warfare puts a premium on ﬂexibility
and surprise. It relies on special operations forces to a much greater
extent than in the past. The “New American Way of War” depends
on the heavy use of psychological and information operations to
force opponents to capitulate without ﬁghting. The main pillar of this
“New American Way of War” is the use of information technology to
integrate air, land, and seapower to accomplish assigned missions.8
Boot points to U.S. operations in Iraq during Operation IRAQI
FREEDOM and in Afghanistan during Operation ENDURING
FREEDOM as evidence that this transformation in the American Way
of War has occurred right before the eyes of Americans. Admittedly,
Iraq was a far better example of the “New American Way of War”
than U.S. operations in Afghanistan. Operation IRAQI FREEDOM
involved greater combined arms operations, for there were far more
conventional land forces than used in Afghanistan.9 Boot’s analysis
of Operation ENDURING FREEDOM demonstrated the difﬁculties
of not employing sufﬁcent land forces in an operation, since
some of the most signiﬁcant Taliban and al Qaeda forces eluded
destruction.10
Boot’s vision of the “New American Way of War” couples the
increased precision of airpower with the networking of the total
joint force to increase the efﬁcacy of airpower. However, this does
not obviate the need for ground forces during decisive operations.
He argues effectively that the United States will require ground
forces in lesser numbers during decisive operations to defeat forces
that airpower cannot destroy due to dispersion and concealment.11
However, one cannot conclude that the United States can gain
savings from the “New American Way of War” by reducing the size
of ground forces. He argues, paradoxically, that the United States
will require more ground forces to secure the peace.12
Similar views about the changing nature of the American Way of
War have appeared. Their authors, the current director of the Ofﬁce
of Force Transformation along with a professor from the Naval War
College, argue that Operation ENDURING FREEDOM in Afghanistan
showcased the “Emerging American Way of War.” In the January
2003 issue of Proceedings, Vice Admiral (Retired) Cebrowski co-
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authored, with his Assistant for Strategic Futures, a vision of the
“Emerging American Way of War.”13 He has expanded this vision
in further detail in a subsequent article titled “The Top 100 Rules
of the New American Way of War.”14 Together, for all intents and
purposes, these two documents outline the Department of Defense’s
(DoD) vision for the future of warfare. The Ofﬁce of the Secretary of
Defense will view and implement future transformational concepts
and white papers through the lens of the “Emerging American Way
of War.”15
The “Emerging American Way of War” showcases special
operations forces operating with local knowledge from remote
locations and applying information-age technology to leverage
networked precision capabilities. These forces will receive the
support of units capable of nation-building and constabulary
operations at the end of strike operations to free elite forces for
subsequent missions. Ultimately, super-empowered individual
warﬁghters (meaning special operation forces) will perform as
super global cops, neutralizing enemies of the United States such
as Osama bin Laden. The “Emerging American Way of War” will
push jointness down to the tactical level. This vision exhibits speed
in execution of operations and increasing precision of operational
effects to limit an adversary’s strategic choices.16
The “Emerging American Way of War” is possible through the
networking of military capabilities to allow more discreet use of
those capabilities in surgical strikes rather than the imprecise battles
of old fashioned war.17 This networking of capabilities will mean
that: “. . . as information moves down echelon, so does combat
power, meaning smaller joint force packages wield greater combat
power. Network-centric warfare generates new and extraordinary
levels of operational efﬁciency.”18
Or put another way, the “Emerging American Way of War,”
through the use of Network Centric operations, supposedly will
provide the promise of less land forces in contact with the enemy
during decisive operations. The “Top 100 Rules of the New
American Way of War” goes so far as to argue that the United States
“endeavors to keep the ground forces’ ‘footprint’ as economical as
possible.”19 How does this concept enable the limited use of ground
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forces? The joint force “aims for rapid dominance of any battleﬁeld
it may enter so the initial blows come from the air.”20 This is the
connection the authors of the “Emerging American Way of War”
make with the concepts of rapid dominance and rapid decisive
operations. In these concepts, ground forces will “roll up enemy
ground forces that have been softened by air attacks and . . . occupy
terrain.”21 Thus, the authors of these concepts envisage limited
ground forces only to impose a decision already facilitated by the
network-centric, rapid decisive operations.
The authors of the “New American Way of War” remain
largely mute about the issue of securing the peace. They envision
constabulary and nation-building forces that will allow elite forces
to exit upon completion of decisive operations. Their notion is
that there will be a clear delineation between decisive-combat and
post-conﬂict operations. The concept of securing and occupying
terrain and controlling the adversary’s populace receives virtually
no attention other than the assumption that limited land forces
will have to secure the peace due to the decisive nature of the
network-centric, rapid decisive operations. In fact, the authors of
the rules for “The New American Way of War” envision a short
stabilization period due to passing of security of the countryside
to the local constabulary or to other national peacekeeping forces.22
The authors further elaborate on this concept as part of their ideas
for the employment of ground forces in which the Army maintains
the peace as a “premier long-term occupation force.” The Army will
maintain the peace only until the United States can transition the
post-conﬂict stability duties to international or local civilian rule.23
What emerges from the Ofﬁce of Force Transformation’s view of
the “New American Way of War” is somewhat different from that
of Max Boot. The Ofﬁce of Force Transformation’s view rests on the
belief that because of the changing nature of war, there will be only a
limited need for ground forces during decisive operations. One may
assume the same ground forces needed for success during decisive
operations could handle the post-conﬂict, since their argument
makes no mention of increasing the number of ground forces in the
transition to post-conﬂict operations. Perhaps a more detailed look
at the concept for rapid decisive operations or the emerging joint
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operations concept for major combat operations, largely based on
ideas drawn from rapid decisive operations, might provide insights
into the transition from conducting decisive operations to securing
the peace and whether this transition requires more land force than
decisive operations does.
FROM RAPID DOMINANCE TO RAPID DECISIVE
OPERATIONS
The seeds for the “New American Way of War” originated in
1996 by a group of military theorists from the National Defense
University and outlined in Shock and Awe: Achieving Rapid
Dominance. The concept of rapid dominance emerged in response
to the changing strategic environment of the post-cold war period.
This environment was one of increasing technological change and
diversiﬁcation of strategic threats. One of the main drivers behind
the concept of rapid dominance was the need to change the two
major regional contingency (MRC) force structure and replace it
with one that was less costly.24 Through the use of perfect, or near
perfect, situational awareness on the battleﬁeld, more efﬁcient forces
supposedly could defeat or destroy an adversary.
Thus came the idea of rapid dominance aimed at harnessing
these technological innovations to produce desired strategic results.
The goal of rapid dominance would render an adversary incapable
of further resistance through the use of physical and psychological
means. The end result, achieved with minimal U.S. forces, would be
complete submission of the enemy through “shock and awe.”25 The
idea of rapid dominance is predicated on four characteristics; perfect
knowledge of the operational environment; rapidity of application
of capabilities; total control of the information and intelligence; and
brilliance in empowering individuals at the lowest levels to apply
such capabilities against an adversary.26
Virtually no description about what occurs after decisive
operations occurs in writings about rapid dominance. The concept
envisioned by the authors is such that “Rapid Dominance seeks to
impose (in extreme cases) the non-nuclear equivalent of the impact
that the atomic weapons dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki
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had on the Japanese.”27 Therefore, with the implementation of
rapid dominance, decisive victory will entail small forces on the
ground with near perfect information and intelligence directing
and applying lethal and nonlethal weaponry against an adversary.
They will so overwhelm the enemy physically and psychologically
that he will capitulate. The transition to post-conﬂict is therefore
just a matter of moving a relatively benign constabulatory force to
occupy an adversary’s territory for a short period of time, at least
until a handover to local or international authority occurs. While
the authors of rapid dominance never really address the transition
to post-conﬂict, the metaphor that Hiroshima and Nagasaki provide
suggests that there will be a relatively rapid transition requiring few
ground forces to secure the peace.
The Joint Forces Command took the ideas of rapid dominance
and developed the concept of rapid decisive operations. The
concept of rapid decisive operations will serve as the blueprint for
future concept development and experimentation.28 In addition,
the Joint Forces Command released the recommendations for rapid
decisive operations to coincide with the release of the results of the
Quadrennial Defense Review of 2001.29 Not surprisingly, none of the
recommendations really addressed the issue of transitioning to postconﬂict from decisive operations or for the security forces required
for ensuring the success of the transition to the post-conﬂict. Rapid
decisive operations, as described in the White Paper, integrates
knowledge, command and control, and operations, while leveraging
other elements of national power, to enable the United States and its
allies to attack an adversary asymmetrically from different directions
and in different dimensions. These operations supposedly will so
overpower an adversary that he will lose coherence, will realize
he cannot achieve his objectives, and thus will capitulate or will
ultimately be defeated.30
A rapid decisive operation, as outlined in the White Paper,
envisions decisiveness by imposing U.S. will on an adversary
through breaking his coherence and defeating his will and ability
to ﬁght. Friendly forces will use the concepts of rapid decisive
operations through knowledge of the enemy’s critical vulnerabilities;
effects-based planning and execution; use of information superiority;
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dominant maneuver; and precision engagement to synchronize
precision effects to generate relentless overwhelming shock on
the adversary.31 As envisioned in the White Paper, rapid decisive
operations will focus on rapid resolution. Rapid decisive operations
thus are:
not designed for long-term commitment or to resolve long-standing
problems. A rapid decisive operation creates the desired outcome
itself or it establishes the conditions to transition to a higher (e.g., major
regional contingency) or lower (e.g., security and stability operation)
level of commitment.32

Therefore, the concept for rapid decisive operations, while
described as simultaneous and parallel in its characteristics,
envisions a sequential and serial post-conﬂict transition. The forces
required for the transition may or may not be available to the Joint
Force Commander since the White Paper concept does not address
the transition to post-conﬂict and conﬂict termination. Moreover,
the White Paper never really addresses the need for the Joint Force
Commander to ﬁght decisive operations, while simultaneously
securing the peace. There really is no mention of a transition from
decisive operations to post-conﬂict operations. Yet the ideas of rapid
decisive operations reﬂect the hallmarks of the “New American
Way of War” as outlined by the Ofﬁce of Defense Transformation
with its emphasis on speed, networked command and control,
and the enabling of effects-based operations at the lowest level to
achieve decisive results.33 The ideas of rapid decisive operations
also permeate the new “Joint Operating Concept for Major Combat
Operations.”34
The central theme for the “Joint Operating Concept for Major
Combat Operations” is that the joint force will bring conﬂict with
a regional nation-state to decisive conclusion through the use of
swiftly executed, simultaneous, and sequentially applied power
in a contiguous or noncontiguous manner.35 The characteristics
of how Joint Forces Command views the future conduct of major
combat operations are to employ a knowledge-enhanced, effectsbased approach, applying relentless pressure, and engaging the
adversary comprehensively. The joint force will accomplish this by
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using collaborative processes, aligning deployment, employment,
and sustainment actions, and protecting itself throughout the
battlespace. The joint force will start a major combat operation with
a strategic purpose in mind to achieve decisive conclusions.36
The description of how a joint force ﬁghts in a major combat
operation in the joint operating concept is similar to the characteristics
of rapid decisive operations. Rapid decisive operations highlight
a knowledge-enabled, effects-based force that uses precision
weaponry to generate relentless overwhelming shock to the enemy’s
system. As with rapid decisive operations, the “Joint Operating
Concept for Major Combat Operations” provides few details on
how a joint force would transition from decisive operations to postconﬂict operations. It envisions that the joint force, if it implements
the concept fully, will “use decisive defeat of enemy combat forces
as a means to achieve decisive conclusion to war.”37 But, of course,
it is the enemy who determines that the war is over.
The concept thus assumes that a coherent enemy force remains at
the end of combat operations to capitulate and terminate the conﬂict.
There is no mention of simultaneous conduct of decisive combat
along with stability operations or security operations to impose U.S.
will on an adversary who no longer represents a coherent ﬁghting
formation but has decomposed into guerrilla bands or terrorist cells.
The concept makes mention of ideas for post-conﬂict: “Successfully
imposing our will on an adversary whose behavior brought us to
engage him in combat operations may very well rest upon what we
do after we have forcefully and successfully engaged an adversary’s
ability to resist.”38 The unstated assumption is that decisive
operations have brought relative stability to the region. There is no
mention of the chaos created in the wake of decisive operations due
to a power vacuum created by the swift disintegration of an enemy
force. In short, there is no meaningful treatment of transition of
decisive operations to post-conﬂict stability operations.
TRANSITIONING FROM DECISIVE OPERATIONS
TO POST-CONFLICT OPERATIONS
Joint Forces Command, in lieu of integrating a concept for
transition to post-conﬂict operations in the “Major Combat
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Operations Joint Operating Concept,” has chosen to stovepipe
the concept into a separate “Joint Operating Concept for Stability
Operations.” The entire focus of the stability operations joint
operating concept is to describe the stability operations following a
major combat operation.39
The joint operating concept for stability operations envisions
a stability force separate and distinct from a combat force. The
joint operating concept envisions that a separate and distinct
commander will command the “Stability Force.” The purpose of
this force will be two-fold during combat: to ensure continued
momentum of decisive combat operations, and to create conditions
that would ensure the long-term success of post-conﬂict operations.
The stability force then will transition to post-conﬂict actions,
following decisive combat operations that will focus on assisting
the interagency, international community, and local government
by conducting security operations and civil-military operations in
“restorative” stability operations.40 Much of this concept calls for an
organization and force structure that is separate and distinct from
the force structure and organizations that execute the major combat
operations.41 Therefore, the Joint Force Command concept is looking
to a constabulary force, a force structure and organizations separate
and distinct from conventional operational forces to conduct the
post-conﬂict operations. This concept compliments a proposal
published by the Center for Technology and National Security
Policy at the National Defense University.
In Transforming for Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations,
Hans Binnendijk and Stuart Johnson recognize that the advent of
the “New American Way of War,” characterized by rapid decisive
operations with the use of network-enabled, precision effects
based operations, brings the need to secure the peace in a rapid
simultaneous fashion. The authors conclude that the force needed
to conduct decisive operations was inadequate to secure the peace in
Afghanistan and Iraq.42 Establishing a safe and secure environment
will be the primary mission of military forces in post-conﬂict
operations. “Embedding” civilians with the expertise required for
essential post-conﬂict activities would facilitate the rapid return
of governance and civil services, essential to long-term success of
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the post-conﬂict operations.43 The authors propose establishing
separate and distinct joint organizations to conduct post-conﬂict
operations rather than providing a single warﬁghting commander
the resources needed to execute simultaneously decisive combat
operations and post-conﬂict operations. The idea would be that
the joint stabilization force would plan the post-conﬂict operations
and then roll in behind major combat operations forces to conduct
post-conﬂict operations in a concurrent manner.44 Military police,
with a Tactical Combat Force provided as back-up, would constitute
the bulk of the security forces envisaged in this concept, depending
on the enemy situation.45 The command and control relationships
are somewhat vague for the joint stability force. Would the force
report directly to the regional combatant commander like other joint
task forces, work for the Coalition Joint Force Land Component
Commander (CFLCC), or, because of the large involvement with
the Interagency, report back to the Secretary of Defense, or some
combination of these that evolve over time?
These are all questions dealing with the transition to post-conﬂict
operations that a variety of researchers have asked. However, the
answer to the most important question about what the military
provides best during the transition to the post-conﬂict will determine
the right force structure solution for the problem. Consensus
amongst these researchers is that the main task that military forces
must accomplish rather quickly in transitioning from decisive
operations to post-conﬂict operations is to provide security to enable
the inter-agency, international community, and local authorities to
reestablish services and governance.46
In A Wiser Peace, researchers from the Center for International
Studies recommend that the United States should not underestimate
the needs for security in post-conﬂict situations to ensure a successful
transition from decisive combat operations to peace. Deﬁciencies in
security forces were endemic in post-conﬂict Afghanistan and to a
lesser extent post-conﬂict Kosovo.47 They argue that a post-conﬂict
security force should be part of any combined coalition force that
leads combat operations. Unity of effort for the security forces as they
transition from decisive operations should ensure swift deployment
of adequate security forces to eliminate the possibility of a power
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vacuum in the wake of swift decisive operations.48 The authors
envisioned that a “constabulary” force would complete these tasks.
They assume that this force would focus on civil security, primarily
policing common crime, but not conducting operations against
guerrillas or terrorists in an asymmetric conﬂict. They recommend
that coalition combat forces disarm the adversary’s army, purge
undesirables, and retrain it to meet internal and external instability
needs. The coalition combat forces would have to meet those
missions until such time as the new force was prepared to assume
post-conﬂict security needs.49 Thus, if instability exists and local
indigenous capability was not available, coalition combat forces
would be required. These combat forces would be an integral part
of the coalition forces for unity of effort and assume these missions
as soon as decisive operations transition to post-conﬂict operations
or maybe simultaneous with decisive operations.
In America’s Role in Nation Building: from Germany to Iraq,
researchers from the RAND Corporation examined post-conﬂict
operations that the United States conducted from Germany and
Japan to Iraq. The researchers conclude that in the transition from
decisive operations to post-conﬂict, one of the most important
considerations will be security. Their research concludes that there is
an inverse correlation between the size of the stabilization force and
risk. The higher proportion of stabilization force appears to reduce
the number of casualties taken in the post-conﬂict.50 They argue
that there will be no quick solution to post-conﬂict since the average
post-conﬂict operation that the United States has participated in
lasted approximately 5 years.51 Indeed, the researchers from Rand
discovered that: “It seems that the more swift and bloodless the
military victory, the more difﬁcult post-conﬂict stabilization can
be.”52 Thus the “New American Way of War” may have created the
conditions that require more forces to succeed in post-conﬂict than is
required for success in decisive operations.
The actual practice of transition from decisive combat operations
to post-conﬂict operations informed the researchers from the Center
for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) and from RAND and
shaped their conclusions and recommendations. The “Stability Joint
Operating Concept” from Joint Forces Command and the “Concept
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for Transforming Stability and Reconstruction Operations” out of the
National Defense University seem less grounded in actual practice.
All recognize the need for security in the transition from decisive
combat to post-conﬂict operations. The concepts from the Joint Forces
Command and the National Defense University take a different path
to achieve that transition. Two differences between the concepts
and the actual practice, as represented by the RAND and the CSIS
study stand out: First is the use of specialized ﬁxed organization
constabulary forces, rather than conventional combat forces, with
the proper capabilities in the right numbers to meet the mission sets
as determined by the coalition commander on the ground. Second is
the idea of a separate joint command for stabilization in post-conﬂict,
rather than the integrating stabilization forces under the overall joint
force commander, to enable a simultaneous transition from decisive
operations to post-conﬂict operations. Finally, there is one other
difference between the two concepts and the review of the modern
historical record. The modern historical record suggests that a larger
ground force is required to provide security during the transition
from decisive combat to post-conﬂict than the force required to be
successful during decisive combat operations. The two concepts
to establish stability forces, on the other hand, envision no need
for additional combat forces for success. In fact, the two concepts
assume that lighter forces may be successful in modern post-conﬂict
operations.
TRANSITIONING FROM DECISIVE COMBAT
TO POST-CONFLICT STABILIZATION: THREE CASE STUDIES
Three modern operations demonstrate the differences between
the actual practice in transition from decisive operations to postconﬂict stabilization and the proposed concepts to accomplish
stabilization under the “New American Way of War.” The
operations are ALLIED FORCE in Kosovo, ENDURING FREEDOM
in Afghanistan, and IRAQI FREEDOM. These operations exhibit
the characteristics of the “New American Way of War.” All three
operations showcased the use of networked, precision, air and
seapower, enabled by special operations forces concluding in rapid
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decisive victory of adversary military forces. All three also required
a transition to post-conﬂict operations. This will be the focus of
the evaluation of the case studies highlighting the size of the force
during the transition to post-conﬂict operations, the command
relationships associated with that force, and, ﬁnally, the efﬁcacy of
the post-conﬂict security arrangements.
Operation ALLIED FORCE-Kosovo.
The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) conducted
ALLIED FORCE to enforce compliance with United Nations (UN)
Security Council Resolution 1199, which called on the government of
the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to cease hostilities and redeploy
mobilized forces from the province of Kosovo. ALLIED FORCE was
primarily an air operation, which NATO commenced on March 23,
1999. The conﬂict ended on June 10, 1999, with the Yugoslav security
forces complying with a Military Technical Agreement, which called
for the full withdrawal of Yugoslavian forces from Kosovo. The
operation lasted 78 days and returned Kosovo to status quo ante
bellum.53
The commander of the Allied Forces Southern Europe
(AFSOUTH) implemented ALLIED FORCE under direction of the
Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR). The Commander
Allied Air Forces Southern Europe (COMAIRSOUTH) commanded
the air operations with the Commander of the Fifth Allied Tactical
Air Force executing air operations.54 However, in practice, SACEUR
retained much of the command of Operation ALLIED FORCE.55
In addition to the command of NATO air forces, the Commander
of AFSOUTH also had NATO operational control of the Allied
Rapid Reaction Corps that fulﬁlled the role of the land component
command. The commander of AFSOUTH was dual-hatted as the
U.S. Commander of Joint Task Force Noble Anvil. In this capacity,
he had tactical control of the Joint Special Operations Task Force as
well as operational control of all U.S. forces within the operating
area.56
ALLIED FORCE demonstrated a pattern of war that is similar to
the “New American Way of War.” The use of air delivered precision
weapon systems by network centric forces achieved a relatively swift
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victory with minimal casualties.57 Indeed one of the major lessons
learned during Kosovo was a validation of American investment in
precision weapons, command and control information technology,
and extensive intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance systems
to enable the U.S. dominated NATO forces to conduct this “New
American Way of War.”58 That is not to say this was exclusively
an air operation. Notwithstanding the potential contributions of
Task Force Hawk, ground forces played a role in ALLIED FORCE.
The Kosovo Liberation Army acted as a force on the ground that
facilitated the targeting of the Yugoslav forces in order to increase
the effectiveness of the air operations, thus enabling the “New
American Way of War.”59 At the time of ALLIED FORCE, the
Kosovo Liberation Army numbered from 5,000 to 15,000 soldiers.60
Ground forces were absolutely essential in securing the peace.
General Clark gave the Allied Rapid Reaction Corps the mission to
move into Kosovo immediately upon cessation of hostilities in order
to secure the agreement reached with the Yugoslavian military and
NATO forces. This was no small task and included the mission to
establish and maintain a secure environment in Kosovo, to include
public safety and order. The initial size of the force under the
name Operation JOINT GUARDIAN was 42,500 troops deployed
in Kosovo directly. This force was under the command of the
commander of Allied Forces Southern Europe who acted as the joint
force commander for the ﬁrst 3 months of the operation.61 The size
of this force correlated to one soldier per 100 residents.62
Thus in one of the ﬁrst operations that could claim the deﬁnition
of the “New American Way of War,” a land force that was larger
than the land force used during the decisive operations had the
task to conduct post-conﬂict security operations. This post-conﬂict
security force was under the command and control of the joint force
commander who had the responsibility for decisive operations,
thereby achieving unity of command and synchronizing the
near-simultaneous post-conﬂict security with the end of decisive
operations. The overall effect of the post-conﬂict security was
relatively successful and has returned the province to status quo
ante bellum in the last 5 years, with a relatively modest NATO and
international presence remaining.63
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Operation ENDURING FREEDOM-Afghanistan.
Operation ENDURING FREEDOM in Afghanistan commenced
on October 7, 2001, in response to the Al Qaeda attacks on the World
Trade Center and Pentagon on September 11, 2001. ENDURING
FREEDOM was a U.S.-led operation with coalition forces. The United
States contributed the bulk of the air forces and special operations
forces, while the coalition partners from 30 nations provided some
airpower, special operations forces, and niche specialty forces. The
bulk of the ground forces during decisive operations, numbering
some 15,000, came from the Northern Alliance, a rebel army that had
been in conﬂict with the ruling Taliban forces for several years prior
to ENDURING FREEDOM.64 Although, the operation is on-going,
decisive combat operations subsided in December 6, 2001, after only
59 days, with the capture of Kandahar and the removing from power
of the ruling Taliban leadership.65
The commander of coalition forces in ENDURING FREEDOM
continues to be the commander of the U.S. Central Command
(CENTCOM). The Commander of CENTCOM assumed the
command of all land forces on November 11, 2001, as the Coalition
Forces Land Component Commander (CFLCC). The Special
Operations Command Central Command held the command of
special operations forces. The commander CFLCC synchronized
special operations activities with his own operations; including
the transition to post-conﬂict security, which occurred near
simultaneously as combat operations progressed with the 10th
Mountain Division and a Marine task force providing some postconﬂict security.66 Eventually post-conﬂict security operations
transitioned to the International Security Assistance Force in
accordance with the Bonn Agreement on December 6, 2001. That
force has post-conﬂict security responsibility only for Kabul and
its environs.67 The post-conﬂict security responsibilities for the
remainder of Afghanistan are somewhat vague.
Initially, decisive combat operations in ENDURING FREEDOM
displayed the use of networked precision ﬁrepower directed by teams
of special forces on the ground, operating with local indigenous
Northern Alliance Forces, which closed with and defeated opposing
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Taliban and Al Qaeda forces.68 Eventually, U.S. conventional forces
deployed and joined with the special forces-assisted indigenous
forces to conduct Operation ANACONDA. The forces required
to conduct decisive combat were approximately 15,000 Northern
Alliance soldiers69 assisted by a handful of special operations A
teams, joined later by approximately a division sized element to
conduct follow-on operations to include Operation ANACONDA.70
Therefore, the operations in Afghanistan during ENDURING
FREEDOM resembled the pattern of the “New American Way of
War” for decisive combat operations.
The transition to post-conﬂict security from decisive operations
was less successful, and its second and third order effects continue
to plague Afghanistan to this day. There was never a general
recognition that post-conﬂict security should be an integral part of
the transition from decisive operations, and that these actions should
occur simultaneously or near-simultaneously. Instead, a separate
organization was established in the form of the International Security
Assistance Force and employed about a month after decisive combat
in Kabul ended, creating a gap in security. The gap has never
closed, to the point of placing post-conﬂict reconstruction efforts and
political actions, such as elections, in jeopardy.71 The United States
limited the military forces committed to the post-conﬂict security
effort by design. The Secretary of Defense’s answer to a reporter’s
question regarding the deployment of peacekeeping forces 10 days
after the completion of decisive combat in Kabul is informative to
the issue of the design of the post-conﬂict security effort:
My feeling is that you don’t get peacekeeping until you get peace. I
like to refer to it as a security force. I don’t think that it will have to be
a terribly big one. The only place they are talking about having it is in
Kabul, the capital. Most of the other places are relatively calm. There is
still ﬁghting and lawlessness, but this is true in some American cities as
well.72

The post-conﬂict security force represented a ratio of one military
member for every 1,730 residents.73 The deliberate under-resourcing
of post-conﬂict security and placing the effort under a separate
command that arrived late may be one of the factors that still are
hampering U.S. efforts to secure the peace in Afghanistan.
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Operation IRAQI FREEDOM-Iraq.
Operation IRAQI FREEDOM was a U.S.-led coalition operation
conducted to disarm Iraq of weapons of mass destruction, to end Iraqi
support for terrorism, and to free the Iraqi people from the tyranny
of the Baath party.74 IRAQI FREEDOM was a joint and combined
operation directed at the removal of the regime of President Saddam
Hussein. Decisive combat operations began on March 19, 2003,
and the President of the United States declared decisive combat
operations, lasting just 44 days, over on May 1, 2003.75 The Coalition
removed President Saddam Hussein from power, and operations to
secure the peace continue to this day.
Commander of CENTCOM General Tommy Franks was the
coalition and joint force commander. CENTCOM organized air, sea,
and land operations under the command of functional component
commanders who may have commanded similar “functions” from
two or more services. General Franks delegated command of all
land forces to the CFLCC Commander, Lieutenant General David
McKiernan.76 The Commander of Special Operations Command,
Central Command (SOCCENT) led the Coalition Forces Special
Operations Command (CFSOCC). Command and control of the
post-conﬂict security force was somewhat ambiguous. The Director
of the Ofﬁce of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance was
to lead the effort of post-conﬂict civil assistance actions and report
directly to the Secretary of Defense with a loose coordination
relationship with the CFLCC. General McKiernan did not view
post-conﬂict security as his mission, but rather that of the Ofﬁce of
Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance.77 Since there was a
clear delineation of responsibility between conﬂict and post-conﬂict
security operations, neither organization planned for the transition.
The need for the transition to post-conﬂict security to occur
simultaneously with decisive operations compounded the problem
of transition for both organizations.
Clearly the decisive combat operations in IRAQI FREEDOM
demonstrated the “New American Way of War”: networked
precision munitions, synchronized with the maneuver of modest
ground forces, rapidly achieved decisive victory.78 Joint Forces
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Command is already integrating lessons from IRAQI FREEDOM
into the joint operating concepts for the conduct of major combat
operations into the future.79 Yet, despite the stunning decisive
victory, the United States has not secured the peace in Iraq.
The limited number of ground forces required to achieve
decisive victory actually proved an impediment to the rapid
implementation of post-conﬂict security. The force that CENTCOM
and CFLCC originally planned to achieve the operational endstate
of a safe and secure Iraq was ﬁve divisions organized under the V
Corps and I Marine Expeditionary Force. The size of the force that
actually conducted the operation was a little over three divisions.80
This translated to approximately 151,000 coalition soldiers and
marines in the land forces during the transition to post-conﬂict
stability, which represented one solider or marine for every 164 Iraqi
residents. Therefore, rapid transitioning to post-conﬂict security
simultaneously, or near simultaneously, was difﬁcult, since the forces
required to follow and support, or follow and assume, the mission
to secure bypassed territory, or bypassed forces, were not available
in sufﬁcient quantities to conduct those operations. Indeed, when
it came time to secure key civilian institutions in Baghdad, General
McKiernan, upon completion of decisive combat operations, was not
able to meet all the post-conﬂict security missions. 81
Therefore, the pattern of the “New American Way of War”
continued in IRAQI FREEDOM. A new pattern emerged as well
that germinated from ENDURING FREEDOM, which was to use
limited ground forces during decisive combat with the assumption
that these same forces would be adequate to conduct post-conﬂict
security missions. Indeed, when presented with the testimony of
Chief of Staff of the Army General Eric Shinseki’s estimate of several
hundred thousand soldiers to secure the peace in a post-conﬂict Iraq,
the Deputy Secretary of Defense stated that “It’s hard to conceive
that it would take more forces to provide stability in post-Saddam
Iraq than it would take to conduct the war itself and to secure the
surrender of Saddam’s security forces. Hard to imagine.”82 Indeed,
hard to imagine. Yet later in the year, the number of coalition
ground forces working to secure post-conﬂict Iraq numbered 185,000
soldiers just for the U.S. Army, let alone coalition partners.83 Thus,
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the latest war in the pattern of the “New American Way of War”
demonstrated that the rapid nature of decisive combat operations
requires more ground forces to secure the post-conﬂict peace than it
does to achieve decisive victory.
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The “New American Way of War” cannot deliver on the
promise of reduced ground forces for which the authors of the 2001
Quadrennial Defense Review hoped. In the drive to swiftly defeat the
efforts of an adversary and return conditions to status quo ante bellum,
American forces will require more ground forces to secure the peace
than to complete decisive combat operations. Indeed, to conduct
and win a decisive campaign in a major combat operation, the
United States will require more ground forces to remove a regime.
Two lessons regarding the transition to post-conﬂict security emerge
from the recent past.
To secure the post-conﬂict peace effectively, an overwhelming
combat force is necessary. In Kosovo this meant deploying 40,000
NATO soldiers to provide presence and impose the Alliance’s will
upon the Serbs and Kosovars. This translated to one combat soldier
for every 100 residents. The joint force commander may reduce the
overwhelming forces required in the initial transition later once
peace and stability return, as occurred after ALLIED FORCE. NATO
reduced forces in Kosovo to half of what they were at the start of
the operation. The United States chose to employ modest forces to
secure the peace in Afghanistan and Iraq. Today the United States
still is unable to provide a stable and secure environment in both
nations. In Kosovo the United States and NATO provided a safe and
secure environment within months of the end of decisive combat.
To secure the post-conﬂict peace effectively as a result of “The
New American Way of War,” the Joint Force Commander needs
to provide simultaneously, or near simultaneously, post-conﬂict
security, while engaged in decisive combat operations. In Kosovo,
this meant deploying land combat forces as soon as NATO signed the
technical agreement with the Yugoslavs. In Afghanistan, coalition
forces waited for a month to provide post-conﬂict security to Kabul,
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while waiting for the arrival of the International Security Assistance
Force. In Iraq, the coalition forces secured terrain as they progressed,
but the arrangements for transition to post-conﬂict security with
the Ofﬁce of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance were
ambiguous. This led to a power vacuum resulting in the massive
chaos that coalition ground forces still are not able to control almost
a year after the war. Unity of effort is essential for a simultaneous or
near simultaneous transition to post-conﬂict security from decisive
combat operations. The idea that a separate organization should be
responsible for post-conﬂict security ﬂies in the face of this lesson.
In order to provide the joint force commander the right
capabilities needed to transition to post-conﬂict security in future
decisive operations, the United States should consider the following
recommendations:
• Properly resource the land component commander responsible
to conduct decisive operations with combat formations that
can follow and assume security missions for bypassed enemy
and provide presence on occupied terrain. The amount of
force sized to secure the peace in ALLIED FORCE could serve
as a good rule of thumb, which was 1 ground combatant for
every 100 residents.
• Place post-conﬂict security forces under the command of the
land component commander for unity of command. Task
organize additional specialized forces such as civil affairs,
military police, and engineers to the combat formations to
assume some post-conﬂict civil reconstruction, police, and
infrastructure repair missions until the security situation
allows a transition to international, local, or nongovernmental
solutions. Such a step would eliminate the need for a separate
joint stability force organization, since the land component
commander would possess the right capabilities to secure the
peace in parallel with decisive combat operations.
• Adjust the rules for force sizing in the next Quadrennial Defense
Review to allow for the sizing of a potentially larger postconﬂict ground security force in comparison to the ground
force required for success in decisive combat operations.
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This should be additive force structure rather than a lesser
included force structure.
Implementing these recommendations may provide the future
joint force commander the right capabilities to ensure that winning
the decisive victory includes securing the peace. A full understanding
how “The New American Way of War” has transformed the nature
of war may help in visualizing the reality that more ground force is
now required to secure the peace than to conduct decisive combat.
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CHAPTER 4
NUCLEAR HIGH ALTITUDE ELECTROMAGNETIC PULSE:
IMPLICATIONS FOR HOMELAND SECURITY AND
HOMELAND DEFENSE
Lieutenant Colonel Thomas C. Riddle
The gravest danger to freedom lies at the perilous crossroads of radicalism
and technology. When the spread of chemical and biological and nuclear
weapons, along with ballistic missile technology―when that occurs, even
weak states and small groups could attain a catastrophic power to strike
great nations. Our enemies have declared this very intention, and have
been caught seeking these terrible weapons. They want the capability to
blackmail us, or to harm us, or to harm our friends―and we will oppose
them with all our power.
President Bush
West Point, New York
June 1, 2002

The National Security Strategy (NSS) of the United States
recognizes that over the past decade, “advances in technology and an
increasingly globalized international environment have contributed
to the proliferation of the means for new adversaries to organize and
threaten great nations in ways that previously required the creation
and maintenance of large armed forces and supporting industrial
capabilities to achieve.”1 The strategy emphasizes chemical,
biological, radiological, and nuclear weapons and the means of
delivering them because these threats are “coveted by rogue nations
as tools of intimidation, military aggression, blackmail, and the
means to overcome the conventional superiority of the United
States.”2 The use of a single nuclear-armed ballistic missile could
offer an adversary the means to accomplish this objective.
Open hearings in the House of Representatives in 1997 and 1999
indicated that the detonation of a nuclear weapon at an altitude of
approximately 500 kilometers (km) over the United States would
generate a high altitude electromagnetic pulse (HEMP) which
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instantaneously could disrupt or destroy electrical and electronic
systems that operate the critical infrastructure of the United States,
as well as portions of Canada and Mexico.3 Largely as a result of
the testimony presented during these hearings, Congress directed
the Department of Defense (DoD) to establish a “Commission to
Assess the Threat to the United States from Electromagnetic Pulse
Attack.”4 Although the interim efforts of the commission are not
publicly available, consideration of the previous testimony, coupled
with a review of on-going efforts to manage the current strategic
environment, provides a suitable vantage point to consider what
additional efforts are required.5 Those interested in the efforts to
ensure an effective homeland defense and homeland security effort
should understand the implications of a successful HEMP attack on
the United States, and the factors that inﬂuence the probability of an
attack, as well as continuously seek innovative ways to prevent such
an attack from ever occurring, and simultaneously, to prepare for it,
if preventative efforts should fail.6
This chapter will explore how a nuclear weapon would create
a HEMP. It will then address the effects that such an attack would
have on electrical and electronic systems and the implications for the
nation’s critical infrastructure. It then will turn to a discussion of the
risks of such an attack and the contributions of the existing national
strategies to prevent and prepare for a HEMP attack. After identifying
areas of concern, the chapter concludes with recommendations
to strengthen the nation’s capability to prevent or mitigate and
recover from the effects of this ultimate form of asymmetric attack.
To appreciate properly the implications for homeland defense and
homeland security, however, it ﬁrst is necessary to begin by deﬁning
what an electromagnetic pulse is.
HIGH ALTITUDE ELECTROMAGNETIC PULSE
The Technology Division of the National Communications
System deﬁnes an electromagnetic pulse as a wide frequency
range, high-intensity, extremely rapid, and short duration burst of
electromagnetic energy. Such a burst produces electric and magnetic
ﬁelds which can couple to metallic conductors associated with
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electrical and electronic systems to produce damaging current and
voltage surges.7 One noted expert in the ﬁeld of nuclear weapons
and electromagnetic pulse effects characterized such a pulse as being
similar to “. . . very intense static electricity that is carried on radiofrequency electromagnetic waves.”8 Although electromagnetic pulse
can result from both nuclear and non-nuclear means, this chapter
will concentrate on a pulse created by a high altitude nuclear
detonation.9
In general, a nuclear explosion creates an electromagnetic pulse
through the interaction of high energy nuclear emanations with
atoms in the atmosphere.10 At altitudes above approximately 40
kilometers (km), this effect becomes particularly signiﬁcant due to
the large volume of the atmosphere underneath the explosion that
interacts with the high energy nuclear radiation. According to one
expert, the nuclear weapon’s high energy radiation interacts with
air molecules and essentially transforms the atmosphere underneath
the explosion into a gigantic, radio-transmitter antenna.11
The Director of the Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics
Lab testiﬁed that there are two overriding characteristics that make
a HEMP attack unique.12 These characteristics are of particular
interest to those concerned with an effective homeland defense and
homeland security. First, the area affected by the electromagnetic
pulse could be continental in scope. As the altitude of the detonation
increases the area in line of sight to the radiation and, therefore
subjected to direct electromagnetic pulse effects, also increases.13
A detonation at an altitude of approximately 500 km could impact
the entire continental United States as well as portions of Canada
and Mexico, although at the edges, the ﬁeld intensity would be
approximately half of the peak levels, while the ﬁeld strength would
not be uniform over the entire area. 14
The second HEMP characteristic is that peak electromagnetic
ﬁeld amplitude and the speed at which it increases are extremely
high.15 Although electromagnetic pulse has often been compared to
a lightning strike, such an analogy is only useful as an illustrative
comparison to understand the scale of some effects. There are
signiﬁcant differences. For example, a HEMP is comprised of
several components, each generated by different effects of the nuclear
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weapon.16 Each has unique characteristics and pose different
protection challenges. Moreover, electromagnetic pulse generated
by an exoatmospheric nuclear explosion develops its peak electrical
ﬁeld much faster than lightning, making it harder to protect against.17
Finally, lightning remains a localized event, while the implications of
a continental-sized electromagnetic ﬁeld create unique propagation
effects.
Since an electromagnetic ﬁeld interacts with metallic conductors
to induce currents to ﬂow through them, any metallic object (such
as power lines, local area network cables, or even plumbing) could
act as antennae which would gather in the electromagnetic signal
and convert it to current ﬂow.18 Long-line conductors such as power
lines and metallic communication cables could extend further these
currents throughout and beyond the area illuminated by the line-ofsight effects. The direct and indirect electromagnetic coupling effects
are the means by which such a pulse generated by a high altitude
nuclear detonation could cause near-instantaneous, potentially
damaging voltages and currents in unprotected electronic circuits
and components throughout an entire continental-sized area.19
Modern electronics and computer systems depend extensively
on semiconductor technology. Due to the exceptional sensitivity
of modern semiconductors to relatively small amounts of energy,
the extreme voltages and/or current spikes produced by an
electromagnetic pulse event could create irreversible damage to
unshielded or specially designed electronic and computer devices.
Such a result underlines why a high altitude electromagnetic attack
would be so potentially catastrophic to the United States―this nation
is the most electronically dependent country in the world.
CONSEQUENCES OF A HEMP ATTACK ON THE UNITED
STATES HOMELAND
A detailed prediction of all of the potential effects of a HEMP
attack is difﬁcult due to the complexity of interdependent systems,
the diverse environments throughout the effected areas, and
the uncertainties associated with the manner of nuclear weapon
employment. While an electromagnetic pulse and its effects on
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various devices and equipment has received intense scrutiny over
the past 40 years, much of this analysis was conducted by DoD and
focused on nuclear command and control systems. As a result, much
of the material produced about electromagnetic pulse remained
highly classiﬁed. A great deal of the publicly available information
regarding the effect of electromagnetic pulse on military and civilian
infrastructure has resulted from several open hearings held by the
House of Representatives in 1997 and 1999. Those hearings form a
foundation to understand the effects that a successful HEMP attack
on the United States could have.
One expert described the results of a successful HEMP attack in
a hearing before the 1997 Military and Research Sub-committee of
the House Armed Services Committee:
. . . [a successful HEMP attack] . . . is a continental scale time machine.
We essentially . . . move it back in time by about one century and you live
like our grandfathers and great grandfathers did in the 1890s until you
rebuild. You do without telephones. You do without television, and you
do without electric power . . . and if it happens that there is not enough
fuel to heat with in the winter time and there is not enough food to go
around because agriculture has become so inefﬁcient and so on, the
population simply shrinks to meet the carrying capacity of the system.20

Taking into account the increasing interdependence of the
critical infrastructure in the United States, the picture is particularly
grim.21 The critical infrastructure of the nation utterly depends on
information age technologies.22 Indeed, all of the 13 interdependent
critical infrastructure sectors (agriculture, food, water, public
health, emergency services, government, defense industrial base,
information and telecommunications, energy, transportation,
banking and ﬁnance, chemical industry and hazardous materials,
postal and shipping23) inextricably are reliant on the proper
functioning of electrical power, electronic devices, and computer
systems. Virtually all of the technology that operates each of these
critical infrastructures may be highly vulnerable to the effects of
electromagnetic pulse.24
In addition to the immediate disruptions caused by the loss
of extensive portions of the information age infrastructure,
the cumulative effects of such an attack would have long-term
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consequences on restoration efforts. Unlike the localized effects of
a hurricane or even a “traditional” low altitude nuclear weapon
detonation, the instantaneous, continental scope and infrastructurewide effects of a HEMP attack would make recovery attempts
exceptionally difﬁcult and a lengthy process. Essentially post-attack
America would remain stuck in the 19th century until replacement
electrical equipment and components became available (most likely
having to be brought in from abroad) and installed.25 Of course, this
assumes those in charge could locate and efﬁciently employ the
variety of skills required to conduct such a recovery in a population
attempting merely to survive the anarchy that would inevitably
result.
Additionally, America’s military forces have increasingly
returned to the continental United States. A HEMP attack would
also affect them directly. Although the strategic nuclear forces (and
portions of their supporting infrastructure) possess the means to
resist the effects of electromagnetic pulse, the general purpose forces
have not received the same capabilities. After a successful HEMP
attack, the posts, camps, bases, and stations throughout the country
likely would be unable to provide the services necessary to function
as power projection platforms. Although some military programs
have incorporated electromagnetic pulse survivability within their
design and acquisition process, increasingly, the military forces have
turned to commercial-off-the-shelf equipment that has little or no
such protection.
To jump start national recovery efforts likely would require
signiﬁcant portions of the remaining overseas military resources of
the United States to focus their efforts on domestic recovery. The
resulting lack of a viable forward military presence, coupled with
an American government intently focused on internal recovery,
undoubtedly would result in numerous regional conﬂicts as nations
attempted to gain advantage or to redress old grievances. Several of
these regional conﬂicts (India-Pakistan, Israel-Syria, China-Russia,
China-India) certainly have the potential to involve further use of
nuclear weapons with their attendant effects.
Moreover, the worldwide economy increasingly has grown
interdependent. The economic disruptions that occurred in the
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wake of the 2001 attacks suggest a clear demonstration of this
interdependence. The disruption of the interdependent critical
infrastructure of the United States would likely produce worldwide
economic turmoil. The extended loss of the American consumer
markets, disruption of domestic manufacturing capability, and
chaotic ﬁnancial institutions would contribute to an extended
period of worldwide economic chaos. Clearly, the United States is
vulnerable, and the consequences of such an attack, both within the
United States and across the globe, are unacceptable. However, the
existence of exceptional vulnerability does not equate necessarily to
risk. One needs to make an assessment of the probability of a HEMP
attack on the homeland of the United States to determine the relative
degree of risk that is acceptable.
ASSESSING THE RISK
When considering potential threats, one must conduct a risk
assessment to gain an appreciation for an event’s occurrence. This
is necessary to provide a basis to ensure the proper provision of
national resources to reduce the likelihood of the event occurring
or the severity of its impact. This risk assessment will ﬁrst evaluate
the current nuclear proliferation environment and provide a broad
assessment of the availability of suitable delivery capabilities. This
will provide a basis to judge the likelihood of a HEMP attack.
Nuclear Proliferation.
Although it is a gross generalization, the reader can assume
that essentially every nuclear weapon will produce infrastructuresigniﬁcant electromagnetic pulse effects when detonated at high
altitude. The Institute for Science and International Security estimates
that approximately 30 countries have either sought to develop
nuclear weapons or indicated their intentions to do so. Other than the
United States, the following countries have successfully developed
nuclear weapons: Great Britain, France, Russia, China, Pakistan,
and India. Israel is suspected of possessing nuclear weapons, as is
North Korea. 26 In a June 2003 report to Congress, the Director of
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Central Intelligence stated that, although Syria is a signatory to the
nonproliferation treaty, broader access to foreign expertise warrants
concern about that nation’s nuclear intentions.27 Of the remaining
nations that either had established programs or had advocated the
development of nuclear weapons, only three were considered to be
actively seeking nuclear weapons: Iraq, Libya, and Iran.28
Nevertheless, there have obviously been substantial
developments over the last year in the arena of nuclear proliferation.
Two of these nations reportedly seeking nuclear weapons, Iraq and
Libya, have terminated their programs. Analysis of the intentions
and methodologies of their programs is on-going and likely will
provide valuable knowledge about other nation’s weapons efforts
and nuclear technology proliferation in general. However, other
recent proliferation developments warrant particularly careful
attention. First, Iran has conﬁrmed the existence of a substantial
weapons-grade material processing capability.29 Although the
International Atomic Energy Agency trumpeted the announcement
that the Iranians have signed the additional protocol on nuclear
safeguards in December 2003, doubts remain as to the extent of
that nation’s future cooperation with full veriﬁcation measures (as
well as the efﬁcacy of those inspections).30 Thus, the full extent and
maturity of Iran’s nuclear weapons program remain unknown.
The second proliferation development that warrants careful
attention is the exposure of a highly efﬁcient and organized
international “proliferation for proﬁt” effort. The acknowledged
extent and activities of the Pakistani “Kahn Network” is particularly
troubling.31 President Musharraf has publicly disavowed the
involvement of the Pakistani government or military (supported
by the prepared statement of Dr. Kahn) with this international
proliferation effort. Nevertheless, there are troubling indicators that
the government of Pakistan has been actively supporting the spread
of nuclear weapons technology throughout the Islamic world.32 The
interception while enroute from Malaysia to Libya of equipment (of
Pakistani speciﬁcation) destined for use in uranium reﬁnement is
just one example.33
The ﬁnal area of concern about proliferation remains the access
to existing nuclear weapons and nuclear weapons-grade material
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by nations and others interested in possessing nuclear weapons.
A recent article in the New York Times reiterates that the reﬁnement
of weapons-grade material is not a simple matter, and that the
production of atomic weapons still remains a complex undertaking.34
This creates an extensive demand for states and others with nuclear
ambitions to obtain either complete nuclear weapons or weaponsgrade materiel. Although any nation with ﬁssile materials or nuclear
weapons is potentially a source, Russia, the newly independent
states of the former Soviet Union, and the former satellite nations
remain a particularly signiﬁcant proliferation concern due to the
economic turmoil, massive stockpiles of ﬁssile materials, inadequate
nuclear storage security, and continuing susceptibility to demandside diversion.35
The inadequate security arrangements surrounding Russian
ﬁssile stockpiles and nuclear weapons storage facilities, the
proliferation of nuclear technologies by organized networks (such
as created by Dr. Kahn), and the nuclear programs of states such as
Iran, North Korea, and, potentially, Syria are clearly of signiﬁcant
concern to U.S. policymakers and strategists. However, to conduct
a HEMP attack successfully, a nation or terrorist organization must
match the weapon to a suitable delivery means.
Nuclear Weapon Delivery.
To conduct a successful HEMP attack on the United States, the
perpetrator confronts the signiﬁcant challenge of getting the weapon
to the required altitude. Due to the area affected by such an attack,
exact geographic accuracy is not a primary requirement. Obviously,
an Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) with sufﬁcient payload
capacity to carry the weapon would sufﬁce. Similarly, weapons
traditionally considered as either short, medium, or intermediate
range ballistic missiles would also be suitable, if of sufﬁcient payload
capacity and positioned at a launch point close enough to the United
States.
The 1998 Commission to Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat to
the United States (the Rumsfeld Commission) observed that the use
of Soviet-era patterns of ballistic missile development as guides to
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evaluating current threats are misleading.36 Those seeking the means
to threaten or attack the United States may use ballistic missile
development and deployment approaches that were not used by the
major Cold War powers for reasons of efﬁciency, safety, or quality
control.37 The report cited transfer of operational missile systems as
a speciﬁc concern. Similarly, the commission speciﬁcally identiﬁed
several countries that were pursuing sea launch capabilities (a
troubling aspect of this development is the increased difﬁculty
of correctly assigning responsibility for such an attack).38 This
development obviously expands the potential threat envelope to
shorter range surface-to-surface missiles such as Scuds.39 Within this
framework of uncertainty, an overview of those nations that could
potentially possess nuclear-capable ballistic missiles is in order.
Of the existing nuclear armed nations currently of concern,
Russia and China possess both land and sea based ballistic missile
systems capable of conducting a HEMP attack on the United States.40
In a June 2003 report to Congress, the Director of Central Intelligence
assessed that North Korea, Iran, and Pakistan possessed a range of
nuclear-capable ballistic missiles, with North Korea ﬁnalizing a
limited range ICBM capability.41 The report also cited Syria as having
a domestic Scud production program, as well as a development
program to produce longer range Scud variants.42 Possession of
nuclear weapon and ballistic missile capability are the entry level
requirements to threaten the United States with a HEMP attack.
But sufﬁcient technical expertise must be available to integrate the
systems together, along with a degree of conﬁdence that the system
will perform as required. Countries that possess a domestic ballistic
missile manufacturing program undoubtedly possess sufﬁcient
technical expertise to do so. How then does the United States intend
to meet these threats?
U.S. NATIONAL STRATEGIES.
The mutually supporting NSS and National Strategy for
Homeland Security (NSHS) aim to provide an integrated,
comprehensive, strategic framework that simultaneously seeks to
create and seize opportunities to strengthen national security and
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prosperity as well as provide a secure foundation for on-going global
engagement.43 Central features of both strategies either contribute to
the prevention of a HEMP attack on the U.S. homeland or establish
suitable frameworks to enable national preparedness, should such
an attack occur.
Two of the central objectives of the NSS are to “strengthen
alliances to defeat global terrorism” and “work to prevent attacks
against the United States and its friends and to prevent the enemies
of the United States from threatening it or its allies and friends with
WMD [weapons of mass destruction].”44 Many of the initiatives that
support these objectives directly and indirectly contribute to the
prevention of a HEMP attack on the United States homeland.
Strengthen Alliances to Defeat Global Terrorism and Work
to Prevent Attacks.
The NSS recognizes the dangers created by the nexus between
terrorists, state sponsors of terrorism, and WMD.45 The al-Qaeda
organization sought to acquire WMD with enormous enthusiasm
and remains a target of particular interest to the United States.46 The
continued interdiction of its sanctuaries, the explicit elimination of
the distinction between terrorists and those who knowingly aid or
harbor them, and the emphasis on the prevention of the transfer
of WMD and their means of delivery to terrorist organizations
contribute directly to the prevention of a HEMP attack on the
United States by state-supported terrorists. The NSS framework
also seeks to prevent the use of WMD through the execution of
three broad elements: counterproliferation, nonproliferation, and
effective consequence management. There have been substantial
developments in the execution of each that contribute to the efforts
to prevent a HEMP attack on the United States.
Counterproliferation.
Ongoing proactive nuclear and ballistic missile counterproliferation efforts are providing substantial dividends that
contribute to the prevention of a HEMP attack. First, the intelligence
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efforts to unmask the extent of the nuclear proliferation network
created by A. Q. Kahn provide an excellent example of on-going
initiatives to strengthen counterproliferation efforts.47 Similarly, the
decision to implement an earlier deployment of an initial groundbased interceptor and improved ballistic missile tracking capabilities
will support the improved passive and active defenses called
for in the NSS.48 Moreover, the convincing demonstration of the
continuing efﬁciency and effectiveness of America’s global precision
strike capabilities during Operation IRAQI FREEDOM is a clear
indication that multidimensional counterforce capabilities remain
a viable element of America’s counterproliferation capabilities.
Such capabilities would clearly contribute to the prevention of a
HEMP attack on the United States. Finally, the U.S. demonstrated
willingness to conduct preemptive strikes to neutralize WMD under
the concept of imminent defense adds an unmistakable dimension to
the concept of deterrence for those seeking to acquire WMD.49
Nonproliferation.
Another initiative speciﬁed in the NSS that is contributing to the
prevention of a HEMP attack on the U.S. homeland is the continuing
emphasis on strengthened nonproliferation efforts. For example,
although the Bush administration initially decreased the emphasis
and associated funding of threat reduction assistance to Russia in
2002, after Congress replaced and mandated additional funding
the following year the Bush administration fully supported the
program.50
Strengthened nonproliferation diplomatic efforts have also been
successful. One particularly promising multilateral diplomatic
initiative has been the development of the Proliferation Security
Initiative.51 This initiative combines the efforts of 11 countries
to combat trafﬁcking to and from states and nonstate actors of
proliferation concern of WMD, their delivery means, and related
materials. 52
That initiative also provides the multilateral framework that
supports another nonproliferation initiative identiﬁed in the NSS:
interdiction. The countries participating in the Proliferation Security
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Initiative agree to interdict the transfer or transport to and from
states (and nonstate actors) of proliferation concern of WMD,
their delivery systems or related materials, either domestically or
internationally.53 Although aimed at the entire range of WMD,
this interdiction protocol contributes to the prevention of a HEMP
attack by seeking to curb the free transport of nuclear technologies,
weapons and ballistic missile systems.
Consequence Management.
The ﬁnal portion of the NSS framework that seeks to prevent the
use of WMD on the United States, its allies, or its friends is effective
consequence management.54 Effective consequence management,
although primarily a preparedness concept, also contributes to the
prevention of a high altitude electromagnetic attack. By seeking
to minimize the effects of WMD on its people and those of allied
and friendly nations, consequence management contributes to
deterrence by demonstrating to the enemies of the United States that
their WMD acquisition and employment strategies will not be worth
the risks.55
The most signiﬁcant contribution to the concept of an effective
consequence management strategy has been the creation of the
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the implementation
of a comprehensive national homeland security strategy. A brief
review of some of the on-going homeland security initiatives will
illuminate some of the efforts that are underway and which are
creating an effective framework to pursue national preparedness
from the effects of a HEMP attack.
NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR HOMELAND SECURITY (NSHS)
The July 2002 NSHS is the ﬁrst-ever national homeland security
strategy and provides the initial framework to secure the homeland
from terrorist attacks.56 The three strategic objectives of this strategy
are to prevent terrorist attacks within the United States, reduce
America’s vulnerability to terrorism, and minimize the damage and
recover from attacks that do occur.57 Since the DHS is a relatively new
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organization and faces an immense task of avoiding the expectation
that it must try to defend everything, everywhere, all at once, it is
reasonable to ﬁnd that its on-going initiatives do not speciﬁcally
concentrate on direct protection against a HEMP attack. However,
of the six critical mission areas created by the strategy, two of them
offer a promising framework to reduce the vulnerability of the
United States to such attacks.
Protecting Critical Infrastructure and Key Assets.
The NSHS recognizes that American society and its modern
way of life are dependent on networks of physical and virtual
infrastructures.58 Of the eight major initiatives to protect these assets,
systems, and functions, ﬁve develop organizational or procedural
frameworks that will contribute to the preparedness of the United
States against the effects of a high altitude electromagnetic attack.
The creation of the DHS resulted in the assignment of a
single accountable ofﬁcial to ensure the United States addresses
vulnerabilities that involve more than one infrastructure sector.59
This step integrated the assessment of threats and vulnerabilities
for the range of interdependent critical infrastructures that support
the United States.60 While the NSHS does not speciﬁcally reduce
the vulnerability of the critical infrastructure to high altitude
electromagnetic attack, it makes the Secretary of Homeland Security
speciﬁcally responsible to assess and reduce critical infrastructure
vulnerabilities to the effects of this type of attack.
The NSHS also speciﬁes that a key role of the DHS will be to
build and maintain a complete critical infrastructure assessment.61
This comprehensive, up-to-date analysis of the vulnerabilities and
preparedness of key points across the critical infrastructure centers
is designed to permit the DHS to match current threat information
against current vulnerabilities to efﬁciently direct the appropriate
actions.62 As with the initiative to unify critical infrastructure
responsibilities, this framework will enable homeland security
personnel to determine the appropriate critical infrastructure
systems that need to be protected against HEMP effects as well as a
means to track the accomplishment of vulnerability reduction.
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Another key initiative that supports preparedness to mitigate
and recover from the effects of a HEMP attack is the effort by
the DHS to construct effective partnerships with state and local
governments and the private sector.63 As with the other elements,
this initiative does not provide direct improvements in the effort
to prepare the U.S. homeland against the effects of such an attack.
However, the establishment of effective mechanisms for the federal,
state, and local governments to partner with the private sector has
laid the groundwork to introduce speciﬁc HEMP infrastructure
improvements.
The next homeland security critical mission area that offers
the potential to reduce infrastructure vulnerabilities to a HEMP
attack is the development of a national infrastructure protection
plan. This plan provides the methodology for “. . . identifying and
prioritizing critical assets, systems, and functions, and for sharing
protection responsibility with state and local government and the
private sector.”64 The effort to establish standards and benchmarks
for the protection of critical infrastructure will be invaluable as the
mechanism for the prioritization of appropriate HEMP hardening
measures.
The ﬁnal initiative to protect critical infrastructures is the ongoing effort to develop effective protective solutions through
effective modeling and analysis.65 Speciﬁcally, advanced simulations
can assist in determining which assets, systems, and functions are
particularly important in a series of interdependent infrastructures.
This will support the efﬁcient use of scarce resources to harden
“high payoff” portions of the infrastructure to the effects of a HEMP
attack.
Emergency Preparedness and Response
As with protecting critical infrastructures, there are several
initiatives underway to support the critical mission area of
emergency preparedness and response. This mission area seeks to
minimize the damage and recover from terrorist attacks. The DHS
has made signiﬁcant progress in the effort to consolidate multiple
existing federal response plans under a single all-discipline incident
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management plan. The Initial National Response Plan, dated
September 30, 2003, represents a “. . . signiﬁcant ﬁrst step toward
integrating the current series of federal prevention, preparedness,
response, and recovery plans into a single, all-discipline, allhazards plan.”66 Due to the substantial effects of a high altitude
electromagnetic attack, the development of a plan to synchronize the
national response to mitigate the effects and guide national recovery
is especially critical.
A related initiative which directly supports the execution of
the national response effort is the creation of a national incident
management system. This system seeks to deﬁne common
terminology, provide a uniﬁed command structure, and is scaleable
to manage incidents of all sizes.67 According to Homeland Security
Presidential Directive 5, the national incident management system
will provide “. . . a consistent nation-wide approach for federal, state,
and local governments to work effectively and efﬁciently together
to prepare for, respond to, and recover from domestic incidents,
regardless of cause, size, or complexity.”68 Along with the creation
of a National Response Plan, the national incident management
system will be absolutely essential to managing the consequences
and organizing the national recovery from the continental-wide,
sustained collapse of substantial portions of the interdependent
infrastructures that a high altitude electromagnetic attack would
cause.
A supporting initiative for the emergency preparedness and
response critical mission area is to enable seamless communications
among all responders.69 In the aftermath of a HEMP attack, reliable
communications among federal, state, and local responders will
be a key enabler of the prolonged national recovery effort. The
development of the national emergency communications plan
will establish protocols, processes, and national standards for
technology acquisition. Incorporation of suitable electromagnetic
pulse hardened communications must be a key component of this
plan.
The DHS recognizes that it must plan carefully for military
assistance to civil authorities to ensure that, when duly authorized
by the President, military forces (which remain under the command
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of the Secretary of Defense) are efﬁciently and effectively used.70
Military assistance to civil authorities may take the form of technical
support and assistance to law enforcement (Military Support to
Civilian Law Enforcement Agencies), assisting in the restoration
of law and order (Military Assistance for Civil Disturbances),
and assisting in incident management. U.S. Northern Command
is responsible for both homeland defense and for assisting civil
authorities when directed by the President (through the Secretary
of Defense).71 During the massive societal upheaval that will follow
the comprehensive, extended disruption of the nation’s critical
infrastructure after a HEMP attack, DoD will play a critical role
in consequence management, maintenance of civil order, and
supporting the national recovery effort. For this reason, the planning
and training efforts between the DHS and DoD must include the
effects of a HEMP attack as a critical requirement.
Although both the NSS and NSHS have accomplished some
successes that help to protect the United States from a range of
complex threats, including HEMP, there are clearly areas that require
improvement. Policy and strategy makers concerned with an effective
national defense and homeland security strategy framework should
consider the following recommendations to strengthen national
efforts to ensure suitable and adequate prevention and preparation
measures against a HEMP attack.
RECOMMENDATIONS
Although the HEMP threat grew out of the Cold War, the threat
of this form of attack exists as long as there are nuclear weapons
and delivery systems that may be targeted against the United States.
Indeed, the advantages to a potential enemy of the United States may
be increasing as the military seeks to further increase its dependence
on commercial-based information technologies. However, the
psychological tendency is to shrug off the implications of a HEMP
attack because the consequences are so enormous.72 Nevertheless,
the threat and the vulnerabilities are real and must be acknowledged,
prioritized, and planned for by both the homeland defense and
homeland security communities. While the Electromagnetic Pulse
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(EMP) Commission will present a thoroughly comprehensive list of
recommendations in the near future, some broad recommendations
are worthwhile presenting here.
As the Rumsfeld Commission warned, and the events of
September 11tragically demonstrated, enemies of the United States
will seek to attack in ways that the nation is not prepared for, using
methodologies that have not been previously tried.73 The on-going
effort to improve the intelligence agencies of the United States must
continue. One particular area of emphasis for all members of the
intelligence community should be the integration of adaptive red
teams that are used to identify idiosyncratic methods of attacking
the United States.
The inevitable tension between homeland defense and homeland
security creates a potential seam that must be recognized and
eliminated or minimized. The efforts by U.S. Northern Command
to craft a joint operating concept to close this seam are particularly
promising. Similarly, the proactive relationships at multiple levels
between the DHS and DoD indicate that both organizations are
seeking diligently to mature their relationship. One speciﬁc area
that should be developed by DoD as a matter of some urgency
however, is a mandated series of planning sessions and simulations
to determine the most effective and efﬁcient way to employ its
resources in the aftermath of a HEMP attack. Speciﬁc care should
be paid to the incorporation of the reserve component and returning
overseas based military capabilities. Planning and prioritization
of military assistance to civilian authorities in a post high altitude
electromagnetic attack scenario should be of particular emphasis.
Another area of concern is that many of the remaining nuclear
physicist personnel, speciﬁcally those associated with EMP, are
retiring without a next generation to follow their lead.74 Similarly, the
physical plant to conduct EMP testing and simulation has atrophied
almost to the point of nonexistence.75 Building upon suggestions
originally proposed in 1999, Congress should mandate and oversee
the creation of an interagency, DoD-DHS led organization to
champion the revitalization of both of these resources.76
Finally, as indicated earlier, the NSHS has made a good
organizational start in several areas. Congress should mandate the
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DHS speciﬁcally incorporate HEMP into the appropriate initiatives
in emergency preparedness and critical infrastructure protection.
Speciﬁcally, the DHS must conduct an analysis of the detailed
vulnerabilities of various portions of the critical infrastructure to
HEMP and, as a matter of priority, integrate selected initiatives to
minimize critical infrastructure vulnerabilities.
CONCLUSION
Increasing proliferation of nuclear and ballistic missile technology,
continued insecurity of ﬁssile stockpiles, and the presence of capable
adversaries dedicated to the destruction of the United States make
a HEMP attack an increasingly likely scenario. A successful HEMP
attack would severely damage the critical infrastructure that
supports the national elements of power of the United States for an
extended period of time. As such, the consequences of this type of
attack are unacceptable.
Implementation of the concepts contained in the NSS and
the NSHS are achieving successes synchronizing the diplomatic,
informational, economic, and military elements of national power
to prevent a HEMP attack, while simultaneously establishing
promising organizational frameworks which may help to prepare
the United States for the consequences of such an attack. The
approaching report of the Commission to Assess the Threat to
the United States from Electromagnetic Pulse Attack will provide
extensive recommendations to mitigate the risks to the United
States from a HEMP attack. This much is certain: the threat has not
diminished; the vulnerabilities to this type of attack exist; there is
much that can and must be done.
The challenge will be for the nation and its leaders to hear
the report, to evaluate objectively the recommendations, and to
implement them effectively. In the end, the United States must
ensure that, in the words of Colin Gray, it does not lose the only
strategic resource that can never be regained: the time to act.77
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CHAPTER 5
IRAQ, 2003-04, AND MESOPOTAMIA, 1914-18:
A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS IN ENDS AND MEANS
Lieutenant Colonel James D. Scudieri
This chapter presents a comparison of the linkage of strategic
ends with operational ways and means between current operations
in Iraq in 2003-04 and the British campaign in Mesopotamia in 191418. The two campaigns took place literally over the same ground.
The United States now, and Britain then, confronted signiﬁcant
challenges in the projection and maintenance of military power in
the Middle East. Moreover, the two great powers inherited daunting
civil-military requirements.1
This chapter considers the conduct and integration of both
military and post-conﬂict operations. It will begin with a discussion
of each campaign, analyzing its strategy. What strategic imperatives
necessitated the initiation of military operations in this far-ﬂung
corner of the world? What strategic assumptions dictated operational,
sometimes tactical, ways and means allocated for execution? In
particular, how did strategy change over time? Did it change during
the course of operational execution of both military and post-conﬂict
operations?
Historical analysis often carries the burden of demonstrating
clear lessons. This comparative analysis did not set out to prove any
speciﬁc “lessons learned.” Rather, the author believes the value of
history lies in its ability to provide “points of departure” for problem
solving. The course of research and interpretation of evidence
has unearthed signiﬁcant insights into the British experience in
comparison to the American experience now ongoing. This chapter
is too late to affect what has already transpired in Iraq in 2003,
but it should provide insights relevant to the continued American
presence in Iraq and for future deployments.
MESOPOTAMIA, 1914-18: SWEEPING SUCCESS, DISASTER,
AND RECOVERY
The British campaign in Mesopotamia during the First World
War was primarily an Indian Army operation. British rule in India
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represented a unique aspect of the age of imperialism. British India
encompassed what today are India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh.2
Britain’s control in India underwent drastic revision following the
Sepoy Mutiny of 1857. The mutiny ended the political role of the
Honourable East India Company. From this point, a select, chosen,
British aristocracy governed India and controlled the Indian Civil
Service (ICS). Its members could not own land in India or participate
in trade. Unlike their contemporaries in Britain, they obtained their
jobs through open, competitive examinations.3
The cabinet in London appointed a viceroy as senior head. He
did not rise from within the ranks of the British-Indian aristocracy,
and thus, in that sense was even more an outsider. The Viceroy was
answerable to His Majesty’s Government with a supervisory chain
that went back to the Secretary of State for India at the India Ofﬁce in
Britain, who was a Cabinet Minister, and hence ultimately answerable
to Parliament. Viceroys, who operated with excessive independence,
faced recall.4 This political system granted the Viceroy considerable
latitude, understandable in an age of limited communications.5 The
Viceroy had a council of ﬁve or six members, of whom one-third
to one-half were outsiders in the same sense as he.6 This council,
a critical component of British rule in India, originally included a
military member.7
The Secretary of State for India also selected a Commanderin-Chief, India. The Commander-in-Chief, India was separate
from the British Army’s Chief of the Imperial General Staff. Field
Marshal Lord Kitchener’s tenure as Commander-in-Chief, India in
Khartoum between 1899-1906 marked three milestones. Following
the elimination of the three presidency armies of Bengal, Bombay,
and Madras in 1895, he integrated all regiments within a single
scheme of numbering and titles. The second established nine
permanent divisions with ﬁxed brigades. The third abolished the
military member of the Viceroy’s Council after a bitter, internecine
political struggle with the Viceroy, Lord Curzon. The viceroy and
commander-in-chief became the most powerful men in India.8
Britain’s leaders did not expect large-scale Indian Army
participation in a world war. Diplomatic reconciliation with Russia
in 1906 removed the long-time fear of a Muscovite invasion, but
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the turbulent kingdom in Afghanistan and volatile border tribes
provided the Indian Army with sufﬁcient missions, considering
its size. Thus, the North West Frontier and internal order were the
principal missions, in accordance with extant constitutional practice,
whereby the army’s principal role was defense and the maintenance
of internal order.9 Moreover, the Indian Army did not possess the
force structure or organization for distant expeditionary operations,
especially against a modernized, regular army.
Strategy and Conventional Operations In Mesopotamia.
There was neither intent nor plan to conduct operations in
Mesopotamia upon the outbreak of the First World War. However,
on the outbreak of war, the government of India and His Majesty’s
Government discussed the participation of the Indian Army in
imperial missions beyond South Asia. India agreed to provide troops
to France and Aden.10 Subsequently, they sent an expeditionary force
to East Africa as well.
The region ﬁrst entered the strategic realm on August 25, 1914,
with a requirement for the India Ofﬁce to prepare a ground force to
guard the scattered reﬁneries of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company from
Abadan Island, and gunboats to secure the Shatt-al-Arab estuary.11
This mission in modern parlance was a force deterrent option
(FDO). The 16th Indian Brigade Group under Brigadier General
W. S. Delamain reached Bahrain on October 23, 1914. Mesopotamia
entered the strategic formula in October with the requirement for
precautionary action to show British goodwill for the Arabs in the
event of war with Turkey.12 Britain’s primary strategic aim was not
to protect the oil ﬁelds. Rather, it was to show support for the Gulf
sheikhs; to impress the Mesopotamian Arabs, who respected only
tangible victory; and to ensure that the Arabs did not join the Turks
in a jihad.13 The British also worried about the sympathies of their
Indian Muslim troops.14
Britain declared war on Turkey on November 5. In a contingency
operation, the 16th Brigade landed at Fao on November 6 and secured
the Shatt-al-Arab on the 14th. Delamein was under the overall
command of Lieutenant General Sir Arthur Barrett, commander-
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in-chief of Indian Expeditionary Force D, even though the parent
6th Indian Division would not be complete until mid-December.
Nonetheless, the British then decided to advance on Basra in order
to reinforce success. Boldness paid off when Basra fell on November
22. Operations continued north to ensure the port’s security, and the
British took Qurna on December 9.
The decision to advance on Baghdad itself lies at the heart of
the controversy over British strategy.15 Both the viceroy and the
commander-in-chief, India agreed that the forces available in India
could not exceed a two-division corps due to other commitments:
II Indian Corps under Lieutenant General John Nixon with the 6th
and 12th Indian Divisions.16 There would be no reinforcements. This
buildup to two divisions alone took until April 1915, and the two
divisions even then still were not at 100 percent strength, especially
in transport.17
Indian Expeditionary Force D resumed its advance in May 1915.
Nixon had replaced Barrett on April 9 in command of operations,
while Major General Sir Charles Townshend’s 6th Indian Division
spearheaded the offensive. British victories in spite of severe
environmental conditions, paltry logistical capability, and the
hardships were extraordinary. Amara fell on June 3; Nasiriya, on
July 25; and Kut al Amara, on September 28.
The string of triumphs ceased at Ctesiphon on November 21, when
the Turks repulsed all British attacks. At this point the 6th Indian
Division was nearing collapse. Indeed, Townshend’s assessment
of its state led to a revised plan to withdraw to Kut-al-Amara and
accept a siege if necessary.18 Belated reinforcements would then aid
the 12th Indian Division to rescue the 6th Indian Division and raise
the siege. Unfortunately, the Turks stymied every attempt of the
relief force, now under the command of Lieutenant General Sir. P.
H. N. Lake, to break through.19 Townshend’s surrender of the halfstarved remnants of 6th Indian Division at Kut on April 29, 1916,
turned success into disaster.20
Failure alone should not be the mere criteria of a strategy’s
wisdom. Hindsight makes an indictment of the British insistence
to push on to Baghdad in 1915 relatively easy. Such criticism fails
to take account of the changing imperatives of strategy over time,
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especially during wartime. This chapter needs to emphasize ﬁve
points. First, British decision and strategy making took careful
note of operations in other theaters. British strategists were keen
to assess second- and third-order effects with Afghanistan, the
North-West Frontier, Persia, Arabistan, Arabia, Egypt, Gallipoli,
and the Caucasus.21 Strategists also understood the ﬁckle nature
of Arab support, which rallied to the winner and plundered the
loser. Second, the Mesopotamian Campaign brought the Indian
Army to a state of strategic overextension.22 It was a secondary
theater, a sideshow among several sideshows, that existed in an
environment of insufﬁcient troops and resources.23 The Indian
Army was balancing the demands of France, Egypt, and East Africa,
while simultaneously executing an unprecedented expansion.24
The exploits of Indian Expeditionary Force D through November
1915 had been truly admirable. Indeed, they led to the third point.
Continued victory bred an underestimation of the Turks. Obviously
surprised by the British incursion into Mesopotamia, the Turks
rebounded, so the British faced a revitalized foe at Ctesiphon.25
Fourth, inadequate logistics capability ﬁnally broke down. Indian
Expeditionary Force D’s combat service support was inadequate
from the campaign’s start. River transportation was a concern from
December 1914 and only deteriorated thereafter.26 Continued tactical
and operational success never rested on a ﬁrm structure. The costly
repulse at Ctesiphon broke the back of the administrative services.
There was an inadequate appreciation how tactical and operational
success rested upon an efﬁcient port operation at Basra and a robust
transportation system to project military power and sustain it.27 One
effect was a collapse in medical support.28
Two aspects of this logistical breakdown warrant further
comment. Strategic decisionmakers and operational commanders
and staff maintained a parsimonious, peacetime obsession with
“economy,” creating “an indisposition to forward or press demands”
regardless of need, and too often in an atmosphere of isolation
from front-line realities. They did not abandon this obsession with
economy after the war started, despite the fact that Parliament had
already approved funding of the Indian Army’s expenses on all
overseas missions conducted on behalf of the Empire.29 A number

99

of operational commanders and staff ofﬁcers also squelched those
who asked for additional resources. The Parliamentary commission
convened to investigate the disaster at Kut thus commented sharply
on the glaring failure to anticipate and expedite ﬁxes.30 Administrative
confusion resulting from two differing systems, Indian and British,
exacerbated matters.31 Kitchener’s elimination of the military
member of the Viceroy’s Council forced the Commander-in-Chief,
India and his staff to do both jobs, since the administrative structure
and system still functioned as if there were two separate ofﬁces.32
The Commander-in-Chief, India could not possibly perform both
jobs effectively with active operations on three continents and in the
midst of its greatest expansion in its history.
Another deﬁciency which the Parliamentary Commission cited
speciﬁcally was the unprecedented volume of correspondence
among senior ofﬁcials marked as “private.” The Commission
viewed this practice with undisguised concern. They concluded that
this departure from practice in effect “dispossessed” the staffs from
their superiors. The Commission believed that the staffs could have
worked solutions for the logistical shortfalls more easily and quicker
than otherwise happened.33
Finally, the decision making process which pushed Indian
Expeditionary Force D into a march on Baghdad was unlike
anything His Majesty’s Government and the Government of India
had ever anticipated. The balance in relationships between the
Government of India and the India Ofﬁce had broken down. The
responsibility to capture Baghdad rested with Nixon; his political
advisor, Sir Percy Cox; and the Commander-in-Chief, India Sir
Beauchamp Duff, with the support of Viceroy Lord Hardinge of
Penshurst. Together they instituted a major policy change reﬂecting
their assessment, without the proper degree of consultation with the
Secretary of State for India and the India Ofﬁce in England. This gap,
in turn, resulted in a dearth of information among British cabinet
members. The Parliamentary Commission concluded that the
Home Government in London lacked an appreciation of the scope
of Nixon’s instructions from Duff as far back as April-May 1915,
which had told him to resume the advance. Moreover, pushing onto
Baghdad constantly appeared in their discussions.34 There was not
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necessarily a conspiracy by the Government of India; events moved
quickly. The communications ﬂow between Mesopotamia, India,
and London left ample opportunity for confusion.35
Deliberate, painstaking reorganization and buildup took place
before the British resumed the offensive. The British War Ofﬁce
assumed operational control from February 1916 and all policy and
management from July 1916.36 Lieutenant General Sir F. S. Maude
replaced Lake on August 28, 1916. The British captured Baghdad
in March 1917 with seven divisions in two corps supported with a
robust theater support structure. Indeed, the Indian Army defeated
two Turkish corps in 6 weeks.37 Even then, the British did not
continue the advance north for another 8 months, capturing Tikrit
in November 1917 and Mosul only in October 1918. Originally
starved of troops and materiel, the Indian Army eventually reached
a strength of 420,000 in Mesopotamia.38
“Post-Conﬂict” Operations in Mesopotamia.
There was no more of a plan to conduct post-conﬂict operations
than there was an operational plan to achieve victory. British
intervention in Mesopotamia created a political vacuum once the
Turks withdrew. Moreover, when the Turks departed, they left a wake
of urban destruction by ensuring nothing of use and/or value fell
into enemy hands. The British then implemented a highly-successful
reconstruction operation. Certain aspects survived through the postwar period of mandate until Iraq became independent in 1930.
The Arabs were receptive to British overtures. The large Turkish
administrative machinery had existed largely on paper. Recognized
authority rested upon the village headman, tribal sheikh, and
local seiyid.39 Thus, local and imposed institutions had remained
separate and distinct. The British could still not take Arab support
for granted. Arab loyalty went to the winner; any loser was a prime
subject for plunder. This reality spelled the difference between
relative tranquility and a line of communications subject to constant
harassment. The Turks did use Arab irregular units but these
generally participated in conventional operations. There was no
concerted Turkish effort against British lines of communications.
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The threat was the Arab interest in booty.40 The British also had to
show the will to remain in the areas they conquered to maintain
Arab support. Turkish retribution in a reoccupied area would have
been merciless.
Certain aspects of “reconstruction” reﬂected military necessity.
For example, Arthur Lawley, a Red Cross Commissioner, visited
Basra and Amarah in early 1916 in response to a request for
assistance from the Viceroy. Lawley noted that Basra had an
adequate water supply, an effective “anti-ﬂy” crusade, and sound
sanitation. The inhabitants had to conform to these regulations
and beneﬁted from them.41 Basra was the primary seaport of
debarkation in Mesopotamia, so the British built numerous wharves,
warehouses, railroads, etc. Basra was just one example of massive
British investment in infrastructure which demonstrated the will
to stay over the long haul and the generosity to make permanent
improvements.
Basra eventually set the example for the rest of Mesopotamia’s
major cities, but the expansion of reconstruction operations all
over the country was a major resource challenge following the
fall of Baghdad. Politicians in London wanted to preserve the
”existing administrative machinery” with participation from local
representatives, thus reducing the British presence to an advisory
function. This idea was not viable. There was no existing machinery
of government, and Arabs did not come forward initially. Besides
assurances of no Turkish return, they awaited news of British
intentions as to the post-war government in the Mesopotamian
Valley.42
The British progressed well beyond projects of military necessity.
Lieutenant Colonel Arthur Wilson, himself a Civil Commissioner,
proudly recorded the growth of a civil administration behind and
on the ﬂanks of the army. Its mission was clearly to replace the
Turkish administration, “to make good by successive instalments
[sic] the promises of liberty, justice, and prosperity so freely made to
the Arab inhabitants at the very outset of the campaign.”43 Gertrude
Bell, a civil servant who visited Mesopotamia in early 1916 from
Egypt, typiﬁed this dedication. Her visit to Mesopotamia became
permanent. She commented on February 8, 1918, “We are pledged
here. It would be an unthinkable crime to abandon those who have
loyally served us.”44
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The ﬁrst British action upon entering Basra was to establish
“public order” in the city. The Turkish police chief and his staff were
gone; looters had sacked the city within 48 hours of their departure.
British and Indian military police were patrolling the streets within
hours of the British entry into Basra on November 22, 1914, but they
were few in number. Wilson acknowledged the challenges in forming
a permanent police force. Initially, ofﬁcers were Moslem Indians
from the Punjab. They successfully established civil peace by April
1915 and extended these urban patrols to Amara a few weeks later,
then to Naziriya.45 Upon occupying Baghdad, the British conducted
house-to-house searches for weapons and prioritized occupation of
road connections and bridges.46 They supplemented military police
and troops with two forces. Local headmen formed small patrols in
the smaller towns. The British recruited an irregular, district police
to patrol the hinterlands. Their name roughly came from the Persian
for night watchmen. These district police proved highly successful,
relieving the army of the need to provide many road and river
patrols.47
An important step in the establishment of a viable civil
administration was the painstaking collection, organization,
and systematization of information. Reassigned to the Political
Department, Gertrude Bell played a key role here. She classiﬁed
tribal data and other details, beginning with information obtained
from the Intelligence Department, then adding updates based upon
the continued British advance. By February 1917, she could claim
that her ofﬁce had not only organized a mass of data, but all tribal
and some other material was available in ofﬁcial circulars. Thus, it
had compiled an exact accounting of the country as the British found
it.48 The process had taken 11 months.
Perhaps the soundest success story was in the legal system, which
demonstrated by daily action the British reputation for fair, impartial
justice. Senior Judicial Ofﬁcer and barrister Lieutenant Colonel S. G.
Knox presided with a temporary/provincial Code of Law, using
a combination of Indian and Turkish law, from April 1915. After
the fall of Baghdad in March 1917, courts conducted business with
an “Iraq Occupied Territory Code” in Arabic. These replaced all
military courts for cases not involving the safety of the armed forces.
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Signiﬁcantly, the British used the sheikhs and religious leaders in the
administration of justice, integrating both tribal custom and Islamic
law. This system formed the basis for a unitary Iraqi court system.49
British civil administration became increasingly effective. In
the summer of 1917 the senior Political Ofﬁcer became the civil
commissioner in Baghdad, who had deputies in the other major
cities. Civil administrators remained under military authority.50
The junior ofﬁcials were quite young, often captains and majors
from the Indian Army.51 Mr. H. R. C. Dobbs from the Indian
Political Department became the head of a Revenue Department.
A separate Customs Department fell under Mr. C. R. Watkins, who
came from the Imperial Indian Customs Service. The British also
fostered the development of a press with the establishment of The
Basra Times on November 29, 1914. It was a government paper until
commercialization in 1921. Later, The Baghdad Times published in
English and Arabic, becoming an Arab government press in 1921. A
major from the Indian Medical Service began a civil medical system
on December 30, 1914, and became the ﬁrst civil surgeon. The port
health and quarantine services, a civil service which helped the
army, dealt with plague in the winter of 1916 and the spring of 1917,
and the 1918 inﬂuenza outbreak, which did not hit Mesopotamia as
hard as it did Persia and Europe.52
A viable currency system became a necessity in the light of
developing revenues from taxation and customs duties. The British
began by setting up branches of the Imperial Bank of Persia which
dealt in rupees, rather than gold as in Arabia. They still faced the
challenge of limited acceptance of paper notes, especially in Baghdad.
Constant assessment and timely response precluded a currency
crisis and passed a rigorous audit. The British even implemented an
interim postage stamp system.53
Finally, the British effort at reconstruction in Mesopotamia
included a rough, embryonic form of what today would be termed
interagency operations and coordination with nongovernmental
organizations (NGOs). Thus, Lawley commented favorably upon
the military cooperation he received. Indeed, he commented that
Mesopotamia saw a “fresh recognition” by army authorities of
the Red Cross as an integral part of the military medical service.54
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However, in general there remained a tension between the civil
administration and the army throughout operations in Mesopotamia.
First, running the civil service was a major drain on military
manpower. Townshend commented in late 1915 that he asked in
vain for the return of his British soldiers to 6th Indian Division who
were functioning as policemen, clerks, and sundry augmentees to
help run and protect the river transport.55 The civil administration
drew heavily on personnel from India: the Indian Army, the reserve
of ofﬁcers, civil service, Imperial and provincial police forces, as well
as those who had been serving in the Sudan, Egypt, and Britain. The
other major tension resulted from differing attitudes towards the
Arabs. Civil administrators, whether civilian or military, eventually
spent years dealing with the general staff and military departments
who remembered only Arab hostility, theft, and rapacity.56 However,
military ofﬁcials learned that ﬁning was a more effective retaliation
and deterrent against Arab marauders than burning and shelling
villages.57
The British campaign in Mesopotamia began as a strictly limited
operation. Excessive ambition led to disaster, the fall of Kut in April
1916. An advance to Baghdad in 1915 was indeed a failure in matching
ends and means―the proverbial bridge too far. Paul K. Davis titled
his 1994 book Ends and Means aptly. However, the modern reader
cannot appreciate how the Government of India in particular
was sensitive to any threat of jihad. The threat was no chimera.58
Driving a political and social wedge between the Arabs and Turks
was crucial in Delhi’s view, and that course of action demanded
military success and support for the Arabs. Thus, the need for Arab
cooperation became an obsession.59 The prize would be favorable
repercussions in Mesopotamia, Persia, Afghanistan, the North West
Frontier, and within India itself. This imperative appeared all the
more critical in the light of the failed Gallipoli expedition and the
periodic delays in the advance on Baghdad. Basra alone did not
meet the strategic imperative.60 Unfortunately, the Indian Army,
as an imperial strategic reserve, already had expended its available
manpower. The Indian Army was in too many locations when the
Government of India needed more troops to capitalize upon success
and achieve a decisive victory. Overwhelming political need drove a
strategy without commensurate means.
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The end of the First World War was merely a passing event for the
civil administration. Mesopotamia became a British mandate under
the League of Nations. Much work remained. The religious question
was signiﬁcant.61 Achieving a lasting political settlement would
prove difﬁcult in the wake of regional diplomatic contradictions
such as the Sykes-Picot Agreement and the Balfour Declaration.
The former divided the Ottoman provinces among the Entente.
In general, France obtained Syria and Lebanon. Britain received
Palestine, Arabia, and Mesopotamia, though Jerusalem originally
was supposed to be under international jurisdiction. Britain in
essence compromised previous commitments to the Arabs. The
Balfour Declaration complicated matters even further with its
favorable stance on the establishment of a Jewish national home
in Palestine. The British also were unable to ﬁnd a viable successor
ruler within Iraq. They chose Feisal, the third son of Sherif Hussein
ibn Ali, Amir of Mecca and King of the Hejaz.62 Nonetheless, the
British Mesopotamian Campaign demonstrated the successful,
simultaneous conduct of conventional combat and reconstruction
operations.
IRAQ, 2003: THE STRATEGY OF PREEMPTION
This comparative analysis views the invasion of Iraq in March
2003 as a comprehensive strategy for the Global War on Terrorism,
the Middle and Near East, and the wider view of foreign policy, since
all are interrelated.63 The clear focus of the Global War on Terrorism
is upon radical, Islamic fundamentalism. Operation ENDURING
FREEDOM in Afghanistan was a retaliatory strike. Operation IRAQI
FREEDOM is a different case altogether. It targeted a potential
ally of Islamic terrorists like al-Qaeda. Regime change removed a
major destabilizing element in the region, in particular for Israel,
Kuwait, and Iran. In the long run, American intervention to help the
Iraqi people could demonstrate the viability of a representational
form of government in Arab Moslem states. Toppling the Saddam
dictatorship and Ba’athist oligarchy sent a clear, if radical, warning to
other potential foes, e.g., North Korea, Iran, and Syria.64 Preemption
would also eliminate any weapons of mass destruction and punish
Saddam Hussein for deﬁance of UN resolutions.65
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The Osama bin Laden tape of early January 2004 supports
this interpretation. He was disappointed that Arab rulers failed
miserably to resist American efforts in Operations ENDURING
FREEDOM and IRAQI FREEDOM, torpedoing any chance of a great
Islamic rising. In Iraq American and coalition forces have begun
to turn the tide against a poorly-supported insurgency. Worse, he
views the “capitulation” of Iran, Libya, and even Syria as a most
unsatisfactory, global strategic situation.66
The Rolling Campaign Start.
The American military conducted detailed, systematic,
continuous planning prior to the invasion of Iraq. Indeed, the
campaign may have been the most planned operation since D-Day
on June 6, 1944, and Operation DESERT STORM in 1991, although
plans changed constantly during the ﬁnal months and weeks.67 Two
aspects of that planning warrant particular examination. The ﬁrst
concerns the implications, tactical and logistical, of the so-called
rolling start. The second concerns the nature and degree of prewar
planning for Phase IV or post-conﬂict operations.
There was considerable controversy about the operational
ramiﬁcations of the rolling start. The inability to land the 4th Infantry
Division (Mechanized) in Turkey in order to launch an attack from the
northern front represented a major loss of combat power. However,
commanders demonstrated that adequate combat forces were on
the ground to execute decisive operations. However, success does
not mean that more combat power was not a requirement. Indeed,
the sheer rapidity of success with so few troops perhaps resulted
in a psychological misunderstanding of the depth of their defeat on
the part of the Iraqis. This chapter, however, will focus more on the
effects on logistics and post-conﬂict operations.
The most glaring deﬁciency for the conduct of decisive
operations that emerged from the rolling-start was a failure in
logistics. Generally speaking, bulk fuel, ammunition, food, and
water sufﬁced, albeit to different degrees; habitual sustainment was
an overall challenge. The timely delivery of Class IX repair parts
was an especially-glaring failure.68 Logisticians at all echelons lacked
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timely knowledge of actual requirements, visibility of where items
were in the pipeline, and an effective transportation network.69 There
was no deliberate, tiered establishment of a logistics architecture of
direct support and general support units at corps and theater levels.
Worse, logistics units had no priority in the deployment sequence.70
The sheer effort required for the results obtained, and the handto-mouth existence which ensued in certain commodities, do not
represent acceptable standards.71 While Iraq was different from
Afghanistan, the repetition of certain logistical challenges suggests a
failure to integrate lessons learned from one operation to another.72
Post-Conﬂict Operations.
There was considerable discussion about the challenges
of reconstructing an Iraq after Saddam Hussein’s defeat well
before the war commenced. Writer James Fallows has articulated
convincingly that nearly everything that has occurred in Iraq since
the fall of Saddam’s regime was the subject of prewar discussion and
analysis, laid out in detail and in writing for decisionmakers. Those
discussions began in October 2001.73
The breadth and depth of prewar analysis are impressive. One
think tank assessed potential human problems following war.74 An
exceptionally-detailed study identiﬁed four broad categories for
post-conﬂict reconstruction: security, governance and participation,
justice and reconciliation, and social and economic well-being.75 The
U.S. Army War College’s Strategic Studies Institute study laid out a
detailed mission matrix for Iraq with a transition phase beginning
during the Decisive Operations phase.76 Begun in October 2002, 4
months elapsed before the study’s publication in February 2003.
Commentators often view the document as a superb analysis of
lessons learned in Iraq. Yet the authors’ intent was to publish clear
guidelines prior to the invasion.77 The State Department Bureau of
Near Eastern Affairs began a comprehensive, classiﬁed analysis
in March 2002, which became the “Future of Iraq Project.”78 It
concluded that reconstruction would require a long-term, expensive
commitment.79
Two observations emerge from an unclassiﬁed analysis of the
U.S. Government’s prewar strategic planning. First, the plan for
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the post-conﬂict phase, due to factors of time and the focus on
decisive military operations, was inadequate for the sheer scope
of the mission, which, in fact, occurred. A “rolling-start” campaign
with its emphasis on rapid “decisive action” and “shock and awe”
could not focus with minute detail on the establishment of effective
bureaucratic administration and the execution of essential public
services over the long haul. However, of greater signiﬁcance were
faulty assumptions at strategic level which refused to credit and
accept the detailed, prewar post-conﬂict planning.80 One writer
contends that Pentagon plans for postwar Iraq rested on three
assumptions―all of which turned out false.81 Others have echoed the
assessment concerning false planning assumptions.82
What did all this mean on the ground? In short, the conception
of the “rolling-start” did not understand or rejected the notion that
Phase IV operations would require more troops than Phase III. Hence,
there were no provisions for deployment of robust follow-on forces
to assume a signiﬁcant security mission, e.g., more combat units and/
or a military police brigade with appropriate subordinate elements.
Instead, troops intended to participate in decisive operations, whose
deployment the Pentagon had delayed, became de-facto security
forces upon arrival in Iraq. Most were already too late to prevent
much of the looting, but they did little to stop what looting was still
occurring upon arrival.83 The decision of Paul Bremer, head of the
Coalition Provisional Authority, to disband the Iraqi armed forces
exacerbated difﬁculties. De-Ba’athiﬁcation of the Iraqi military did
not require total disbandment of the army. Granted, numerous
Iraqi forces simply melted away, but internal disintegration does
not explain the entire story. Disbandment created a pool of armed,
unemployed Iraqis who became part of the problem.84
Likewise, the plan should have “packaged” a signiﬁcant force
of combat support and combat service support units to begin
the humanitarian, stability, and support operations. Admittedly,
ﬁnding the correct mix and number of units was a daunting task―
and will remain so. But there was no realistic alternative. The lack
of international support reduced UN participation to a minimum.
Moreover, NGOs did not ﬂee Iraq only in the wake of the latest terror.
They had largely abandoned Iraq as far back as mid-1992.85 Those few
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present in 2003 lacked on-the-ground experience.86 Coalition troops,
in fact, did well in humanitarian operations―in large measure due
to the preparation for and study of worst-case scenarios.87 However,
the Combined Forces Land Component Commander lacked the
ground forces and the direction to inaugurate other post-conﬂict
operations with a ﬁrm hand.
American military capability in the 21st century is clear. This
superiority notwithstanding, Operation IRAQI FREEDOM, and
Operation ENDURING FREEDOM before it, appear as attempts
to wage war “on the cheap.” Stated differently, Phase III decisive
operations now require fewer troops than Phase IV. However, while
the former wins the war, the latter wins the peace.
LESSONS LEARNED
A comparison of the First World War’s Campaign in
Mesopotamia by British forces and the current American/coalition
operation in Iraq highlights differences as well as similarities. In
the interest of balance, this chapter will begin with the differences.
First, there is little comparison between the levels of strategic and
operational planning of the two campaigns. The British had no
intent of operating in Mesopotamia in August 1914. They eventually
formulated and executed a contingency operation a mere 3 months
later in November 1914. The American operation came after
meticulous planning, albeit subject to considerable change and with
certain, signiﬁcant, misconceived assumptions.
Second, conventional, military or “decisive” operations
proceeded along different lines. The British had to advance in
distinct phases, in particular after the disastrous surrender of
Townshend in Kut in April 1916. Two years and four months passed
from the initial British landing in the Shatt-al-Arab to the capture
of Baghdad. Conversely, the American offensive was a single,
sweeping campaign that involved a swift advance to Baghdad and
the rapid overrunning of the entire country. The conventional Iraqi
defense was feeble compared to expectations―the absence of urban
ﬁghting a pleasant surprise. President George Bush declared major
combat operations over in 6 weeks. The shock came later.
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Third, the British faced an easier task in the conduct of posthostilities operations for one distinct reason. Ineffective Turkish rule
over the Arabs left viable, local institutions. The British were able
to capitalize on these local institutions and link them with British
organization and concepts of justice, as well as the rule of law to
establish political and social order. Their major task was simply to
demonstrate Britain’s intention to remain. The Americans faced a
far more daunting task. The Iraqi people were not just venturing
into unexplored ground. A quarter-century of unprecedented fear
and repression had left Iraqis psychologically paralyzed in every
way, and utterly unprepared to do anything in a cooperative
manner. Newfound freedom conﬂicted with fear of the past and
the unknown.88 Expatriate Iraqi population elements frankly misled
planners and/or decisionmakers and bred misconceptions about
how to proceed effectively.89
However, some fascinating similarities emerge from this
comparative analysis. First, both campaigns had to conduct postconﬂict operations as a result of successful combat operations.
Granted, the initial basic strategies appear to exhibit drastic
differences in scale. The British originally intended a peripheral
operation to protect friendly Arab rulers and develop pro-British
sentiment to preclude successful, Arab-Turkish holy war. The
American goal of regime change in 2003 was far more ambitious
from the start. But both ﬁlled a political vacuum.
Second, this chapter concludes, rather harshly in some minds,
that both the Mesopotamian Campaign through 1916 and the Iraqi
Campaign in 2003 were logistical failures. Logistics exerted such
signiﬁcant constraints and restraints as to inhibit commanders at the
tactical level. Both the British in 1914-15 and the Americans in 2003
took considerable risks, given inadequate logistics in the theater.
Interestingly, transportation shortfalls ﬁgured prominently in both
campaigns: boats for river transport in Mesopotamia, and trucks for
ground line haul and air transport in Iraq. Mesopotamia scandalized
the British with the utter breakdown of medical services. In Iraq the
breakdown lay in selected supply and services, especially in Class IX
repair parts, although asset visibility and distribution management
in general failed to meet expectations.
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Third, combat operations triumphed singularly against the
enemy. The Turks in late 1914-early 1915, and again in 1917-18,
and the Iraqis in 2003―were simply no match for their opponents.
But these triumphs did not end the ﬁghting. Both the British and
Americans still faced chronic threats to their lines of communication.
This threat differed slightly in scope and origin. The principal
British foe was the Arab raider, interested in plunder and preying
on the weak, losing side. As ultimate British success became more
evident, this raiding petered out. The Americans faced a more
fanatical, ideologically-motivated threat, which crystallized into an
insurgency, one which the American and coalition partners appear
to be gradually winning as of January 2004.90 However, both the
British in 1914-18 and the Americans in 2003-04 were fortunate
that their opponents had no comprehensive plan to target lines of
communication. Otherwise, already-stretched supply lines might
well have collapsed.
Fourth, neither the British nor the Americans took sufﬁcient
note of post-hostility requirements in planning. Indeed, both
governments, in 1917 and 2002-03, expected short periods of
transition to Arab self-rule. Both views were extremely optimistic,
if not myopic and fanciful. Defeat of the enemy army brought the
fall of the state and left a power vacuum. Both campaigns also
demonstrated excessively-optimistic expectations of Arab support,
both domestically “in country” and internationally in the region.
Fifth, both the British in Mesopotamia and the Americans in
Iraq instituted largely ad-hoc post-conﬂict operations. The British
in Mesopotamia capitalized on a wealth of available talent in
ofﬁcials who had decades of experience in India, Egypt, the Sudan,
and knowledge of the Persian Gulf region. They were also able to
develop procedures in the Basra vilayet ﬁrst, before moving onto
Baghdad. The Americans faced a more difﬁcult mission, and lacked
a similar pool of long-experienced personnel. Nonetheless, adaptable
soldiers, many with previous experience in the Balkans, exercised
initiative and devised suitable methods at local level. The effort still
appears more halting and, indeed, amateurish in comparison. This
statement in no way diminishes the phenomenal accomplishments
of troops who identiﬁed a need and set to work with zeal. The
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comment underlines the abject failure to prepare at strategic and
operational levels for a comprehensive nation-building operation.
A dire result, even a year following the invasion, is a damaging
insurgency. Another after effect has been the sheer ignorance on the
home front and in the international community of what the coalition
forces already have accomplished.
Thus, the recent British after action report for Iraq not surprisingly
concluded that a great deal of advance planning must occur “a
long time ahead of a decision to undertake the military option”
of intervention.91 A signiﬁcant mitigating factor for Iraq has been
that sheer secrecy worked against the ability to conduct in-depth,
interagency planning,92 as the British Mesopotamian “private”
correspondence had stymied full cooperation.
Sixth, security became the primary post-conﬂict mission
requirement. In both Mesopotamia and Iraq, the interval between the
defeat of the enemy’s armed forces with the collapse of any residue
political authority, and the occupation of key facilities and nodes by
friendly forces was critical. The majority of the looting took place
during this period of unmistakable power voids in both conﬂicts.93
Seventh, and perhaps most signiﬁcantly, the armed forces, mainly
the Army, became the primary tool of action. The Indian Army in
1914-18 and the U.S. Army and coalition forces in 2003 conducted
nation-building because there was no one else able to do so.
RECOMMENDATIONS
This comparative analysis suggests several important
recommendations for senior leaders. First, expeditionary operations
by U.S. forces to problem areas of the world will likely continue
in the 21st century. American political leadership may determine
another regime change to be necessary. Intervention may occur in a
failed state. Whatever the reason, U.S. armed forces must be ready
to conduct both decisive combat and post-conﬂict operations in a
theater simultaneously. Hence, post-conﬂict operations require the
same depth and breadth of joint and combined/coalition planning
before operations commence as that devoted to the conduct of decisive
operations, as well as the added complexity of integrated and
synchronized interagency planning.
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Moreover, plans for the Middle and Near East should avoid the
temptation to overestimate the scope of potential Arab support for
any Western intervention operation.94 Such support for Western
action, regardless of the justice or necessity, cannot overcome
historical suspicion and resentment. However, more effective
information operations can mitigate the effects.
Second, even the best efforts of the UN and the dedication of NGOs
and international organizations will be unable to accomplish much
in the early stages. The death of a state, no matter how oppressive
or how feeble, will be a traumatic experience. Invariably there will
be signiﬁcant infrastructure challenges, due to destruction, damage,
or simple nonexistence. The U.S. Army will remain the primary
instrument of post-conﬂict operations during initial intervention
and for an indeterminate period thereafter. Frankly, no one else has
the resources to do the job.
Third, the primary post-conﬂict mission is to establish security.
This requirement almost always will necessitate a dual task, the
simultaneous conduct of decisive operations with military operations
other than war (MOOTW) law-and-order missions. A political and
societal power vacuum marks this sensitive period. The sooner the
occupying force establishes presence, the fewer the losses to wanton
looting.
Fourth, Army logistics requires signiﬁcant overhauling in order
to sustain the warﬁghter effectively in the 21st century. The vision
for the ﬁxes exists; the issue is funding.95 The “bottom-line” is that
the logistics doctrine which won the Cold War and the First Gulf
War is not ﬂexible enough for short-notice, expeditionary warfare.
Best-business practices, which created efﬁciencies in the 1990s, have
proven incapable of delivering “just-in-time” logistics support. The
necessary technological enablers were absent. Such tools exist, but
are expensive. These efﬁciencies must combine with more ﬂexible
and responsive support for “reach-back” sustainment to provide
proper support forward. Even when a proper system is in place,
experience in both Operations ENDURING FREEDOM and IRAQI
FREEDOM suggests the need still for larger stocks in units for shortterm use followed by sustainment from the strategic, wholesale
supply system. However, a theater-level logistics structure will most
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likely still be required. Moreover, this sustainment pipeline can also
no longer assume 100 percent security of all lines of communication
“from factory to foxhole.” Finally, Army logistics unit structure
requires considerable streamlining. There are too many levels for
expeditionary warfare.
Fifth, the experience of expeditionary warfare to the world’s
problem areas over the last decade has highlighted signiﬁcant
shortfalls in Army force structure. Simultaneous operations in Iraq,
Afghanistan, Kosovo, Bosnia, and the Sinai have severely taxed
active and reserve components alike, given the requirements for
both initial-entry and follow-on forces. The strains began in 1995
with the onset of Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR. The addition of
Afghanistan and now Iraq, which equates to a major theater of war
given the numbers deployed, has nearly broken the system. This
dilemma is the result of an army force structure geared to ﬁght a
Cold War gone “hot,” during which the nation would have time for
a deliberate mobilization. The need now is to respond to generally
short-notice, then simultaneous, open-ended, expeditionary and/or
imperial-policing operations.
The Total Army requires radical restructuring between active
and reserve components. This restructuring is not about saving
Army divisions. Rather, it must deal with the entire range of combat,
combat support, and combat service support units, their speciﬁc
type, and the proportional alignment among active and reserve
components in order to optimize the capability desired both to
implement national policy, and in accordance with the deployment
guidelines of the Secretary of Defense’s Memorandum dated July 9,
2003, and entitled Rebalancing Forces. The answers must address
not only rebalancing the current ratio, but also the potential need to
raise new units. For example, the ratio of transportation truck, water
puriﬁcation, maintenance, or general supply units may alter between
reserve and active components without changing the total number.
Other requirements are small, extremely low-density organizations
with highly-specialized capabilities that can facilitate deployment
or conduct signiﬁcant infrastructure tasks during the early stages
of post-conﬂict operations. The former category includes the array
of transportation units related to movement control, as well as
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other logistics units which execute port support activities. The latter
category includes diverse units like vertical (construction) engineers,
facility/utility engineers, engineer ﬁre ﬁghting detachments, and the
rarely-mentioned railroad units.
Sixth, there is need for closer, deeper integration between the
Departments of State and Defense. Though not preferred, the
British experience in Mesopotamia and the American experience in
Iraq―and virtually every “small war” in the 20th century for that
matter―has demonstrated that the military must remain in charge
of initial post-conﬂict operations, not only to ensure security, but
also to conduct a host of noncombat missions for which the Army
alone possesses the capability. These missions must begin while decisive
operations are still ongoing. Moreover, their duration is uncertain.
Finally, the nature of conﬂict in the 21st century has spotlighted the
need for a doctrine of interagency operations in a deployed theater.96
This chapter also recommends that such doctrine recognize the
initial preeminence of the Department of Defense in an operational
theater, to include the commencement of reconstruction missions,
then to highlight guidelines to determine the optimal period to hand
over proponency to the State Department. Such a stage would still
involve a security mission, etc., but the senior authority would be the
American ambassador or some other civilian authority.
This comparative analysis also highlights the utility of history.
There is no evidence planners looked at the British operations, as
well as a number of other experiences. They should have. The British
campaign foreshadowed many problems the Americans would face.
A summary of the most critical at strategic level follows.
The strategic imperative to match means with ends to set the stage
for operational success is paramount. The British failed to do so, and
that failure culminated operationally following the demoralizing
defeat at Ctesiphon on November 22-24, 1915―a defeat that resulted
in the disastrous surrender of 6th Indian Division at Kut on April
29, 1916. U.S. and coalition forces wielded overwhelming material
and technological superiority against a qualitatively-inferior foe in
Iraq in 2003. This military dominance did not convert to the requisite
number of “boots on the ground” to initiate post-conﬂict operations
effectively. The failure to establish immediately a comprehensive
security was especially glaring.
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The utter lack of timely strategic guidance regarding any postconﬂict operations, and/or nation-building in both campaigns
exacerbated the disconnect between ends and means. Only the
selﬂess, timely initiative of military forces in theater prevented
potential civil-military cataclysms of signiﬁcant proportions.
Another painful lesson was the direct relationship between
effective combat power and sound logistical arrangements. The
British administrative apparatus was never robust until the major
reorganization following the Kut ﬁasco. The absence of a host of
combat support and combat service support units in Operation
IRAQI FREEDOM was a calculated risk. American units in 2003
would have been hard pressed to continue Phase III decisive
operations much longer than they did. Up to that stage, the risk
appeared tolerable. Afterwards, the lack of these units underlined
the woeful inadequacy of plans and hence preparedness to conduct
post-conﬂict operations. The United States cannot afford to repeat
such mistakes in the campaigns that will inevitably occur in the
coming decades of the 21st century, otherwise conﬁrming the words
of philosopher George Santayana, “Those who cannot remember the
past are condemned to repeat it.”97
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CHAPTER 6
WAGING PEACE:
ECLIPSE IN POSTWAR GERMANY AND IRAQ
Lieutenant Colonel Kenneth O. McCreedy
The decision for war usually rests on rational calculations that
conﬂict will create satisfactory conditions to achieve strategic
objectives. The scale of the objective, Clausewitz suggests, deﬁnes
the character of the war. The character of the war, in turn, inevitably
dictates the peace that follows. As war drives toward fulﬁlling its
terrifying logic, Clausewitz argues, passions overthrow reason,
violence spirals, and stakes grow. Statesmen must assemble the
ways and means to achieve the desired ends. So great is the effort
required to wage war, so high the costs, that it can consume political
and military leaders who thus often fail to look beyond the ﬁghting.
Yet such vision is the most signiﬁcant requirement of strategists:
It is not enough to win the war―they must also win the peace to
secure broader policy objectives, without which the sacriﬁces of war
have no meaning. This effort demands the appropriate application
of ways and allocation of means as does the war that precedes it.
Waging peace requires a level of planning, commitment, and exertion
consistent with the ends pursued in the war. Failure in waging war
can have disastrous results, more often than not the price of a ﬂawed
ends-ways-means assessment. Similarly, failure in waging peace
will undermine the sacriﬁces of war and wrest defeat from victory
by undermining the achievement of broader policy aims for which
military forces have waged (or should have) the conﬂict.
In May 1943, Allied staff ofﬁcers in London began working
on a complex plan that arguably had as signiﬁcant an impact on
the postwar world as its more famous companion, Operation
OVERLORD. The plan became ECLIPSE, the operation that governed
the occupation of Germany by the western allies. Sixty years later,
the Combined Forces Land Component planning staff titled its plan
for postwar operations in Iraq ECLIPSE II. As present day operations
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unfold, Operation ECLIPSE offers a lens through which to examine
its successor. It brings into sharp focus the extent to which planners
and policymakers anticipated the requirements for successful postconﬂict operations, the assumptions underlying their plans, and the
way the United States postured itself to conduct postwar operations.
Despite distinct differences in the circumstances of both Operations
ECLIPSE and ECLIPSE II, there exist fundamental commonalities
in the challenge of deﬁning and balancing ends, ways, and means
in such a manner as to advance national interests. While a perfect
correlation does not exist between the circumstances that pertained
in the two events, each ECLIPSE operation offers instruction about
how to think about, plan, and conduct postwar operations.
OPERATION ECLIPSE
On February 12, 1944, General Dwight Eisenhower received
the celebrated directive to “enter the continent of Europe and
. . . undertake operations aimed at the heart of Germany and the
destruction of her armed forces.” What historians understandably
tend to ignore is a less ringing passage entitled: “Relationships with
Allied Governments―the Re-establishment of Civil Governments
and Liberated Allied Territories with the Administration of Enemy
Territories.” Allied staffs planning postwar operations must have
eagerly looked here for long-awaited policy guidance, only to ﬁnd
that: “Further instructions will be issued to you on these subjects
at a later date.”1 In fact, policymakers were unable to deﬁne the
desired end state beyond the immediate objective of defeating
and occupying Nazi Germany. Not unusually for a politician,
President Franklin Roosevelt preferred to keep his options open,
and not surprisingly, he vacillated between competing visions of a
retributive and realist peace. More importantly, he had to consider
the demands of maintaining a wartime coalition: So long as the
decision hung in the balance it was folly to raise troublesome issues
arising from competing visions of the postwar order.2
Responsibility for conducting the war resided with the War
and Navy Departments. Left undeﬁned was which government
agency would bear responsibility for planning and administering
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the peace. Roosevelt’s ideological preference for civil administration
over military government suggested that he would turn to the
Department of State to meet this requirement. The New Dealers
who surrounded Roosevelt reﬂexively viewed the military with
suspicion and were sensitive to any hint of imperialism or militarism
in American policy. From April to December 1943, a debate raged
within the Roosevelt administration over the propriety of military
government. The Army’s provost marshal general reported that, at a
cabinet meeting in early 1943, Secretary of the Interior Harold Ickes
“denounced our military government plans as ‘imperialistic’ and the
President told the Secretary of War by memorandum that he thought
the government of occupied territories was a civilian rather than a
military matter.”3 However, events in North Africa after Operation
TORCH underlined the practical fact that the State Department
lacked the capacity for planning and conducting such a complex
task. Immediately after Pearl Harbor, Secretary of State Cordell Hull
had established an advisory committee to consider postwar foreign
policy. Most important was the work of a number of subcommittees
that met periodically to address economic reconstruction, postwar
European structures, and security issues. The last sub-committee
included representatives from the War and Navy Departments,
the ﬁrst interagency body to consider postwar policy.4 The work of
these committees abruptly ended in June 1943 when the Combined
Chiefs of Staff, wrestling with how to deal with liberated territories
in the wake of Operation TORCH, brought postwar policy into
the War Department by establishing the Combined Civil Affairs
Division under Assistant Secretary of War John McCloy. The State
Department had representation on this committee, but there is no
evidence that it used this venue to shape policy.5
The most signiﬁcant product of the Combined Civil Affairs
Division was CCS/551, the “Directive for Military Government
in Germany Prior to Defeat or Surrender,” issued to Supreme
Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Forces on April 28, 1944.
This order vested in the supreme commander the authority and
responsibility for governing occupied Germany and established
basic principles for him to follow. Because the directive applied
only to the presurrender period, however, signiﬁcant questions as
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to the policy the United States intended to pursue and the military’s
role in postwar occupation remained unanswered. In the absence
of political decisions, commanders and staffs remained in limbo
about the ends the President was pursuing and the instruments of
national power he intended to apply. Eisenhower’s Chief of Staff,
Bedell Smith, sought guidance by posing a series of questions to
the Combined Chiefs of Staff about postwar German government,
economy, and partition. He emphasized: “On the answers to these,
and to many other kindred questions, long-term planning depends.”
He reminded the chiefs that “the problem is not one that can be
handled piecemeal or a solution extemporized hurriedly in the last
stage of the operation.”6 Events 60 years later proved him correct.
Within months of D-Day, Supreme Headquarters Allied
Expeditionary Forces had to grapple with the practical problems
of conducting postwar operations before a policy existed to govern
such operations. On September 18, 1944, following the Allied
capture of the ﬁrst German town, Eisenhower issued a proclamation
announcing that “Allied Military Government is established in
the theater under my command to exercise in occupied German
territory the supreme . . . authority vested in me as Supreme
Commander . . .”7 Small military government detachments would
travel immediately behind the lead elements of advancing forces
and begin the process of political and physical reconstruction under
the direction of division, corps, and army commanders executing
Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Forces directives.8
Although many saw victory in Europe as imminent by December
1944 (at least prior to the German’s Ardennes offensive), the U.S.
Government still did not have a coherent postwar policy, nor
had it worked out the ways or means that it would require in the
postwar period. At the initiative of new Secretary of State Edward
Stettinius, the Secretaries of State, War, and Navy formed the StateWar-Navy Coordinating Committee to consider postwar policy.9
This committee’s deliberations and policy recommendations
were instrumental in preparing Roosevelt for Yalta in January
1945, where the Soviets, British, and Americans proclaimed their
“inﬂexible purpose to destroy German militarism and Nazism
and to ensure that Germany will never again be able to disturb the
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peace of the world.” To do so, they intended to oversee the complete
disarmament, demilitarization, and denaziﬁcation of Germany.10
In May 1945 the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) ﬁnally issued JCS
1067, the ﬁrst formal national guidance for the conduct of postwar
operations, to Eisenhower in his capacity as Commander, U.S. Forces
European Theater. By its provisions, the U.S. Army would occupy
Germany and treat the Germans as a defeated enemy. Occupation
forces would exercise limited control over the economy and limit the
distribution of goods and foodstuffs to levels necessary to prevent
disease and unrest. Orders strictly forbade fraternization between
soldiers and Germans, while the troops oversaw the thorough
extirpation of Nazism and militarism. As General Lucius Clay,
later military governor, observed, “there was no doubt that JCS
1067 contemplated the Carthaginian peace which dominated our
operations in Germany during the early months of occupation.”11
With the ends that the government aimed to pursue ﬁnally
articulated, the ways available to achieve those ends had received
little or no assessment. After North Africa, the U.S. Army explicitly
received primary responsibility for planning and conducting
postwar operations.12 There was little interaction with other
potential players such as State and Treasury; there assuredly
was no interagency process beyond general policy discussions in
the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee to coordinate the
application of various approaches to accomplishing strategic ends.
The one-dimensional nature of postwar planning was clear in the
case of General Clay. In early 1945, Eisenhower had selected Clay
to oversee military government operations as his deputy.13 Before
departing for Europe, Clay met with the President, Secretary of War
Henry Stimson, and Army Chief of Staff General George C. Marshall
to receive instructions. He did not meet with anyone from the State
Department. He later recalled: “As I look back, I ﬁnd it amazing that
I did not visit the State Department or talk with any of its ofﬁcials. . .
No one at that time advised me of the role of the State Department in
occupation matters or of its relationship to military government, and
I am inclined to believe that no one had thought it out.”14
Despite its instrumental role, the army remained uncomfortable
with postwar operations as a long-term mission. After V-E Day, the
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War Department immediately began pressing for an early transition
from military to civil government in occupied Germany. According
to Clay, Eisenhower sought to create an “organization which could
be transferred to civilian control on 24-hours notice.” Marshall, who
had experienced the short-lived occupation of Germany in 1919 at
ﬁrst hand, was especially sensitive to the possibility that a public
clamor to “bring the boys home” would curtail postwar operations.15
Eisenhower sent a memorandum to Stimson setting a target date for
the transition to civil control by June 1, 1946. The new President,
Harry Truman, approved this objective without consulting
Secretary of State James Byrnes. Byrnes, believing adamantly that
his department was a policymaking organization, not an operational
entity, deftly maneuvered behind the scenes to forestall State’s
assumption of primary responsibility for the occupation.16 As a
result, the June 1, 1946, date for transition came and went without
remark, while the War Department retained responsibility for
governing Germany until 1949.17
With the ends settled and the ways deﬁned as residing solely
with the military instrument of power, it remained for the military
to plan, coordinate, and execute the application of means to achieve
strategic and political objectives. This effort had begun in March
1943, despite the policy void, as prudent military planning when the
Combined Chiefs of Staff directed the Chief of Staff Supreme Allied
Commander (COSSAC) to draft contingency plans for a sudden
German collapse or surrender. The result was Operation RANKIN.18
RANKIN assumed an unopposed occupation of Germany and
avoided discussing administration of the occupied territory by
either civil or military authorities.19 After completion of RANKIN, a
postwar planning cell continued to develop staff studies and papers
that served to advance thinking about post-hostilities operations
and raise relevant questions and issues to policy-makers.20
As D-Day approached, planning shifted from preparations
for a sudden Nazi collapse to considerations for the period after a
military campaign that resulted in the occupation of Germany. In
this environment, there was an explosion of postwar planning by
the Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Forces staff that
resulted in a new plan in October 1944, TALISMAN. TALISMAN
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addressed disarmament, disposal of war material, control of German
prisoners of war, care of Allied prisoners of war, and denaziﬁcation
as the major postwar tasks.21 Conspicuously missing was speciﬁc
guidance on how the Allies would administer occupied Germany,
by whom, and what fate awaited the defeated state. Soon after
completion of the plan, SHAEF, believing its codeword had been
compromised, renamed it ECLIPSE.22
The ECLIPSE Plan consisted of two phases. The primary phase
focused on physical occupation and would occur simultaneously with
the terminal combat operations of OVERLORD. In the second phase,
ECLIPSE would stand alone as the Allies solidiﬁed their control of
occupied areas, disarmed the Wehrmacht, enforced surrender terms,
established law and order, and redeployed Allied forces into deﬁned
national zones of responsibility. ECLIPSE also directed commanders
to “complete establishment of Military Government throughout
the sector.”23 Attached memoranda provided detailed guidance on
surrender procedures, labor policies, procedures for handling Allied
prisoners of war and displaced civilians, mechanisms for disarming
the German armed forces, and guidance for establishing military
government.24
The military possessed ample means to execute these tasks. On
V-E Day, 61 U.S. Army divisions were in Germany and available to
execute ECLIPSE. This made the security mission relatively simple:
Units dispersed and assumed responsibility for assigned areas. The
territory that a division might receive the mission of covering could
be extensive. The 78th Infantry Division, for example, was responsible
for an area of 3,600 square miles, while the 70th Infantry Division
covered 2,500 square miles.25 Commanders usually decentralized
command and control down to companies and assigned them to
guard frontiers, key installations, bridges, banks, and utilities,
and to provide reaction forces to respond to disturbances, looting,
or criminal activity. U.S. forces performed various other special
security functions. For instance, the 26th Infantry Regiment of the
1st Infantry Division guarded the prisoners and proceedings at the
Nuremburg Trials for a year, while a tank battalion and infantry
regiment guarded the huge treasure trove of Nazi-looted items
found in a mine near Merkers. 26
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The troops also implemented ECLIPSE plans to secure prisoners
of war, demobilize the German Army and dispose of war materiel.
This was a huge task. By April 15, 30,000 German soldiers were
surrendering daily to the western allies; by early May, more than
ﬁve million German prisoners of war were in Allied hands. Because
plans had anticipated only 900,000 prisoners by the end of June,
there were signiﬁcant shortfalls in logistics, facilities, and guards.
As an example of what this could mean at the tactical level, a ﬁrst
lieutenant commanding 300 troops found himself charged with
guarding 37,000 Germans at Bad Kreuznach.27 More daunting than
security were the logistics challenges of dealing with this many
prisoners, especially providing them rations. Seven million rations
were required daily in Germany to feed U.S. soldiers and prisoners
of war; this rate of consumption could not be supported. SHAEF
cut rations for Allied personnel by 10 percent. It also authorized
a distinction between “prisoners of war” who had surrendered
prior to V-E Day and “disarmed” German military forces who had
surrendered after May 9. This allowed circumvention of the Geneva
Convention requirement that prisoners of war receive the same
rations as their captors; disarmed Germans were given less than
Allied soldiers.
To deal with the problem and provide manpower to assist
in restoring essential services, SHAEF ordered the discharge of
German prisoners of war who were coal miners, transportation and
utility workers, police, and farmers on the condition that they had
no SS connections and posed no security risk. The units charged
with running the prisoner of war compounds seized on this order
“to discharge as many as possible, as fast as possible, without a great
deal of attention to categories,” according to one G-1 inspection
report. To aid this process, local commanders established discharge
centers and reception points at railheads, and transported prisoners
of war to the areas from which they had been inducted.28 Remaining
prisoners were organized into labor companies and assigned to
American commands to assist in reconstruction efforts ranging from
clearing rubble, to burying the dead, to removing wire obstacles
and mineﬁelds. This was done under the “labor reparation policy”
whereby the Allies determined to use German labor to assist in
rebuilding devastated areas of Europe.29
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The other signiﬁcant task involved in disbanding the German
armed forces was disposing of the equipment and munitions that
littered battleﬁelds, collected at depots, and ﬁlled bunkers and
production facilities throughout Europe. Only souvenir hunters
had paid attention to captured enemy equipment before V-E Day,
except in the case of new technology for technical intelligence
exploitation. After the German surrender, the ECLIPSE plan charged
Army quartermasters at all levels with recovering and disposing of
German war materiel. They initially gave priority to destruction
of enemy chemical and munitions stocks.30 According to the Third
Army history of the occupation, “Large quantities of explosives
were crated and dispatched to the port of Bremerhaven where
they were disposed of by being dumped into the sea, while other
shipments of ammunition were distributed among Allied Nations as
a form of reparation.”31 For captured weapons and equipment, they
applied the model used by the U.S. Army for disposal of surplus
war materiel. Ordnance units established huge depots to receive
the collected materiel; one near Wurzburg contained up to 17,000
vehicles. Each piece of equipment required inspection, cleaning,
maintenance, and processing before it could be sold, shipped, or
destroyed. The total effort to dispose of materiel and munitions
placed further stress on increasingly scarce resources of personnel as
demobilization gathered pace.32
Perhaps the most politically sensitive and in sheer scope the
largest task was that of caring for and assisting millions of displaced
persons to return to their homes throughout Europe. Agreements
reached at the Yalta Conference required military commanders “to
employ all practicable means to transport United Nations displaced
persons to agreed locations where they could be transferred to
national authorities.”33 U.S. forces were overwhelmed by the sheer
numbers of displaced persons they faced: There were an estimated
2.3 million in American occupied areas on V-E Day. This represented
but a portion of the “unprecedented mass migration of civilians
and soldiers” that was taking place in Europe. In addition to seven
million displaced persons throughout Germany, there were 12 to
14 million refugees and hundreds of thousands of German soldiers
from eastern Germany ﬂeeing the Soviets.34 Units encountered large

133

and small groups of refugees daily as they advanced into Germany.
Commanders initially emphasized caring for the almost universally
malnourished and ill they found. They arranged housing for them
in former German barracks, prisoner of war camps, schools, and
private residences (unsympathetic American troops forced out the
German owners, if necessary), and they issued them food from
captured stores, supplemented by U.S. military rations. Army
medical teams conducted an intense public health campaign among
the displaced persons to contain feared outbreaks of typhus and
other communicable diseases. Third Army Chief of Staff General
Hobart Gay captured this concern in his journal on April 10,
1945: “The situation reference displaced persons continues to be
aggravated . . . . Most of them are like animals, or worse, and unless
force can be used on them to ensure reasonable sanitary measures,
it would appear that disease, perhaps something bordering on
a plague, is in the ofﬁng.”35 Among other actions, the Twelfth
Army Group established a “cordon sanitaire on the Rhine” to dust
displaced persons with DDT before they left Germany.36 U.S. forces
slowly sorted displaced persons by nationality and moved them
into camps to facilitate the process of repatriation. Tactical units
provided logistical and security support to the UN Refugee Relief
Administration (UNRRA) which administered these facilities. These
displaced persons represented a serious threat to order. Accounts
of the occupation are replete with reports of drunkenness, looting,
arson, rape, and murder by displaced persons celebrating their
freedom and seeking to exact revenge on the Germans.37 By October
1945, over 2,000,000 displaced persons had been repatriated out of
the American zone.
Allied occupation forces also faced an enormous challenge
to organize reconstruction efforts to restore basic services and
prevent a humanitarian disaster resulting from famine, epidemic,
or exposure. Engineer units rebuilt and repaired roads, bridges,
electric plants, sewage treatment facilities, and waterworks. When
Bonn was captured, for instance, virtually all public services were
nonfunctional. Within days, gas, water, and electric service had been
restored to parts of the city, and within months, street cars were
again operating. 38 Elsewhere water puriﬁcation units provided safe
drinking water. Engineers also demolished German fortiﬁcations,
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gun emplacements, bunkers, and mineﬁelds. Construction units
worked to improve living conditions of occupation forces by
winterizing billets and building recreational facilities.39
Military commanders also were responsible initially for
establishing political authority, implementing denaziﬁcation, and
directing reconstruction. At the strategic level, denaziﬁcation had
perhaps the greatest political interest. The Allies were determined
to stamp out any vestige of the Nazi Party in Germany. Eisenhower
signaled the importance attached to this effort in a speech in the fall
of 1945, when he stated: “The success or failure of this occupation will
be judged by the character of the Germans 50 years from now. Proof
will come when they begin to run a democracy of their own and we
are going to give the Germans a chance to do that, in time.”40
The primary instruments for executing this policy were the
military government detachments charged with ﬁnding acceptable
non-Nazi public ofﬁcials and the Counter Intelligence Corps soldiers
whose mission it was to ﬁnd and arrest Nazis. An immediate
problem the occupation faced was how to deﬁne “Nazi.” Was it
related to length of membership, rank, or did it apply to every party
member regardless of activity? Guidance was unclear initially. The
Counter Intelligence Corps, according to one special agent, was
“given orders to arrest all Nazis from Ortsgruppenleiter on up, all
Gestapo, all SD, all SS from Gefreiter up.”41 Military government
detachments, desperate to ﬁnd qualiﬁed personnel to assume
responsibility for running German cities, counties, and states tended
to be more forgiving. Historian Earl Ziemke, who participated in
the occupation, observed: “Competent non-Nazis were among the
rarest commodities everywhere in Germany . . . ; in the managerial
and professional groups they were practically nonexistent.”42
It was difﬁcult enough to ﬁnd someone with requisite skills to
undertake administrative responsibility for a town; the problem was
complicated inﬁnitely by the need to identify a politically untainted
qualiﬁed applicant. This fundamental difference in orientation could
lead to conﬂict. The daily report from one military government
detachment read: “Having trouble with CIC. Do not believe
security threatened so have concentrated on assuring food, proper
administration, and property protection on the assumption these
will prevent unrest. Have done these at the expense of looking into
past activities of present civil servants.”43 Candidates were vetted
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against black-white-gray lists prepared by the Ofﬁce of Strategic
Services and investigated by Counter Intelligence Corps agents.44
When the glare of media attention was turned on the occupation,
it became politically intolerable to be perceived as “coddling” Nazis,
and policy hardened. At the direction of Eisenhower, military
government personnel made an intense effort to screen all Germans
seeking employment or assistance from the occupation forces.
Military government detachments administered a questionnaire (the
Fragebogen) to all Germans seeking employment or assistance from
the occupation forces. Effectively, this amounted to the entire adult
population of the American zone, or some 13,000,000 Germans,
creating an immense administrative burden. The chief historian of the
U.S. High Commissioner for Germany observed: “The assignment of
going over the 13 million completed forms, investigating the validity
of the data furnished, and deciding on the action to be taken in each
individual case was positively overwhelming.”45
While specialized military government detachments existed
to assist in executing this task, by April 1945 the area of occupied
territory exceeded their capability, and army commanders formed
provisional detachments using antiaircraft, ﬁeld artillery, and
signal troops.46 Soldiers were transferred from other duties and
assigned to assist the military government detachments. Even with
this augmentation, little headway could be made in reducing the
backlog. Ultimately, 1.65 million Fragebogen were screened before
General Clay succeeded in passing responsibility for this task to
newly constituted German courts. Of the 1.65 million questionnaires
screened, U.S. ofﬁcials judged 300,000 to be Nazis, eligible only
for employment as common labor.47 Eisenhower was willing to
accept diminished administrative efﬁciency in return for thorough
denaziﬁcation. Military Government Law Number 8, effective in
September 1945, “made it mandatory to dismiss anyone who had
ever been a member of the Nazi party for whatever reason from any
position save one of ordinary labor.”48 Patton’s well-documented
clashes with Eisenhower on this issue resulted in Patton’s removal
from command of Third Army in October 1945. Patton recorded
in his diary on September 29, 1945, the result of a meeting with
Eisenhower in which they discussed the presence of Nazis in the
government of Bavaria: “So I called Harkins at 0630 and told him to
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remove Schaeffer, Lange, and Rattenhuber and all members of their
ministries in any way tainted with Nazism regardless of the setback
it would give to the administration of Bavaria and the resultant cold
and hunger it would produce―not only for the Germans but also for
the DP’s. This seemed to make everyone happy except myself.”49
What stands out in an examination of postwar planning and
operations in Germany are the time and resources that were
devoted to it. Although policy decisions deﬁning political ends
were slow to emerge from politicians preeminently concerned
with holding together a wartime coalition, British and American
military commanders in Europe realized their likely role in postwar
operations early on (although they may not have liked it), and even
developed an appreciation for the fact that postwar tasks might
coexist uncomfortably with combat operations.50 Military leaders
took prudent measures to supply the means for postwar operations
during the war by ﬁelding specialized postwar units, military
government detachments, and providing them expert training,
doctrine, and organizations. ECLIPSE planners, given a considerable
period to reﬁne their estimates, generally anticipated requirements
accurately. Worst-case scenarios of a Nazi resistance movement
failed to develop and the magnitude of destruction and population
turmoil were understated in the plans. But the ECLIPSE plan ignored
no signiﬁcant tasks that emerged in the postwar period. There is no
evidence the ECLIPSE plan made assumptions that wished away
postwar problems in order to redeploy forces rapidly to the Paciﬁc
or quickly return them to the United States for demobilization,
despite the obvious political and military beneﬁts that would accrue
from such actions. Ends, ways, and means were aligned to support
a prolonged postwar operation in Germany to secure a long-term
peace.
OPERATION ECLIPSE II
Nearly 60 years after ECLIPSE, American political and military
leaders again confronted the requirement to deﬁne ends, identify
ways, and assemble the means to advance national objectives
beyond the short-term one of “regime change.” American soldiers
again found themselves responsible for the practical problems
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arising from their position as the most available means for waging
peace and maintaining order in the wake of combat.51
On March 19, 2003, after months of military preparations,
political maneuvering in Congress and the Security Council, and
alternating Iraqi acts of deﬁance and compliance, the American-led
coalition launched Operation IRAQI FREEDOM. When announcing
the beginning of hostilities, President George W. Bush deﬁned
the coalition’s objectives in the following terms: “To disarm Iraq,
to free its people and to defend the world from grave danger.”52
With diplomacy exhausted and economic sanctions a demonstrable
failure, the President settled on the military “to apply decisive force”
to achieve his ends. Signiﬁcantly, the President also had articulated a
postwar vision for Iraq; in a speech on February 26, 2003, he declared
America’s objective to be a “free and peaceful Iraq.” He noted that
achieving this would not be easy and pledged the “sustained
commitment” of the United States to the effort. Hearkening back to
1945, the President recalled that:
After defeating enemies, we did not leave behind occupying armies,
we left constitutions and parliaments. We established an atmosphere of
safety, in which responsible, reform-minded local leaders could build
lasting institutions of freedom. In societies that once bred fascism and
militarism, liberty found a permanent home.53

Not burdened by the requirement to hold together a disparate
wartime alliance that Roosevelt had confronted, Bush went to war
with clearly articulated ends.
Before the war, the President also designated the instrument he
would employ to secure his policy objective of a secure, prosperous,
reconstructed, and democratic Iraq. On January 20, 2003, he issued
National Security Presidential Directive 24 and explicitly assigned
responsibility for the conduct of postwar operations to the Defense
Department. Although such efforts ostensibly were to be interagency
in approach, under Pentagon leadership, the military instrument
of power became the chosen way through which the President
proposed to achieve his strategic ends, just as it had for Roosevelt.
Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld quickly established the Ofﬁce
of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA) under the
leadership of retired Lieutenant General Jay Garner.
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Garner put together a team of 200 former military, foreign service,
academic, and corporate personnel and began developing plans.54
Despite requirements to reestablish a political system, provide aid
and assistance, create a sound banking system, and a multitude of
other tasks that touched expertise across the expanse of the U.S.
Government, Rumsfeld refused to allow the effort to reach out from
the Pentagon.55 As a result, ORHA did not integrate work done by
the State Department in its “Future of Iraq” project that began in
March 2002, nor did it pay any attention to wargames conducted by
the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) the summer before.56 Garner’s
organization was where the various instruments of national power
were supposed to come together and function in a coordinated
fashion in the few short weeks before combat operations began. It
did not happen. Its work on humanitarian assistance was extensive,
reﬂecting concerns aroused by U.N. predictions of thousands
of refugees and widespread shortages of food and water in the
wake of serious ﬁghting.57 Planning for civil administration and
reconstruction, however, remained vague. In late February, ORHA
conducted a rehearsal at Fort McNair. One observer reported “I got
the sense that the humanitarian stuff was pretty well in place, but the
rest of it was ﬂying blind.”58
In the absence of a coherent interagency approach, the military
made its own preparations based on a doctrinal appreciation that
planning must address postwar requirements, just as the Army
had done in 1942.59 Military planning for what became Operation
IRAQI FREEDOM reportedly began in earnest in summer 2002 at
the President’s direction. Commander of the U.S. Central Command
General Tommy Franks tasked Combined Forces Land Component
Commander Lieutenant General David McKiernan and his staff to
prepare plans for ground operations, including conﬂict termination
operations. Their planning initially focused on the tough questions
of assembling the military force to topple the regime, building
the support structure to sustain operations, and synchronizing
the effects of joint ﬁres and maneuver to achieve a rapid, decisive
victory. Phase IV (postwar stability and support operations) received
less attention as it depended more on national policy decisions, was
less critical for decisive combat operations, and remained outside
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the “comfort zone” of most military decisionmakers.60 Policy
guidance to shape Phase IV emerged only gradually from the ofﬁce
of Under Secretary of Defense Douglas Feith. According to an after
action review by the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) that was leaked, this
guidance failed to reﬂect any interagency planning between the
Defense and State Departments.61 Indeed, Feith’s efforts remained
tightly contained within a small circle in the Pentagon, because of
the political sensitivity of planning for the war against Iraq and,
perhaps, because of a widely reported rift between Rumsfeld and
Secretary of State Colin Powell over Iraq policy.62
With the military instrument of power established as the means
of achieving the administration’s ends, DoD began assembling
forces for implementation. Central to this process were several
assumptions that soon became unquestionable within the Pentagon.
Principal among these was the belief within the Ofﬁce of the
Secretary of Defense that the Iraqis would view the coalition as a
liberating force. They then would rise up to hasten the collapse of
the regime and assume responsibility for sustaining public safety,
administration, and basic services. According to dismissed Army
Secretary Thomas E. White, Feith “had the mind-set that this
would be a relatively straightforward manageable task because
this would be a war of liberation, and therefore the reconstruction
would be short-lived.”63 Similarly, Deputy Assistant Secretary of
Defense Joseph Collins stated in late February 2003: “We’re not
coming in to punish or to occupy Iraq. We’re coming in to liberate
the country and create the conditions where the Iraqis can create a
highly functioning democracy on their own.”64 The Pentagon thus
based force planning and deployments on assumptions that military
operations could accomplish this aim rapidly once Saddam and
Ba’athist party apparatchiks were deposed, by building on existing
Iraqi governmental and security structures.
Initial responsibility for postwar operations would necessarily
fall to the military, which would need to begin addressing postwar
tasks from the moment U.S. forces crossed into Iraq. However,
signiﬁcant military power was not available immediately to conduct
stability and support operations designed to avert humanitarian
disaster, restore critical infrastructure, and provide the environment
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for creation of a free, democratic Iraq. Admittedly a major effort did
occur at the outset to preserve the Iraqi oil ﬁelds. Only after combat
operations were complete could the efforts of the four coalition
divisions and three combat brigades, together with large numbers of
theater and corps support units, focus on postwar tasks.
DoD had shaped this force to achieve success in bringing down
Saddam’s regime, not for postwar efforts. Deputy Secretary of
Defense Paul Wolfowitz dismissed estimates that the army would
need more troops for postwar operations than combat operations
as “outlandish.” He went on to say that “It’s hard to conceive that it
would take more forces to provide stability in post-Saddam Iraq than
it would take to conduct the war itself and to secure the surrender
of Saddam’s security forces and his army. Hard to imagine.”65
Yet, when confronted by the anarchy that occurred in the wake of
Saddam’s collapse, American troops were stretched too thinly to
respond in a timely manner to contain the violence and destruction.
Former CENTCOM commander General Anthony Zinni, who
had expressed concern before the war that the new plans called
for two fewer divisions than plans he had developed, observed in
testimony to Congress that “The reason we had those two extra
divisions was the security situation. Revenge killings, crime,
chaos―this was all foreseeable.”66 The perspective of historian
John Gaddis is illuminating, offering perhaps the best critique of
the administration’s approach not only to Iraq, but the wider war
on terrorism. He argued that the President, in pursuing a decisive
battle, another “Agincourt” in his war on terror, could secure victory.
He warned of the risks, however: “The trouble with Agincourts . . .
is the arrogance they can encourage, along with the illusion that
victory itself is enough and that no follow-up is required.” The Bush
strategy, Gaddis asserted, ultimately relied “on getting cheered, not
shot at.”67
The Pentagon assembled the means for implementing the
President’s vision of a democratic and stable Iraq under two principal
headquarters: ORHA and Combined Forces Land Component
Command (CFLCC) until it transitioned to a Combined Joint Task
Force as planned in June. However, according to participants in the
planning effort at CFLCC, there was virtually no contact between
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military planners and the ORHA, despite the latter organization’s
supposed subordination to Central Command. Matters did not
improve when Garner and his staff deployed to Kuwait on March 16,
3 days before the war began. Rather than accepting facilities on the
same installation as the CFLCC, Garner leased a hotel in Kuwait City,
which given travel restrictions might have been in another country.
The divide continued to widen.68 The CFLCC saw the contributions
of the ORHA as coming too late to be helpful in shaping plans, while
they viewed its headquarters and staff as isolated from the realities of
combat operations. The ORHA, for its part, felt marginalized by the
military and without necessary resources. There was neither unity
of effort nor unity of command in implementing a postwar strategy.
Unlike Eisenhower, Franks does not appear to have involved himself
directly in planning or executing postwar operations.
The arrival of Garner and his team in Iraq weeks after coalition
forces had occupied Baghdad further exacerbated problems in
transition to postwar operations. ORHA was then glacially slow
in getting organized. In fairness, the conditions they faced were
daunting. The convention center in which Garner’s team established
operations was covered in dust and debris; the small ORHA staff
had to clean it themselves and set-up operations from the groundup with little assistance from military forces. Nonetheless, it did
not convey a message to Iraqis, the insurgents, the international
community, military commanders on the ground, or the American
public that anyone had a ﬁrm grip on the situation. There were no
military government detachments following combat troops into Iraq
as they had in Germany; civil affairs units in the country were too
few and lacked the detailed preparation that had characterized their
predecessors in Germany.
Garner appeared increasingly hapless in the face of mounting
reconstruction tasks and a deteriorating security situation. In his
defense, the damage to the infrastructure was much greater than
anticipated, in part due to widespread looting and the wholesale
collapse of Iraqi civil institutions, including the ministries that
ORHA was counting on to accomplish day-to-day administration.69
The Bush administration therefore accelerated the timeline to
replace Garner, and in May the President appointed Ambassador
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Paul Bremer to head ORHA’s successor, the Coalition Provisional
Authority, to “oversee Coalition reconstruction efforts and the
process by which the Iraqi people build the institutions and
governing structures that will guide their futures.”70 While Bremer
continued to report to Secretary Rumsfeld, he also had the status of
special assistant to the President.
With looting, blackouts, insurgent activity, and the organizational
disarray of security and reconstruction efforts, Iraqis were uncertain
whether the Coalition had a plan, much less was executing one. The
result was a loss of momentum, the appearance of ﬂawed planning
and preparation, and the frittering away of the psychological
impact gained through decisive combat operations by indecisive,
disorganized, and unsure postwar operations. The effects that
the speed and precision which had destroyed the regime might
have inspired instead dissipated in what many observers, Iraqi,
American, and international, viewed as a bungled transition to
peace operations. Iraqis soon were suspicious that such ineptitude
could only be deliberate, an excuse to lengthen the occupation. One
Iraqi told Robert Stefanicki, a Polish journalist, that “Americans
took over Iraq in 3 weeks but they have not been able to restore the
electricity in 3 months. What kind of power is that? They promised
us democracy, but where is the government . . . After the war with
Kuwait, Saddam rebuilt Iraq in 4 months.” Stefanicki concluded:
“Three months after the end of the war, Iraqis express a growing
sense of disappointment in the new American order―or, to be more
precise, the lack of order. There is no dictatorship, but there is also
no electricity, work, safety, or government.”71
The administration answered its critics by arguing in effect that
things could have been a lot worse. Wolfowitz, when asked by the
interviewer if there was anything he would have done differently in
the prewar planning for the postwar, responded: “You mean all this
terrible planning that prevented oil ﬁelds from being destroyed, that
prevented humanitarian crises, that prevented fortress Baghdad,
that prevented weapons from being used against Israel . . . I get a
little tired of all these things we didn’t plan for when there was so
much good planning that prevented all these thing that these critics
predicted.”72
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With the complete collapse of domestic Iraqi institutions, the ﬁrst
priority for postwar reconstruction was creation of an “atmosphere
of safety.” This has proved problematic for coalition forces and
has had a signiﬁcant impact on the pace, costs, and perceptions of
progress. Flawed assumptions that overestimated the coalition’s
ability to destroy pro-regime forces quickly came into play, as
potential sources of resistance melted into the population in the
face of the speed and ﬁrepower of the coalition offensive. Equally
troubling was the impression of widespread anarchy in the streets of
Baghdad created by widespread looting in the wake of the regime’s
disintegration.73 The coalition served as a lightning rod, attracting
radical Islamic ﬁghters from throughout the region, exacerbating
the security problem. The porous borders with Syria and Iran
readily allowed al Qaeda and other terrorist groups to join the
ﬁght. According to commander of ground forces in Iraq Lieutenant
General Richard Sanchez, “We did not expect instability before we
arrived here. We did not expect the old Iraqi army to disappear and
the political and economic structures to shut down. That was clearly
a surprise.”74 Faced with what appears to be a protracted insurgency,
Dod has been compelled to extend tours and maintain high numbers
of troops in Iraq, while casting about for more international assistance
and accelerating formation of Iraqi police and military forces.
Perhaps most emblematic of the problems the coalition faced in
Iraq was that of reconstruction. As part of its postwar preparations,
the administration let a $680 million contract with Bechtel for
reconstruction projects, $230 million of which was earmarked for
restoration of the electric grid. The plan assumed that precision
bombing would limit damage and allow relatively rapid restoration
of essential services. Planners failed to take into account the
depths to which Iraq’s infrastructure had fallen after years of
mismanagement, underinvestment, and a decade of international
sanctions. Bomb damage, although relatively slight, proved difﬁcult
to repair; and looting in the wake of the fall of Baghdad decimated
an already fragile infrastructure. The collapse of the power grid
serving Baghdad and much of the rest of Iraq became a symbol of
the failure of the reconstruction effort. Despite concerted coalition
efforts to restore power, prewar levels of electrical production were
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not reached until October. The blackout apparently was caused by
a massive power surge when American forces accidentally severed
high-voltage lines near Baghdad International airport.75
The Bush administration’s request to Congress for funds to
rebuild Iraq recognized the magnitude of the problem by asking for
over $12 billion for reconstruction projects alone. Also, $5.7 billion
was requested “to rehabilitate and upgrade Iraq’s electric power
infrastructure.” In addition, $3.7 billion was requested for water and
sewer system projects, $2.1 billion to modernize the oil industry, and
over $700 million for projects to rebuild and improve transportation
networks.76 Iraq continues to consume many more resources―time,
manpower, and ﬁnancial―than initially estimated, largely due to
the decrepit state of the infrastructure and the stultifying effects
of 3 decades of fear, brutality, statism, and inefﬁciency on the Iraqi
people, factors undermining their initiative and sense of individual
power.
OPERATIONS ECLIPSE AND ECLIPSE II―A COMPARISON
There are obvious differences in the conditions that existed
in Germany and Iraq as the victors implemented the Operation
ECLIPSE plans for postwar military operations. The ﬁrst ECLIPSE
operation occurred amid the total destruction of the Nazi regime
and the utter devastation and prostration of Germany. There was
no ﬁght left in the German people after nearly 6 years of virtually
total war―and any inclination to resist was extinguished quickly by
the presence of millions of Allied soldiers on the soil of Germany
(and for those in the western zones of occupation the specter of
Soviet occupation always held out a worse fate). No insurgency
emerged under these conditions. As a result, security operations for
the American occupation forces largely involved law enforcement
tasks, especially since the constituted German police ﬁrst had to
be denaziﬁed. Politically, Germany comprised a homogeneous
population and the occupation did not have to deal with different
ethnic and religious factions vying for power. The chief challenge
for the western allies was the permanent and complete eradication
of all vestiges and manifestations of the Nazi Party, no matter how
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much more difﬁcult that might make day-to-day administration of
occupied Germany. The democratization process was aided because
Germany was familiar with the basic processes of democracy from its
experiences in the Weimar republic and in late imperial Germany, as
well as a rich cultural heritage of local representative governments;
democratization did not represent a cultural leap.
There were some in the west, however, who wondered if
“Teutons” were capable of democracy. The most dramatic condition
that faced the occupation was the sheer magnitude of the destruction
and dislocation that had occurred in the course of 6 years of total
war. A large percentage of the European population had been
displaced; millions were homeless; the specter of famine was real;
infrastructure throughout the continent was in shambles; ﬁnancial
and legal institutions were shells; and industry was ﬂattened or
given over to wartime production. Great cities lay in ruins and abject
desperation characterized the conquered German population. The
German people were self-reliant, industrious, well-educated, and
inspired by desperation; they took the rebuilding of their country
on their shoulders and willingly supplied the labor to clear rubble
and restore infrastructure. National Socialism had not sapped the
initiative from people or stiﬂed the spirit of entrepreneurship.
Dramatically different conditions pertained in Operation ECLIPSE
II. Precision weapons and a lightning campaign did not ﬂatten the
country in the way that years of mass bomber attacks, unrestricted
urban warfare, and massive artillery barrages had leveled Germany.
Instead, Iraq suffered from a more insidious deterioration arising
from years of neglect, the effects of a years of international economic
sanctions, and the systematic pillaging of the country by those who
beneﬁted from Ba’ath Party rule. Decades of colonialism followed by
nearly a half-century of despotic abuse had deprived the people of
belief in their capabilities to effect their own futures. Moreover, Iraq
was the invention of post-World War I imperial gerrymandering,
incorporating disparate peoples within the geographic borders of
a 20th century ideal of ancient Mesopotamia. Sunni Muslims lived
tensely amidst the peoples and shrines of the rival Shi’ia faith; while
the Kurds, losers in the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire, existed
uneasily stateless at the conﬂuence of Turkey, Iran, and Iraq. This
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cultural heterogeneity was not leavened by a shared ideological
commitment to liberal ideals of compromise, federalism, or personal
rights; but represented instead a real source of friction and a potential
source of ﬁssure.
The rapid overthrow of the regime without the attendant death
and destruction of its adherents, as was the case with Nazi Germany,
deﬁned the conditions that would shape execution of Operation
ECLIPSE II. First, it allowed the nucleus for a resistance to survive.
The pampered class, the Ba’ath Party faithful, had nothing to lose
once ousted from power and so undertook armed opposition to
both the Coalition occupation and Iraqi supporters of a new political
order in the country. Coalition policy underscored their exile from
power by the announced program of de-baathiﬁcation. Their only
option then was resistance, either passive or active. When the
Ba’ath loyalists were joined by an inﬂux of Islamist militants from
throughout the Muslim world seeking to engage the Americans, the
primary problem faced by those conducting Operation ECLIPSE
II quickly became security. The reconstruction challenge, while
daunting, is manageable, especially with the resources the Bush
administration and international donors have made available, but
it is greatly complicated by the difﬁcult security situation. The
Coalition’s inability to conduct an orderly demobilization of the
military and get control of weapons and explosives in the wake
of ﬁghting further exacerbated the problem. Other issues that
challenged ECLIPSE operations in Germany, such as displaced
persons and the potential for famine and disease did not arise in
Iraq to any great extent, in part because of preparation and planning,
but more because of the rapidity of operations and lack of collateral
damage that would cause an exodus of refugees from cities.
Perhaps the most signiﬁcant condition that pertained in both
cases was that each operation occurred within a broader context,
both emerging as deﬁning battles in wider struggles: Germany
in the Cold War, and Iraq in the Global War on Terrorism. Both
places assumed tremendous symbolic importance and represented
the centerpieces of long-term strategies to confront totalitarian and
nihilistic ideologies. “Losing” the postwar peace was unthinkable in
either situation and justiﬁed immense expenditure of resources and
effort sustained over time.
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IMPLICATIONS FOR WAGING PEACE
The ECLIPSE experiences indicate that the United States
possesses outstanding capabilities for waging war, but U.S. postwar
operations over the past 2 decades have had an ad hoc nature that
is fundamentally inefﬁcient, costly, and open-ended. The challenge
for policy makers is not only to articulate strategic ends, identify
appropriate ways, and allocate sufﬁcient means, but also to link
ends, ways, and means to produce a coherent strategy. If the policy
objectives (the ends) are unclear or undeﬁned, the strategy may well
deﬁne the policy―for better or worse. Conversely, if the strategy is
ﬂawed, the attainment of policy goals will be threatened. Clausewitz
argued “The political object is the goal, war is the means of reaching
it, and means can never be considered in isolation from their
purpose.“77 He also urged statesmen not to take the ﬁrst step toward
war without considering the last, to ensure that they had a coherent
strategy to link ends and means.
Operation ECLIPSE and the planning for the occupation of
Germany present the case of a military strategy seeking policy.
Allied military leaders planned for and resourced postwar
operations in the absence of a policy deﬁning what such operations
would be asked to accomplish. In Iraq, the situation was reversed.
The policy was established in some detail before initiation of
hostilities. The President publicly laid out his postwar objectives on
several occasions. However, the strategy to achieve the policy was
hampered severely by ﬂawed planning assumptions, the failure
of the U.S. Government to apply sufﬁcient resources to the task to
ensure decisive results, the limited time for integrated planning,
and a lack of interagency coordination. The latter deﬁcit points out a
common failing in both ECLIPSE operations, a failure to identify and
apply all appropriate ways to achieve the desired ends.
For American military ofﬁcers, the centrality of planning in
this process seems self-evident. Military ofﬁcers learn carefully
deﬁned decisionmaking processes; daily operations and exercises
then reinforce that instruction. It is axiomatic to military personnel
that these planning techniques are universally relevant to all
situations. It often comes as a professional shock for them to learn
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that policymakers do not necessarily share the same conﬁdence in
planning as a means of preparing for the future. Winston Churchill
wrote his Foreign Secretary in 1942: “As you know, I am very doubtful
about the utility of attempts to plan the peace before we have won
the war.”78 Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld apparently shares
Churchill’s reservations about the limits of planning. According to
Undersecretary of Defense Douglas Feith, Rumsfeld’s “big strategic
theme is uncertainty . . . . The inability to predict the future. The
limits on our knowledge and the limits on our intelligence.” Feith
related that as a result if someone told Rumsfeld, “’Let me tell you
what something’s going to look like in the future,’ you wouldn’t get
to your next sentence!”79
This reluctance to predict the future conﬂicts with the imperative
for careful planning that under girds highly complex military
operations. As General Bedell Smith warned during the ECLIPSE
planning, “The problem is not one that can be handled piecemeal or a
solution extemporized hurriedly in the last stage of the operation.”80
Yet this is precisely the approach policymakers, who want
maximum ﬂexibility to react to changing domestic and international
considerations, often prefer. By 1943, with the United States well in
the war, Churchill overcame his doubts about planning the peace, as
he astutely initiated operations in the Mediterranean and elsewhere
with a clear eye on the future and the need to posture the British
Empire to deal with threats that might emerge in the wake of the
defeat of the Third Reich. The magnitude of the task of winning the
war and the necessity of holding together the coalition, however,
limited the public enunciation of postwar goals by the Big Three
until 1945, creating opportunities for military leaders to prepare
plans and build organizations that could then implement policy
decisions. Sufﬁcient ways and means were present in the context of
total war to achieve postwar objectives as they emerged.
In general terms, the Bush administration also recognized what
it wanted to accomplish in undertaking to overthrow Saddam
Hussein’s regime. It marshaled sufﬁcient ways and means to gain
an overwhelming military victory in a limited war but, in trying
to minimize forces committed to the operation, it failed to provide
adequate ways and means to wage peace successfully. Political

149

considerations limited the scope of postwar planning, shaped
assumptions that downplayed resources required to achieve stated
objectives, and failed to establish either unity of command or unity
of effort to link military operations with political, economic, and
informational operations to achieve a rapid decision in the wake of
ﬁghting.
The experiences of ECLIPSE I and II also suggest that postwar
operations are complex civil-military endeavors that require clear
lines of authority. In postwar Germany, Eisenhower received
undisputed command of the U.S. occupation. He exercised this
authority through Clay, whom he purposefully endowed with the
title “Deputy Commander” to connote the level of responsibility
he was giving him. While Eisenhower reported through the Army
Chief of Staff and the Secretary of War, he had sole responsibility
for the conduct of postwar operations. This is in stark contrast to the
confused state of affairs that exists in ECLIPSE II. DoD separated
responsibility for postwar operations just weeks before the initiation
of combat operations in a way seemingly calculated to sow confusion
and cause a lack of unity of effort. Secretary Rumsfeld quickly formed
the ORHA to oversee reconstruction, humanitarian assistance, and
the transition of Iraq to a representative form of government under
the rule of law. Garner, however, did not have the power or stature
to pull things together quickly; and Franks failed to exercise powers
as a theater commander to impose order on disjointed postwar
efforts.81
At a tactical level, the ECLIPSE experiences indicate that the
military means necessary to achieve decisive postwar results may
not be equivalent to the means required to prevail on the battleﬁeld.
In Germany, as in Iraq, the force that began executing postwar
operations was largely the same as that which conducted the
war. In World War II, the presence of 61 divisions, augmented by
specialized military government detachments, meant that sufﬁcient
means were available in Europe to dominate both the combat and
postwar battleﬁelds, but the Pentagon, in conducting the war in Iraq,
made a conscious decision to move away from an overwhelming
force model.82 Given advances in technology, the forces needed to
gain decisive results in the combat phase may be inadequate to wage
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peace decisively. Smaller maneuver forces can ﬁght and win with
precision ﬁres and timely, accurate intelligence.
However, this lethal combination is vulnerable when the mission
shifts to peace operations with their demand for presence, human
intelligence, civil affairs, and information operations. Waging peace
requires an overwhelming force on the ground, especially in its
early phases.83 Numbers matter, because it takes soldiers conducting
patrols in neighborhoods and responding rapidly to unrest to achieve
security and stability; precision ﬁres cannot substitute for troop
presence. In addition to taking and holding terrain, information
dominance becomes critical in the postwar period, not just for its
military utility in providing information to support force protection
and security, but for its ability to shape public opinion, disseminate
information to the populace, counter enemy propaganda, and build
cultural and political awareness in the occupying force to gauge
effects of actions. Finally, economic and political means from other
government agencies necessarily become more critical given the
objectives of most postwar operations―economic sufﬁciency and
political stability.84
This is perhaps the most important lesson of ECLIPSE: postwar
operations do not fall just within the purview of DoD. The decision
to go to war involves a calculus that the application of force will
set the conditions that allow the nation to achieve its policy aims.
Statesmen must link the ﬁrst step, going to war, to the last step,
ordering the resulting peace to ensure the achievement of policy
objectives.85 This requires the wielding of all instruments of national
power in a coordinated campaign on a battleﬁeld where force is not
the primary determinant of success.86 Such an integrated effort did
not occur in either ECLIPSE operation.
After ECLIPSE, policymakers sought to institutionalize the
informal consultations that had developed in various subcommittees
and in the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee through the
National Security Act of 1947 that created the National Security
Council. ECLIPSE II exposed an interagency planning process that
continues fundamentally to be ﬂawed. National Security Presidential
Directive (NSPD) 24 made DoD the lead agency for postwar
operations, but that seems to have translated into a perception by
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other agencies that Iraq is the Pentagon’s show; actions by various
members of the Ofﬁce of the Secretary of Defense appear to have
reinforced that belief. As a result, other than the CIA’s active
involvement in all aspects of the war (especially the search for
weapons of mass destruction) and the Agency for International
Development’s actions to posture American and international aid
efforts to forestall a potential humanitarian disaster in the wake of
ﬁghting, other key agencies in the government were conspicuously
absent from planning and execution of postwar missions. 87 The
National Security Council (NSC) system failed to act forcefully as an
effective vehicle for interagency cooperation, and when the National
Security Advisor attempted to carve out such a role for herself and
the NSC staff, a strong Secretary of Defense quickly quashed the
attempt.88
The state of the current national security structure is reminiscent
of DoD prior to Goldwater-Nichols. It is time for wholesale changes
in the culture of government to inculcate an interagency spirit that
transcends departmental parochialism. Interagency training, a
common doctrine for planning and management, and removal of
barriers to information and communication are essential to build
mechanisms for interagency cooperation and truly joint planning
and operations. The time is ripe for a revision of the National
Security Act of 1947, itself a product of the realization of the need
for interagency coordination exposed by World War II, to create
an organizational structure and culture able to seamlessly and
simultaneously bring all instruments of power to bear at strategic,
operational, and tactical levels. 89 In order to do so, the means must
be adequate to the task. Only in this way can policy and strategy be
linked to ensure that the nation wages peace with the same focused
intensity as it wages war.
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furnish the Allies speciﬁc information and admonishing them to cooperate and
protect facilities and equipment pending disposition instructions. Appendix H
provided for sanctions against violators of the terms of surrender. These included
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war matters and the memorandum directed him to attach personnel to the army
groups to assist them in executing this task. The memorandum also established
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Number 10, “Primary Disarmament of German Air Forces Opposing Us and
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159

government were contained in the Military Government Handbook published by
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the State Department, an all-important ﬁrst step would be taken. With a cadre in
the State Department directly sharing equity in post-conﬂict operations with DoD,
a venue for meaningful interagency cooperation and planning would be in place.
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CHAPTER 7
THE ABRAMS DOCTRINE:
HAS IT BEEN ABUSED IN THE GLOBAL WAR ON TERROR?
Colonel George A. Brinegar
We have all seen the world change, and change with an intensity and rapidity
that an earlier generation might not have believed. This change has brought us
challenges and opportunities. As a Nation, we must grasp these challenges and
seize these opportunities.
General Creighton Abrams1
Chief of Staff of the Army, 1974

Creighton Abrams’ statement did not occur in the aftermath of
September 11, 2001, but in the turmoil of the last days of the Vietnam
War. Abrams, the chief of staff of the Army, provided these words
in his “Posture of the Army Statement” before the Committee on
Armed Services, U.S. House of Representatives, in 1974. However,
these same words seem equally appropriate in the midst of the
Global War on Terror and the instabilities of the 21st century.
Abrams clearly understood the critical mistake of his war and time,
but, more importantly, he also had a clear vision for victory in future
wars.
In the ﬁnal days of the Vietnam War, Abrams initiated a strategy
whereby the U.S. Army would never go to war without substantial
mobilization of the reserve component. This strategy has become
widely accepted as the Abrams Doctrine. Now the United States
ﬁnds itself in another potentially long war, the Global War on Terror.
Since September 11, 2001, the United States has executed a “partial
mobilization” of soldiers from the reserve component to meet the
demands of this war. In the third year of the Global War on Terror,
has the Department of Defense (DoD) abused the Abrams Doctrine
to the extent that too many reserve soldiers have mobilized? This
chapter examines the genesis of the Abrams Doctrine, analyzes
current mobilization trends of the Army Guard and Army Reserve,
and describes the effects of this current “partial mobilization” on
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employers, families, recruiting, and retention. Finally, it makes
recommendations and observations for the future.
THE DIFFICULT YEARS PRECEDING THE ABRAMS
DOCTRINE: 1960S
Lyndon Johnson astounded the Defense Establishment with his refusal
to call up the reserves . . .
Lewis Sorley2
Historian, 1991

To understand the rationale for the Abrams Doctrine, one
must take a step back to the 1960s and the early years of the U. S.
intervention in the Vietnam War, where American leaders made
decisions that “set the course” for failure. In 1965,
Lyndon Johnson astounded the Defense Establishment by his refusal to
call up the reserves to support expansion of the war in Vietnam, perhaps
the most fateful decision of the entire conﬂict. Johnson’s refusal was
apparently motivated in part by reluctance to spread the effects of the
war through the population—certainly many more families and virtually
every town and city would be affected by a call-up of any proportion,
with a much different class cross-section and much greater political
impact than draft calls affecting only those who could not engineer a
deferment.3

The second-and third-order effects of the President’s refusal to
utilize the reserves in this war were disastrous. First, as the Army
was trying valiantly to expand to meet the demands of the war,
the “pool” of reserve leaders and soldiers was “off limits.” To ﬁll
this void, active duty ofﬁcers and NCOs, receiving premature
promotions, could expect numerous rotations to the combat zone.
Second, the reserve component, not a part of the deploying Army
team, soon became demoralized and bitter. As understood now, it
would take years to restore reserve component morale. In effect,
the government told devoted reservists and guardsmen, who for
years had trained for mobilization, to stay home with absolutely no
expectation for combat. Further, to make a bad situation worse, the
reserves quietly watched much of their equipment go out the back
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door for cross-leveling to satisfy the demands of the active Army
trying to prosecute a war without disturbing the American public.4
There is no doubt that the decision not to mobilize the reserves
drastically impacted the entire Army.
Arguably, the most disastrous effect of not mobilizing the
reserves was the perception that nobody cared in “Hometown
America.” Lewis Sorely, clearly states the nature of the problem:
Lyndon Johnson’s policy of trying to ﬁght the war on the cheap, on
the sly almost, and without involving the larger community [reserve
component], meant that the general populace had no stake in it, and
hence no motivation to ensure that the sacriﬁces of those who did serve
were in some way validated by the eventual outcome.5

Equally disastrous was the unknown number of individuals joining
the reserves with only one desire: to avoid military conscription
and probable deployment to Southeast Asia. Lacking motivation
for military service, many of these soldiers and ofﬁcers did nothing
but “bide their time,” awaiting the end of their initial enlistment
and subsequent discharge. With no “callup” of the reserves by the
President, reserve units were quickly ﬁlling with members of less
than full dedication to professional military training and service.
To complicate an already complex situation Army-wide,
standards in the reserves began to falter drastically as the likelihood
of mobilization and deployment signiﬁcantly decreased. So at this
point, collectively, both the active and reserve components’ readiness
and motivation for service was deteriorating at an overwhelming
rate. Even worse, resentment between those on the active side,
with near term deployment to war as a guarantee, and the reserve
members, with no fear of future deployment, festered.
Lack of utilization of the reserves was spoiling the entire Army
and would take decades to overcome. In fact, this huge divide
between the active and reserves, those going to war and not going to
war, grew to such an extent, that even today, 30 years later, it is a key
issue in the 2004 presidential election. Sadly, erasing the memories
of this ugly divide will take several more years and possibly another
decade.
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THE CHIEF OF STAFF OF AN ARMY IN CRISIS: 1972-1974
The Nation and its well-being must be kept foremost, and must not be
hazarded by purely parochial concerns.
General Creighton Abrams6
Chief of Staff of the Army, 1974

On October 12, 1972, General Creighton W. Abrams became the
26th chief of staff of the U. S. Army. An ofﬁcer who had seen combat
in World War II, Korea, and Vietnam was now the point man for
an Army in crisis. Abrams clearly knew his Army was in deep
trouble. General Frank Mildren, who had been a division, corps,
and land forces commander, provides a clear glimpse of this period:
“The image of the Army was at an all time low. The public had no
conﬁdence in the Army. They blamed the Army for all our ills . . .
The morale was probably lower than its been for many years in the
active Army.”7
This situation was no surprise to the new chief. He had
commanded at all levels from troop to corps, to army staff level, and
was no stranger to the Washington bureaucracy. Moreover, to his
credit, he knew the reserves through his time as the Deputy Assistant
Chief of Staff for the Reserve Component in the late 1950s. Now his
new position would requires superb leadership for an Army in the
“ﬁnal death throes” of its ugly experience in the Vietnam War.
To understand Creighton Abrams fully, one must look
beyond his illustrious military record. His keen insight into the
American people, in combination with his superior military skills
and understanding of force structure, led to his strong belief in
the importance of utilization of the reserve component. Several
situations provide a glimpse inside the man, and one of these is his
action prior to assuming the duties as Chief of Staff of the Army,
while awaiting Senate conﬁrmation. According to Major General D.
C. Smith, Deputy Chief of Staff for Information-Army Staff, Abrams
and his family went on a vacation to “drive the country.” Abrams
delighted in conversations with all who would talk to him, from gas
station workers to shop attendants. He had a great faith and respect
for the common people and American society. He sincerely believed
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the Army was a part of that society. During this trip, he conﬁrmed in
his own mind the essential strength of this country and the common
sense and wisdom of the average American.8 Abrams understood
both the importance and strength of the “will” of the public. This
factor would quietly, but consciously, play an important role in his
thoughts in regard to mobilizing the reserve during time of crisis.
THE INTENT AND EMERGENCE OF THE ABRAMS
DOCTRINE: THE 1970S
They’re not taking us to war again without calling up the reserves.
General Creighton Abrams9
as heard by General John Vessey

Abrams had survived the most difﬁcult years and was now in a
position to affect the Army’s future. Lieutenant General Donn Starry
provided an interesting insight into Abrams, the strategic leader,
during an interview for the U.S. Army Oral History Program. He
explained that although Abrams was not a political scientist, he was
a soldier and a realistic leader who uniquely understood the Army’s
mission and the military’s relation to the Nation.10 In 1972, Abrams
brought a new and refreshing perspective as the Army’s chief. This
was easily enhanced by his in-depth knowledge of both the Army’s
active and reserve components. He quietly began to build a strategy
for the “Total Army” (Army, Army Reserve, and Army National
Guard).
His strategy for the future “Total Army” relied heavily on
the entire Army (active and reserve). In fact, he boldly made the
following assertion during his “Posture of the Army Statement” in
1974 in testimony before the Committee on Armed Services, U.S.
House of Representatives:
We consider the Total Force structure, both active and reserve
components, in developing requirements for initial reinforcement and for
mobilization. Obviously, we rely heavily on reserve component forces.
We can make no plans to ﬁght in a major conﬂict without considering
their early mobilization and commitment.11
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Thus, the Abrams Doctrine that provides for the utilization of the
reserve as an important component in Army capabilities was born.
Abrams’ methodology was twofold. First, his increased reliance
on the reserve could quickly increase the Army’s strength. Abrams
committed himself to increasing the Army from a 13-division
structure to a 16-division structure, while maintaining the 785,000
active duty endstrength. Utilization of the reserves allowed the
Army to reach this goal.12 Second, reliance on the reserves also
enabled Abrams to capitalize on an intangible Clauswitzian factor,
the “will” of the American people, which he deeply understood.
General John Vessey, who would later become the Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff, remarked the following about Abrams’ feeling
toward the American people:
He thought about that [appreciation for the kind of a nation America
was] an awful lot, and concluded that whatever we’re going to do we
ought to do right as we are a Nation. Let’s not build an Army off here in
the corner someplace. The Armed Forces are an expression of the Nation.
If you take them out of the national context, you are likely to screw them
up. That was his lesson from Vietnam. He wasn’t going to leave them
in that position ever again. And part and parcel of that was that you
couldn’t go to war without calling up the reserves.13

Thus, in August of 1974, Abrams signed a memorandum to the
Army leadership providing his direct guidance: “We [with the full
support of the Secretary of Defense] are committed ﬁrmly to the
essential task of bolstering the readiness and responsiveness of the
reserve components, integrating them fully into the Total Force.”14
The Army was to entrench maximum utilization of the reserves
deeply into the strategy for future war. Today, there is no doubt
that the Army relies heavily on the expertise, leadership, and sheer
numbers provided by the reserves.
APPLICATION OF THE ABRAMS DOCTRINE:
MOBILIZATION OF THE U.S. ARMY RESERVE COMPONENT
SINCE SEPTEMBER 11, 2001
Today [March 19, 2003], we are in the midst of one of the longest periods
of mobilization in our history…As we prepare to give the Nation
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more options in the Global War on Terror, additional Guardsmen and
Reservists are being mobilized.
Thomas Hall15
Assistant Secretary of Defense
for Reserve Affairs, 2003

It is now almost 30 years since General Creighton Abrams was
the Chief. Nevertheless the Abrams Doctrine continues to live in
U.S. military strategy. In fact, in 2001, the United States found itself
again involved in another possibly long and costly war. However,
the lessons and hardships of the Vietnam War are still vividly clear
for DoD and particularly the Army. One of the lessons learned,
maximum utilization of the reserves, remains a signiﬁcant part
of military strategy. In the Global War On Terror, the application
of the Abrams Doctrine, with regard to the “partial mobilization”
of the reserves, has continued at a feverish pace since September
11, 2001. In fact, using the authority of Title 10 U.S. Code, Section
12302, “partial mobilization,” the President can activate up to one
million reservists (all services) for up to 2 years. The President issued
Executive Order 13223 on September 14, 2001, authorizing “partial
mobilization,” in response to the terrorist attacks of September 11th.
This Executive Order remains in effect today.
In the third year into the Global War On Terror, however, has
the United States overly relied on the Abrams Doctrine, speciﬁcally
within the Army? Has the mobilization of so much of the reserve
component impacted negatively on recruiting and retention for years
to come? What are the effects on civilian employers and the reserve
component families? These questions are essential to understand the
future of reserve forces in national strategy.
THE CURRENT PACE AND TREND OF MOBILIZATION
America’s part-time troops will shoulder a much larger share of the
front-line burden in Iraq next year [2004] than they do now, according
to a troop-rotation plan announced Thursday [November 6, 2003] by the
Pentagon.
Dave Moniz16
Journalist, 2003
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Limited mobilization occurred during the Vietnam War. In fact,
approximately 5,000 soldiers (42 units) were mobilized from the
Army Reserve. Likewise, Executive Order 11406 federalized up to
24,500 soldiers (12,234 actually activated) in the Army Guard. Even
though the 1967 Army Reserve endstrength was 261,000 (418,000
for the Army Guard), the vast majority of this large manpower
pool never mobilized for combat in Vietnam. In order to put this
in context for today, Figure 1 depicts the current breakdown of the
Total Army which is composed of 47 percent active duty Army
soldiers, 33.1 percent Army Guard soldiers, and 19.9 percent Army
Reserve soldiers.
USAR
19
47
33

Active Army
ARNG

Source: Ofﬁce of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs
Figure 1. Fiscal Year 2003, Total Army.
The number of reserve soldiers mobilized for the Vietnam War
pales in comparison to the current mobilization pace for the Global
War on Terror. This appears in the numbers as reported by the
Department of Defense. Since “Partial Mobilization Authority” on
September 14, 2001, (as of February 9, 2004), the Department of
Defense has mobilized over 238,000 Army reserve soldiers.17 Some
critics’ claim that a large number of these soldiers have mobilized
multiple times, a claim widely believed. As of February 2004, this
was simply not true. In fact, less than 3 percent of the Army reserve
soldiers mobilized have been mobilized multiple times in the Global
War on Terror.18 Table 1 depicts the number of soldiers mobilized
and the number of soldiers mobilized multiple times.
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ARNG
141,765
4,465

Mobilized as of February 2004
Multiple Activations

USAR
96,790
1,850

TOTAL
238,555
6,315

Source: Ofﬁce of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs
Table 1. Soldiers Mobilized Since September 14, 2001.
Figure 2 depicts a signiﬁcant trend of utilization of reservists from
September 2001 to October 2003. Heavy reliance on the reservists
in the Global War on Terror is quite apparent. The Pentagon’s
chief spokes-person Lawrence DiRita highlighted this reliance in
reference to Iraq, in November 2003. He explained that by spring
2004, reservists will represent 37 percent of the Total Force in Iraq
compared to 22 percent in November 2003. This equates to 39,000
reserve soldiers, many of whom serve in the three National Guard
brigades that will be on duty in Iraq by spring 2004.19 Simply stated,
the reserve of the Army has been and will continue to be a key player
in the Global War on Terror.
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Figure 2. Recent Mobilization Trend.
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MOBILIZATION AND THE EFFECT ON THE EMPLOYER
It’s a dilemma, by the way, that we’ve faced since the founding of our
Country. When the winds of war were stirring in 1776, John Adams, a
lawyer in Boston wrote to a minister in Boston, ‘we must all be soldiers
now’.
Paul Wolfowitz20

Deputy Secretary of Defense, 2002

DoD must counter the effects of mobilization on the employers
of reservists, if the United States intends to maintain a strong and
ﬂexible reserve force. America’s reserve system requires traditional
training of 1 weekend per month and 15 consecutive days of training
per year. Reserve soldiers rely on their civilian occupation for the
remaining 326 days a year. Thus, the Army is not the reserve soldier’s
primary source of income. Of course, with every mobilization,
soldiers demobilize and return to civilian jobs. In general terms,
satisfaction of the employer weighs heavily on the mind of the
reservist.
As the nation pursues the Global War On Terror and the
Army’s execution of the Abrams Doctrine, what is the employer’s
perspective? Consider two sets of data: ﬁrst, the most comprehensive
study is the “Reserve Employer Survey,” a study conducted by DoD
between 1999 and 2000. Although the survey occurred prior to the
Global War On Terror, most would agree that it provides the greatest
insight into the 21st century reserve soldier/employer relationship.
The second source of data is the “Status of Force Surveys” initially
conducted in May 2003. The Under Secretary of Defense for
Personnel and Readiness directed these surveys (conducted three
times per year) to gather information with regard to current and
critical issues. Both sources provide DoD and the Army leadership
with critical information so that mobilization decisions will not rest
on generalizations or widespread misconceptions.
The “Reserve Employer Survey” rested on interviews conducted
with 2,037 large and small employers nationwide. Employers used
in the survey came from two sources: a representative list of U.S.
employers and a list of employers provided by DoD’s seven military
reserve components.21 The survey yielded the following ﬁndings:
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• 93 percent of employers expressed favorable attitude toward
reserve service.
• 96 percent of employers were satisﬁed with their reservistemployee.
• 92 percent of employers have ﬂexible policies to accommodate
absences.22
However, tougher issues arise with long-term reservists’ absences
from the workplace. Consider these ﬁndings:
• A majority of employers indicated that absence due to military
obligations were too long.
• Nearly 50 percent felt that absences over 14 days caused
problems [in the workplace].
• 80 percent of employers were affected by absence of more than
30 days.
• The impact was greater on smaller businesses; the most serious
effect was increased workload on co-workers.
• More than one-third felt that increased reliance on the reserve
component will cause problems in the workplace in the
future.23
As the Army continues to exercise the Abrams Doctrine, it cannot
afford to neglect the interests of the employers. It is no surprise that
this survey provided these simple but critically important requests
from employers to lessen problems in the workplace. The top three
requests were:
1. Receive copies of reservist’s orders.
2. Receive ofﬁcial notiﬁcation from the military service.
3. Receive longer notiﬁcation times (with rationale for
deployment and likely duration, which provides improved
workload planning for employers, possible lower costs and
decreased resentment).24
DoD designs the “Status of Force Surveys” as concise, web-based
questionnaires to gather critical information regarding current
issues (health care, employer support, activation process, intent to

183

reenlist, etc.). These surveys, integral to DoD’s Human Resources
Strategic Plan, are intent at improving both policy and practice. This
random internet survey in May 2003 elicited over 25,000 responses.
Nearly half of those responding were reservists (all services)
activated within the previous 24 months.25 Their responses to the
survey questions below provide considerable insight. The numbers
in the parentheses indicate the percentage of Army National Guard
(ARNG) or U.S. Army Reserve (USAR) soldiers responding in the
respective category.
Q.10.f. In your opinion, how does your civilian supervisor view
your participation in the National Guard/Reserve?
Very-Somewhat Favorable: (56percent ARNG)/(58percent USAR)
Somewhat-Very Unfavorably: (10percent ARNG)/(12percent USAR)
Q.159.a. For your most recent activation, how much of a problem
was employer support at the beginning of the activation
for you or your family?
Not a Problem-Slight Problem: (79percent ARNG)/(76percent USAR)
Serious-Very Serious Problem: (7percent ARNG)/(9percent USAR)
Q.159.b. For your most recent activation, how much of a problem
was getting the same job back after returning for you or
your family?
Not a Problem-Slight Problem: (86percent ARNG)/(84percent USAR)
Serious-Very Serious Problem: (8percent ARNG)/(8percent USAR)
Q.159.d. For your most recent activation, how much of a problem
was loss of civilian job after returning for you or your
family?
Not a Problem-Slight Problem: (91percent ARNG)/(92percent USAR)
Serious-Very Serious Problem: (6percent ARNG)/(4percent USAR)26
Both of these sources fail to express a signiﬁcant problem in the
reservist/employer relationship, but the surveys also suggest that
this relationship is delicate. DoD must consider employers in the
current and future execution of the Abrams Doctrine because reservist
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morale and livelihood depend on this sensitive relationship. As the
data also suggests, efﬁciently organized and executed mobilizations
can mitigate many of the challenges faced by these employers and
their employees. DoD and the Army must minimize the sacriﬁces
made by reservists’ employers through efﬁcient communication and
predictability (i.e., military orders, expected time-line, etc.).
Even though “only 6 percent of all businesses in the United
States employ reservists,”27 this relationship between employer and
employee is critical to the ability to execute the Abrams Doctrine and
for its continued prosecution of the current Global War on Terror.
So far DoD has not yet abused the Abrams Doctrine according to
employers. However, DoD and the Army leadership must dedicate
themselves to forming and nurturing a strong “Total Army/
Employer Team.” If either member of this team loses credibility,
successful execution of the mobilization process will become
problematic. More importantly, the result will jeopardize the Army’s
ability to prosecute the Global War On Terror.
MOBILIZATION AND THE EFFECT ON THE RESERVE
COMPONENT FAMILY
We cannot continue to rely on our reservists who now comprise
approximately half our force [all services], if their families are not ready
for the stresses and strains of separations and long deployments.
COL James Scott II28

Director of Family Policy
OASD-RA, 2003

The execution of the Abrams Doctrine directly affects reservists’
families. Of course, the execution of the “partial mobilization” in the
Global War on Terror has directly impacted the lives of thousands
of Guard and Reserve spouses and children. In order to determine
if DoD has gone too far in the magnitude of current mobilization,
this author used the most current and comprehensive spousal
assessment, the “2002 Survey of Spouses of Activated National
Guard and Reserve Component Members,” commissioned by the
Ofﬁce of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs
(OASD-RA).29
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Caliber Associates conducted this mail survey from August
through November 2002. Spouses of 4,002 soldiers, activated for
scheduled or unscheduled mobilization periods, responded to the
survey. All mobilizations came after September 11, 2001. Listed
below is a summary of the key issues identiﬁed by this survey.
• Although [family] support is strong for many units, all
families are not being reached.
• Loss of income can be a factor during mobilization, but not all
families suffer ﬁnancial hardship. In fact, many families make
more money during mobilization.
• Some “high risk” families are more likely to need support,
but may be the least likely to seek support. These families are
newly married, with young children, and often isolated.
• Strong [family] programs at the unit level are most
effective.30
Close scrutiny of these issues leads to three observations that
indirectly effect the successful execution of mobilization. First,
many families have seen an increase in income with mobilization
(55 percent of families in Army Reserve received an increase; 65
percent of Army Guard families received an increase). As a result,
the generalization that all mobilizations are a detriment to family
income is simply not true. Second, “high risk” soldiers/families
exist and their identiﬁcation prior to mobilization is critical. The
challenge is to assist the soldier in overcoming the problem prior
to mobilization, in order to avoid discharge due to an inability to
deploy. Third, despite widespread media comments, many families
of reservists are “working through” the challenges of mobilization
and doing well. In fact, survey wide, 61 percent of the spouses said
they were either coping well or very well. Again, another widespread
generalization is simply not true, that is, not all families suffer
tremendous and highly signiﬁcant trauma with the mobilization of
an immediate family member.31
Reliance on the Abrams Doctrine requires the Army’s commitment
to building readiness at the unit level in the Army reserves. The data
cited in this survey indicates there are many dedicated and devoted
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families coping with both scheduled and unscheduled mobilizations
in a commendable manner. Although there are challenges in
reservists’ family readiness, the data from this survey does not
support the generalization that current mobilizations collectively
abuse the families of Army reservists.
MOBILIZATION AND THE EFFECT ON RECRUITING
AND RETENTION
The National Guard sees no indication that the homeland security mission
or the War on Terrorism is having any serious impact on recruiting.
LTG Steven Blum32
Chief National Guard Bureau, 2003

The author utilized the most current data available, ﬁscal yearend 2003 results, to address the impact on recruiting and retention
in the midst of a “partial mobilization.” Both the Army Guard and
Reserve met endstrength for 2003, staying below the attrition ceiling,
as depicted in Table 2. In fact, the Army Guard has met endstrength
requirements for the past seven consecutive years.

Component
ARNG
USAR

Authorized

Actual

350,000
205,000

351,091
211,890

Number
+/% Authorized
1,091
6,890

100.30%
103.40%

Attr
Rate
Ceiling

Actual
Attrition
Rate

18.00%
28.60%

17.20%
20.60%

Source: Ofﬁce of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs.
Table 2. Army Reserve Component Retention, Fiscal Year 2003.
Endstrength is critical, but attrition may be just as important.
Figure 3 depicts the recent attrition history (Fiscal Year 93-Fiscal
Year 03) for both the Army Guard and Army Reserve. Figure 3
indicates Army Guard attrition negatively increased in 2001 and
2002, with positive and signiﬁcant decreases in 2003. Army Reserve
attrition has been on a consistent and positive decline since 2001 and
that trend continues through 2003.
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Figure 3. Army Reserve Component Attrition, Fiscal Years 1993-2003.
Initial indications reveal that the Army is not abusing the
Abrams Doctrine to the extent of reaching a “point of diminishing
return” in reserve recruiting and retention. However, this positive
news must not encourage complacency. Several underlying issues
deserve consideration. First, are soldiers staying in the reserve
component “willingly” or staying because of “stop loss” orders?
The reserve “stop loss” policy is much different than that used by
the active Army. The Assistant Secretary of the Army (Manpower/
Reserve Affairs) has approved reserve component “stop loss”
effective with unit alert for mobilization through 90 days following
demobilization.
Second, how many reservists are currently deployed, but
will not re-enlist following demobilization? The only indicator of
such disenchantment is a survey commissioned by DoD of 40,000
reservists (all services) in Iraq, July 2003. Defense under Secretary
for Personnel David Chu explained the results of the survey to
the Committee on Armed Services, U.S. House of Representatives
on November 5, 2003. Referring to the survey data, he explained
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that 66 percent of the 40,000 reservists in Iraq had intentions of reenlisting.33
Third, the Global War on Terror continues with no end in the
near term. As a result, meeting endstrength in 2003 provides no
guarantees for 2004 or 2005. Acting Secretary of the Army Les
Brown provides insight into the future of retention in the reserve
component. In testimony before the Senate Armed Services
Committee, in November 2003, Brown indicated no problems in
retaining soldiers in the reserves, but indicated that it still may be
too early to realize the effects.34 Republican Senator from Arizona
John McCain countered, “They’re not ready to stay in at this kind
of deployment schedule, [and] might as well be in the Regular
Army.”35
The initial indication is that men and women will continue to
enlist and reservists will continue to re-enlist during this large-scale
execution of the Abrams Doctrine in the Global War on Terror. Thus,
the Army is not abusing the Abrams Doctrine, and recruiting and
retention goals continue to be met.
Overall, the current status of the reserve of the Army is positive.
On the other hand, DoD and the Army cannot afford to “bask in the
sun” of initial good news. Fortunately, the Secretary of Defense has
identiﬁed several challenges related to mobilization issues identiﬁed
with employers, family, and the reserve soldiers themselves. Given
the feverish pace of the current mobilization, DoD and the Army
must work quickly to identify ﬁxes and viable alternatives to achieve
a healthy Army reserve component for the 21st century.
2004 AND BEYOND: THE FUTURE APPLICATION OF THE
ABRAMS DOCTRINE
Reserves and Guardsmen were called up three or four months before
they were needed, to ﬁnd out they were not needed, and many were
given only ﬁve days’ notice, rather than the goal of thirty days, which
really isn’t fair to them. And it’s not fair to their families or their
employers. And that’s not right. . . . We need to ﬁx it, and we’re in the
process of getting it ﬁxed.
Donald Rumsfeld36
Secretary of Defense, 2003
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The Secretary of Defense admits there are several problems
that require correction in the mobilization process. This especially
is signiﬁcant to maintain the reserves as a healthy and key player
in the “Total Army.” To this point in the Global War on Terror, the
Abrams Doctrine has not been abused. But, all must acknowledge
the existance of a sensitive relationship among the reserve unit,
citizen soldier, their families, and their employers. Accordingly,
this author’s purpose in the following paragraphs is to suggest both
recommendations and observations for the future to avoid reaching
a point of “diminishing return” in the nation’s investment in their
reservists.
Mobilizations Must Be More Efﬁcient and Better Communicated.
Maximizing technology for efﬁciency and organization is
critical to improving the mobilization process. The combatant
commander must receive the reserve soldier without delay, while
providing predictability for the family and employer. An example of
capitalizing this technology is the Reserve Component Automation
System (RCAS). One critical asset of this system is the ability to
query mobilization data. Chief Information Ofﬁcer for National
Guard Bureau Maureen Lischke explains that a recent test of this
system dramatically increased the speed and efﬁciency of unit
mobilizations. With further improvements, mobilization-processing
time can be decreased by 60 percent.37
Is the RCAS the answer? The evidence is not clear, but the
potential exists to leverage “state of the art” technology so that the
reserves can be mobilized quickly and efﬁciently. During peacetime,
at least a portion of the DoD budget must be invested into the
mobilization process. All agree that the United States is without a
peer in regard to weaponry, but is the technology to get the reserve
soldier to the “ﬁght” the best the 21st century technology has to
offer? The answer is clearly “No!” DoD must dedicate effort, time,
and dollars toward an efﬁcient and timely mobilization process.
Equally important is the timely communication of accurate
and organized information from DoD and the Army to the reserve
soldier, family, and employer. This information is crucial and has
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direct impact on decisions in the workplace and home. An alert
notice that advises the soldier, family, and employer of the possibility
for near-term mobilization, must be accurate, timely, and clear. The
subsequent “mobilization order” must articulate the situation,
beneﬁts, requirements, and likely duration of the mobilization. As
a critical information tool for the spouse and ﬁrst line supervisor
at the work place, this mobilization order cannot consist of endless
acronyms for the military bureaucratic system. Communicating a
team building attitude at the beginning equates to long-term success
for all; the Army, soldier, family, and employer. Most importantly,
an inclusive attitude of professionalism and sincere concern by the
Army exhibits a dedication to the Abrams Doctrine and the reserve
force.
Employers, Predictability, and the Reserve System.
The Nation should assume that employers, although dedicated
Americans, must consistently maintain a proﬁt in order to stay
active in their respective business. With the continued reliance
and current trend of utilization of the reserves, the time has come
for the political leadership to advocate a form of tax credit for
those employers who hire members of the reserve component.
This tax credit would provide a direct compensation from the U.S.
Government to employers to offset the cost of temporary employees,
additional training, and increased workload in the absence of
mobilized employees. No one questions the loyalty and dedication
of American employers, but this tax credit could signiﬁcantly offset
the cost of this loyalty and dedication while most importantly
decreasing resentment between the reserve soldier (employee),
employer, and the federal government. This is a delicate balance,
but one that is crucial to national security. As a result, this tax credit
for employers can be considered an investment in the defense of the
nation.
Predictability for the reserve soldier, employer, and family is
paramount. Furthermore, mobilizing a reservist for more than 2
years in a 6-year time frame may be counterproductive. The key is
developing a rotational system to maximize both predictability and
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fairness. This rotational system must identify speciﬁc reserve units,
for a speciﬁed time frame with a priority for mobilization. Examples
of a rotational system already exist across the U.S. Military. These
examples include “Air and Space Expeditionary Force rotations”
and Army division/brigade rotations for the Balkans. Adapting
these examples to build an Army reserve component rotational
model must become reality. When units are not on the priority
list for mobilization, units should focus on military education and
continued individual/collective soldier skills qualiﬁcation. Granted,
this rotational system may not work for all units, but it could easily
incorporate the Guard/Reserve battalions, brigades, and divisions.
DoD and the Army now must examine sincerely the relationship
between recruiting and retention on the one hand, and the reserve
soldier’s deployability on the other. It is no longer a question of
“if” the reserve soldier will be mobilized, but “when.” Indeed,
the increasing likelihood of mobilization could contribute to a
decrease in recruiting and retention. Furthermore, the Army reserve
component must review its current personnel realistically to identify
soldiers who are a higher risk than normal of not having the ability
to mobilize. This review of personnel will impact retention directly.
On the other hand, discharging the soldier prior to mobilization due
to a family or an employment issue will avoid the waste of precious
time during an actual activation for long-term service. Although
such dismissals are harsh, these problems typically do not improve
with time. Subsequently, at the point of mobilization, the soldier
cannot mobilize. Worst of all, the reserve soldier does not reach the
combatant commander.
What Next after the Enhanced Brigades Are Used.
In support of DoD and the Department of the Army, the National
Guard Bureau established 15 priority combat brigades. These
“enhanced brigades” have received priority in overall resources,
training, and equipment, as compared to other guard combat forces.
Thus, they maintain a higher rate of readiness. Of course, these units
and soldiers should expect to deploy in relation to a higher state of
readiness in time of conﬂict.
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On the other hand, the lesser priority guard combat units
primarily make up eight National Guard divisions. These units
perceive a less likelihood for mobilization due to less modern
equipment, limited funding, and increased amount of train-up
time following mobilization but prior to deployment for actual
combat. But, surprisingly, before the enhanced brigades and prior to
September 11, 2001, parts of these divisions mobilized for “military
operations other than war,” and deployed to the Balkans. In fact,
the 49th Armored Division, Texas Army National Guard, was the
ﬁrst guard division headquarters to mobilize and deploy since the
Korean War, with a 9-month deployment to Bosnia in 2000. Since
then, several other Guard divisions have completed rotations in the
Balkans.
Now, in 2004, and after prosecution of a manpower intensive
struggle in the Global War on Terror, DoD and the Department of
the Army are reaching a key decision point. Elements of the vast
majority of all the enhanced brigades now have been mobilized and
deployed since 1999 for service in Iraq, Afghanistan, Africa, Sinai,
Bosnia, Kosovo, and global force protection missions or will deploy
in the very near term. At a higher state of readiness, these units and
soldiers should have expected to deploy.
But what reserve combat units are next to mobilize for the Global
War on Terror? The Guard divisions are the only remaining option.
Were these units expecting to mobilize for combat, short of World
War III? Were their family members and employers expecting them
to mobilize for war? Although these questions cannot be analytically
answered, the decision has been made. In fact the Headquarters of
a Guard division, the 42nd Infantry Division, New York National
Guard, will deploy as a part of Operation IRAQ FREEDOM, rotation
3, in late 2004 along with the 256th (Louisiana) and 116th (Idaho)
Enhanced Separate Brigades and the 278th (Tennessee) Enhanced
Armored Cavalry Regiment. Additionally, elements of Guard
divisions will deploy to “plus up” this rotation in Iraq, with the
potential of a Guard division to Afghanistan in the near term.
Thus, DoD has set the precedent for the potential mobilization of
any and all reserve units enhanced or otherwise, for peacekeeping,
limited, and full-scale war. In other words, and regardless of
resourcing levels, the question has become “when” will the reserve
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unit mobilize, not “if.” In the very near term, this will be the true
test of the Abrams Doctrine. This requires an even closer scrutiny
of the reaction of the employers, family members, and the overall
reserve system. How much stress can this sensitive equation of
support at home (family plus employer) sustain before permanent
damage occurs to the overall reserve system in the form of declining
retention, readiness, and overall support of the American people for
their hometown reserve unit? At present, this author cannot answer
these critical questions in full, but guarantees that the answers are
critical to the future execution of the Abrams Doctrine and, more
importantly, the overall readiness of the Army’s reserve.
America’s Aversion to Reserve Component Causalities.
One must assume with the execution of the Abrams Doctrine,
the reserve of the Army will have casualties. In actuality, these
causalities in the reserves, both wounds and death are occurring
now in the Global War on Terror. This leads to the question, “In
the eyes of the American public, is there a difference in a casualty
from the active duty ranks and a casualty from the reserve ranks?”
This author provides an unquantiﬁable “yes.” A casualty from the
reserves is not seen as a regular Army soldier by his community.
For example, prior to mobilization, the reserve soldier was the
hometown banker, high school math teacher, or the downtown
policeman. Although mobilized and deployed to a combat zone, this
reserve soldier still is perceived by his fellow township as a member
of the local community, not a soldier or a warrior. The leadership of
both DoD and the Army must be aware of the risk of causalities and
the public perception when executing the Abrams Doctrine.
Next comes the question, “How many causalities can a hometown
guard unit take before it becomes unacceptable to the conscience
of the local community?” Qualiﬁedly, this question cannot be
answered, but the lesson is that there is a signiﬁcant risk with the
execution of the Abrams Doctrine. One must only go back 13 years
to Operation DESERT STORM, where during a missile attack, a
comparatively large number of reservists became causalities from
one speciﬁc geographical location of the United States. Although
the war ended soon after this incident, the caution still remains just
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as valid: The Abrams Doctrine does not come risk free today in the
Global War on Terror or in the future.
Department of Defense Strategy for the Way Ahead in Utilization
of the Reserves.
DoD has begun to develop a new strategy for the use of reserve
forces in the future. The beginning of this new strategy is a result of
the formal “Review of Reserve Component Contributions to National
Defense,” in December 2002.38 As a follow-up, each U.S. military
service is to re-evaluate force structure, utilizing the Secretary of
Defense’s new planning metrics in his July 9, 2003, memorandum,
“Rebalancing Forces.” The new metrics are twofold: reduce the
need for involuntary mobilization during the early stages of a rapid
response (the initial 15 days) and limit involuntary mobilization to
reasonable, sustainable rates (not more than 1 year in every 6).39
In response to these new metrics and the organization of a
new strategy for the use of reserve forces, the Ofﬁce of the Deputy
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs prepared a
lengthy report, “Rebalancing Forces, Easing the Stress on the Guard
and Reserve,” in early 2004. This report provides a review of each
service’s rebalancing initiatives, within the intent and new metrics
per the Secretary of Defense. Overall, the services’ rebalancing
of force structure is based upon a three-fold approach: resolve
stressed career ﬁelds in the reserve component (i.e., civil affairs,
police, intelligence, air crews, special forces); employ innovative
management practices in the reserve component; and enhance early
responsiveness in the reserve component.40 As per the executive
summary of this report, “It has become evident that the [current]
balance of capabilities in the active and reserve components is not
the best for the future. There is a need for rebalancing to improve
the responsiveness of the force and to help ease stress on units and
individuals with skills in high demand.”41
CONCLUSION
Although this rebalancing strategy has a well-meaning intent, it is
important to remember that many of these processes and structural
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changes require legislative action and years of ﬁscal planning and
spending to result in execution. The intent to increase predictability
and reduce stress on the reserves is an ambitious goal during this
manpower intensive endeavor of Global War on Terror. So, is this
new strategy and method of executing the Abrams Doctrine practical
in 2004 or 2005? No, but it does begin to modify the Abrams Doctrine
for the new demands of the 21st century and not just a strategy to
reorganize the same assets and limited funding of the past. Have the
real core challenges and stresses of the reserves in the post-Cold War
era been identiﬁed clearly? Before development of a new strategy for
utilization of the reserves, DoD must undertake a thorough analysis
of the current Abrams Doctrine “in action.” The modiﬁcations must
be for the new era and not forged from Cold War mentality.
DoD’s current relook at the reserve force in regard to manning
and management must be more unique for the future war ﬁght.
Current restructuring initiatives cannot rest on old solutions and
only for execution in full-scale war. Forming new units of reserve
soldiers willing to participate in speciﬁc reserve units with a higher
than normal readiness rate and expectation for early deployment
is another generation of the enhanced brigades. In contrast, other
initiatives appear to address the real issues: simpler approval
processes which equate to increased predictability, judicious and
prudent use of the reserves, and linking duration of a mobilization
period in relation to effectiveness. Again, these are admirable
initiatives, but most importantly, they require earnest commitment
to the reserve forces by DoD in the form of sincere effort and a
signiﬁcant portion of the Defense budget.
The Army reserve component system has a critical role in national
security. The intent is to provide trained and ready reserve soldiers/
units to the civilian authority and combatant commander to achieve
required objectives. For this reason, the United States maintains
a professional reserve force. This is why sincere analysis and
improvements must be periodically made in regard to the Abrams
Doctrine and the overall mobilization process of the reserve of the
Army. As of now, in the Global War on Terror, collectively there
is not a signiﬁcant overall negative effect on recruiting, retention,
family, or employer. However, research also shows that the citizensoldier concept is fragile, requiring special care, and modiﬁcation for
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a new era. This Nation’s Army reserve component force has no peer
in the world, but requires continuous analysis.
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CHAPTER 8
THE ABRAMS DOCTRINE:
TOTAL FORCE FOUNDATION OR ENDURING FALLACY?
Colonel Brian D. Jones
In December 2002, following the successful completion of
Operation ENDURING FREEDOM, the Secretary of Defense, Donald
Rumsfeld, stated that the “Total Force” policy (e.g., the existing active
component/reserve component force balance) was “hampering his
ability to deploy forces” and suggested that he would seek changes.1
The primary issue of force balance revolves around the necessity of
activating speciﬁc capabilities that reside in the reserve component
to enable the active component to conduct combat operations.
Structurally, active component forces cannot deploy to combat
without activating key reserve component capabilities, a sometimes
cumbersome and politically overt act. Following a similarly
frustrating experience in the subsequent planning and execution of
Operation IRAQI FREEDOM, Rumsfeld issued a memorandum on
July 9, 2003, requesting a review of the composition of the active and
reserve components.
Addressed to the secretaries of the individual service departments,
the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Under Secretaries
of Defense, the memorandum tasked the respective addressees to
review the force balance with a view towards structuring each to
reduce the need for involuntary mobilization during the ﬁrst 15 days
of a rapid response operation (or for any alerts to mobilize prior to
the operation); to structure forces to limit involuntary mobilization
to not more than one every 6 years; to establish a more rigorous
process for reviewing joint requirements to ensure appropriate force
structure; to validate requests for forces to provide timely notice
of mobilization; and to make mobilization and demobilization
more efﬁcient.2 Although much of the requested review deals with
reserve mobilization procedures, the request to structure each
component (e.g., the active component and the reserve component)
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to “reduce the need for involuntary mobilization” caused quite a
stir in the reserve community.3 Although the primary intent of the
proposed rebalancing was purportedly to allow quicker responses
to international crises, reserve advocates saw it as a threat to the
foundations of the Laird “Total Force” policy and commensurately as
a threat to their relevance, resourcing, recruitment, and retention.4
The Laird “Total Force” policy, referred to informally as the
“Abrams Doctrine,” has just exceeded 30 years as a fundamental
basis for the Department of Defense’s (DoD) force structure and
manning policy. During this period it has become institutionalized
in doctrine and accepted as the unquestioned foundation of
the active-reserve balance of forces.5 The Abrams Doctrine has
principally rested on force structure considerations and constraints
that General Creighton Abrams, Army Chief of Staff in the early
1970s, confronted in the post-Vietnam era. Abrams’ actual intention
in advocating this policy represented an attempt both to save force
structure and resource reserve forces adequately.
Despite that fact, the two perceptions most often associated today
with the “Total Force” policy are the necessity of gaining popular
support for committing U.S. forces to combat, and a hidden intent
in the active-reserve force structure to limit presidential powers. The
necessity of gaining popular support has resulted in two interrelated
beliefs: that it is necessary to mobilize the reserves to obtain popular
support for military action; and conversely, that the President must
obtain popular support before mobilizing the reserves. The second
perception is that the “Total Force” policy aimed expressly with
“malice aforethought” to limit the powers of the president.6 Various
constituencies have adopted these perceptions after the fact, and they
are actually fallacies. At the same time, a third function―that of
limiting prolonged combat―was a desired outcome.
The impacts that a protracted war on terror imposes on the
reserve force structure are difﬁcult to predict. Yet, the present
situation requires, and the current Abrams Doctrine provides, both
a convenient and a necessary starting point. In arriving at a future
“Abrams” Doctrine, compromise, the main component in achieving
a solution in the past, provides a remarkable and applicable
ingredient for a future solution.
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Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld is correct that some aspects
of the Abrams Doctrine need discarding, but it is important to retain
the essential core in formulating a new “Total Force” policy. Any
new “Abrams” Doctrine must arrive at a force structure appropriate
to today’s threat, while ensuring the continued relevance of the
reserve component. At the same time, a new “Abrams” Doctrine
must continue to perform the “conﬂict limiting” function that it now
provides.
ARRIVING AT THE ABRAMS DOCTRINE: THE INTENT
The principle architect of the army’s portion of the “Total
Force” policy that evolved from the nation’s Vietnam experience
was Abrams.7 A well-respected, highly decorated soldier, Abrams
was as gruff personally as he was shrewd politically. His tour of
duty, tragically cut short by cancer, coincided with several separate
political forces that allowed him to shape the post-war army to
match his vision of the desirable future force. These political forces
were both international and domestic, and together they provided
Abrams with a near-perfect window of opportunity.
Internationally, the United States was seeking support from its
allies to share the burden of containing the Soviets―especially on
the ground in Central Europe. Coincidentally, the economic and
political recovery of Western Europe made it a more practical time
for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Allies to assume
a larger portion of alliance defense, especially in areas related to
this area of interest.8 Additional host nation support capabilities
for traditional military police duties, transportation support
requirements, and general rear area roles would facilitate a reduction
of active American combat service and combat service support
units without a loss of combat capability. For Abrams, additional
host nation support translated to allowing the total number of U.S.
soldiers in Europe to remain constant, while the number of combat
units expanded as personnel spaces previously required for combat
support and combat service support forces declined.
Domestically, legislative pressure to reduce the size of active
forces and to reinvigorate the role of the reserves increased
signiﬁcantly following Vietnam.9 Budgetary reductions, together
203

with the increased costs of ﬁelding an all-volunteer army and
predictable post-war pressures to reduce the military seemed to
justify cutting the active duty force structure. Abrams, however,
thought that reductions in active duty forces were the last thing
the Army needed, as it shifted its focus back to Europe and the
Soviet threat. Fortunately, newly appointed Secretary of the Defense
James Schlesinger supported Abrams’ desires to resist pressures to
downsize the Army. He was willing even to expand the number of
combat divisions provided Abrams did not raise the total end strength
of the active Army. Signiﬁcantly, these two also agreed that the
Army’s reserve forces would again resource and train in conjunction
and coordination with active forces.10
This led to the formulation of the “Round Out” concept, which
aligned reserve combat and combat support/combat service support
elements with active divisional combat units and thereby preserved
active component manpower spaces for expanding combat forces.
Coupled with personnel space savings from host nation support
overseas, this innovative concept allowed Abrams to carve out three
more division headquarters and their associated combat elements
from current end strength.11
Abrams’ recommended solution to the seemingly divergent
requirements of the active and reserve constituencies was both
simple and brilliant. He expanded the active structure to provide
more combat divisions by relying on the reserve forces to provide
unit-level ﬁll. This allowed him to expand and then maintain the
combat strength of the active army at 16 divisions and also promised
the Army could resource those speciﬁc “round-out” reserve force
units in a fashion comparable to their active brethren.12 Additionally,
he moved the remaining bulk of the Army’s combat support and
combat service support units into the reserves. Thus, the active Army
would rely on alliance members for such support before reserve
forces could arrive for a conﬂict in Europe. Again, this approach
ensured that these particular reserve forces would receive resources
appropriate to their deployment timelines.
There was, however, a “catch” associated with this approach.
The combined results of these actions meant that, in order to ﬁght
a lengthy or serious conﬂict with active forces, especially outside of
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Europe, the President would have to call up the combat support/
combat service support assets from the reserves. As an example,
theater support infrastructure―such as the transportation terminal
brigades and battalions needed to provide the military interface at
commercial seaports of embarkation, deployment support brigades
to assist with loading the equipment on commercial transportation,
and port security companies to provide security at military ocean
terminals―now existed only in the reserve structure.13 Since upwards
of 95 percent of the Army deploys to large scale contingency
operations by sea, such deployment support units must mobilize
early to support the movement of the active heavy combat forces.14
Despite the assertions of some critics, Abrams’ motivation
primarily to preserve a large regular Army should not be a matter
of historical debate. Dr. Conrad Crane points out, that on assuming
the position of chief of staff of the Army as it returned from Vietnam,
Abrams commanded a force undergoing a traumatic transition.
Facing a signiﬁcant drawdown, the shift to an all-volunteer armed
force, and a desire for ethical reform from the rank and ﬁle of an ofﬁcer
corps who believed the Vietnam war had weakened service integrity,
Abrams’ primary goals were to establish an active force structure that
maintained 16 division ﬂags while increasing the readiness of the reserve
components.15

Retaining, even increasing, divisions was more important than any
other consideration for Abrams. At that time, divisions were the
accepted metric for discussing, funding, and opposing the similarly
constructed Soviet threat in Europe. To achieve the number of
divisions in the structure he desired, he had to reinvigorate the
reserve forces. This was realistic and a political necessity based on
the domestic environment.
A second intended outcome of the “Total Force” policy was
for selected elements of the reserves to be resourced in a manner
commensurate with and in consonance with the active forces.
The Cold War forced the Army’s components into a symbiotic
relationship, since “the Cold War was partly responsible for this
increased reliance because the Soviet threat appeared overwhelming
and the cost of maintaining large active forces was prohibitive.”16 The
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nature of the Soviet threat provided relevance and a focus that was
difﬁcult to deny. By tying reserve resources to the active components’
ability to meet and defeat this threat, the Abrams Doctrine provided
the former a mission focus that imparted credibility to their resource
arguments and enabled the successful execution of their retention
and recruitment efforts. The Abrams Doctrine provided the reserves
with relevancy, and it is from that relevancy that the remaining three
“Rs” draw their support.17 Such relevancy is a fundamental necessity
for the reserve components and a source of continuing debate in the
post-Cold War era.
The Abrams Doctrine seemingly addressed each constituency’s
most serious needs. For Abrams and the active component, it allowed
the manning of more pure combat formations, while keeping the costs
associated with that force relatively low. For the reserves, it provided
relevance for political and bureaucratic leverage, promised access
to resources, and resulted in retention and recruiting advantages.
Thus, it was a politically crafted compromise solution to structuring
the force, which continued to operate long after the conditions that
necessitated its inception had changed dramatically. Of course, as
with many intended policy outcomes crafted by governments, there
have been unintended consequences as well.
THE POLITICS OF MEANING: THE ASSOCIATED
PERCEPTIONS
Although designed to address “programmatic” issues, the
Abrams Doctrine became associated with some signiﬁcantly
different perceptions over the intervening years. In fact, one of
the disconcerting aspects of the Abrams Doctrine is that each of
its constituencies has developed its own largely unchallenged
interpretation of the doctrine. Academics, buttressed by the
arguments of a number of authors, see the policy as an attempt
to limit presidential powers. Some of these as well as others,
including military ofﬁcers, see the Abrams Doctrine as an argument
for obtaining popular support prior to mobilization. Still others,
particularly members of the reserve components―speciﬁcally the
National Guard and its many supporters―have interpreted it as a
necessary precursor to military action:
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The Total Force policy of 1973 was designed to gain popular support for
military operations from the American public by mobilizing the National
Guard from its thousands of locations across the United States when
needed.18

In popularizing this interpretation they have helped legitimize
this sentiment, and subsequently raised the linkage between
mobilization and popular support to near canonical status.
Likewise, some associate the active component, fairly or unfairly,
with a supposedly subtle attempt to limit presidential powers by
promulgating a dependence that lies at the heart of the Abrams
Doctrine.19 The restrictive interpretations on American military
interventions associated with both the Weinberger and Powell
Doctrines allegedly have their lineage in the structural limitations
conceived by Abrams.20 Yet, curiously, nowhere in Abrams’
contemporary papers, nor in public statements made at that time, is
there a single hint that Abrams’ intended obtaining popular support
or of imposing incidental constraints on the powers on the executive
branch as outcomes of the new “Total Force” policy. 21 Nonetheless,
each of these articulated beliefs about the Abrams Doctrine retains
a signiﬁcant number of adherents and therefore warrants a closer
examination.
Mobilization and its Relationship to Popular Support.
That there is a linkage between mobilizing the reserves and
committing and maintaining the will of the people in support
of a war remains a generally accepted belief. Advocates of this
line of thinking make either or both of two arguments: ﬁrst, that
mobilization of the reserve forces results in obtaining or increasing
popular support for an intended military action; and, second,
conversely, that the President must ﬁrst obtain the support of the
people in order to mobilize the reserves. It represents a somewhat
confusing tautology. Theoretically, its roots rest on the writings of
Prussian theorist, Carl von Clausewitz.
Clausewitz posits that there exists a remarkable trinity in war
composed of primordial violence, hatred and enmity; the play of
chance; and the interaction of policy. Speciﬁcally, he states that
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these three aspects mainly concern the people, the commander and
his army, and the government.22 He describes the requirement for
leaders in war to keep these three “aspects” balanced so the policies
pursued in regards to one do not occur without regard for their
effects on the others. In effect, he admonishes governments for trying
to go to war without the support of the people. Most probably the
result of his own and Prussia’s experience in the Napoleonic wars,
the application of his theoretical construct to a modern democratic
government still merits consideration. Although Clausewitz does
not guarantee that the preparation and thoughtful orchestration
of all three elements to draw forth and appropriately direct the
maximum power of a nation will guarantee victory, he implies that
failing to manage the relationship of the trinity properly will lead to
defeat.23
More so than the current all-volunteer force, the reserves,
providing representation from numerous small communities
across the country, seem to represent the mechanical linkage that
integrates the key Clausewitzian trinity of the people with the other
two elements. In fact, Colonel Harry Summers’ book, On Strategy, A
Critical Analysis of the Vietnam War, presents a powerful argument
that the U.S. government ignored the “remarkable trinity” (and
other Clausewitzian theory) and suffered defeat in Vietnam as the
will of the people drifted from the policy of the government and the
actions of its army. As Summers argues, someone
. . . needed to tell him [the President] that it would be an obvious
fallacy to commit the Army without ﬁrst committing the American
people. Such a commitment would require battleﬁeld competence and
clear-cut objectives to be sustained, but without the commitment of the
American people, the commitment of the Army to prolonged combat
was impossible.24

In this belief, Summers was not alone. Many defense analysts and
military leaders agreed that President Lyndon Johnson’s decision
was fateful. In fact, it has become a common and oft- repeated
rationale for the defeat in Vietnam.
The lesson learned by the American military in Vietnam involves
the third leg of Clausewitz’s “remarkable trinity,” the people. The
consensus, particularly acute among Army ofﬁcers, seems to suggest
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that the American people have a duty and a role in the authorization of
force beyond that delegated to their elected representatives in Congress
and the President. This conviction can be summed up by the statement
that war is a shared responsibility between the people, the government,
and the military. 25

Abrams’ belief was that the direct result of Johnson’s decision not
to mobilize the reserve forces led not only to defeat, but to serious
damage to each of the Army’s structural components. Many observers
thus assert that Abrams’ chief legacy is that he and his colleagues
became committed to an early mobilization of the reserves.
Does Mobilization Ensure Popular Support?
The objective of ensuring popular support for future wars was not
in any of General Abrams’ writings at the time that the “Total Force”
policy came into effect. Ensuring that the passions of the people
became engaged and remained focused on the outcome of a conﬂict
as a result of this structural forcing function apparently arose through
interviews and writings after the fact. Lewis Sorley was one of the
ﬁrst authors to discuss this objective in depth in his 1992 biography
of Abrams. Summers makes a similar argument in his book offering
a Clausewitzian analysis of the Vietnam War. Although he does not
cite Abrams or the Abrams Doctrine, Summers asserts that for most
of U.S. history, the support of the American people was imbedded
deeply into the very force structure of the American military.26
He stresses the necessity of mobilizing the reserves by citing the
theoretical basis of Clausewitz’s trinity. However, there are critics
who would argue that Summers’ application of the trinity is too
broad in nature; and that “the concept of the “remarkable trinity” is
a basis for the practical political-military analysis of particular wars,
not a description of the social structures―which may alter over
time―that support war.”27 By raising the tendencies of the trinity
to dogmatic status, Summers’ interpretation is certainly open to
criticism. 28
Regardless of the views concerning the validity of the theoretical
linkage between reserve mobilization and obtaining popular support,
the question remains: Is mobilization of the reserve component
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an effective methodology for ensuring support of the war effort?
A review of the effect of mobilizing and deploying reserve forces
since Vietnam indicates that obtaining and maintaining popular
support rests on a number of factors. In regards to the mobilization
prior to the Gulf War and its impact on popular support, one author
suggests:
Although the public rallied behind President Bush in August when he
announced the American military intervention, popular support for
his Persian Gulf policies soon fell sharply. The mobilization of large
numbers of guardsmen and reservists had no impact on that precipitous
drop in public support. Opinion polls showed that the American people’s
support for Bush’s Persian Gulf policy was not restored until U.S. forces
began combat operations.29
A similar trend occurred during the air war over Kosovo. In fact, popular
support has more to do with the results than with the type of components
involved.
The truth is remarkably simple. When the U.S. achieves victory in a just
cause, the public applauds the use of force. When it loses―worse, still,
when America is defeated or runs away (as in Somalia or Vietnam)―the
public reasonably says the use of the military was a mistake.30

In hindsight, the fact that the United States remained heavily
engaged in Vietnam for 9 years (with a belief that achieving victory
was possible for at least 6 of those years) before withdrawing seems
to support such a contention. Also in hindsight, it is now apparent
that such conditional support is not peculiar to democracies.
Gunther Lewy concluded in his review of Vietnam that a mixture
of propaganda and compulsion offers a totalitarian regime an
advantage in a war for limited objectives.31 However, the Soviet
experience in Afghanistan illustrates that any unsuccessful war that
drags on for a long time will inevitably lose the backing essential for
its successful pursuit.32
A review of peacekeeping missions from this same time frame
reveals similar results with respect to support and mobilization.
Although his work focuses speciﬁcally on the inﬂuence of casualties
on public policy, James Burk concludes from an examination of
peacekeeping efforts in Lebanon and Somalia that public support
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was neither as unsteady, nor as critically contingent on the absence
of casualties as many have claimed.33 Interestingly enough, Burk’s
conclusions are that public approval or disapproval for such
missions largely is set before casualties are incurred. This is signiﬁcant
in that he asserts that the political leadership is more responsible for
popular support of military operations than other factors. He bases
this assertion upon a study that concludes that public support for
military deployments rests heavily on consensus (or its absence)
among political leaders.34 Max Boot concurs that the public is willing
to “go along,” if the elites in government and the media remain
favorably disposed.35 In fact, the belief that activating the reserve
component ensures the support of the people may be nothing more
than a well-propagated myth. Accepting, then, that mobilization
does not equate to popular support, the question remains: To what
degree is popular support necessary prior to mobilization?
Mobilization as a Prerequisite?
A variant of the popular support argument is that the president
must ﬁrst gain the popular support of the people prior to initiating
military operations. However, popular support cannot be a limiting
factor, and to make such support a prerequisite for action would be
to paralyze the political leadership. One commentator agrees:
As for explaining its failures or half-successes since World War II, even
thoughtful general ofﬁcers declared that to have victories, you must
have the political will―and that means the will of the administration,
the congress, and the American people. All must be united in a desire
for action. If accepted, such an extreme pre-condition―a unity that has
escaped the United States in every major war except the World Wars―
means that the civilians will always disappoint the military and the
soldiers will always have an excuse.36

In the history of American arms, popular support rarely has occurred
before hand, and certainly has not been a guarantee after the action
begins. Were it a prerequisite to action, the United States would
have engaged in few, if any, of the wars that have made it a great
power. This is so in limited conﬂicts, in peacekeeping operations, or
in “crusades.”
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The quest to obtain the ever-elusive goal of popular support for
military action will not result necessarily from any single event and
cannot be guaranteed under most circumstances. Mobilization does
not result in obtaining popular support. Popular support is not a
prerequisite to military action. There are too many variables in the
dynamic equation that determines the relationship of mobilization,
presidential decisions, and making popular support to assign
outcomes with any degree of certainty.37 The supposedly irrefutable
argument of the role of reserves as a linkage among the trinity,
although politically attractive, remains both dubious and unproven.
Effective political leaders able to reach a policy consensus, or at
least able to maintain consensus long enough to initiate action on
favorable terms, possess power sufﬁcient to take the nation to war,
including mobilization of reserve forces. Hence, the belief that a
cause and effect relationship exists between mobilizing the reserves
and ensuring popular support possesses little validity, just as the
idea that popular support is necessary prior to acting is equally
without basis. To continue to accept either of these arguments serves
no purpose in formulating a future policy.
Tying the President’s Hands?
Related to the argument that the President must gain popular
support prior to mobilizing the reserve component is one that the
active dependence on reserve mobilization came about speciﬁcally
from a desire to limit the President’s ability to commit the nation to
war. Lewis Sorley, based on an interview he conducted with then
General (Retired) John Vessey in 1988, argues that the general was
the originator of the characterization of the Abrams Doctrine as
being designed with “malice aforethought.”38 He details what in
Vessey’s belief was an unmistakable effort on the part of Abrams to
tie deployment of active forces to the mobilization of the reserves not
in order to gain popular support, but to force the President to seek
approval prior to acting. It is tough to argue with an authority like
Vessey, although Crane raises doubts based on the time elapsed, the
lack of any contemporary documents to support the assertion, the
seriousness of formulating and disguising the intent of such an act,
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and the characterization of Abrams’ service made by Schlesinger.39
Correctly, Crane points out that “interpretations that the true
motivation for the new force structure was purposefully concealed
from civilian decisionmakers or that the justiﬁcation was only created
after the fact to preserve current policy are both troubling.”40
Regardless of the intent, it appears that most presidents have
not been constrained in their actions, with or without this supposed
inﬂuence of the Abrams Doctrine. Other attempts at restraining
executive branch power, such as the Weinberger or Powell Doctrines
or the War Powers Resolution have had little impact on the exercise
of presidential discretion. As Jeffrey Record points out
. . . with the exception of Jimmy Carter, they [recent Presidents] have
displayed a greater propensity to intervene in foreign civil wars than did
their pre-Vietnam predecessors. Reagan sent U.S. forces into Lebanon and
Grenada. Bush intervened in Panama, the Philippines, and Somalia. And
Clinton has intervened in Haiti and Bosnia. In none of these instances
were fundamental U.S. security interests at stake or was a White House
full-court press mounted to mobilize congressional and public opinion
on behalf of intervention.41

The question of whether the Abrams Doctrine aimed at curtailing
executive branch powers is actually moot. It clearly does not. It is
nothing more than an inconvenience, which is one reason the current
Secretary of Defense is trying to change it. In fact, the lore associated
with its design may be more harmful than it is worth, as Elliot
Cohen (among other scholars) has noted: “This was, nonetheless an
extraordinary effort by the military to limit the choices available to
their civilian masters, to tie the hands of policymakers through the
seemingly technical manipulation of organizational structures.”42
It is only natural that the civilian leadership would interpret
such an effort to undermine civil-military relations as extremely
disingenuous. However, the evidence would indicate that the
accepted belief of a malice aforethought simply is not accurate.
THE ABRAMS DOCTRINE’S TRUE LEGACY!
Abrams’ intent is being misinterpreted and others have obscured
its true legacy. The unseen and often overlooked brilliance of the more
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subtle, associated outcome of the Abrams Doctrine is not that it uses
the reserves as a forcing function in limiting the active component’s
commitment in an action, but in its clever method of leveraging the
reserves to get the active component out of an action. The use of the
reserves does not cause the President to reconsider the commitment
of forces when weighing matters of national security. Nonetheless,
with its presence in 2,700 communities across all 54 states and
territories, the mobilized and committed reserve components bring
the political pressure of their elected representatives to bear to end
a crisis that appears to be unsuccessful.43 This effect may be even
more necessary with an all-volunteer force than it was with a draftee
force.
Abrams witnessed the death and debilitating effects on both
the nation and on the Army through 9 years of feckless action in
Vietnam. His World War II experiences assisted him a great deal in
realizing the impact of failing to introduce reserve forces on ending
the Vietnam War. In fact, Abrams’ legacy is not in preventing the
United States from going into another Vietnam, but in ensuring that
its military actions do not remain indecisive for prolonged periods
as a result of congressional inaction. His design ensured that a
mobilized reserve component would generate the political focus
on future wars reﬂective of the mobilized reserves’ representative
community basing.
This interpretation would change Summers’ assertion that
“without the commitment of the American people, the commitment
of the Army to prolonged combat was impossible” to “with the
commitment of the American people, the commitment of the
Army to prolonged combat was impossible.”44 The misperception
that Abrams sought to undermine the executive’s constitutional
authority is ironic. In fact, his design strengthened the constitutional
role of Congress. Additionally, by removing doubts about the
motives associated with this policy, it reinforces Schlesinger’s
characterization of Abrams as the epitome of a “good servant.”45
If there is a forcing function imbedded in the design of the force
structure instituted by the Abrams Doctrine, the conﬂict curtailing
function may be it.
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THE FUTURE DIRECTION OF THE ABRAMS DOCTRINE
Current international and domestic political pressures differ
markedly from those of 30 years ago, and although they may be more
familiar, they are no less pressing. Internationally, the disappearance
of the Soviet threat, the continued decline in the defense budgets of
traditional allies, the public opposition to U.S. policies by numerous
international and nongovernmental actors, the rise of transnational
terrorism, and the hesitance of other nations to provide forces and
access to assist the U.S. form a different context for force planning.46
The sometimes-public resentment of what former allies now choose
to interpret as unilateral or hegemonic actions by the United States
is also causing a decrease in host nation and allied force support.
These international tensions are both lessened and exacerbated
by domestic realities. Given these changes in the threat and in the
international and domestic environments, the future direction of the
Abrams Doctrine requires careful deliberation.
Although improbable, it remains possible that the compromise
Abrams conceived has no future. The impacts that a protracted war
on terror will have on the reserve force structure are difﬁcult to
predict. Yet change is necessary, and the current Abrams Doctrine
provides both a convenient and a necessary starting point. The
actual intent, central to Abrams’ compromise then and to any
compromise now, focuses on ensuring reserve component relevance
and on an active-reserve force balance within a constrained endstrength. While maintaining relevance is vital, equally critical is the
balancing of force capabilities across the range of military operations
and in consonance with overseas, homeland defense, and homeland
security missions. In attaining this balance, it is likely that only a
future “conﬂict curtailing” function merits retention from the design
of the current active-reserve force. Nonetheless, it is possible that
the hardest question surrounding the future direction of the Abrams
Doctrine is the one Rumsfeld did not ask: Is balancing the force
really all that is required? In arriving at a future “Abrams” Doctrine,
compromise, the main component in achieving a solution in the
past, provides a remarkable and applicable ingredient for a future
solution.
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THE FUTURE AND RESERVE COMPONENT RELEVANCE
Without the specter of a Soviet invasion of Europe, and following
the failure of reserve combat units to be employed during Operation
DESERT STORM, the relevance of portions of the reserve forces came
into question. This was highlighted in 1997 when the Quadrennial
Defense Review did not even mention the speciﬁc utilization,
integration, or modernization of the reserves.
This was due primarily to the active component view of the National
Guard combat units as a strategic reserve, In other words, the two major
theater war scenario involved only the active component divisions.
National Guard combat units would only be called upon in such a
scenario if the conﬂict was not resolved within a speciﬁed time frame,
or if active forces were required to redeploy to another conﬂict. Based
on existing deployment practices, National Guard combat units would
deploy to theater 45-60 days after mobilization, and would be committed
only when the situation was under control. Basically, the National Guard
was viewed as less “relevant” to future war ﬁghting requirements.47

Largely driven by budgetary requirements, reserve supporters
allege that the active forces attempted to relegate the reserve combat
unit contributions to post-combat periods in an effort to avoid
modernization costs.48 This is a practical demonstration of how
relevance translates to resources for the reserve forces, and this
rift developed into a fraternal bureaucratic ﬁght of such particular
ferocity that both the Deputy Secretary of Defense and the National
Defense Panel commented adversely.49 Clearly, this type of inﬁghting
weakens the symbiotic relationship and reserve relevance once born
and nurtured by the Soviet threat.
Relevance remains a concept that even the active force wrestles
with openly. The recently appointed Army Chief of Staff adopted
the motto of “Relevant and Ready” as the theme of his tenure.
Relevance for the reserves, and the resources, retention, and
recruiting that are its downstream effects remain a foundation of
the future Abrams Doctrine. The United States can obtain structural
relevance by linking reserve component units to complementary
active capabilities, by including unique supplementary capabilities
in the reserves, or by assigning homeland defense or homeland
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security roles to the reserves. Whatever missions or roles assigned to
the reserves, it is imperative that they be linked to the “Total Force,”
and be related directly to the capabilities required to face the current
threat. Relegating a sizable portion of the reserves to unrealistic
missions or seldom-used functions will destroy their relevance. The
destruction of their relevance will only serve to destroy the subtle
curtailing function they provide, as unnecessary or seldom-used
capabilities do not require mobilization. The relevance of the reserve
forces, a foundation of the future force design, cannot be jeopardized.
However, retaining relevance without building a balanced force is
meaningless as well.
THE FUTURE AND FORCE BALANCE
Several factors now inﬂuencing the balancing debate do not
align as easily as those that faced Abrams in 1973. The advent and
success of the all-volunteer force now acts as a huge impediment
towards any near-term or future growth of the active component.
Regardless of critics of a “poverty draft” or of questions surrounding
the future availability of a sufﬁciently qualiﬁed recruiting pool, the
all-volunteer force is providing the necessary human raw material
to ﬁll the military’s force structure.50 In fact, the largest argument
against the all-volunteer force and a tremendous dampening factor
in expanding the active component is its cost. Recruiting, training,
retaining, and supporting the retirement of an active duty service
member is expensive when considered in the context of other DoD
costs.
As defense budgets decline, personnel costs compete with
modernization costs in each service’s budget. Modernization costs
continue to rise all too quickly, prompting one defense industry
executive to joke that by 2054, it will require the entire defense budget
to purchase a single aircraft.51 This competition for defense dollars
explains why the Secretary of Defense examined the reduction of the
active Army to just eight divisions as recently as 2001.52 He initially
envisioned a division of labor between the active and reserve forces
that maintained the current modernization direction by reducing the
size of the active force and increasing the utilization of the reserve

217

force. In effect, he rebalanced the force to assign more missions
requiring mobilization to the reserves to preserve modernization for
the active force.
This approach explains why the Army and DoD’s leadership
remain opposed to recent congressional efforts to raise the size of
the Army’s active component by two divisions without a reasonable
guarantee that Congress will sustain the additional funding for
such an increase in force levels for the foreseeable future.53 Neither
Congress nor the Army seems willing to reduce procurement
funding. Nonetheless, the impacts of the budgetary pressures to
reduce the active forces led to a commensurate reliance on the
manpower of the reserves. Interestingly, while the active forces
declined from 18 to 10 divisions, the reserve forces retained all 8 of
their divisions, not counting 15 enhanced separate brigades. Critics
maintain that, in an effort to preserve the current 10 divisions at all
costs, the active forces focused modernization funds on the “core
competency” of ﬁghting and winning a conventional war and
encouraged an increased role in stability and support operations
for the reserves as necessitated by the requirements of the National
Security Strategy and the emerging threat environment.54
The renewed threat of transnational terror organizations and the
emerging necessities of ﬁrst responder duties as part of homeland
security missions for the reserve forces make the balancing debate
even more complex. In the past, the selected transfer of what the
military terms military operations other than war critical active
forces to the reserves (e.g., civil affairs, military police, and engineer
vertical construction assets) had little noticeable effect or impact
domestically.55 However, as the deployment requirements for
reserve forces compete with both disaster response and anticipated
homeland defense requirements, tensions experienced throughout
the active and reserve force structure are reﬂected among state-level
political leadership.56 For example, skills now required by the active
forces may not be replaced in reserve formations or be replaced
by skills that are not as easily recruited, retained, or utilized by
the states’ leadership. The transfer of military police, medical,
vertical construction, or civil affairs specialties (i.e., those required
for ﬁrst responder duties) now is much noticed. As a result, when
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the senior leadership of the Army openly discusses the possibility
of transferring nearly 125,000 manpower spaces with many of
the aforementioned skills back into the active forces to fulﬁll the
Secretary of Defense’s rebalancing tasking, it only serves to heighten
these tensions.57 Couple these pressures with those now being voiced
over the extended and repetitive deployment of reserve forces and
the higher casualty rates these forces are experiencing in Operation
IRAQI FREEDOM’s stability and support operations, and the
pressures to reexamine the reserve’s role in overseas deployments
in regards to homeland defense and security missions grow even
more.58
Balancing active and reserve structure and capabilities between
the current international and domestic environments in consideration
of the National Security Strategy admittedly is a difﬁcult proposition.
An active force supported by a three-tiered reserve (including units
earmarked, recruited, and retained speciﬁcally for expeditionary
actions, homeland defense, and homeland security) is one proposed
concept.59 However, any action to limit employment of portions
of the reserve force to hostile environs overseas may undermine
the conﬂict curtailing function that mobilization provides. Such
steps require a careful balancing of district representation among
the reserve forces earmarked for deployment to preserve this
vital function. Clearly, the active component must accomplish
its immediate missions without reliance on the reserves. Just as
clearly, the reserves require a degree of redundancy of active force
capabilities that are complementary, supplementary, and neither
too expensive nor too speciﬁc to retain in the active forces. This new
total force structure cannot be skewed towards combat operations,
but requires capabilities that address the entire spectrum of conﬂict
distributed prudently across each component. Balancing the force is
a complicated and politically delicate act indeed.
Regardless of the force balancing solution derived, the new
Abrams Doctrine must preserve the existence of complementary and
supplementary capabilities resident in both active and reserve forces
in case changes in the strategic environment require an unforeseen
and rapid expansion of the defense capabilities of the nation. The
multiple defense challenges reﬂected in the attacks on the World

219

Trade Center, the Anthrax scare, and in Operation IRAQI FREEDOM
provide excellent examples of just how diverse a force structure the
United States requires.
THE SPIRIT OF THE ABRAMS DOCTRINE: THE WAY AHEAD
Retention of the Abrams Doctrine as originally designed and
now executed is no longer feasible, but incremental modiﬁcation is
preferable to discarding a policy that retains desired qualities at this
point in time. Whether divisions or brigade combat teams become
the “coin of the realm” for measuring the size of the active forces is
not as important as ensuring that the capabilities required to project,
sustain, and conduct combat operations sufﬁcient to defeat the most
likely enemies balance properly amongst the components. The combat
curtailing function provided by ensuring that the congressional
representatives of the mobilized reserves scrutinize the actions of
committed forces remains a key quality that necessitates retention
in any future force structure. Americans would ignore this function,
not understood fully in the aftermath of the bitter defeat of Vietnam,
at considerable peril in the future. Integral to designing the future
force balance is redeﬁning the desired role of the reserves in direct
support of the active forces overseas, in support of homeland defense
requirements, and in support of homeland security requirements. In
accomplishing this, the relevance of the Army’s reserve component
in performing the diverse military missions envisioned by the
original Abrams Doctrine remains essential to recruit, retain, and
resource the reserve force.
Just as modifying the current Abrams Doctrine necessitates the
retention of key qualities, so too does it require the elimination of
several associated perceptions. The perception that structurally
tying the deployment of the active force to the mobilization of the
reserves creates or ensures a degree of popular support is a myth.
It should be discounted. Structurally tying mobilization of the
reserve component to employment of the active force has little, if
any, demonstrated effect on presidential decisionmaking. Since
there is little supporting evidence to justify this belief, the Army
should refute loudly the “malice aforethought” claims related to its
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supposedly nefarious attempt to restrain presidential power through
structural design. When crafting the new “Abrams” Doctrine, all
concerned should take particular care that the motivations, intent,
and processes are visible and “transparent,” thereby avoiding the
types of negative connotations that gain the military an array of
academic and political critics for no sound reason.
Possibly, the larger question is the one Secretary Rumsfeld did
not ask: What is the fundamental relationship of the reserves to
the active force in the future? Rather than merely examining the
balance, perhaps the entire reserve-active force relationship needs
revisiting. Depending on how one views the current war on terror
(e.g., as a relatively short-term operation or as an open-ended
commitment that may last 50-100 years), the solution to this question
may require a structural adjustment more far reaching than a mere
rebalancing of the force. A long-term requirement for continually
mobilizing reserve forces may not be possible with the all-volunteer
force. In all likelihood, the reserve forces possess a “tipping point”
which extended deployments will trigger that will either compel
soldiers to choose a nondeployable arm of the future reserve force,
or cause them to opt not to serve. Neither option bodes well for a
viable active-reserve relationship to continue in anything close to
its present form. Even if DoD modiﬁes the reserve force to include
the three-tiered framework cited above, the challenges in designing
a single force that could perform the diverse roles of homeland
security, homeland defense, and providing relevant augmentation
to the active combat forces are incredible. The global war on terror,
which began by the physical destruction of the twin towers, may
have wrecked conceptually the active-reserve relationship that has
endured for decades. If nothing else, it revealed that the activereserve compromise forged in the 1970s is no longer applicable to
today’s threat environment, and hints that rebalancing the force may
not solve the problem in its entirety. What, then, is the way ahead?
The Army consumes a vast amount of internal leadership and
bureaucratic energy ﬁghting battles over roles and missions once
deﬁned by an ingenious compromise. That DoD and Army leadership
has allowed this landmark compromise, known as the Abrams
Doctrine, to exist in name only for the past 12 years is understandable,
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given the changing nature of the international security environment.
The current Secretary of Defense appears to be examining options
for a solution to this problem. But a solution requires willingness to
compromise by all parties; and the fundamentally political nature of
this dilemma means that compromise remains the main ingredient
in formulating a solution to the rebalancing effort. Compromise will
be possible only if the ﬁnal goal is kept fully in mind, and only when
all those creating other subordinate goals, developing personal
agendas, or inserting personal priorities remember that “an army’s
function is not to serve itself, but its society.”60 Even if compromise
is achieved in revising the current Abrams Doctrine, there remains a
lingering sense that this is but the ﬁrst step in redeﬁning the activereserve relationship required in the future security environment.
Secretary Rumsfeld is correct that some aspects of the Abrams
Doctrine need discarding, but it is important to retain the essential
core in formulating a new “Total Force” policy. Any new “Abrams”
Doctrine must arrive at a force structure appropriate to today’s threat
while ensuring the continued relevance of the reserve component. At
the same time, a new “Abrams” Doctrine must continue to perform
the “conﬂict limiting” function that it now provides.
ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 8
1. Bruce Jacobs, “Lessons Lost?” National Guard Magazine Online, March
2003. Jacobs is one of several authors from the National Guard Association of the
United States that are attacking Rumsfeld’s policy initiative. He offers a vigorous
argument relying on his own, and Lewis Sorley’s) summation of the post-Vietnam
events that led to the establishment of the Abrams Doctrine.
2. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, “Rebalancing Forces,”
memorandum for Secretaries of the Military Departments, the Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Under Secretaries of Defense, Washington, DC, The
Pentagon, July 9, 2003.
3. Jacobs, p. 5.
4. Randy Pullen, “Keep The Reserves In The Fight,” Strategic Studies Institute
Newsletter, October 2003; and Lewis Sorley, “Creighton Abrams and Active
Reserve Integration in Wartime,” Parameters, Summer, 1991, pp. 35-50. Both offer
a general summary of the beneﬁts gained by the reserve component forces based
on the Abrams Doctrine.
5. Joint Chiefs of Staff, “Joint Doctrine for Mobilization Planning,” Joint
Pub 4-05, Washington, DC, Joint Staff, June 22, 1995, pp. 14-16. This publication
222

illustrates the acceptance of the Abrams Doctrine. It states that the “Total Force
Policy is one fundamental premise on which our military force structure is built.
It was institutionalized in 1973 and caused a shift of substantial military roles and
missions to the Reserve Component along with resources necessary to maintain
high levels of readiness, especially in units that are needed early in a crisis.”
Additionally, Lewis Sorley, in “Creighton Abrams and Active Reserve Integration
in Wartime,” p. 48, reﬂects that after the passage of years, the active component
came to depend on the reserves “so much so that it became an article of faith―as
Abrams had planned―[that] the Army could not go to war without them.”
[Emphasis added]
6. Sorley, “Creighton Abrams and Active Reserve Integration in Wartime,” p. 45.
7. Technically, the complete “Total Force” policy was ofﬁcially named for the
then Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird. Over the years, perhaps because it had the
greatest impact on and implications for the Army, it has become more common to
simply refer to it as the “Abrams Doctrine.”
8. Simon Lunn, “Burden Sharing in NATO,” Royal Institute of International
Affairs, Chatham House Papers #18, London, 1983, p. 15. Lunn discusses the
potential advantages to the United States of the then resurging post-war Western
European economies.
9. Lewis Sorley, Thunderbolt: General Creighton Abrams and the Army of his
Times, New York, 1992, p. 365. Sorley provides an excellent summary of the
political environment facing Abrams at the time. See also Richard Lock-Pullen,
“An Inward Looking Time: The United States Army, 1973-1976,” The Journal of
Military History, No. 67, April 2003, pp. 483-512.
10. Ibid., p. 365.
11. Sorley, “Creighton Abrams and Active Reserve Integration in Wartime,”
pp. 45-47. Sorley cites an interview he conducted with General William DePuy,
U.S. Army retired, where DePuy claimed to have conceived the “roundout”
concept.
12.Ibid., p. 45.
13. Joint Pub 4-05, p. IV-8.
14. The statistics concerning the Army’s deployment by sea are based on
remarks made by a speaker participating in the Commandant’s lecture series, U.S.
Army War College, AY 2004.
15. Conrad C. Crane, Avoiding Vietnam: The U.S. Army’s Response to Defeat
in Southeast Asia, Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2002, p. 5.
Dr. Crane bases his ﬁndings upon the contemporary sources located in Abrams’
personal papers stored at the U.S. Army Military History Institute.
16. Charles E. Heller, Total Force: Federal Reserves And State National Guards,
Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 1994, p. 1.

223

17. Pullen, “Keep The Reserves In The Fight,” p. 2. Pullen discusses the
necessity of relevancy in rebuilding, and indirectly, in maintaining) the reserve
forces. Heller’s Total Force also covers this topic extensively on pp. 30-35.
18. National Guard Posture Statement, FY 2000, Appendix B: “Constitutional
Charter of the Guard,” p. 3, as quoted in Spencer W. Robinson, The Role of the Army
National Guard in the 21st Century; Peacekeeping Vs. Homeland Security, Monterey,
2002, p. 18.
19. Elliot A. Cohen, Supreme Command: Soldiers, Statesmen, and Leadership in
Wartime, New York, 2002, p. 186.
20. Ibid., p. 204. Additionally, see F. G. Hoffman, Decisive Force, The New
American Way of War, Westport, CT, 1996, pp. 100-101; and Max Boot, Savage Wars
Of Peace: Small Wars and the Rise of American Power, New York, 2002, pp. 318-335.
21. Crane, Avoiding Vietnam, pp. 5-6. Crane states that, although Abrams’
subordinates later claimed he also had a long-term vision to ensure that no
president could ever ﬁght another Vietnam without mobilization, that claim is
neither clariﬁed nor supported by available documents.
22. Carl von Clausewitz, On War, trans and ed. by Michael Howard and Peter
Paret, Princeton, 1976, p. 89.
23. James O. Kievit and Thomas P. Murray, “Citizen Soldiers in a 21st Century
Army At War,” Center for Strategic Leadership Issue Paper, Vol. 09-03, October 2003.
24. Harry G. Summers, Jr., On Strategy: A Critical Analysis of the Vietnam War,
Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1982, p. 13.
25. Hoffman, Decisive Force, p. 30.
26. Summers, On Strategy, p. 13.
27. Christopher Bassford and Edward J. Villacres, “Reclaiming the
Clausewitzian Trinity,” Parameters, Autumn, 1995.
28. In fact, Bassford and Villacres continue (on page 5) by suggesting that
Summers’ advocacy of a “social” trinity formed by the people, the government,
and the army is such an alteration of Clausewitz’s initial concept as to recommend
it be referred to as the “Summersian trinity.”
29. Charles J. Gross, American Military Aviation in the 20th Century: The
Indispensable Arm, College Station, TX, 2002, p. 260. Although such sentiment is
forgotten now, Gross cites numerous sources to support the assertion that the ﬁrst
Gulf War was a contentious and divisive issue until hostilities commenced.
30. Humphrey Taylor, “Win in Kosovo And The Public Will Approve,” The
Wall Street Journal, June 1999, p. A26.
31. Guenter Lewy, America In Vietnam, New York, 1978, p. 43.
32. Hoffman, Decisive Force, p. 32.
33. James Burk, “Public Support for Peacekeeping in Lebanon and Somalia:
Assessing the Casualties Hypothesis,” Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 114, No. 1,
Spring 1999.
224

34. Ibid., pp. 5, 12. He summarizes Eric V. Larsen’s argument from Casualties
and Consensus, Santa Monica, 1996. See also Boot, Savage Wars of Peace, pp. 327330.
35. Boot, Savage Wars of Peace, p. 329.
36. Cohen, Supreme Command, p. 204.
37. If nothing else, Alan Beyerchen’s discussion of Clausewitz’s writings with
respect to nonlinearity illustrates these points rather adeptly. See Alan Beyerchen,
“Clausewitz, Nonlinearity and the Unpredictability of War,” International Security,
Vol. 17, No. 3, Winter 1992, pp. 59-90.
38. Sorley, “Creighton Abrams and Active Reserve Integration in Wartime,”
p. 45.
39. Crane, Avoiding Vietnam, pp. 5, 21.
40. Ibid., p. 20-21.
41. Jeffrey Record, The Creeping Irrelevance of U.S. Force Planning, Carlisle
Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 1998, p. 10.
42. Cohen, Supreme Command, p. 186.
43. Robinson, The Role of the Army National Guard in the 21st Century, p. 19.
Robinson is used to cite the number of communities and states/territories. See also
Victor Davis Hanson, Carnage and Culture: Landmark Battles in the Rise of Western
Power, New York, 2001, p. 442, for his discussion of constant political audit.
44. Summers, On Strategy, p. 13.
45. Crane, Avoiding Vietnam, p. 5.
46. This is predominantly general knowledge, but these ideas are themes
gathered from the in-class discussions of Seminar 7, U.S. Army War College,
during Academic Year 2004.
47. Robinson, The Role of the Army National Guard in the 21st Century, p. 49.
48. Ibid., p. 57.
49. Ibid., p. 51.
50. Claire Shaeffer-Duffy, “Uncle Sam Hustles to Keep the Ranks Filled,”
National Catholic Review Online, December 30, 2003.
51. Stan Crock, “Less Bang from the Pentagon’s Bucks” Business Week Online,
March 29, 2002. Crock cites a comment attributed to Norman R. Augustine,
referred to anecdotally as “Augustine’s Law.” It states that in 1983, Lockheed
Martin Chairman and CEO Augustine looked at the trajectory of per-unit costs for
jet ﬁghters and the trajectory of increases in the defense budget and formulated
something he dubbed “the First Law of Impending Doom or the Final Law of
Economic Disarmament.” He [Augustine] wrote back then: “In the year 2054, the
entire defense budget will purchase just one aircraft. This aircraft will have to be
shared by the Air Force and Navy 3 1/2 days each per week except for leap year,
when it will be made available to the Marines for the extra day.”
225

52. David Pyne, “New Army Brigade Plan is Dangerous,” Military.Com,
November 5, 2003.
53. Jim Garamone, “Army Chief ‘Adamantly Opposes’ Added End
Strength,” Defense Link, January 29,2004. Gammarone, writing for the Armed
Force Information Service, was one of many who cited the Army’s concern with
Congress giving the “military an unfunded order―meaning that the service must
take the money from other areas to fund the requirement.”
54. Robinson, The Role of the Army National Guard in the 21st Century, pp. 57-59.
55. Record, The Creeping Irrelevance of U.S. Force Planning, p. 21.
56. As an example, see Mike Madden, ‘’Mobilization for Iraq Hits W. Va.,
Kentucky Hard” The Herald Dispatch, February 27, 2003.
57. This comment is based on remarks made by a speaker participating in the
Commandant’s Lecture Series, AY 2004.
58. Robert Burns, “Most U.S. Iraq Deaths Are Reservists.” Comcast News,
January 1, 2004.
59. Philip Gold and Erin Solaro, “Wrecking . . . and ﬁxing the Reserves.”
Washington Times, October 15, 2003.
60. Cincinnatu, Self Destruction: The Disintegration And Decay Of The United
States Army During The Vietnam Era, New York, 1981, p. 44. This book, because its
views represent a distinctly different perspective of the Army as an institution and
of the ofﬁcer corps in Vietnam, should be required reading for every ofﬁcer.

226

CHAPTER 9
SECURE THE VICTORY:
IS IT TIME FOR A STABILIZATION
AND RECONSTRUCTION COMMAND?
Lieutenant Colonel Eric L. Ashworth
Take up the White man’s burden–
And reap his old reward:
The blame of those ye better,
The hate of those ye guard.
Kipling

Why is the U.S. Army so reluctant to change? Have past
victories made leaders fearful of disrupting a good thing?
Unfortunately, history is full of examples of military organizations
that were victorious one day but defeated the next. The current
transformation of the U.S. Army into a leaner, lethal and more
rapidly deployable force is impressive. However, is this effort
developing the appropriate force to solve the current and future
national requirements? According to Joint Vision 2020, the ultimate
goal of the U.S. military is to achieve “full spectrum dominance―the
ability of U.S. forces, operating unilaterally or in combination with
multinational and interagency partners, to defeat any adversary and
control any situation across the full range of military operations.”1
This dominance requires the ability to conduct military operations
in both combat and noncombat situations.2
The military operations that destroyed the Iraqi Army in two
Persian Gulf Wars have demonstrated the dominant combat
capabilities of the United States. On the other hand, the tragic
outcome of Operation RESTORE HOPE in Mogadishu and the
current instability in Iraq creates doubt as to whether the United
States dominates military operations other than war. In light of
this disparity, why would any adversary develop forces to attack
America’s strength―direct combat. This is especially true since the
U.S. military appears to ﬁnd it difﬁcult to defeat opponents that
227

prefer to ﬁght with asymmetric responses. To better ﬁght both types
of conﬂict, a proposal has been made to establish a Stability and
Reconstruction Joint Command.3 Considerable debate has occurred
whether a new command is the proper solution. The purpose of
this chapter is to review the strategic environment the United
States confronts, discuss the options the nation has in controlling
all phases of conﬂict within this strategic environment, and suggest
the beneﬁts that a new force structure including a Stabilization
and Reconstruction Joint Command would provide the Army in
achieving a ready and relevant “full spectrum” force.
STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT
After the overwhelming success of the American-led coalition
against Iraq in Operations DESERT STORM and IRAQI FREEDOM,
the likelihood that an enemy would challenge the United States in
direct combat has decreased signiﬁcantly. Max Boot, an historian
of military operations other than war, claims that, “The United
States is so far ahead of any rival in all the underlying components
of power: economic, military, technological, or geopolitical that
scholars describe the international scene as unipolar.”4 With the
strength of the economy and the rapid advances in technology in
American society, the gap between the U.S. military and its nearest
competitor seems to be increasing. This gap makes direct combat
less likely or at least provides the nation with signiﬁcant warning
of an emerging military competitor. However, technological and
economic advantages do not guarantee peace nor do they ensure
that the United States will not confront enemies that will ﬁnd other
means to attack the nation. Two obvious threats to national interests
have emerged.
The ﬁrst threat is the proliferation and potential use of weapons
of mass destruction by rogue states or nonstate actors, such as
terrorist organizations. According to the National Security Strategy,
“. . . the nature and motivations of these new adversaries, their
determination to obtain destructive powers hitherto available
only to the world’s strongest states, and the greater likelihood
that they will use weapons of mass destruction against us, make
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today’s security environment more complex and dangerous.”5 U.S.
nuclear retaliation will not deter such actors because they claim no
particular sovereignty and view their cause as a greater concern
than the population they supposedly represent. These organizations
increasingly have become more difﬁcult to ﬁnd and target.
The second threat, terrorist attacks against American and allied
citizens, similar to September 11, 2001, provides an example of
the use of unconventional means that overcomes an opponent’s
inability to meet the U.S. military on the battleﬁeld. Boot reminds us,
“It is likely that the September 11, 2001, attacks on the World Trade
Center and the Pentagon are only a taste of what America can expect
in the future.”6 Terrorism is an inexpensive but effective weapon to
adversaries having minimal training and military capabilities.
Although much of the world disapproves of such methods,
terrorist organizations will continue to use these means to attack
the citizens of the United States and their economy that depends
on stable markets and world trade. Section IV of the U.S. National
Security Strategy stresses the importance of free markets and free
trade to America’s prosperity.7 Producing chaos and disrupting
international stability hinders American prosperity and therefore
provides a potential means to defeat the United States indirectly
or at least force America to leave a particular region. To protect the
country from these threats within the nation’s borders, the current
administration created the Department of Homeland Security (DHS)
and expanded its intelligence agencies. What has the military done
to meet such threats beyond America’s borders?
TRANSFORMATION VERSUS THE EXPECTED THREAT
The military is attempting to transform to meet these threats
and develop the forces required for future combat. According to
Joint Vision 2020, the goal is “the creation of a force that is dominant
across the full spectrum of military operations―persuasive in peace,
decisive in war, preeminent in any form of conﬂict.”8 Therefore, to
dominate across the full spectrum of conﬂict, the Army must always
be trained, rapidly deployable, and capable of operating in all four
phases of joint campaigns―deter (phase I), seize initiative (phase
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II), decisive operations (phase III), and transition to civil control
(phase IV). These phases exist whether the military operation
involves combat or military operations other than war. The current
transformation programs are designed to produce a modular and
more rapidly deployable force. This will greatly improve the U.S.
military’s ability to tailor appropriate forces and deliver them into a
theater faster. However, will military leaders produce a force trained
to operate in both combat and noncombat situations?
MILITARY MISSION AND FORCE STRUCTURE MATCH
If the military is responsible for ﬁghting the nation’s wars, then
its force structure should meet the requirements associated with all
phases of operations. Phase IV operations require skill sets to handle
stability and reconstruction operations. Both are different from the
standard tasks of closing with the enemy and securing objectives
by force, that are more realistic in Phases II and III. If the United
States is unable to handle all phases concurrently, should America
consider itself a global hegemony? Any future adversary would
logically focus its efforts on defeating the United States in the phase
that it has the least capabilities.
Comparing the Army force structure against tasks in all
campaign phases, the Army has forces that excel during the ﬁrst
three phases, while it attempts to jerry-rig forces to meet Phase IV
requirements. Special Operations Command forces and forward
deployed forces provide the nation with strong capabilities to deter
(phase I) potential enemies. By inﬁltrating into unstable regions
and living with the people, Special Operations Command’s soldiers
provide intelligence needed prior to conﬂict. Training in language,
regional traditions, and cultures assist Special Forces in carrying
out this mission. In fact, special operations teams often stabilize
hostile situations before combat occurs, and thus save the United
States the expense of armed conﬂict.9 If conﬂict is unavoidable, the
costs of training these operatives and their limited numbers make
it impractical to use them in long, direct combat with the enemy.
However, these specialists continue to assist in a supporting role
as combat forces enter into the theater. Forward deployed combat
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forces have a stabilizing inﬂuence on the world as demonstrated
by the years of peace in Europe after World War II, on the Korean
peninsula since 1953, and currently in Afghanistan.
As recent history has shown, the U.S. military handles Phase
II and III operations quickly and decisively. Military forces now
have the capability to deploy and defeat the enemy in a matter of
weeks. This is a dramatic improvement over past wars that took
several months just to prepare for combat. However, as Frederick
Kagan points out, “The Rumsfeld vision of military transformation,
therefore, is completely unbalanced. It will provide the U.S. with
armed forces that do one thing only, even if they do it superbly well.
They will be able to identify, track, and destroy enemy targets from
thousands of miles away and at little or no risk to themselves.”10
However, the Army currently has no designated force to
transition (Phase IV) from combat into civilian control. It attempts
to adapt itself into the peacekeeping role upon completion of
combat operations, claiming that soldiers are adaptable and have
the ﬂexibility to switch mindsets. But soldiers typically have little
experience or training for both types of missions. One academician
argues that the United States has experienced trouble in the past
by its “. . . failure to create the capability to address the immediate
aftermath of serious conﬂicts [that] undermine our ability to convert
military victory into lasting success.”11 To achieve lasting success,
post-conﬂict operations take time. These operations are key to
securing the victory. Military forces that remain in the area after
the conﬂict has terminated visually represent to the indigenous
population America’s resolve and stabilize the new government.
The military also provides security to nongovernmental agencies
that are critical to reestablishing humanitarian services.12 Therefore,
is the transformation effort eliminating an American vulnerability
or improving capabilities where it already has an overwhelming
advantage?
A dilemma occurs when other commitments require the United
States to pull its military forces from a region before true change
has occurred. The administration continues to place additional
tasks on the military, “Today America faces equivalent tasks―
battling terrorists, narco-trafﬁckers, and weapon proliferators, and
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ensuring open access to not only the oceans, but also the skies and
space.”13 Even with multiple missions and the open-ended tasks of
post-conﬂict operations, the military still seems to be reluctant to
improve capabilities to conduct Phase IV operations. High-intensity
warfare happens in a matter of days or weeks, while reconstruction
and stability operations involve decades. This has made it difﬁcult
to stabilize one region and reconstitute military forces for future
combat missions.
This phenomenon is neither new nor unique. The U.S. military
found itself involved in Phase IV operations after the Mexican War
in 1847, after the Civil War, in the Philippines after the SpanishAmerican War, in Europe after the two World Wars, and in the
numerous small scale contingencies since the end of the Cold
War.14 Nor can the United States expect a decrease in post-conﬂict
operations anytime soon. “Looking ahead, the possibilities for
more U. S. intervention of some kind are well known: a chaotic
post-Castro Cuba, a collapsing North Korea, and disintegration in
Liberia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and Angola. . . . Haiti
remains a failed state.”15 Because of the global American economy
that depends on stability for future growth, most of these areas will
require an American presence to stabilize the political situation.
OPTIONS AVAILABLE FOR MILITARY OPERATIONS
OTHER THAN WAR
Since the strategic environment predicts that the American
military will continue to conduct stability and reconstruction
operations after combat and support peace operations when
national interests dictate, what options are available? The ﬁrst
option is to continue with the status quo. Generally, this would keep
the focus on training combat skills with a short, roughly “90-day”
training cycle for military operations other than war just prior to a
deployable unit entering into theater. A second option would be to
adjust the mission essential task lists for combat units to incorporate
a balance of noncombat and combat tasks to prepare the unit to
handle both types of missions. The third option would be to create a
new force speciﬁcally tailored to handle all military operations other
than war missions, while leaving the remaining forces to train and
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execute combat.
Some may argue another option exists where the military would
transfer these missions to the United Nations, contractors, or other
government agencies. However, the United States cannot rely on
any of these organizations, and therefore this is an infeasible option.
The United Nations has shown its inability to develop consensus in
policy and execution of peace operations, as in Mogadishu, or its
unwillingness to operate in potential unstable environments, such as
witnessed in Iraq. Outside sources or other government agencies do
not possess security elements sufﬁcient to protect their employees
adequately. Therefore, the military appears to be the best means
available to handle peace and Phase IV operations.16
FOCUS ON COMBAT WITH 90-DAY TRAINING CYCLES
FOR MILITARY OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR
Many believe the current approach most effectively utilizes
the forces available. However, this concept relies largely on the
ability of the American soldier to adapt to changing mission
requirements. Although modern-day soldiers are adaptable, should
young Americans confront dangerous situations where they have
had limited prior training? If this is true, why train at all? Leaders
owe soldiers the maximum amount of time possible to prepare for
deployments and the training resources to rehearse effectively their
expected missions.
Lieutenant Colonel Michael Walsh conducted research in 1998 to
determine the impact that military operations other than war had on
combat readiness. His overall ﬁndings were that units preparing for
such missions were training less for their combat mission.17 These
ﬁndings were typical of all units requiring training on tasks not
performed during normal training cycles. His results also discovered
other weaknesses in the current approach.
This approach affects the noncommissioned ofﬁcer. Are future
Army noncommissioned ofﬁcers going to be the experts of their
military occupational specialty or the jack-of-all-trades? They
cannot become experts if they are doing combat training one day
and providing humanitarian support the next. Combat skills are
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too perishable. When one adds the rapid changes in computer
software and advancements in military equipment, every day
away from training for combat makes noncommissioned ofﬁcers
less proﬁcient in preparing their soldiers and their unit for combat.
Often, units must leave their primary weapon systems at home and
conduct operations in high mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicles
(HMMWVs) to carry out peace operations. Being away from their
combat equipment hinders their ability to train for even basic
preventive maintenance and conduct weapons qualiﬁcation.
Much of the dilemma of conducting peace operations and training
is the manpower required to execute military operations other than
war tasks and the differences between these two missions. There is
not sufﬁcient time to complete all the peace operation tasks and train
at the same time for combat. Warﬁghting deals with destruction and
killing. Peace operations usually focus more on rebuilding, stability,
and diplomacy. When combat forces deploy for combat, the opposite
effect occurs as 100 percent of the time is spent on improving combat
skills. Therefore, if the two missions are incompatible, why is the
Army willing to degrade its combat force accomplishing noncombat
tasks?
More detrimental to warﬁghting skills is that often the soldier
does not realize the importance of the tasks he is required to perform.
Walsh’s survey concluded that the majority of leaders surveyed
were “willing to neglect 20 percent of their METL [mission essential
task list] tasks to train for military operations other than war tasks.”18
The latter has become so commonplace that leaders feel these skills
are more important than combat tasks. This view probably indicates
that these soldiers felt they had a greater opportunity to deploy for
noncombat rather than combat missions, and thus they should train
accordingly. This mindset could lead to an unprepared Army for
future wars.
Recovery time is also an issue. The survey concluded “at least 7.5
weeks to 13 weeks as the reconstitution time necessary to recover
the training element of readiness.”19 This is time a unit needs to
be fully operational to conduct its primary combat mission after
returning from a deployment. If the same combat unit conducts
multiple noncombat missions, the reconstitution time would
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most likely increase as a greater percentage of combat trained
leaders would have departed the unit since solid combat training
had occurred. Lieutenant Colonel Timothy Cherry, in a strategic
research paper published in 2000, determined that total time lost
to a combat unit’s warﬁghting training was closer to a year after
its return from deployment away from home station. As a result,
extended peace operations affected the combat proﬁciency of three
units―the recovering unit, the deployed unit, and the unit preparing
for deployment.20
Finally, are the soldiers executing the jobs they were recruited for
or even trained on during basic training? Soldiers enter the service
expecting to defend their nation in combat. However, the nation is
increasingly asking them to conduct peace operations. Lieutenant
Colonel Colleen McGuire’s strategic research paper in 2001 stresses
the difference, “Soldiers admit that operations in Somalia, Bosnia,
and Kosovo were not the life they expected when they joined the
Army or graduated from their entrance training into the service.
They expected to be ready for battle―not escorting children to
school. Many were not trained to handle domestic disputes among
foreign civilian populations.”21
BALANCE MISSION ESSENTIAL TASK LISTS TO COVER
COMBAT AND MILITARY OPERATIONS OTHER THAN
WAR TASKS
Since rapid train-ups for peace operations are disruptive to combat
readiness, others have suggested that the best solution is to balance
unit METLs between combat and noncombat tasks. Colonel Lloyd
Miles, in his 2002 strategic research paper, claimed that, historically,
constabulary forces that spent the majority of their time conducting
stability operations could not maintain their warﬁghting ability.
They would prove ineffective if there was an increase in hostilities
in the region.22 But does training for combat, then deploying for
peace operations do any better in a unit’s preparation for combat?
Units deployed for military operations other than war prior to
conducting combat training center rotations were noticeably weaker
at combat tasks. “According to a former National Training Center
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observer/controller and opposing force commander, observers at
the training center are noticing an absence of fundamental skills and
abilities at every level. Many believe the only solution is to increase
the frequency of training.”23 Balancing unit METLs would reduce
combat training, not increase it.
In McGuire’s paper, a considerable number of former battalion
commanders and staff ofﬁcers believed that training for peace
operations negatively impacted combat readiness.24 Several of the
Army’s ﬁeld manuals stress the importance of training to maintain
the force capable of deploying to ﬁght the nation’s wars. Never
can the Army afford not to train and maintain the highest levels of
readiness. With a focus towards combat preparedness, would peace
operation tasks ever receive sufﬁcient priority in training these tasks
sufﬁciently? Walsh raises the additional point that, “much of the
Army doctrine and Joint doctrine indicates that [military] operations
other than war are difﬁcult and challenging and that they require
skills beyond those developed in our normal training tasks.”25 With
a different mindset―killing versus peaceful diplomacy―and the
incompatibility of tasks between combat and peace operations, this
option becomes less attractive, unless the unit’s tasks were similar to
begin with.26 This is not the case with the majority of combat forces.
DEVELOP A NEW FORCE WITH PRIMARY MISSION
TO HANDLE MILITARY OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR
Numerous documents discuss the option of creating a separate
military force tailored to handle peace and Phase IV operations. In
1998, Colonel Don Snider built a case on returning a constabulary
force to the U.S. Army. He proposed that the Army “create a
constabulary force using roughly 15,000 active duty structure spaces
. . . [which] would have roughly the combat equivalent of three MP
brigades.”27 This new force would perform most of the noncombat
operations, allowing the majority of the Army to focus on the combat
mission.
Cherry proposed the creation of a U.S.-based, corps-sized
engagement force to handle small-scaled contingencies. This corps
would support peace operations and allow the rest of the Army to
focus on warﬁghting. It would become the nation’s expert in civil236

military, multinational, and information operations. Along with
small-scaled contingency deployments, it would provide a school to
train soldiers on peace operations.28 Two authors from the National
Defense University recently published a joint planning document,
“Transforming for Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations,”
that recommended the creation of the Stability and Reconstruction
Joint Command as a method to adjust today’s military structure to
better handle stability and reconstruction operations.29
Opponents of the formation of such a command often state the
concern that the Army has about increased end strength. However,
is end strength the critical factor in the Army’s reluctance to form
the Stabilization and Reconstruction Joint Command? Most of those
in favor of this new command claim this structure could come
from current forces, thus eliminating concerns about increased end
strength. Certainly today’s force restructuring to “units of action”
aims at identifying spaces that the Army potentially can eliminate.
But even if military leaders proposed an increase in active duty
personnel, the present end strength is still 300,000 less than the Army
had at the end of the Cold War. Increases of 30-50,000 would more
than provide adequate force manning for this joint command and
still maintain the Army at a strength less than the Cold War Army.
One could certainly justify increased costs to the country, if this new
force structure better served the nation’s vital interests than what is
available now.
The 1999 Congressional Budget paper, “Making Peace While
Staying Ready for War: The Challenges of the U.S. Military
Participation in Peace Operations,” concluded that peace operations
affected combat readiness and proposed an increase of 20,000
soldiers to handle military operations other than war missions.30
In late January 2004, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld used
emergency powers to authorize an increase of 30,000 soldiers to
temporarily cover shortfalls created by stability and reconstruction
operations in Afghanistan, Iraq, and other countries.31 Although this
is only a temporary measure, legislators do not seem to be upset
over this increase in Army end strength. Thus, the opportunity may
exist to fund an increase in the military personnel in response to the
new demands created by the war on terror.32
Opponents have suggested that having two forces within the
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Army is inefﬁcient.33 Listed above were several reasons why one
force attempting to do both missions does not represent the most
effective means of conducting peace operations while preparing
for future combat. On the other hand, the Stabilization and
Reconstruction Joint Command would still be a military force, and
assigned soldiers would have to maintain the same standards as the
rest of the Army, the only difference being its emphasis on training
and conducting post-conﬂict and peace operations. Operations
in Kosovo provided examples where soldiers speciﬁcally trained
in peace operations deployed faster and performed considerably
better than combat forces. Given the political sensitivity of such
missions, America must have its best trained soldiers executing
these missions.34 If the Army expects infantrymen to maintain skills
different from those of a supply clerk, why should it look on forces
speciﬁcally designated to handle peace operations differently that
combat units? In this high operating temp (OPTEMPO) environment
the military is experiencing, the United States cannot afford, “. . . a
mind-set characterized by one civilian Pentagon ofﬁcial as ‘We just
do combat, and stability ops is a sideline’.”35
SKILLS REQUIRED FOR STABILITY
AND RECONSTRUCTION OPERATIONS
“Secure the Victory” is the motto of the Civil-Affairs branch of
the U.S. Army, and this is exactly what peace operations accomplish
for America.36 Throughout history, soldiers have stabilized regions
as countries transform their form of government.37 No matter how
technologically advanced the military becomes, transition requires
a visible deterrent to reduce the violence as the new government
develops.38 In today’s rapid and decisive combat environment, this
visible post-conﬂict presence may be even more important since a
large portion of the adversary’s population may not have witnessed
the defeat of their own conventional military forces or personally
experienced the effects of war.39
Public opinion also affects peace operations and therefore requires
soldiers who understand the importance of maintaining positive
public support. The globalization of the world economy, along
with America’s views towards human rights, will continue to keep
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the United States involved in regional conﬂicts.40 The Army needs
soldiers who possess the skills found in Joint Pub 3-07.3 and Army
FM 3-07 to execute peace and phase IV operations effectively.41
Soldiers in stabilization and reconstruction units must have
persistence. Nation-building takes time and enemies must
understand America’s resolve.42 Soldiers must be comfortable
working with the population, even if this produces a greater risk of
casualties.43 Force protection measures typically restrict American
soldiers from integrating with the local community. Combat forces
tend to look at the population as dangerous and fear that locals
support the enemy. This philosophy handicaps success in nationbuilding.44
Another reason why combat forces cannot maintain the expertise
required for peace operations is that not all such operations are
the same. FM 100-23 lists three types of peacekeeping operations:
“support to diplomacy, peacekeeping, and peace enforcement.
In simple terms, support to diplomacy seeks to prevent conﬂict;
peacekeeping attempts to maintain the peace; and peace enforcement
attempts to establish peace.”45 Because of the unique requirements of
each mission, it is unrealistic to believe that combat forces training
for war would gain the experience to handle the complexities of
these peace operations.
USING THE STABILITY AND RECONSTRUCTION COMMAND
If the military created the Stabilization and Reconstruction Joint
Command, this new command would receive the mission for all
peace operations, including Phase IV operations in campaigns
involving combat. This shift in responsibilities would allow combat
forces to focus totally on training or executing combat. As Snider
states, “The Army’s mission for the foreseeable future is as clear
as it is daunting: to be prepared simultaneously at both ends of
the conﬂict spectrum―high-intensity power projection operations
in regional theater war and constabulary operations of extended
duration.”46 This new command would provide strategic leaders the
ability to manage both “ends of the conﬂict spectrum” and never
lose focus of providing the nation a well trained combat force.
Examples of Stabilization and Reconstruction Joint Command
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responsibilities would include the majority of the military forward
presence forces. For example, this uniﬁed command would include
all units currently in Korea. These forces would not have the combat
power of the 2nd Infantry Division. However, they would have the
capability to rapidly receive and sustain combat forces onto the
Korean Peninsula, should war start. The command’s mission of
deterrence and demonstrating America’s resolve would continue
to force adversaries to decide whether negotiating settlements
peacefully were in their best interests instead of facing the combat
capabilities of the United States. Should increased violence become
the enemy’s choice, then combat forces would rapidly enter into
the theater, engage the enemy until successful mission completion,
and depart the theater to reﬁt for future combat. While in theater,
this new command would support the joint task force commander
by securing lines of supplies and communications, and continue to
work with the local population in areas no longer requiring combat
forces. When combat forces depart, this new headquarters would
receive command of the units in the area to continue Phase IV and
other peace operations. Stability and reconstruction units would
remain in theater until either the United Nations assumes command
of the rebuilding mission or stability returns to the point that the
new government assumes responsibility for its own security efforts.
Bradley Graham, a Washington Post correspondent, notes, “The idea
is that the stabilization and reconstruction force would serve as a
kind of bridge between the end of major combat operations and
the point at which a civilian-led, nation-building effort is up and
running. . . .”47
Using the current IRAQI FREEDOM scenario with this new
command, the Stabilization and Reconstruction Joint Command
would have become involved from the beginning of planning best to
execute transition operations. The command would have deployed
into theater as a supporting command to the Combined Forces Land
Component Commander. Deployment phasing considerations
would include sufﬁcient Stabilization and Reconstruction Command
structure to assume responsibility for occupied territory as coalition
forces moved towards and secured Baghdad. Once all combat forces
had completed their deployment into theater, remaining stabilization
and reconstruction forces would ﬁnish their deployment. By May
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2003, this new command would have received most of the security
responsibilities of southern Iraq and Mosel areas, with a much
smaller combat force required to focus on the counterinsurgency
mission in the Sunni Triangle.48 The military would have redeployed
the majority of three combat divisions back to the United States and
reﬁt these divisions for future combat operations. The Stabilization
and Reconstruction Joint Command would publish annual rotation
schedules, with the majority of these follow on units mobilized from
the reserve component.
As ENDURING FREEDOM and IRAQI FREEDOM required the
U.S. military to extend the transition phase, it raises a question to the
nation―How long can America afford to keep combat forces tied up
in post-combat operations? While executing this mission, is America
preparing these forces for its next adversary? Adjusting force
structure to create a uniﬁed command with the direct responsibility
of post-combat operations seems a more efﬁcient means to prepare
for both operations in the future.
IMPLEMENTING THE STABILITY AND RECONSTRUCTION
COMMAND INTO CURRENT FORCE STRUCTURE
How large should the new Stabilization and Reconstruction
Joint Command force structure be? The Army should ﬁrst decide
the required size force and the type of units needed for expected
future combat scenarios. If IRAQI FREEDOM were the standard,
then a combat force of approximately four divisions reinforced with
required artillery, logistics, and communications units attached
should be the size of the force. The military can afford to maintain such
a small combat force due to transformation efforts that continually
improves its rapid deployment capabilities and its ability to execute
modern warfare quickly and decisively. To plan for unexpected
contingencies, possibly another similar corps using a mix of active
and reserve component divisions should more than cover any remote
situation where two wars occur near simultaneously. These forces
train at the combat training centers and maintain their equipment
in a high state of readiness because when called, they execute! The
military would direct additional reserve units for combat missions if
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world events presented an increased need for combat forces. Special
Operations Command force structure would increase to provide
each geographical component commander sufﬁcient soldiers to
keep a forward presence, collect vital intelligence towards potential
adversaries, and support the training of friendly militaries in their
area of operations.
The Stabilization and Reconstruction Joint Command would
command all other forces. This headquarters should recommend
the force structure required to meet its missions, but in general,
this command would be the largest part of the Army. A key
component to this new force structure is the development of the joint
headquarters directing noncombat operations. Although the Army
will provide the majority of personnel within this uniﬁed command,
this headquarters must plan and coordinate with all services to best
utilize limited resources.49
Along with this new headquarters, Chapters 3-5 of “Transforming
for Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations” provides a detailed
list of the required forces and how to create this stabilization and
reconstruction capability.50 This document recommends a force of
two division-equivalents, with at least one being from the active
component. This force would have the ability to grow larger by
incorporating additional reserve component units if events required
an expanding American military presence. This new command
must have active duty forces capable of immediate deployment as
well as a large reserve component to cover potential increases in
mission requirements and to provide for the rotation of initial entry
forces. These forces would be modular, reducing the need to deploy
entire divisions if a smaller force is sufﬁcient. The command should
be able to forecast rotation schedules well in advance, aiding to
predictability for many reservists.
Adjustments will have to be made to ensure the correct mix of
civil affairs, military police, psychological operations, and other
key post-conﬂict military operation skills are available in the
active duty component. “Overwhelmingly, civil affairs soldiers are
reservists. Their real-world job experience gives them an edge in
performing Army tasks,” said Lieutenant General James R. Helmly,
Commanding General, Army Reserves. “Hands-on nation-builders,
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they focus on infrastructure improvements: getting utilities up and
running, working with contractors and overseeing the bureaucracy
that distributes food, clothing, and water to civilians.”51 Active
duty units must develop these skill sets to provide immediate
support to the civilian population after combat has degraded
existing infrastructure. This support aids in securing the victory as
much as defeating enemy conventional forces. Homeland defense
requirements would also be the responsibility of the Stabilization
and Reconstruction Joint Command. Local National Guard units
would handle the majority of these operations; however, the new
command could reinforce them with active component units if the
threat expands.
A transformation of this magnitude is not unprecedented.
Frederick Kagan, reminds us, “In the mid-1970s the U.S. abandoned
the draft and recruited an all-volunteer professional military.”52 The
nation questioned this sociological transformation but executed
it with great success. “The shift should echo President John F.
Kennedy’s establishment of the Peace Corps at the height of the
Cold War, with the ring of new responsibilities for the U.S. and our
determination to fulﬁll them.”53
DEVELOPING A STABILIZATION AND RECONSTRUCTION
FORCE INSTITUTE
When not deployed, stability and reconstruction personnel should
be gaining expertise in post-conﬂict operations through education.
The U.S. military should create a Stability and Reconstruction
Institute where experts would educate future leaders in the art
of Phase IV and peace operations, and offer lessons learned to
American allies. Students would master regional expertise, customs,
and language skills, all key capabilities for military operations
other than war. According to Colonel Miles, “At this school, lessons
learned could be taught to a large number of trainees, and doctrine
could be established. It is realistic to believe that the UN would also
support such a university with skills obtained by other countries.”54
The institute would consolidate expertise from the international
community to develop viable solutions to improve noncombat
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operations.
The institute could also support the development of Phase IV
military operations plans. Over a period of time the institute would,
“. . . create an institutional cadre of highly skilled and motivated
experts, adequately trained and ﬁnanced, whose careers will be
devoted to operating in politically chaotic situations. The American
people do not desire to remain in these countries any longer than
required, but no one should underestimate the time necessary to
establish a transition to stability.”55 The institute would provide
senior strategic leaders with more realistic time tables and critical
event checklists to better plan exit strategies.
CONCLUSION
America is new to the role of global hegemony. However,
being new to this role has not reduced the goals of the United
States. According to the National Security Strategy, “. . . the United
States will use this moment of opportunity to extend the beneﬁts of
freedom across the globe. We will actively work to bring the hope
of democracy, development, free markets, and free trade to every
corner of the world.”56 With such an aggressive foreign policy,
the military can expect to become involved in numerous regional
conﬂicts as our nation attempts to learn and administer the duties as
the global policeman.
History indicates that whatever program America adopts to
transform its armed forces, her enemies will react to level the playing
ﬁeld. Kagan states,
The search for an indeﬁnite American “asymmetrical advantage,”
requires not merely a revolution in military affairs: it also requires a
fundamental revolution in human affairs of a sort never seen before. It
requires that America continue to change her armed forces so rapidly
and successfully that no other state can ever catch up―indeed, that no
other state in the world would try.”57

The current transformation program relies on maintaining an
overwhelming advantage in a single area of conﬂict―direct combat.
A more beneﬁcial goal of transforming America’s national defense
is to achieve full spectrum dominance by creating a force structure
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capable of achieving superiority in war and peace. The concept of a
Joint Stabilization and Reconstruction Command is a feasible option
to solve America’s reluctance to engage in the increasing number
of military operations other than war missions without degrading
combat proﬁciency. If the military ever wanted to change, the time
to act has never been better.
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CHAPTER 10
NATION BUILDING:
A BAD IDEA WHOSE TIME HAS COME?
Lieutenant Colonel Burt K. Thompson
Our military requires more than good treatment. It needs the rallying
point of a deﬁning mission and that mission is to deter wars―and win
wars when deterrence fails. Sending our military on vague, aimless
and endless deployments is the swift solvent of morale. We will not
be permanent peacekeepers, dividing warring parties. This is not our
strength or our calling.1
Governor George W. Bush,
September 1999
You are requested to form a Defense Science Board Task Force addressing
the transition to and from hostilities . . . Our military expeditions to
Afghanistan and Iraq are unlikely to be the last such excursions in the
global war on terrorism.2

It appears that the United States has once again come full circle in
regards to the use of military force in support of national objectives,
in this case speciﬁcally nation-building. During the last presidential
campaign, then Governor George W. Bush’s line was “an explicit
condemnation of Clinton/Gore foreign policy―speciﬁcally that the
White House had stretched the military too thin with peacekeeping
missions in Haiti, Somalia and the Balkans.”3 Bush argued that
President William Clinton had failed to understand that the primary
mission of the military was deterrence, combat, and winning the
nation’s wars. The “‘Let me tell you what else I’m worried about’
line proved to be among the most popular in his stump speech,
guaranteed to evoke an eruption of applause from the conservatives
who packed Bush’s campaign rallies.”4
But, it seems now that the Bush administration has come faceto-face with the challenges presented by the terrorist attacks on
September 11, 2001. Thus it has adopted a more realistic set of
objectives. The 2002 National Security Strategy (NSS) describes this
new world where America is threatened less by conquering states
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than by failing ones, and where conﬂict is more likely to occur
within countries than between them.5 The strategy recognizes that
threats can suddenly emerge as state weakness, rather than strength,
spreads conﬂict and chaos. It argues that an environment of failed
states, terrorism, weapons proliferation, and political chaos may
have outgrown Cold War institutions and policies designed to deter,
ﬁght, and win against a different set of dangers.6
For over 50 years, the U.S. military has focused on ﬁghting major
wars and the ability to mass the required land, sea, and air power to
engage a global adversary. But times have changed and as the NSS
states, “it is time to reafﬁrm the essential role of American military
strength.”7 Ironically, while preparing for a conventional war, the
United States has routinely engaged its forces in smaller-scale
operations. The military combated terrorism, fought insurgencies
and counterinsurgencies, conducted non-combatant evacuations
from war zones, strengthened friendly governments, provided
humanitarian assistance, and executed countless peacekeeping
operations. But as retired Marine General Anthony Zinni argues,
“still trying to ﬁght our kind of war―be it World War II or DESERT
STORM―we ignore the real warﬁghting requirements of today. My
generation has not been well-prepared for this future, because we
resisted the idea.”8 President Bush has acknowledged the recent
trends as well and points out that “operations other than war”
have moved from the sidelines to center court and in the process
have raised legitimate questions about the structure and roles of
America’s armed forces.
A recent memorandum from Acting Under Secretary of Defense
Michael W. Wynne further illustrates that operations other than war
have truly left the sidelines. He has directed that a Defense Science
Board Task Force be formed to look at the issue of transitions to and
from hostilities. The memorandum states that U.S. armed forces
are capable of projecting force and achieving conventional military
victory. However, “we Americans will encounter signiﬁcant
challenges following conventional military success as we seek
to ensure stability, democracy, human rights, and a productive
economy.”9
The purpose of this chapter is to address issues associated with
an NSS that have increased the likelihood that the United States will
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involve its military in post-conﬂict operations, to include nationbuilding. The chapter will examine current policies regarding
stability operations, provide a brief survey of America’s historical
experiences in nation-building and their relevance today, and
examine issues speciﬁcally associated with the use of conventional
forces in nation-building. Finally, it will examine options and make
recommendations that could enhance the potential for success in
such operations in the future.
WE DON’T DO OCCUPATIONS? LESSONS FROM THE PAST
Every time they do a post-war occupation, they do it like it’s the ﬁrst
time, and they also do it like it’s the last time they’ll ever have to do it.
We can’t change the mistakes we made of Iraq, but we can try to avoid
them in the future.10

Although nation-building is not new to the Army, it has always
been a controversial mission for the American military, especially
over the past 3 decades. “The United States military has engaged
in these non-traditional operations throughout its history, far more
often than it has waged conventional warfare.”11 The Army has
directly supervised the creation of new governments in many beaten
states, while performing countless nonviolent and nonmilitary tasks
and missions. What is remarkable are the similarities between
nation-building efforts in these contingencies. Two of the most
familiar success stories are Germany and Japan at the end of World
War II. There are, however, other cases that get less attention, such
as the Mexican War, reconstruction at the close of the Civil War, the
Spanish American War, and World War I. Recent interventions that
included governance responsibilities in the post-conﬂict phase took
place during the Cold War as well. They include the Dominican
Republic in 1965, Grenada in 1983, Panama in 1989, as well as Somalia
in 1993, Haiti in 1994, and the Balkans in 1995. More recent examples
that deserve considerable scrutiny include operations in Afghanistan
and Iraq. In fact, in over 13 instances since the 1800s, soldiers, under
the theater commander’s operational control, have supervised and
implemented political and economic reconstitution.12
A short historical review of the relevant operations illustrates
the scale and frequency of post-conﬂict and occupation operations
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as well as the level of exposure and experience the U.S. military
has had in such operations. One can easily distinguish recurring
themes and lessons―temporary government, population control in
general, suppression of residual resistance, resettlement of displaced
noncombatants, rejuvenation of supply and distribution systems,
infrastructure repair and institutional reform.13
The Spanish American War illustrates several themes that
resonate today. The Army conducted the Spanish American War
with little preparation for post-conﬂict operations. In performing
administration duties, the Army learned the limitations of its
operational doctrine and the requirement for political compromise.
In post-hostility operations the military had to deal with the full
range of modern politico-military problems: political intelligence,
control of guerrilla forces, military government, the arming of
indigenous forces, and their terms of political settlement.14
Although the Spanish American War consisted of rather quick
and decisive combat operations, the post-conﬂict operations were
long and complex. This early act of nation-building has many
similarities to the conditions that U.S. military forces are facing in
Iraq today. To illustrate the point, the following description of the
events in Cuba following the Spanish American War could be used
to illustrate post-conﬂict operations in Operation IRAQI FREEDOM
(OIF) today.
The close of the war with Spain did not settle the Cuba problem. As a
result of years of rule and ﬁghting, conditions in the island were in a
deplorable state when the ﬁghting ended . . . [T]he United States was
committed to turning Cuba over to its people. But to have withdrawn
before economic and political stability was established would have
been both folly and evasion of responsibility. A provisional government
supported by an army of occupation therefore was set up. It began at
once the many tasks involved in the tremendous job of rehabilitation
and reform: feeding and clothing the starving; care of the sick; cleaning
up the accumulated ﬁlth of centuries in the cities; restoring agricultural
and commercial activity; disbanding the Cuban Army and paying its
veterans; organizing municipal governments, local guards, and courts;
building roads and other public works; establishing schools; and in
general, preparing the people for self-government.15
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Additional lessons that are relevant today include transition
operations occurring simultaneously with combat operations,
command decisions required of military leaders, the necessity
to have U.S. soldiers fulﬁlling civil affairs responsibilities, the
requirement to establish effective relationships with a multitude of
ethnic groups, and the necessity for a balanced approach between
force and restraint in dealing with the populations.16
The constabulary operations in Germany at the end of World
War II provides an excellent example of the Army’s ability, in a
relatively short period of time, to establish and train a force with
specialized skills that can execute post-conﬂict operations. Planning
began early to determine the best way to accomplish the occupation
duties in both Europe and Japan. General Dwight D. Eisenhower,
who understood the importance of the occupation, approved the
establishment of a Military District Constabulary in the two Military
Districts in Germany.17 The Army established a School of Military
Government to assist in the preparation of ofﬁcers and enlisted men
to ensure that American soldiers were not falling into operations
where they were forced to learn on the ﬂy.18
One can draw many parallels in comparing the experiences
of the U.S. military through World War II with what is occurring
in Afghanistan and Iraq today. Both involved similar noncombat
tasks that required highly trained and disciplined forces, extensive
interaction with local ofﬁcials and civilians, decentralized operations,
different leader and staff skill sets, relationships with governmental
agencies and nongovernmental organizations, and restraint through
the minimum use of force. It would be beneﬁcial to reexamine
the constabulary operations in postwar Germany and Japan for
applicability in today’s post-conﬂict operations in both Afghanistan
and Iraq.
Postwar success in both Germany and Japan obviously owed
much to the highly developed economies of both nations. However,
nation-building is not principally about economic reconstruction. It
must have a signiﬁcant aim of political transformation as well, which
only serves to conﬁrm the U.S. inability to install viable democracies
in Somalia, Haiti, and Afghanistan.19
Although one could write volumes about operations in Panama,
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Somalia, Haiti, and in the Balkans, this chapter presents only a few
observations. One of the most apparent observations is that each
subsequent operation by the United States has been larger in scope
and more ambitious than its predecessor. Operations in Afghanistan
and Iraq conﬁrm the trend. Themes common to these operations
include tactically oriented planners and commanders unprepared for
the chaos of Phase IV operations; the campaign plans lacked details
on Phase IV operations, and the plan was distributed after hostilities
began; difﬁculties in balancing humanitarian/peacekeeping roles;
difﬁculties of transitions; mission expansion into nation-building;
importance of long-term commitment; a “top-down” approach
to the reconstruction; and the absolute necessity for interagency
planning.20
In Iraq the United States “has taken on a task with a scope
comparable to the transformational attempts still under way in
Bosnia and Kosovo and a scale comparable only to the United
States occupations of Germany and Japan.”21 A statement made by a
former member of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) illustrates
the challenge U.S. forces face in Iraq, “The Messiah could not have
organized a sufﬁcient relief, reconstruction, or humanitarian effort
in that short a time.”22
Most observers agree that planning for the reconstruction phase
in OIF was not as advanced as the planning undertaken by Central
Command for the ﬁrst three phases of the war. Although one could
attribute this to Carl von Clausewitz’s fog or friction, it more likely
represents a lack of acceptance or realization of the importance of the
political and economic reconstruction of Iraq as an integral part of
the war or use of faulty assumptions in the planning phase.23
THEMES/LESSONS
If there is any lesson to be learned from our “post-conﬂict” involvement
in Iraq to date, it is that we have failed to adequately learn the lessons
from previous such experiences.24

The American experience with post-conﬂict and occupation
operations is so extensive that one can easily distinguish recurring
themes. Listed in this section are some of the common themes and
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the salient lessons of the past. Obviously the list is not inclusive, but
it emphasizes many of the issues discussed above. A review of after
action reports from each operation suggests that these should not be
new lessons. The themes and lessons break down into the following
categories:
• Planning:
– Limitations of phased planning and a plan predominantly
focused on combat operations.
– Faulty planning assumptions.
– Planners avoiding the “Phase IV dilemma”.
– Inadequate planning for Phase IV operations.
– Failure to clearly identify who is responsible for winning the
peace.
– Underestimating post-conﬂict security requirements.
• Preparation:
– Failure to institutionalize knowledge gained in stability
operations.
– Failure to integrate salient lessons into our doctrine, our
training, and our future planning for future operations.25
– Lack of clarity on roles and responsibilities resulting
in agencies being inhibited and not making the proper
investments needed to do these tasks better.
– Failure to regard soldiers with experience in the ﬁeld of postconﬂict operations as national assets, to be retained, rewarded
for service, trained further, and placed in positions to utilize
their skills.26
– Understanding historical/cultural contexts.
• Execution:
– “Mission creep”―expansion of the mission into nationbuilding.
– Active Component/Reserve Component mismatches.
– Combat Support/Combat Service Support shortages.
– Difﬁculty with transition to civilian agencies.
– Infrastructure repair and institutional reform.
– Force protection during transition.
– Reestablishing the rule of law.
– Rapid rebuilding of basic infrastructure.
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These lessons and many others from recent post-conﬂict
reconstruction operations highlight the consistent mistakes that
can and must be avoided. A clear lesson is the importance of preconﬂict planning, preparation, communication, and coordination.
Anticipating and preparing for the countless tasks required in
countries emerging from conﬂict is onerous, but must be undertaken
before the ﬁghting starts if post-conﬂict reconstruction efforts are to
be effective once the hostilities cease. Simply “noting” lessons is not
enough; we must “learn” from these lessons. The United States and
the international community must commit the resources, military
might, manpower, and time required in Iraq. The United States
faces a “Phase IV dilemma” in Iraq; it cannot stay forever, it cannot
leave, and it cannot afford to fail! What makes success in these types
of operations even more critical is that America’s international
credibility is on the line.27
SUPERPOWERS DON’T DO WINDOWS
It’s the most difﬁcult leadership experience I have ever had. Nothing
quite prepares you for this.28

General Eric K. Shinseki

Since the attacks on September 11, many Republicans have come
to view stability operations as even more relevant to American
national security. In fact, based on the number of soldiers engaged
in peacekeeping, it has become the fastest-growing mission for the
U.S. military. “We could take or leave peacekeeping operations
in the 1990s as witnesses by our hasty departure from both Haiti
and Somalia. The sense was that although pulling out might be
regrettable in terms of local conditions it was justiﬁable because
the two countries were not seen as a security threat to the United
States.”29 It has become obvious now that failed states such as
Somalia and Afghanistan are potential havens for terrorists, and
even though the United States has signiﬁcant forces engaged in
peacekeeping operations, there may be more in the future.
General Eric Shinseki’s observations about his preparation
for a peacekeeping operation is a common one. Peacekeeping
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operations in general, and post-conﬂict operations in particular, are
controversial missions, and the Army has done little to prepare for
them. To make matters worse, the institutional resistance in both
the State and Defense Departments has been signiﬁcant as neither
department considers nation-building among its core missions.
There is signiﬁcant cultural resistance in the military to any tasks that
are not combat related. As the Stability Force (SFOR) commander,
Shinseki felt that he confronted a “cultural bias” in the military and
speciﬁcally in the Army. Army doctrine-based training prepared
him for warﬁghting and leadership, but “there was not a clear
doctrine for post conﬂict stability operations.”30 This absence of a
doctrine for an institution that is doctrine-based presents a challenge
when you walk into in peacekeeping environment. You are in a kind
of “roll-your-own situation.” This is a revealing statement from a
senior army general. The most remarkable fact, however, is that he
is not alone in his opinion; other senior ofﬁcers who served in Bosnia
made similar assessments.31
Although the Army’s performance in Bosnia is generally
considered an overwhelming success, many senior ofﬁcers believe
that they were not prepared for the experiences they encountered
in Bosnia. Were they trained? The answer is yes, but the training
predominately encompassed the art of warﬁghting and high-intensity
conﬂict. But after the initial deployment in Bosnia and after the
prospects of conventional warfare had faded, it became increasingly
obvious that the skills acquired by individual soldiers up to general
ofﬁcers were not adequate for the challenges confronted in Bosnia.32
The most signiﬁcant shortfall in a training strategy that
predominately focuses on preparation for major combat operations
with little regard for post hostility operations is in the area of
readiness. Arguably, the capability of U.S. armed forces to support
and accomplish America’s national security requirements is the
ultimate measure of readiness.33
TRAINING READINESS: JUST ENOUGH AND JUST IN TIME
It is undeniable that training is an essential prerequisite for
effective military operations. The same is true for post-conﬂict
stability operations. The U.S. military can no longer afford to train
263

for war and adapt for peace. The military must stay prepared to
ﬁght and win the nations wars, and retain the “capacity” to execute
peace operations when called upon to do so.34 It would not be a
stretch to say that the Army’s actions in preparing for and executing
peacekeeping operations adhere to the following model: “Train for
war adapt for peace, with just enough and just in time!”
In reality, like combat operations,
. . . the U.S. has learned that the key elements of successful stability
operations are well trained and disciplined soldiers under the command
of skilled and competent leaders. Although American soldiers are highly
trained and possess combat skills that are easily transferable to the needs
of post-conﬂict operations they still require the time to adapt to the nature
of the operation, its rules of engagement and its terms of reference.35

Another factor that impacts on training readiness is the duration
of the stability operation. Lengthy involvement in peacekeeping
operations degrades combat skills and has a signiﬁcant impact on
combat readiness. As a result, the trend is that combat troops are
used for peacekeeping only when necessary and those additional
units, with post-conﬂict related skills, are “cobbled” onto combat
divisions as required to meet postwar demands.36 However, in most
cases, armed forces ill-prepared for the job at hand quickly adapted,
ﬁgured out what they had to do, and did it with great success.37
Although it is admirable that U.S. troops and leaders are agile
and can “ﬁgure it out,” they should be put in that position only by
exception.
Morale problems stemming from prolonged deployments,
equipment that wears out too quickly, and decreased combat training
levels, increase when troops execute noncombat operations. Further
exacerbating the military’s declining readiness is the tendency to
pull troops with high demand special skills from nondeployed
units. A mission may affect nondeployed units as well because they
will not be able to train properly due to critical skill shortages.38 The
concept of training readiness is well-understood in the U.S. Army,
but as Afghanistan and Iraq have demonstrated, readiness for what
happens after the ﬁghting stops is just as important.39
If military training for post hostilities is just enough and just in
time, is Army doctrine any better? The Army is a doctrine-driven
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institution, but the one area of doctrine it lacks is in post-conﬂict
operations. In Bosnia, Army doctrine was largely inadequate in an
environment where American commanders had to wrestle with the
political, diplomatic, and military demands of stability operations.
Almost from the inception of Implementation Force operations,
commanders found themselves in uncharted waters. Major General
William Nash described the problem as an “inner ear problem.”
Having trained for 30 years to read a battleﬁeld, the general ofﬁcers
were now asked to read a “peaceﬁeld.”40 The requirement to train
and develop senior leaders to read the “peaceﬁeld” and participation
in stability operations has largely escaped consideration.
The Army must place greater emphasis on the education of its
ofﬁcer corps. Education must begin at the ofﬁcer basic course and
continue at all levels of the Professional Military Education system.
Ofﬁcers at all grades will beneﬁt from a focus on post-conﬂict
stability operations. Today’s ofﬁcers are likely to be involved in other
than war operations on multiple occasions throughout their service.
Geopolitical and cultural training should also represent a signiﬁcant
educational effort, and all ofﬁcers should maintain proﬁciency in a
foreign language throughout their careers.
General ofﬁcers interviewed in a 1999 study conducted by the
U.S. Institute of Peace singled out senior service colleges as the place
where leadership training for stability operations should occur
and where the most curriculum development is needed. These
institutions must place greater emphasis on operations other than
war, geopolitical issues, and cultural awareness.41
Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) must embrace the
entire training effort for stability operations, and the Army must
incorporate these skills in its training base for captains, majors,
lieutenant colonels, and colonels. A doctrinal set of principles for the
conduct of post-conﬂict operations deserves attention. Along with
the doctrine, the training must crystallize the fundamentals of this
new skill set.
Clearly, there is a need to strike a balance. The United States
cannot afford to win the war but lose the peace. To win both the war
and the peace will require that the Army must review its institutional
training base and build on this foundation without signiﬁcantly
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reducing conventional training, while at the same time integrating
new training aimed at supporting 21st century peace operations.42
WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE?
We have to stop making nation-building a political football and recognize
that it’s a national competency we need to foster that we’re not going to
be able to avoid these kinds of activities.43

So, how does the Army handle this political football called nationbuilding? According to Max Boot, the Army must deal with the task of
“imperial” policing. He states that, though it is not a popular duty, it
is vital to safeguarding U.S. interests in the long run, as are the more
conventional warﬁghting skills. “The Army brass should realize that
battleﬁeld victories in places like Afghanistan and Iraq can easily be
squandered if they do not do enough to win the peace.”44
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Stability Operations
Joseph J. Collins provides another perspective. Collins states that
there is a “strong notion that the military exists to deter, ﬁght,
and win wars, that’s it, and any other use of the military is some
kind of borderline abuse.” He points out that war and recovery
are inseparable and occur almost simultaneously. “People in the
military have to realize that this is part of the strategic environment.
And you do not get to pick your strategic environment. You don’t
always have the choice to play the game the way you would like to
play it. You have to adapt to the situation.”45
The United States has yet to discover a workable stabilization
strategy for use against large populations that avoids signiﬁcant troop
commitments. Several countries have proposed personnel policies
that seek to avoid the painful arithmetic of large deployments. They
conduct extended tours of duty using deployed forces built around
short-service conscripts or volunteers. This may be a viable option,
but so far most Western countries have chosen to rely on their
professional armies, and the United States is no different.46 Although
there are many possible force structure options to deal with posthostilities operations, this chapter will look at three alternatives that
warrant consideration. The three options are the steady state option,
the specialized peacekeeping force, and the adaptable multi-purpose
unit options.
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If It’s Not Broke, Don’t Fix It.
The steady state option is straightforward and varies little from
the Army’s current mode of operation in dealing with post-conﬂict
and peacekeeping operations. In essence, the Army would continue
to be a “switch hitter.” Many in the Army feel that what the Army
is doing now is working, that there is no need for change and that
soldiers must continue to train for the high end of the spectrum.
Generally those in favor of the status quo realize that operations
other than war with their associated challenges will require
signiﬁcant pre-deployment training.
The military has demonstrated that it can adapt to operations
other than war while ramping up for deployment. However, the
challenges experienced during the deployments to Afghanistan and
Iraq have rendered the “just enough training, just in time” option
obsolete. There is not ample time prior to deployment to train soldiers
and leaders in the skills sets required for nation-building operations.
So, if the status quo is not acceptable what are the options available?
The remainder of this section will focus on the two options that are
getting the most attention by the Department of Defense (DoD):
specialized peacekeeping forces and multi-purpose units.
Specialized Peacekeeping Units.
During speaking engagements in 2003-04 at the U.S. Army
War College, three senior level general ofﬁcers responded to the
following question: Is it time for the Army to establish specialized
peacekeeping units or commands to respond to post hostility
challenges? They all felt strongly that this was not a good idea for
the following reasons: The Army would lose deterrence value; there
would not be enough specialized forces; and those forces that existed
would be overworked. All stated that the Army must improve in
both its effectiveness and efﬁciency, but they were not proponents of
specialized peacekeeping forces.47
Interestingly, in a Washington Post article titled “Pentagon
Considers Creating Postwar Peacekeeping Forces,” Bradley Graham
argued that the Pentagon is looking at creating dedicated military
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forces that could be dispatched to trouble spots around the globe to
conduct peacekeeping and reconstruction after conﬂicts. “The idea
is to forge deployable brigades or a whole division out of engineers,
military police, civil affairs ofﬁcers, and other specialists critical to
postwar operations.”48 The new stabilization and reconstruction
force would bridge the gap between the end of decisive combat and
the point at which a civilian-led, nation-building effort is up and
running.
The force would be distinct from a proposed NATO rapidresponse force and apart from the United Nations (UN). The
standing constabulary force would consist of troops from a range
of countries―but led and trained by the United States. 49 Secretary
of Defense Donald Rumsfeld has stated that “it would be good for
the United States to provide leadership to train other countries who
desire to participate in peacekeeping. The result would be a cadre
of people who are trained, equipped, organized and ready to work
with each other.”50
Defense ofﬁcials note that Secretary Rumsfeld’s proposal is
consistent with the aim of limiting U.S. military overseas deployments.
Though it would specialize a small number of American troops
in peacekeeping, it would also seek to enlist other countries to
contribute the majority of troops, with the promise of training by the
United States. Creating a standing international peacekeeping force
led and trained by the United States would also allow the Pentagon
to exert considerably more control over peacekeeping than in the
past. This proposal has attracted signiﬁcant opposition from senior
Army leaders.
Another proponent of permanent constabulary forces is retired
Vice Admiral Arthur Cebrowski, the head of the DoD Transformation
effort. He argues that the United States needs a permanent postconﬂict stabilization force, but it must be on an equal footing with
combat units. Although many of the elements that would make up a
post-conﬂict force such as engineers and military police are already
found within the military, their mere existence does not necessarily
constitute a post-conﬂict capability without proper organization and
command and control.51
During a conference in December 2003, the Fletcher Center
for Technology and National Security Policy looked at the issues
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associated with Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations and
addressed the idea of standing peacekeeping forces. The attendees
made the following proposals:52
• Create two standing Joint Stabilization and Reconstruction
Commands, one active component and one reserve component
division equivalents.
• Stabilization and Reconstruction Joint Command plans, trains,
exercises, develops doctrine and deploys to areas of responsibility
(AOR).
• Maximize jointness with Army lead.
• The forces should be:
- Capable of operating in hostile environments.
- Capable of operating under a Joint Command or as a separate
Joint Task Force.
- Modular, scalable, tailorable for mission, embedded
interagency.
• Provide link to nongovernment organizations (NGOs) and
contractors to hand off to civilian leadership for nation-building.
Although the option of using specialized forces explicitly for postconﬂict operations is attractive, it is not the most optimal solution.
As Afghanistan and Iraq have shown, troops that are proﬁcient in
their warﬁghting skills are essential in both the decisive operations
and stabilization stage. As we are discovering in Iraq, without
security peace will not follow and progress will not be made. Based
on current trends, it is unlikely that a specialized peacekeeping force
could meet the future demands of post-conﬂict operations. There
simply would not be enough of the specialized forces to go around,
once again resulting in cobbling forces together at the last minute.
Another option is the adoption of multipurpose units.
Multipurpose Units.
Considering the future realities the Army will certainly face,
multipurpose units make sense. Chief of Staff of the Army General
Peter Schoomaker’s unit of action initiatives are more relevant to a
multipurpose versus a specialized approach to stability operations.
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The multipurpose units would maintain agility by mixing and
matching subordinate forces according to the needs of the mission
resulting in a modular plug and play, multicapable outﬁt. The
multipurpose units appear to be a valid option for the force the
Chief of Staff of the Army envisions. This multipurpose unit option
allows more emphasis on focused training at all levels, including the
leadership. The concept requires that a set of key nation-building
tasks be identiﬁed, guidance provided to units, and these essential
tasks be added to unit Mission Essential Task Lists (METL).
Adding noncombat focused tasks to unit METL challenges
the conventional wisdom, and many feel that it will shift the
primary focus of training away from warﬁghting. Combined with
the multipurpose unit approach, the ability to plug and play and
identify the essential post-conﬂict tasks would ensure that the U.S.
Army would be postured to meet National Security Strategy (NSS)
demands to provide ready and trained units to execute missions
across the full-spectrum of conﬂict. Dr. Conrad Crane provides an
excellent list of recommendations that may assist the Army in better
preparing itself to operate in “a future of continuous and cumulative
SSCs [small scale contengencies].”53
• Create truly multicapable units structured, trained, and
committed to both winning in Major Theaters of War and
handling the stability portion of contingencies.
• Increase the ability of units at all levels to train for, plan, and
execute stabilization phase tasks.
• Ensure adequate focus on the planning and execution of
stabilization phase tasks at the U.S. Army Command and General
Staff College and the U.S. Army War College.
• Conduct a complete review of the Army’s overall combat
support/combat service support force structure and based on
the review realign force structure between active and reserve
components. 54
Although the list is certainly not all inclusive, the failure to
address any of the issues will have signiﬁcant implications for the
Army. Regardless of the force structure strategy, the Army selects
the essential task to improve and sustain the combat proﬁciency of
our Army and its capability to execute critical stability tasks. “One
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thing is certain, the post-conﬂict mission is too important and too
hard to rely on cobbling forces together enroute to the objective.”55
CONCLUSION
Our primary mission is not to ﬁght and win the nation’s wars,
though that’s our most important mission. We exist to serve the
nation, however, the nation wants us to serve wherever and
whenever we are needed.56
General Kevin P. Burns

General Byrnes sums it up best. Ultimately the armed forces will
do what the nation wants and will serve whenever and wherever
they are needed. However, the objective “is not to ignore postconﬂict challenges―shrinking from intervention, ousting regimes
without consideration for their replacement, or performing only
half-hearted reconstruction planning.”57
The challenges of preparing the armed forces to ﬁght in major
regional conﬂicts and other military operations will require ﬂexible
and adaptive doctrine and a force structure that can meet the
dangers of a post-9/11 world. The basic tenets of our military policy
and force structure focus should remain conventional land warfare.
The United States clearly needs the capabilities that come with welltrained and equipped land forces. As long as it is the policy of this
nation to respond to the types of operations the Army is currently
engaged in, it should build forces of sufﬁcient size and with the
capability to operate across the full spectrum.58
The multipurpose force approach will provide the ﬂexible,
adaptive doctrine and force structure required in the increasingly
complex post-conﬂict environment. As this chapter illustrates, the
specialized force approach to post-conﬂict and nation-building
operations is not the most optimal solution. It is unlikely that
a specialized force could meet the future demands of stability
operations. However, multipurpose forces that are trained,
equipped, with leaders who are committed to both winning in Major
Theaters of War and handling the stabilization phase of small scale
contingencies will ensure progress towards U.S. security goals.
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Recently the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and
Readiness told a group of defense correspondents that, in order
to prevent future wars, the U.S. military is in the nation-building
business to stay, and it seems unlikely that the Army will not
continue to play a signiﬁcant role in the future.59 Like the Cold War,
the global war on terror and its increased requirement for postconﬂict intervention is likely to preoccupy the United States for
decades, and we must be prepared.
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CHAPTER 11
SEABASING AND SHIP-TO-OBJECTIVE MANEUVER
AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS FOR THE JOINT FORCE
COMMANDER
Lieutenant Colonel Stuart L. Dickey
The developing concept of “Ship-to-Objective Maneuver” within
the U.S. Marine Corps relates to parent concepts―“Expeditionary
Maneuver Warfare,” “Operational Maneuver From the Sea,” and “Sea
Based Logistics.” Speciﬁcally, recent studies focus on determining
the operational reach capabilities of U.S. Marine expeditionary units
and expeditionary brigades in the 2015 timeframe. This represents the
projected date for the ﬁelding of multiple systems, vessels/vehicles,
and equipment necessary for implementation of these concepts.
The objective then is to: Analyze the operational reach of ship-toobjective maneuver as determined by recent studies; determine what
the Marine Corps aims at achieving with this capability; determine
what the naval services need to do for ship-to-objective maneuver to
become an operational reality; and, determine what this capability
offers national leadership and joint force commanders.
The U.S. Navy and Marine Corps published a White Paper in
the early 1990s entitled “Forward . . . From the Sea.” It signaled
a signiﬁcant shift for the U.S. Navy away from traditional blue
water operations to addressing growing threats in the littorals.
It also signaled a closer doctrinal relationship to the U.S. Marine
Corps, which has always focused on the littorals. The foundation of
the Marine Corps has been its expeditionary capabilities, coupled
with an institutionalized expeditionary mindset, culture, and
structure. Its relationship with, and dependence on, the Navy makes
“Forward . . . From the Sea” even more signiﬁcant in its focus
on closer cooperation between the two services to maximize
capabilities and develop new approaches to meet current and future
threats.
In 1997, the U.S. Marine Corps developed the concept of
operational maneuver from the sea. This applied the tenets of
277

maneuver warfare to sea space. This concept views the sea as
maneuver space, not an obstacle. Naval amphibious forces have
use of the sea for positional advantage, thus preventing the enemy
from dictating the location of attack. The concept aims at creating
dilemmas that force the enemy to defend the length of his coast or
littoral area and at the same time provide American naval forces
the option to strike at the time and place of their choosing.1 The
principles of operational maneuver from the sea are:
• A focus on operational objectives.
• The use of the sea as maneuver space.
• The generation of overwhelming tempo and momentum.
• The pitting of strengths against weaknesses.
• The emphasis of intelligence, deception, and ﬂexibility.
• The integration of all organic, joint, and combined assets.2
The Marine Corps developed the concept of expeditionary
maneuver warfare subsequent to operational maneuver from the
sea. It represents the Corps’ overarching warﬁghting doctrine
encompassing the tenets of operational maneuver from the sea,
while reﬁning and expanding them. The Marine Corps considers
expeditionary maneuver warfare its capstone concept that supports
its direction for the 21st century. It sees expeditionary maneuver
warfare as the union of its core competencies, maneuver warfare
philosophy, expeditionary heritage, and the concepts by which it
will organize, deploy, and employ forces.3 Imbedded within these
concepts are the concepts of seabasing, ship-to-objective maneuver,
and sustained operations ashore.
Seabasing represents the enabling concept of expeditionary
maneuver warfare and operational maneuver from the sea and,
speciﬁcally, ship-to-objective maneuver. It is integral to “Sea Power
21,“ the Navy’s vision for the 21st century.4 Its fundamental basis
is the creation of vessels, systems, and capabilities that allow for
prolonged sustainment of forces ashore from ﬂoating logistics bases
at sea. Such an approach eliminates the need for an operational pause,
while logistic support is delivered to shore. This logistics sea base
would have its location over the horizon. Seabasing is more than just
logistics, however. It is the projection platform from which forces are
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launched, commanded, sustained, reconstituted, and transported. It
cannot be a single ship or capability. Rather, it must be a system of
systems built on capabilities in the maritime prepositioning forces,
future, navy amphibious ships, and other capabilities. The tenets of
seabasing are:
• Primacy of the sea base: over the horizon positioning, reduced
or eliminated footprint ashore.
• Reduced demand: sea based support, technology
improvements, lighter forces ashore.
• In-stride sustainment: network-based, automated logistics
for maneuver units.
• Adaptive response and joint operations: expanded missions,
joint support.
• Force closure and reconstitution at sea: building and restoring
combat power. 5
The most signiﬁcant capabilities that seabasing enables are
assured access and rapid force projection. Seabasing is dependent
on neither host nation support nor benign deep-water ports. As
the chief enabler of expeditionary maneuver warfare and shipto-objective maneuver, it also addresses the problems raised by
antiaccess defenses by allowing maneuver forces to avoid them. If
such defenses prove robust, then seabasing supports forcible-entry,
antiaccess operations as well as joint follow-on forces.6
Maritime prepositioning force, future, is to seabasing what
seabasing is to expeditionary maneuver warfare and ship-to-objective
maneuver. It represents the fundamental capability that makes them
work. Of all the capabilities under development to support “Marine
Strategy 21,” “Sea Power 21,” and the “Naval Operating Concept for
Joint Operations,” it is the closest to being truly transformational.
Its ships will have the capability for at-sea arrival and assembly of
units, direct support of the assault echelon of the amphibious task
force, now known as the expeditionary strike group, long-term seabased sustainment for the landing force, and at-sea reconstitution
and redeployment of the force. A number of new technologies
are under development to support seabasing: selective on-load
and off-load, internal ships systems (i.e., automated warehousing,
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item/pallet/container operations, roll-on/roll-off systems, and
ﬂow patterns), external ship systems (i.e., ramps, lighterage, and
other craft interfaces), modular system/sub-system concepts, and
aircraft interface technology.7 The ability for a Marine expeditionary
brigade to be operational from the sea base within 7 to 10 days from
initial deployment could alter signiﬁcantly the initial conditions
of a conﬂict.8 This is the operational objective of ship-to-objective
maneuver as enabled by seabasing.
Ship-to-objective maneuver is the tactical extension of
operational maneuver from the sea. It projects forces ashore in
ﬁghting formation without the need for a beach lodgment. It treats
the sea as maneuver space and uses it as a protective barrier as well
as a high-speed avenue of approach. It places forces ashore and
inland at multiple points, thus creating a dilemma for the enemy and
expanding the tactical and operational options for the joint forces or
Marine air ground task force commander. Its forces will move via
surface and air lift to objectives inland. Maneuver units take only
minimum essential logistics support and rely on resupply from the
sea base. The joint force can expand the logistical footprint ashore
as the mission requires, particularly if sustained operations ashore
occur. The intent aims at providing “the joint force commander with
forces optimized for forward presence, engagement, crisis response,
and warﬁghting that will achieve his operational objectives.”9
APPLICATION10
The Marine Corps currently has the capability to conduct
limited ship-to-objective maneuver operations. Task Force 58’s
performance during Operation ENDURING FREEDOM is the most
recent example. Analysis conducted by the Marine Corps Combat
Development Command entitled “Ship-to-Objective Maneuver
Concept of Operations” addresses future ship-to-objective
maneuver operational capabilities.11 The basis for this study derives
from the “Defense Planning Guidance.” Planning and execution of
the scenario within established parameters achieved the following
results:
• Forces operated from a sea base located 25 nautical miles over
the horizon.
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• This sea base consisted of six amphibious ships and six ships
in the maritime prepositioning force, future; six high speed
vessels; organic heavy surface lift; and 28 aircraft operating
spots. 12
• The two smaller marine air/ground task forces organized
into a surface lift task force and a vertical lift task force. Each
consisted of two reinforced infantry battalions. The surface
force was mechanized. The vertical lift task force consisted of
light infantry with light armored vehicles.
• Day 1 put 4,861 personnel and 558 vehicles ashore. Day 2
put the reserve battalion ashore, for a total of 6,753 personnel
and 886 vehicles at surface task force and vertical task force
objectives.
• The vertical assault executed in four waves and carried
personnel, equipment, supplies, and the combat service
support detachment. During one period of darkness (7 hours
and 45 minutes), 195 sorties of MV-22 Osprey tilt-rotor aircraft
and 76 sorties of CH-53E heavy lift helicopters delivered
2,153 marines, 25 light armored vehicles, 170 vehicles, and
supporting equipment to an objective located 85 miles inland
(a total of 110 nautical miles from the sea base). Fifty-three
sorties of AH-1/UH-1 attack and utility helicopters and 32
joint strike ﬁghter sorties supported this effort by providing
escort support, command and control, close air support, and
naval surface ﬁre support direction.
• The surface lift task force conducted forcible entry operations
during the hours of darkness in a mined environment using
four lanes per battalion. The surface assault consisted of
three cycles and a total of 76 expeditionary ﬁghting vehicles,
30 landing craft air cushion, and 18 landing craft utility
(replacement) sorties. It landed the following personnel and
equipment at its objective during one period of darkness:
-

2,708 Marines
76 expeditionary ﬁghting vehicles13
50 light armored vehicles
22 M1A1 tanks
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-

2 assault breacher vehicles14
8 expeditionary ﬁre support systems15
6 lightweight 155mm howitzers
180 HMMWVs
26 medium tactical vehicle replacements.

• The Marine expeditionary brigade closed a force of over
13,000 Marines within a 7-day period, using multidimensional
strategic lift assets that included:16
-

-

Self-deploying aircraft: 30 joint strike ﬁghter (short
take-off, vertical landing version), 48 MV-22s, 5 EA6Bs or its future replacement, 12 KC-130s, and 314
personnel.
Commercial airlift: 22 747s transporting a total of 9,094
personnel.
Strategic lift: 48 C-17s carrying 20 CH-53s, 9 UH-1s, 18
AH-1s, aviation ground support equipment, critical
low-density/high-demand cargo and 182 personnel.
This force completed at-sea arrival and assembly with
the sea base using MV-22s and high-speed vessels. 17

A second study, entitled “Mission Area Analysis, Operational
Reach-2015,” has analyzed the ability of a Marine expeditionary
force-sized Marine air/ground task force to project combat power
ashore. While the study incorporated surface lift capabilities, its
primary focus was vertical lift capabilities and limitations in a shipto-objective maneuver scenario, using MV-22 and CH-53E platforms
with accompanying escort aircraft. The purpose of the landing was
to ensure a rapid, orderly, and tactical build up of combat power
ashore. These characteristics become critical when assessing the
effectiveness of the plan as ranges extended. The study analyzed
distances from 25 to 200 nautical miles to answer the questions
“how much, how far, and how fast.”18 This study’s primary focus is
vertical assault capabilities. It also conﬁrms, however, that sufﬁcient
current and projected surface lift capabilities exist to conduct shipto-objective maneuver related surface assaults.19
This scenario used 78 MV-22s and 28 CH-53Es for the vertical
assault portion of the base landing plan.20 A total of 732 sorties
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would land the entire force at a vertical assault objective located 95
miles from the sea base (397 sorties for the assault forces, 205 sorties
for the combat trains, and 130 sorties for the combat service support
detachment). This put 3,823 marines and sailors, plus 479 vehicles or
pieces of equipment, ashore in a 2-day period. This included 4,000
gallons of fuel and the artillery battalion’s basic load of ammunition,
plus 1 day of allowance.21
These two studies conﬁrm that the Marine Corps will be
capable of projecting large mechanized forces ashore via surface lift
platforms from sea bases located approximately 25 nautical miles
over the horizon. It is the ability to project and sustain forces over the
horizon from a sea base that differentiates current capabilities from
future ones. These studies also calculate that the operational range
of regimental-sized vertical assault forces culminates at 110 nautical
miles from the sea base. Since it is the vertical assault that comprises
true ship-to-objective maneuver capabilities, the following study
analyzed the capabilities of a smaller force by looking at extended
range operations for the Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special
Operations Capable) [MEU (SOC)].22
The results of this study, entitled “MEU (SOC) Extended Range
Operations,” suggest that a reinforced infantry company-sized force
package has an operational range of 200 nautical miles from the sea
base, 90 more nautical miles than the regimental-sized forces in the
previous two studies. The risk factors identiﬁed in this study focus
on conditions that could prevent its successful operation: weather
conditions, availability of aircraft, availability of appropriate type
ships, deck management issues such as sufﬁcient deck spots and
rotations, and embarkation issues. This study concluded that, while
such missions are possible, they have an almost zero percent margin
of error, particularly in terms of aircraft operational readiness. This
type of mission depends on two KC-130J aerial refueling platforms,
a distinguishing factor between it and other studies. According
to the maintenance and readiness parameters used for this study,
vertical assault aircraft meet mission requirements 80 percent of the
time, while ﬁxed-wing aircraft meet requirements 50 percent of the
time.23
This last study focused on Marine expeditionary brigade
seabasing and thus is entitled “Seabasing Concept of Operations.”
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It rests on the classiﬁed version of “Ship-to-Objective Maneuver
Concept of Operations,” but extended the campaign to 22 days and
stressed logistics to determine overall requirements.24 It represents
the fourth in a series of sea-based operations in-process reviews
and builds on the conclusions of the previous three. It supports the
ﬁndings and conclusions of ship-to-objective maneuver concept of
operations, while identifying additional areas that require further
reﬁnement. This study organized its ﬁndings in three main areas:
movement conclusions, sustainment conclusions, and overall “takeaways.”
The movement conclusions validated that initial assaults are
feasible within periods of darkness. Vertical assaults took 7.4
hours to complete and surface assaults took 6.6 hours to complete.
Embarkation management and conﬁguration is critical to the assault
and directly related to deck spot utilization. Additionally, the
synergistic effect of the combined capabilities of the expeditionary
strike group and the maritime prepositioning group signiﬁcantly
enhanced rapid buildup ashore.25 Both vertical and surface assaults
were challenging, but supportable.26
Sustainment conclusions indicate that forces ashore can be
sufﬁciently resupplied by air. Intermodal packaging―one of the
critical capabilities provided by the future ship designs in the
maritime propositioning force, future―is essential. It would allow
for improved packaging, greater quantities, and better visibility of all
items, particularly the smaller items that tend to get lost in the mass
of supplies that are critical for embarkation and logistics, i.e., slings,
nets, drums, etc. This future capability would improve seaborne
warehousing, retrieval, and loading capabilities signiﬁcantly, and is
one of the critical elements of sea based logistics. It directly relates to
embarkation efﬁciency and deckspace management. 27
The most signiﬁcant ﬁndings in this section concern fuel
consumption and identiﬁed that problem as the biggest logistical
challenge of ship-to-objective maneuver. It applies to both the
platforms used to project forces ashore and the forces themselves.
Due to substantial vertical and surface lift requirements, lift
platforms use more fuel then forces ashore.28
Thus, the major insights from this Marine expeditionary brigade
seabasing analysis are:
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• Ship-to-objective maneuver concept of operations is basically
sound, but it is a work in progress that requires continuous
updating.
• One-hundred-ten mile ship-to-objective maneuver is
supportable.
• Embarkation is the key to the assault.
• Intermodal packaging and slings are critical enablers that
require accurate warehousing visibility.
• Synergism between expeditionary strike groups and
the maritime prepositioning group represents a critical
requirement.
ANALYSIS
The Marine Corps’ stated objective is for the “sea base to develop
to the point where it is able to support fully a Marine expeditionary
brigade with an air-delivered and sustained battalion-size maneuver
unit out to 200 nautical miles from the sea base with some elements
to 240 nautical miles. Small tailored units could be supported at
ranges greater than 240 nautical miles to the full range of naval
supporting ﬁres, air and missile defense, within limits of logistics
reach.”29 The distances depend on the projected operational ranges
of the MV-22 Osprey and the expeditionary ﬁghting vehicle.30 The
results of the studies, however, fall somewhat short of these ranges,
but nonetheless demonstrate a considerable capability for a joint
force commander.
Essentially, ship-to-objective maneuver is a precision strike
capability on a large scale. In line with the Department of
Defense’s focus on long-range precision attack operations, it is
heavily dependent on improved intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance capabilities across all three spectrums of warfare―
tactical, operational, and strategic. While the Marine Corps controls
most aspects of its own tactical and operational intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance requirements, it has no control
of the military and intergovernmental agencies that provide the
highest levels of strategic intelligence. The planning assumption that
these agencies will not only be able to provide the high resolution of
intelligence required, but will also be fully dedicated and focused
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on providing that intelligence “real time” to naval forces involved in
ship-to-objective maneuver operations is tenuous. This potentially
could debilitate the ability to make sound planning assumptions;
in other words, not to assume away enemy capabilities or create
friendly ones that do not exist. It remains to be seen how this affects
the ultimate operability of ship-to-objective maneuver.31
High-volume naval surface ﬁre support also is essential in
ship-to-objective maneuver. It may be even more critical than in
conventional amphibious operations because some trade-off in
ground-based ﬁre support may be necessary for vertical assault
forces and their need for operational level ﬁre support. The logistical
footprint and sustainment requirements of ground-based ﬁres
also present a challenge.32 The Marine Corps’ development of the
lightweight 155mm howitzer and the expeditionary ﬁre support
system represent attempts to address this problem. The Navy
is developing the advanced gun system for its next generation
destroyer, the DD(X), to support ship-to-objective maneuver forces
at the ranges and distances required.33
Fundamental changes in logistics support and organization may
be among the most signiﬁcant issues related to ship-to-objective
maneuver. The Marine Corps is approaching this problem from
two directions. One approach involves increased efﬁciency and
effectiveness through internal restructuring. The other rests on
the actual reduction of requirements ashore. The development
of integrated logistics consolidates maintenance and logistics
functions at higher echelons to reduce combat requirements. Future
combat service support aims at shifting many logistics functions
and responsibilities from the units to the Marine air/ground task
force combat service support element, minus aircraft maintenance.
This would allow unit logistics ofﬁcers to focus on requests and
coordination with the combat service support element instead of
focusing on internal logistics support. Conceptually, this potentially
reduces the logistics section of an infantry battalion from 50 to
10 marines.34 Such a reduction in personnel ashore would result
from reduction in demand resulting from future technologies that
allow for more efﬁcient vehicles, and increased visibility of logistic
and maintenance requirements. The hope is to reduce the Marine
expeditionary brigade sea-based ﬂow-in-echelon table of equipment
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by more then 50 percent. If sustained operations ashore require more
support, then it is phased gradually into theater and ashore.
Opponents of the integrated logistics concept argue that ground
combat is about effectiveness, not efﬁciency. They contend that
combat demands redundancy at all levels―personnel, equipment,
supplies, and maintenance capabilities. This is a greater concern
for the motorized and mechanized units that have larger logistical
and maintenance requirements. And while this concept may be
appropriate, even necessary, for a vertical assault task force, it
eventually may result in problems for surface assault task forces
comprised of heavier units (expeditionary ﬁghting vehicles, tanks,
trucks, artillery, light armored vehicles). How the Marine Corps
resolves and incorporates these issues into future ship-to-objective
maneuver operations will be critical to their sustainability and
overall success.
Naval countermine capabilities are essential for littoral
operations. Amphibious forces must be able to clear lanes through
the shallow water zones (10 to 40 feet depth), as well as the surf
zone/craft landing zone (0 to 10 feet depth). Such capabilities must
allow for in-stride breaching without disrupting the momentum
of the surface assault. The goal is to create four transit lanes per
battalion and eight littoral penetration points per regiment.35 The
joint force commander and the Navy have responsibility for the sea
area from the sea base to the beach exits. The Marine Corps has it
from the beach to the objective. This concept requires all landing
craft air cushion, expeditionary ﬁghting vehicles, and landing
craft utility (replacement) to have a common tactical picture that
electronically displays cleared lanes through the breached areas,
backed-up by visual markings. “Ship-to-Objective Maneuver
Concept of Operations” states that “negotiating a marine mineﬁeld
in a GPS [global positioning system]-denied environment at night
in Sea State III could be challenging.”36 This may be the greatest
understatement ever written in a military publication.
It further states that the Marine expeditionary brigade must have
the capability of conducting reconnaissance on 32 potential littoral
penetration points, even though as few as eight may eventually be
used.37 Littoral penetration points can be 500 meters apart. Littoral
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penetration sites are notionally ﬁve kilometers wide and separated
by approximately three kilometers. This equates to over four-anda-half miles of shoreline. This is a daunting requirement even with
the combined assets of navy seal and marine force reconnaissance
teams.
Operation DESERT STORM exposed U.S. countermine
capabilities as lacking, and these capabilities have not improved
sufﬁciently since then. “Ship-to-Objective Maneuver Concept
of Operations” suggests that “technological advances will
likely [emphasis added] support remote clandestine detection,
classiﬁcation, identiﬁcation, marking, and monitoring of mines and
obstacles at sea and ashore.”38 A recent U.S. Government Accounting
Ofﬁce (USGAO) report states that current forces “are not effectively
capable of breaching and clearing mines in very shallow water near
the shore.”39 The Navy’s mine warfare section, N752, identiﬁes the
area between the surf zone and the craft landing zone as being
the most deﬁcient―not necessarily the very shallow water zone
as the USGAO report suggests. This happens to be the area where
responsibilities for countermine operations shift from the Navy
to the Marine Corps, tactically referred to as a seam. It is also the
area that allows for less expensive mines to have greater antiaccess
potential. The impact of this has not gone unnoticed by either the
Marine Corps or the Navy. Part of the problem relates to money and
resource priorities, while the other relates to science and technology.
This is a critical vulnerability for surface assault forces in ship-toobjective maneuver operations. Finding an affordable solution that
the Marine Corps agrees with, and the Navy supports, is critical.
Strategic airlift, military and civilian, remains essential in
expeditionary maneuver warfare and ship-to-objective maneuver
operations to transport personnel and equipment to advance
bases. Even with multiple means of force projection, including
self-deploying aircraft, high speed vessels, and Navy amphibious
shipping, the scenario in “Ship-to-Objective Maneuver Concept
of Operations” requires 22 747s and 49 C-17s to rapidly transport
required personnel to the advance base. There, they get on high-speed
“connectors” for transport to the sea base. This is not an exorbitant
amount of aircraft if U.S. Transportation Command is not supporting
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multiple concurrent strategic lift missions. It might become a ﬁght
for resources, however, during a large-scale time-phased force
deployment contingency. And, as the Army is reorganizing into a
more modular expeditionary force, it puts even more emphasis on
strategic lift requirements to get forces into theater. This situation
may not be different from current joint requirements, but it is worth
exploring from a joint perspective.
The one glaringly obvious fact about ship-to-objective maneuver
operations is their absolute reliance on signiﬁcant amounts of vertical
lift assets and capabilities, much more so than either current ground
or amphibious operations require. Ship-to-objective maneuver,
as envisioned, depends on the capabilities of the MV-22 and the
CH-53E (service life extension program) and the ability to conduct
continuous large-scale air assault operations, exponentially larger
then anything the Marine Corps is currently capable of performing.
The studies analyzed in this chapter provide speciﬁc and accurate
data on lift requirements for initial assaults and subsequent resupply
ﬂights, but do not consider sustained operations ashore in a high
casualty environment. Even though surface lift will transport many
casualties, considering the myriad combat scenarios possible, it is
realistic to expect that the majority of casualties will require vertical
lift to get from the objective to casualty collection points to await
surface lift to the sea base. The worst-case scenario would entail
concurrent assault insertions with multiple casualty missions and
stretch already thinly stretched lift assets even further.
Increased reliance on all Marine air platforms makes the Marine
Corps air component even more integral to the Marine air/ground
task force concept. The Marine Corps defends its aviation arm on a
regular basis against both military and political critics who see it as
a redundant asset. Critics argue that it runs contradictory to joint
concepts and intent for the Marine Corps to have its own airspace
and, speciﬁcally, ﬁxed-wing aircraft. The Marine Corps has been
successful so far, but as jointness continues to permeate the services
and the U.S. Congress, it may become a more tenuous position.
Ship-to-objective maneuver adds strength to the argument for the
Marine Corps. But in order to carry the necessary weight to win the
argument, ship-to-objective maneuver must prove itself not only
successful, but also vital to joint operations.
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Surface lighterage is another lift asset critical to ship-to-objective
maneuver. Current capabilities will not meet future requirements.
Even with the purchase of more high speed vessels, the service life
extension of the landing craft air cushion, and the introduction of
the landing craft utility (replacement), more and better types of
lighterage must be purchased or produced in order to meet the full
range of requirements, especially logistical. These vessels require
the capability to marry-up to maritime prepositioning force, future,
ships and conduct in-stride replenishment in sea state III conditions.
Ship-to-objective maneuver is as dependent on these types of surface
lift assets as it is on vertical lift assets. And as increased reliance on
air makes the Marine air wing more integral to the Marine Corps
and its Marine air/ground task force concept, increased reliance
on navy surface lift has the same effect on the Navy-Marine Corps
relationship. In fact, it is one of the few areas in the military that
begins to achieve the joint objective of dependence rather than
interoperability.
At the moment, however, there is a disconnect between the two
services. While lighterage to support ship-to-objective maneuver
operations is a priority for the Marine Corps, the Navy has several
acquisition project priorities, and surface lift is not at the top of that
list. The Navy must put more emphasis in this area if it is to see the
realization of “Sea Strike” as laid out in its “Naval Transformation
Roadmap.”40
Over-the-horizon and long range communication is essential
for ship-to-objective maneuver operations. This is a recognized
critical capability and is proving to be one of the most challenging.
It requires aerial retransmission platforms with wide and narrow
band satellite communication capability. MV-22s equipped with the
joint tactical radio system can communicate via narrow band ultra
high frequency satellite communications. Both vertical and surface
assault forces require wide area and local area network capabilities
in order to receive the current operational and tactical pictures.
The intent is for situational awareness at all levels to be achieved
through battleﬁeld visualization made possible by the current
operational and tactical pictures. The increased command and
control and intelligence requirements of ship-to-objective maneuver

290

make it essential that these are always available. Database backups
and redundant communication systems supposedly ensure this
happens.41 Intelligence is dependent on “unprecedented amounts
of detailed and accurate information” which it achieves through
reachback connections to joint and national agencies and which
requires their cooperation.42 Ship-to-objective maneuver requires
vast communications pathways to make this happen. Even with
FORCEnet, there is still a chance for competing requirements to
impact command and control, communication, and intelligence
capabilities.43 In this regard, ship-to-objective maneuver makes
itself dependent on the same amount of “exquisite intelligence”
that Network-centric warfare does in a number of circumstances. It
is arguable whether such levels of intelligence are achievable. Even
if they are, dependence on such information provides a cautionary
warning. There is a difference between developing these capabilities
and maximizing their effectiveness, and developing operational
concepts that are too dependent on them.
IMPLICATIONS
Current studies demonstrate that a Marine expeditionary
brigade-sized force will be capable of conducting ship-to-objective
maneuver operations out to 110 nautical miles from a sea base
located 25 miles over the horizon. While ship-to-objective maneuver
operations consist of both surface and vertical assault forces, it
is only the vertical assault force that is capable of achieving this
110 nautical mile range during the ﬁrst period of darkness. Both
forces consist of two infantry battalions. The surface assault force is
mechanized, and the vertical assault is infantry-pure. Naval surface
ﬁre support, air assets, and inherent mortar and artillery capabilities
provide ﬁre support for both. Both forces are capable of logistical
sustainment from the sea base, although continued sustainment of
the vertical assault force by air assets alone will prove challenging,
but feasible. Extended range operations beyond this 110 nautical
mile limit are possible with smaller forces. A reinforced company of
approximately 250 Marines is capable of conducting vertical assault
operations out to 200 nautical miles from the sea base.
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The Marine Corps considers seabasing and ship-to-objective
maneuver transformational capabilities, but it provides its own
perspective on the nature of transformation. The Marine Corps
considers something transformational if it invents a new capability
that did not exist, or it makes an existing capability better by orders
of magnitude. It identiﬁes four pillars of transformation: operational
change, institutional agility, leap-ahead technology, and acquisition
and business reform.44 In this context, seabasing is certainly a
transformational capability. Whether or not ship-to-objective
maneuver meets these parameters is arguable. Regardless, the
capability to project and sustain elements of a Marine expeditionary
brigade-sized force or a reinforced company from a sea base as
far as 110 or 200 nautical miles, respectively, provides joint force
commanders multiple operational and tactical options that do not
currently exist.
How signiﬁcant is it that current projections fall short of the
stated 200-240 nautical mile ranges? It is not signiﬁcant at this point.
It would be another matter if the Army and Marine Corps were
developing similar capabilities and were involved in a bidding war
over which one had the greater operational reach capability. But
they are not, nor is this within the realm of Army roles and functions.
Besides, the Army is busy enough trying to make itself modular so
that it can task organize much along Marine Corps lines. And as this
concept matures, real operational data and tactics, techniques, and
procedures no doubt will expand operational reach. It will take trial
and error, combined with technological modiﬁcations and ingenuity,
to overcome the design limitations that currently limit lift ranges.
In the interim, providing combatant commanders with innovative
capabilities to prevent hostilities before they begin, gaining decisive
tactical results that have operational and even strategic impact, and
laying the foundation for further operational expansion are the
objectives.
The critical capabilities required to make seabasing and shipto-objective maneuver realities are the current technologies being
developed (or not) to support it. The previous analysis discusses
these technologies, along with strengths, weaknesses, and additional
requirements. Transformational capabilities begin as concepts
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that equipment and doctrine then are developed to support, not
the other way around. Seabasing and ship-to-objective maneuver
identiﬁed the need for capabilities provided by such vehicles as
the MV-22 and expeditionary ﬁghting vehicle, just as amphibious
operations identiﬁed the need for amphibious tractors and new
classes of amphibious ships prior to World War II. The issues of
sufﬁcient additional lighterage, naval surface ﬁre support, and mine
countermeasure capabilities remain questionable, if not contentious,
and must be resolved for seabasing and ship-to-objective maneuver
to realize full operational effectiveness. Despite this, the cooperation
between the Marine Corps and Navy in this endeavor is almost
unprecedented, not only between themselves but also among the
services as a whole. The massively expensive acquisition programs
of both services in support of seabasing and ship-to-objective
maneuver provide proof of this.
Is it worth it? The naval services seem to think so, especially the
Marine Corps. It appears to be betting the farm on it, considering
the prices tags of the MV-22 Osprey and the expeditionary ﬁghting
vehicle (which costs more than an M1A1). But does this mean that
the Marine Corps envisions itself conducting only ship-to-objective
operations from over-the-horizon sea bases? The answer is no, but
it does believe that the ability to do this exponentially enhances
current capabilities that will continue to be available to combatant
commanders and national decisionmakers.
A larger question is what, exactly, a Marine expeditionary brigadesized unit conducting ship-to-objective maneuver operations at these
distances can accomplish. This question must be kept in context. The
concept of seabasing allows not only for initial ship-to-objective
maneuver operations, but also, and perhaps more importantly, for
the follow-on expansion into sustained operations ashore if required.
The capabilities discussed herein offer little beyond an operational
or tactical raid, even at the expeditionary brigade level. This would
be true if an operation consisted solely of initial assault forces with
limited sustainment and without the ability to be reinforced. But the
concept of ship-to-objective maneuver operations aligns very much
with the Marine Corps building block concept of Marine air/ground
task forces. That is, Marine expeditionary units can be built into
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expeditionary brigades that can become expeditionary forces as the
situation develops. So, too, are surface and assault forces capable of
being supplied and reinforced from the sea base which, in turn, is
capable of being replenished from its reachback sea and air lines of
communication. The entire system of systems allows for incremental
build up and sustainment of forces ashore if sustained operations
ashore become necessary. If used properly and in a timely manner,
however, the real intent of ship-to-objective maneuver is to prevent
the situation from growing into sustained land combat, or, as
previously stated, to “signiﬁcantly alter the initial conditions of a
conﬂict.”45 Forces of this size, ﬂexibility, and reach inserted at the
right place and time should be able to do this and more.
As previously stated, seabasing is a potentially transformational
capability that extends beyond logistical sustainment from a sea
base. It is a ﬂoating command and control and power projection
system comprised of disparate, but interconnected, components
dispersed over potentially hundreds of miles of ocean, and reaching
back thousands of miles to the continental United States. It could
allow for strategic, operational, and tactical ﬂexibility heretofore
unseen in warfare. There is much to be done in order for this
capability to be fully realized, but all things must have a beginning.
What must be emphasized is the importance of this concept to the
entirety of the U.S. military and national decisionmakers, not just the
Navy and Marine Corps. As the U.S. military moves towards more
expeditionary-type forces and fewer permanent overseas bases, the
ability to project, sustain, and command forces from the sea will take
on even greater signiﬁcance for all the Services.
In order for seabasing to realize this level of inter-service
capability, all of the services must be involved in its development.
The Navy and Marine Corps will develop seabasing and ship-toobjective maneuver over the next few decades to operationally and
tactically useable levels. And these will have joint applicability,
particularly seabasing. Special operations units, Army, and even
Air Force and allied/coalition partners will be able to leverage these
capabilities. But, with only two services contributing monetarily to
the development of these concepts, they may not realize their full
potential across the joint spectrum.
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Prepositioning programs and vessel design is the critical nexus
for comprehensive joint seabasing operations. The requirement
is not for service chiefs to refocus all of their efforts and budgets
on seabasing compatibility. This is unnecessary and unrealistic.
Prepositioning compatibility is the most important critical enabler.
If the other services would partner now with the naval services, they
could develop future maritime prepositioning ships and capabilities
that meet their service-speciﬁc requirements for expeditionary
seabasing operations. Such prepositioning forces could create a joint
sea base from which to project, sustain, and command air, land, and
sea forces without the restrictions of excessive land-based assets and
requirements. These forces would retain ﬂexibility across all three
levels of warfare at levels currently unknown. Such capabilities do
not preclude traditional land-based sustained operations ashore
when needed. These forces will have multi-role capabilities. But if
seabasing can be developed to the level that such operations are not
necessary, or at least to the point that two-thirds of all forces can
operate and sustain themselves from the sea base, why put them
ashore?
Is this hyperbole, political naivete, or both? Hopefully, none
of the above. The realities of service budget battles, priorities, and
parochialism are understood. The future is unknown, as is the size
of future defense budgets. Day-to-day realities and political agendas
get in the way of good ideas, even visionary ones sometimes. Selling
this idea is no easy task, but neither was moving beyond horses, sails,
and prop-driven airplanes. Seabasing is not a panacea, but is offers
one of the best options to future force projection, forward presence,
and warﬁghting challenges. Of all the concepts currently being
developed by the services, it is the most far-sighted and applicable
to joint warﬁghting enhancement.
Chapter Five of the National Security Strategy states that, in order
to support preemptive options, America must continue to transform
its military forces to ensure the ability to conduct “rapid and precise
operations to achieve decisive results.”46 Expeditionary maneuver
warfare, operational maneuver from the sea, seabasing, and ship-toobjective maneuver support this directive perhaps better than any
other current capability or initiative among the services or within
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the Department of Defense. And, as the concept and technologies
mature into reality, the applications for the joint force commander
and for all the services increase.
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CHAPTER 12
IS THE AIR COMPONENT COORDINATION ELEMENT (ACCE)
EMBEDDED IN THE COALITION FORCES LAND COMPONENT
COMMAND (CFLCC) HQ A MODEL FOR FUTURE CONFLICT?
Colonel Byron H. Risner
Operation IRAQI FREEDOM in Iraq and Operation ENDURING
FREEDOM in Afghanistan changed the Air Force “foot-print around
the world . . . substantially,” said Roche. The service set up “new
bases and renewed relationships” and proved “remarkably ﬂexible in
adapting to these new demands.” Roche said that “teamwork and trust”
made Gulf War II a coordinated “warﬁghting effort from planning to
execution.” One example was the joint planning effort of the Air Force
and Army to iron out air-ground coordination problems that surfaced
during Operation Enduring Freedom. As a result, USAF placed an air
component coordinating element―led by then Major General Daniel P.
Leaf―with the land component commander for Gulf War II.
Air Force Magazine
November 2003

WHAT IS THE CFLCC-ACCE?
Operation IRAQI FREEDOM was the ﬁrst conﬂict where the Combined
Force Air and Space Component Commander (CFACC) created air
component coordination elements within the component headquarters
and each of the functional counterparts (land, maritime, and special
operations). As part of other operations, the Air Component Commander
had air component coordination elements embedded in Coalition Joint
Task Force (CJTF)-180 and CJTF-Horn of Africa. During Operation IRAQI
FREEDOM, the Coalition Force Land Component Commander-Air
Component Coordination Element (CFLCC-ACCE) deployed to Camp
Doha, Kuwait, and formed a part of the coalition forces land component
commander staff.
At the headquarters in Kuwait, an Air Force Major General led the air
component coordination element. Lieutenant General T. Michael Moseley,
CFACC during Operation IRAQI FREEDOM, selected Major General Dan
Leaf to serve as the air component coordination element director to the
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land component staff. At the time, Leaf was working at the Pentagon as
Air Force’s Director of Operational Capability Requirements. He received
clear guidance regarding command relationships as well as roles and
missions for his position. Leaf attended orientation at Shaw Air Force
Base in late January 2003 where he was briefed on Central Command Air
Forces (CENTAF) Operation IRAQI FREEDOM plans. At the same time,
Leaf assembled a core staff of ten ofﬁcers and two enlisted personnel for
deployment to Camp Doha.1

Figure 1 depicts the various command and coordination
relationships between the ACCE and other elements in theater. It is
important to note that the ACCE Director remained under operational
control to the Coalition Forces Air Component Commander during
all operations.
Coordination

Surface Commander’s HQ

COMUSCENTAF CFACC
Coordination

9ASETF/CC D/CFACC

OPCON

ACCE Director
AFFOR

Senior USAF
Ofﬁccer

ACCE Staff

Figure 1. Surface Commander, CFACC, ACCE, and AFFOR
Command and Coordination Relationships2
MISSION AND INTENT
The mission and intent of the ACCE was deﬁned in the November 2002
U.S. Central Command Air Forces (USCENTAF) Concept of Operations
as follows: The Air Component Coordination Element is the primary
facilitating authority between the surface commander and the CFACC. It
facilitates the interaction of the surface commander’s and air component
commander’s functions within standard operating procedures (SOPs),
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and in the absence of SOPs, aids in establishing cross-communication
between the functionals. The ACCE will serve as a conduit of information
ﬂow and will facilitate coordination between the Combined Air Operation
Center (CAOC) and the headquarters’ functionals. The ACCE will also
provide airpower expertise to support mission planning and execution. It
is important to note that the ACCE does not and will not replace, replicate,
and/or circumvent normal request mechanisms already in place in the
surface commander’s staff.3

During Operation IRAQI FREEDOM, the CFACC’s concept also
intended to insert representation at a level commensurate to staff
principals on the CFLCC staff. With the ACCE mission statement as
a guideline, the Kuwait CFLCC-ACCE developed its own mission
statement: “Provide command-to-command level presence in the
CFLCC. Provide operational level assessment and coordination of
CFLCC planning and execution to ensure integration with the Air
Component Commander’s air operation plan and operational intent
to meet Joint Force Commander guidance.”4
Major General Leaf further provided more speciﬁc guidance to
members of the ACCE in a Director’s intent statement:
The CFLCC-ACCE Director’s intent is to provide a continuous ﬂow of
effective, operational level communication between the CFACC and
CFLCC. This requires CFLCC-ACCE team participation in all aspects
of CFLCC’s planning and execution cycles to represent the CFACC’s
operational vision and intent. Essential planning and execution
cycles include long-range plans, future operations, Deep Operations
Coordination Cell, intelligence, and ﬁre support element. The team will
keep the CFLCC-ACCE Director informed of key issues that may impact
combined/joint operations at the theater operational level and provide
input during CFLCC working group meetings to ensure CFACC/
CFLCC coordination. Additionally, the team will support at least one
position on the Coalition Operations and Intelligence Center ﬂoor as the
CFACC representative.”5

The CFLCC-ACCE had mission statements and directives that clearly
deﬁned the role the ACCE would play in Operation IRAQI FREEDOM
while supporting Lieutenant General McKiernan and his staff. At the time
there was no Joint or Air Force doctrine that deﬁned the ACCE to those
who did not have the USCENTAF ACCE concept of operations.
The CFLCC-ACCE deployed to Camp Doha, Kuwait, on February
4, 2003. Leaf’s 10-person team fell in on the Air Force element that had
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been in place at McKiernan’s Headquarters since December 2003. This
four-person element was part of the normal 90-day Air Expeditionary
Force rotation that provided the CFLCC staff with support for sustained
operations in the defense of Kuwait. Organization and manning for Leaf’s
ACCE reﬂected the USCENTAF concept of operations with the ten person
increase required when combat operations are likely. Table 1 displays the
manning for the CFLCC-ACCE.6

Headquarters Element:
#
Grade
Position
1
O-8
ACCE Director
1
O-4/O-3
Executive Ofﬁcer
1
E-6/E-5
Info Management Specialist
1
E-4
Personnel Security Ofﬁcer
Plans/Ops/Intel Element:
#
Grade
Position
3
O-4/O-3
Air Ops Planners (Strike, Mobility, Airspace)
3
O-4/O-3
Intel
Table 1. AFLCC-ACCE Manning.
One of the key components of the CFLCC-ACCE was that for the ﬁrst
time the Director was to be a general ofﬁcer with equal rank to key staff
principals on the CFLCC staff. Major General Leaf modiﬁed the actual
rank structure of the CFLCC-ACCE during Operation IRAQI FREEDOM.
He personally selected his staff to included two colonels (one as Deputy
Director), three lieutenant colonels, and two majors. Although not an
original manning requirement, the ACCE Director selected a space/
information operations expert as part of his staff. This member worked
all aspects of space, information operations, and counter command and
control activities. This selection reaped signiﬁcant dividends as the ACCE
received positive feedback from both the CFLCC information operations
and space cells. A key factor was that the individual had experience with
multiple counter C2 systems and special access programs, as well as
experience working with the Army.7

The CFLCC-ACCE initially set up to operate and support CFLCC’s
prewar battle rhythm. Once the war began, the Army’s combat
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rhythm immediately demanded a 24-hour operational presence
for ACCE members and the need to be immediately available. This
required the senior ACCE staff to move into the CFLCC “War Room”
as well as additional presence in the operations center. The CFLCCACCE went from one person manning the CFLCC Operations ﬂoor
to two and three during combat operations. The ACCE worked in
this conﬁguration until redeployment on April 20, 2003.8
CFLCC-ACCE: OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM ISSUES.
The ACCE quickly established its relevance and value to McKiernan’s
staff, breaking down existing institutional barriers. In accordance with the
ACCE concept of operations, the organization’s manning did not include
representatives of sister services or coalition partners. As operations
progressed, the ACCE quickly became an element that reﬂected the
coalition/joint operation it supported. During the course of Operation
IRAQI FREEDOM, the CFLCC-ACCE absorbed Navy, Marine, and
coalition personnel to provide critical liaison with the CFLCC staff. Some
of these personnel already were attached to the CFLCC staff but migrated
to the ACCE during the conﬂict.
CFLCC and ACCE staff members felt that the arrival and standup of
the ACCE occured late in the planning cycle. Once established at Camp
Doha, ACCE personnel had to spend valuable time in order to understand
CFLCC’s ground plan. Members who deployed in January missed the ﬁnal
planning stages of the ground plan, as well as the last exercise prior to
combat operations. Thus, the ACCE arrived at a critical transition period
where CFLCC was preparing for combat operations, one that was less
than optimal for both staffs. In addition, some ACCE members had not
been “read in” on higher classiﬁed portions of both CFACC and CFLCC
plans. This delayed them from understanding fully the IRAQI FREEDOM
operational ground and air plans. Moreover, ACCE members did not
have the opportunity to review the Master Air Attack Plan or meet and
interface with key members of the Combined Air Operations Center
(CAOC) at Prince Sultan Airbase, Saudi Arabia. Members of the ACCE
required brieﬁngs on CFACC plans as well as interface with members of
combat operations, combat plans, airlift, space, intelligence, and battleﬁeld
coordination detachment elements. It is from these key air operations center
elements that the ACCE receives and communicates vital CFACC/CFLCC
information. The CFLCC-ACCE required a single point of contact in the air
operations center to facilitate proper routing of ACCE queries, information
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requests, and important issues. CFACC remedied this difﬁculty in early
March 2003, when he established an ACCE help desk at the Prince Sultan
air operations center. 9

Information exchange between the ACCE and CFLCC Future
Operations Cell and the Deep Operations Coordination Cell was
critical during Operation IRAQI FREEDOM. The coordination
between the ACCE and these two cells was key to ensuring
synchronization between CFLCC and CFACC planning. Early on,
members of the Deep Operations Coordination Cell, the Future
Operations Cell, and CFLCC staff were unfamiliar with the
wartime ACCE and initially expected the ACCE to be a “battleﬁeld
coordination detachment in reverse.”10
Joint Publication 3-30 deﬁnes the battleﬁeld coordination
detachment as:
The Army component commander establishes a battleﬁeld coordination
detachment to act as the interface between the component commander
and the JFACC. The BCD is collocated with the JFACC’s staff in the
joint air operations center. The battleﬁeld coordination detachment
processes land force requests for air support, monitors and interprets
the land battle situation in the joint air operation center, and provides
the necessary interface for the exchange of current operational and
intelligence data. The battleﬁeld coordination detachment expedites
the exchange of information through face-to-face coordination with
elements in the joint air operations center, and coordinates air defense
and airspace control matters. Immediate and emergency airlift requests
are passed to the battleﬁeld coordination detachment via the airlift
advanced notiﬁcation/coordination net by theater airlift liaison ofﬁcers.
The battleﬁeld coordination detachment is organized into sections
which are incorporated throughout the joint air operations center (e.g.,
plans, intelligence, operations, fusion, air defense artillery and Army
management, and airlift). 11

Air Force Doctrine Document 2-1.3 (Counterland) deﬁnes the battleﬁeld
coordination detachment as:
The senior Army liaison element to the Theatre Air Control System
and is located in the air operations center. The battleﬁeld coordination
detachment processes the land component’s air support requests, to
include air interdiction target nominations and requests for preplanned
close air support. The battleﬁeld coordination detachment processes the
ground component’s target nominations and acts throughout planning
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and execution to ensure proper representation of ground component
priorities in the overall process. The battleﬁeld coordination detachment
acts as the primary conduit for real-time and near real-time requests for
air interdiction targeting from the ground component. Such requests
ﬂow up the Army chain of command to the highest echelon, then ﬂow to
the air operations center via the battleﬁeld coordination detachment. It
is also the battleﬁeld coordination detachment’s responsibility to inform
the various ground commanders of which nominated targets were or
were not included on the target list for incorporation into the air tasking
order and the approval status of preplanned close air support requests.
This feedback loop is critical, as ground commanders must know which
requested targets did or did not meet the joint force commander’s priority
requirements for air attack. During the execution process, the battleﬁeld
coordination detachment provides current ground picture information
to the air operations center on both friendly and enemy ground forces.12

Since the ACCE and the air operations center battleﬁeld coordination
detachment had little initial interface to deﬁne clearly each element’s
function and responsibility, there was some confusion on the part of both the
staffs regarding who to use as the source for CFLCC/CFACC interface. This
caused friction in the CFLCC staff when the ACCE would not have certain
information the staff thought it should possess. The ACCE felt that CFLCC
could have obtained this information through the battleﬁeld coordination
detachment. At times, this caused the ACCE to be consumed with issues
that drew them away from their primary duties. In turn, members of the
battleﬁeld coordination detachment suffered similar frustrations when
the ACCE would call to get information from them that it should have
obtained from the air operations center staff. The Operations Chief of the
air operations center battleﬁeld coordination detachment ﬁnally had to
instruct his staff to stop answering information requests from the ACCE
and informed the ACCE to contact the appropriate air operations center
staff section.13 This clearly highlights the importance of the ACCE

and battleﬁeld coordination detachment staffs coordinating early
to clearly deﬁne and deconﬂict the roles and responsibilities of each
element. Once they have established roles they must communicate
that information to the CFLCC and combined air operations center
staffs to avoid confusion. Because the battleﬁeld coordination
detachment and ACCE did not possess sufﬁcient manning, and little
coordination between the elements had occurred prior to the conﬂict,
difﬁculties were exacerbated. The less than optimal manning of
the battleﬁeld coordination detachment was an issue Lieutenant
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General McKeirnan acknowledged as one that needed addressing in
future contingencies.14
Command and Control (C2) systems interoperability and
knowledge was a basic requirement for the CFLCC-ACCE team to
function smoothly. C2 systems and databases were a concern for
both staffs. The need for common joint C2 systems was apparent
as their lack occasionally hampered operational level decision.
Some systems were common to both CFACC and CFLCC, but the
majority were not. The air operations center used Theater Battle
Management Command Systems, while CFLCC utilized Command
and Control Personal Computer and Automated Deep Operations
Coordination Systems. The lack of a fully functional theater battle
management command system in the Kuwait operations center was
of particular concern for the deep operations coordination cell as it
did not provide the deserved level of detail on the air tasking order.15
From the CFLCC-ACCE perspective, the digital collaboration tool
system purchased by the Army and CENTCOM performed poorly.
Less than 10 percent of the users actually utilized the tool; it was a
large bandwidth consumer and frequently locked up. Access to and
training in common operational and tactical pictures and chat instant
messaging tools were essential to CFLCC-ACCE effectiveness.
CFLCC and CFACC did not use the same chat systems or servers;
CFACC used internet relay chat, Microsoft chat, and zircon chat,
while CFLCC used Microsoft and internet relay chat. Lack of
interoperability between those chat systems decreased functionality,
reduced effectiveness, and increased workload. As an example, the
ACCE intelligence section was not able to communicate in real time
with the CFLCC intelligence staff or the battleﬁeld coordination
detachment at the air operations center.16
Since the ACCE works for the CFACC, equipment provided
by the CFLCC was minimal. The CENTAF ACCE concept of
operations assumed more host component support than was
available. The ACCE members found that they lacked sufﬁcient
numbers of classiﬁed computers, web based common operational
picture software for the air and ground picture, and equipment that
allowed them to access weather information throughout the theater,
as well as operating bases of coalition aircraft. The CFLCC-ACCE
did not arrive with theater information sources such as telephone
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directories and key web sites. The team had to invest a great deal
of effort in building an information base during the initial stages of
deployment.
Finally, parts of the CFLCC staff felt that the CFLCC-ACCE
departed rather abruptly. The ACCE had no predeﬁned exit
strategy, and some CFLCC staff members felt there was no overlap
for transition to Phase IV operations.17 Though several manning,
training, and equipment shortfalls challenged the CFLCC-ACCE
as a result of the quick activation and deployment, the ACCE and
CFLCC staff adapted and responded quickly prior to and during
combat operations. Equipment had to be improvised, processes
needed to be established, and operating procedures had to be
developed. In the end the ACCE was able to provide the Director
with situational awareness and processes required to effectively
represent the CFACC to CFLCC.
CFLCC-ACCE RECOMMENDATIONS
Lieutenant General [Ronald] Keys said an important innovation was
creation in Kuwait of the Air Component Coordination Element headed
by Major General Daniel P. Leaf. He served as personal representative of
the Combined Force Air and Space Component Commander (CFACC)―
USAF Lieutenant General T. Michael Moseley―to the Coalition Force
Land Component Commander (CFLCC), Army Lieutenant General
David D. McKiernan.
Leaf’s job, Keys said, was to “straighten out the special kinks that happen
during a fast-moving war.” In addition, he went on, “every major land
force had an ACCE with them, and their job was, if their priorities weren’t
being looked at properly, or there was going to be a change to the ground
scheme of maneuver, or there was something happening on the air side
that the land force needed to know, they got that.”
The position was crucial in the opening hours of the war, when the
decision was made to launch the ground forces without a preceding air
war. Air operations were supposed to start March 22. When timetables
were advanced, communication between the CFACC and the CFLCC
was critical. The new position “paid us big beneﬁts because of the ﬂuid
nature of this war,” said Keys.
Air Force Magazine
June 2003
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As Deputy Chief of Staff for Air and Space Operations Lieutenant
General Keys stated, the ACCE is a “key innovation” lauded by both
Army and Air Force leaders. The following recommendations should be
incorporated where applicable.
The ACCE has recently been included in Joint Doctrine. The current
ACCE deﬁnition is in Joint Publication 3-09.3 (released November 2003):
Air Component Coordination Element (ACCE). The Air Force
component commander establishes an ACCE to interface and provide
liaison with the joint force land component commander (JFLCC) or
commander, Army forces. The ACCE is collocated with the JFLCC staff.
The ACCE is the senior Air Force element assisting the JFLCC staff
in planning air component supporting and supported requirements.
The ACCE interface includes exchanging current intelligence and
operational data, support requirements, coordinating the integration of
AFFOR/JFACC requirements for airspace control measures, joint ﬁre
support coordinating measures, and CAS. The ACCE is organized with
expertise in the following areas: plans, operations, intelligence, airspace
management, and airlift. The ACCE is not an air support operations
center or tactical air control party, but acts as the AFFOR/JFACC
senior liaison element and can also perform many air support planning
functions.18

Joint Publication 3-06.3 is the recently revised manual for Joint
Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Close Air Support (CAS). While
the document mentions the function of the ACCE, Joint Publication (JP)
3-30, Command and Control for Joint Air Operations, does not. The
ACCE deﬁnition does contain some overlap with duties of the battleﬁeld
coordination detachment; speciﬁcally when addressing the coordination
of joint ﬁre support control measures and close air support. The need
for coordination between the ACCE and the battleﬁeld coordination
detachment prior to conﬂict is critical to prevent any confusion that may
arise between the staffs. The ACCE, by deﬁnition, is much more than a
coordinating element for close air support, and joint doctrine should reﬂect
this fact. Thus, it should form a part of the CFACC organization in Chapter
Two of the next revision of Joint Pub 3-30. The ACCE concept is so new that
current Air Force and Army doctrine does not mention it. The Air Force is
currently revising AFDD 2-1.3 (Counterland) to include the function and
purpose of the ACCE.19 Army doctrine will need to include the ACCE

in appropriate FM 100 series publications, speciﬁcally FM 100-13.
The CENTAF ACCE concept of operations should be distributed
and made available to CFLCC and other components that would
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receive support from an ACCE. This would make the CFLCC staff
and others aware of the ACCE mission and functions, as well as the
expected support required for the ACCE.
In future operations, the Air Force should identify the ACCE
Director as early as possible. This would allow him to select his team
and allow it to prepare properly for deployment. Predeployment
processing for the CFLCC-ACCE presented challenges that made
an expedient departure difﬁcult. Since they deployed late in the
planning process, ACCE members had to spend valuable time
“catching up.” Being familiar with the air and ground plan as well
as coordination with the air operations center and the elements
mentioned earlier are absolute necessities. CFLCC-ACCE personnel
initially had difﬁculty establishing relationships with appropriate
air operations center action ofﬁcers as the air operations center
action ofﬁcers were not familiar with the ACCE mission. Since
the ACCE relies heavily upon information from the air operations
center, it is important the air operations center staff be ready to
support the ACCE and the CFLCC mission. Early identiﬁcation
and notiﬁcation would also facilitate determining equipment and
security requirements. Chemical gear, cots, body armor, computers,
and classiﬁed phones were equipment some ACCE members had to
acquire once they arrived at Camp Doha. The ACCE needs support
from either the closest air component installation or CFLCC. Doing
so would allow the ACCE to begin operations with minimal lost
time.20
Operation IRAQI FREEDOM manning requirements for the
CFLCC-ACCE require adjustment to take advantage of the full
spectrum of air and space capabilities. Listed below are the desired
base manning requirements for the CFLCC-ACCE identiﬁed in the
CFLCC-ACCE After Action Report (AAR):
•
•
•
•
•

Director―Brigadier General desired.
Deputy Director (Rated)―Colonel.
Chief of Staff―Lieutenant Colonel.
Executive Ofﬁcer (any AFSC)―Major/Lieutenant Colonel.
Air Operations Center (AOC) functionality expertise (Rated)―
Major/Lieutenant Colonel.
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• Tactical air operations expertise tailored to the situation
(Major-Lieutenant Colonel mix)
— 1 Airlift
— 1 Multi-role ﬁghter/bomber
— 1 Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR)
— 1 Space/Information Operations
• Information Systems Ofﬁcer (expert in COP/CTP
management)―Captain/Major.
• Comm/Computer―Staff Sergeant/Captain.
• Intelligence Ofﬁcer and NCO―Major/Technical Sergeant.
• Personal Security Ofﬁcer (PSO) detail for Director.
• Administration―Technical Sergeant.
While the CFLCC-ACCE maintained a team approach and worked for
the CFACC, it was necessary to assign ACCE team members to several
CFLCC functional areas. Future CFLCC-ACCE teams may ﬁnd it beneﬁcial
to assign individuals to the following responsibilities: 21

• Plans:
— Maintain visibility on all CFLCC long range planning.
— Maintain contact with air operations center strategic
planners and battleﬁeld coordination detachment plans.
— Ensure CFACC equities are represented.
— Attend all CFLCC planning group meetings.
— Inform the ACCE Director of potential conﬂicts, issues,
and opportunities.
• Future Operations:
— Maintain visibility on the 48–144 hour ﬁght.
— Maintain contact with air operations center plans chief
and battleﬁeld coordination detachment plans.
— Attend all CFLCC planning team meetings.
— Read all fragmentary orders and screen for CFACC
issues.
— Inform ACCE Director of potential conﬂicts, issues, and
opportunities.
• Deep Operations Control Cell:
— Maintain visibility on all targeting issues in the Deep
Operations Control Cell.
— Maintain contact with CAOC Guidance, Apportionment,
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and Targeting Chief, Master Air Attack Plan Chief and
battleﬁeld coordination detachment plans.
— Attend Combat Assessment Board, Daily Effects Board,
and Effects Working Group.
— Be aware of and coordinate all airspace coordination
measures, including ﬁre support coordination line,
forward boundary, and joint special operations areas.
— Be aware of the Time Sensitive Target process.
— Inform the ACCE Director of potential conﬂicts, issues
and opportunities.
• Fire Support Element―Ops Floor Current Operations:
— Conduct 24/7 operations on the CFLCC Ops ﬂoor.
— Maintain contacts with air operations center Chief of
Combat Ops, air operations center Fire Support Element,
and battleﬁeld coordination detachment operations.
— Prepare products as necessary for battle updates.
— Monitor Air Tasking Order execution for situational
awareness.
— Keep the ACCE Director informed of any current ops
issues that require his attention.
• Space and Information Operations.
— Serve as a key CFACC interface with other service space
and information operations agents.
— Coordinate the functional capability of information
operations systems used by the CFACC.
— Interpret function and service of the information from our
space systems.
• Information Operations:
— Work with local information management staff on
connectivity.
— Ensure that the systems required to build situational
awareness are working.
— Ensure the ACCE team is trained and able to utilize the
information.
— Coordinate with Component command C-6 section for
service.
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A member of an Army study that evaluated the operational and
strategic conduct of CFLCC operations during Operation IRAQI FREEDOM
recommended that the ACCE improve its focus on the processes within the
air operations center system. There were times when information received
by the CFLCC staff through the battleﬁeld coordination detachment and
other air operation center elements conﬂicted with information received
through the ACCE.22 Proper coordination between the ACCE and

battleﬁeld coordination detachment and the robust manning
structure mentioned above will allow the ACCE to better assist with
the Army’s planning process. ACCE members with functional area
expertise placed in these areas will be able to jointly integrate Air
Force kinetic and non-kinetic multipliers with proper connectivity
and liaison with the air operations center.
CFLCC personnel should always strive to obtain information
through established doctrinal processes and avoid shortcutting
proper channels by using the ACCE for answers. Staff members
must be cognizant of the fact that ACCE current operations ofﬁcers
do not have “action” or execution authority and avoid the tendency
to make platform-based support requests rather than maintaining
an effects focus. ACCE personnel must be well-informed as to the
proper doctrinal channels for information ﬂow and assist/guide
the CFLCC staff. Additionally, they must rapidly learn the internal
workings of the Army staff in order to understand unique terms
of reference and be familiar with the internal operations center
processes. LTG McKeirnan’s staff continually sought quantitative
portrayal of CFACC contribution to the ﬁght. Presence of the ACCE
may have ampliﬁed this desire as the ACCE struggled to balance
providing that picture while focusing on future operations. The air
component must improve capability to rapidly capture and distribute
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance coverage, air tasking
order sortie generation and battle damage assessment mission report
data.23 By having a well-coordinated communication path between
the air operations center, the land component commander’s staff,
and the battleﬁeld coordination detachment, the ACCE will be able
to provide the Army with accurate and timely information on both
kinetic and non-kinetic efforts of the air component.
Air Force and Army air to ground coordination during Operation
IRAQI FREEDOM was a huge success. A joint close air support
conference held at McKiernan’s headquarters prior to the start of
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hostilities was critical in establishing common close air support
procedures. The Operation IRAQI FREEDOM environment was
particularly complicated in that the theater area contained multiple
boundaries and command and control agencies. Close air support
special instructions must be completed and distributed by the air
component prior to the conference in order to allow ample time to
review the execution level details at the conference. The kill box/grid
square method of deconﬂicting ﬁres also worked well; the ACCE
ensured that the Army staff fully understood the kill box concept.
Buy in was complete at all levels by the end of offensive operations.
The urban close air support construct for air operations in and around
Baghdad demonstrated close coordination between the ACCE and
CFLCC staffs. Coordination on zones, subsections, and key facility
location was extremely important in developing this phase of the
operation. The ACCE presence during planning and execution was
a key factor in Army acceptance of using longitude and latitude
gridlines when designating the ﬁre support coordination line.
Initially, phase lines oriented around geographical features marked
this critical deconﬂiction tool. Due to the speed of the operation along
with the wide use of global positioning systems, laptop mapping
systems, and aircraft navigation systems, latitude and longitude
gridlines were used as the approved method for designating the ﬁre
support coordination line. The ACCE recommends that all future
joint training and exercises use this procedure.24
CFLCC-ACCE: DID IT WORK?
CFLCC Commander, Lieutenant General David McKiernan
stated that the CFLCC-ACCE “worked very well” and viewed
the ACCE as a valuable “plug-in” to his staff. He emphasized the
importance of having both the permanent Joint Air Force billets
on his staff as well as the ACCE available during Operation IRAQI
FREEDOM. Although he frequently spoke directly to Lieutenant
General Moseley on component commander issues during Operation
IRAQI FREEDOM, he felt the relationship between his staff and the
ACCE was extremely beneﬁcial and greatly added to the success of
his ground forces. 25
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To summarize, overwhelmingly, Army and Air Force members
involved with the CFLCC-ACCE agreed that the concept is one that should
continue and be improved upon for future operations. The ACCE is a
valid entity and was a subtle but important contributor to CFLCC success
during Operation IRAQI FREEDOM. The CENTAF concept of operations
is sound, and the ACCE concept provides critical Army/Air Force linkage.
General Leaf felt the CFLCC-ACCE provided two principal advantages:
First, presence in the CFLCC headquarters and activities. Physically being
present in the CFLCC headquarters diffused many issues before they
became roadblocks to joint operations. By being present as ground plans
and operations developed, his ACCE was able to convey the air perspective
to CFACC personnel with greater clarity and understanding than an
e-mail, brieﬁng, or phone call. The ACCE provided this air perspective
to McKiernan’s staff without circumventing the battleﬁeld coordination
detachment process. On several occasions, Leaf’s staff referred questions
to the battleﬁeld coordination detachment in order to exercise the proper
doctrinal processes and communication channels. Likewise, the battleﬁeld
coordination detachment referred the ACCE to the air operations center
for questions that should be addressed by that staff. It is clearly evident
that prior coordination between the ACCE and the battleﬁeld coordination
detachment is crucial to prevent confusion regarding the roles and
responsibilities of each element.
Second was the unique perspective that presence provided.
Embedding the ACCE within CFLCC gave the ACCE a unique perspective
that required discipline to remain objective and retain the role of CFACC
representative.26 ACCE members need to be accessible and involved

joint team players, while at the same time avoiding becoming de
facto members of the CFLCC staff. This is an important balance;
the ACCE cannot treat the Army staff as an adversary, but must
ﬁrmly present the air component perspective and defend its
methods and priorities. Two critical decisions were central to ACCE
success: 1) Providing directors with sufﬁcient rank to function as
representatives for the CFACC; and 2) the related decision to have
the ACCE Directors remain within the CFACC’s chain of command
as opposed to becoming part of the host component staff.27
The ACCE concept should be used as a model for the future
and be improved upon to make it an even more robust and viable
element for the CFLCC staff. With a dedicated effort to address and
solve the doctrine, manning, and equipment issues mentioned, the
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ACCE will remain a relevant entity for joint warﬁghting success in
the 21st century.
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CHAPTER 13
THE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY OF THE UNITED
STATES: DEVELOPMENT OF GRAND STRATEGY
Lieutenant Colonel Thomas P. Reilly
The fundamental purpose of national security strategy is to
provide a comprehensive framework that balances the ends, ways,
and means of the elements of national power to achieve national
security and to protect, preserve and promote a way of life. When
successful, this process results in the development of a grand
(unifying) strategy that combines values and interests with a strategic
appraisal that leads to a series of national policies articulated in a
unifying strategy. This strategy then serves as a unifying document
for the national government.1
This chapter will examine the origins and development of
national security strategy in the United States. It will examine the
requirement and the content of the annual report the President
and his advisors develop and submit to Congress, as mandated by
the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986. This chapter will then outline
and analyze the 1987, 1988, 1994, 1998, and 2002 National Security
Strategy reports. The purpose is to determine whether or not they
achieve the intent of Goldwater-Nichols by providing a unifying
(grand) strategy for the nation. These ﬁve reports represent new
or signiﬁcant changes in the thinking and direction of U.S. national
security strategy.
THE BACKGROUND: A HISTORICAL RETROSPECTIVE
One of the fundamental ways to achieve national security is to
provide the required government institutions and mechanisms that
organize the defense establishment, unify the armed forces, harness
science to military purposes, mobilize military manpower, and
distribute the cost of defense across the national economy.2 For most
Americans, the golden age of isolationalism ended on December 7,
1941, with the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. With the end of World
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War II came the realization that the United States and the world had
entered a new era of global ideological competition.3 For the United
States, this journey towards deﬁning and reﬁning a national security
structure and strategy began during the Second World War. But the
U.S. Government ﬁrst formally articulated a national strategy in the
National Security Act of 1947.
The end of the Second World War brought two fundamentally
different political philosophies to the fore in the debate over the
future course of American’s role in the world. The ﬁrst resulted from
an older conservative political culture that feared that development
of a strong national security state would endanger the basic values,
principles, and institutions associated with American democracy.
Inherent in this approach was a belief that a strong national security
structure would waste resources, regiment the nation’s youth, and
concentrate too much authority in the national government, in
particular the military. This group also feared that the creation of a
strong executive branch would undermine the basic constitutional
balance between the Congress and the executive branch.4
The second was a new philosophy of national security that
believed the United States must pursue an active role in world
events. This approach stressed that the United States had entered
an era of total war and the new threats required a new degree of
military vigilance and preparedness in which all of the nation’s
resources were mobilized for the defense of America. Furthermore,
they believed it was not possible to separate the defense of American
liberties from the defense of liberties everywhere in the world.5 “Peace
and freedom were indivisible, so that American leadership had no
choice but to safeguard the country’s security by safeguarding the
security of the free world in general.”6
In the end, as in all political processes in a democratic society, the
debate between these fundamentally different philosophies ended
in a compromise. The formulation of strategy is not a rational and
systemic process. In fact, it is an intensely political process from
which national strategy emerges after protracted bargaining and
compromise.7
The roots of the National Security Act of 1947 trace back to the
preparations for and execution of military operations during the
First and Second World Wars and battles between the executive and
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legislative branches of government, as well as internal differences
inside the War Department and between the War Department
and the Department of the Navy.8 The primary fault lines were
arguments between the Army and Navy over the role of airpower,
the realization that the nation’s security structure could no longer
rest on one organizational structure for peace and a different
one for war, interservice disagreements over postwar roles and
missions, the collapse of the peacetime national security planning
and decisionmaking structure, the lack of a true Joint Chiefs of Staff,
and the fundamental need to unify the armed services under a single
department of defense headed by a cabinet rank civilian secretary.9
In recognition of the need for greater unity, coordination, and
integration for national defense, Congress enacted the National
Security Act in July of 1947. This act established the modern
American national security structure by creating a host of new
agencies, including the National Security Council, National Security
Resources Board, the Central Intelligence Agency, and the Joint
Chiefs of Staff.10
It also created the National Military Establishment by merging
the Department of War and the Department of the Navy. This
new executive branch agency was to be headed by the Secretary of
Defense, a cabinet rank civilian secretary. His ofﬁces would consist
of three autonomous executive departments, the Army, Navy, and
Air Force, as well as several other staff and coordinating boards.11
The 1947 National Security Act was not without controversy and
political inﬁghting, especially between the Army and Navy, which
stood to lose autonomy and status, and the Congress, which stood
to lose access and inﬂuence. While the Secretary of Defense was to
be the principal assistant to the President on national security issues,
Congress limited his authority, power, and the size of his staff.12
The service secretaries retained their cabinet-level status, were full
voting members of the National Security Council, and possessed
direct access to the President.13 The net result was a weak Secretary
of Defense and a less than efﬁcient national defense structure.
The ﬁrst major change to the National Security Act of 1947 was
the codiﬁcation of amendments into the National Security Act
of 1947. These removed the service secretaries from the National
Security Council, clariﬁed their subordination to the Secretary of
323

Defense, and established the position of Chairman of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff, who would not possess command authority or the right to
vote with the Joint Chiefs.14 The net result signiﬁcantly strengthened
the powers of the Secretary of Defense by making him “the central
ﬁgure in coordinating the activities of the three services, who were
to continue to be separately administered, but not merged.”15
The Defense Reorganization Act of 1958 continued the trend
of unifying the armed services. It further reﬁned the relationships
between them and the Secretary of Defense. The military departments
were to be “separately organized” rather than “administered,” and
were placed under the “direction, authority, and control” of the
Secretary of Defense.16 Congress also explicitly granted the Secretary
of Defense the authority to reorganize the military departments,
and deﬁned the chain of command as running from the President
through the Secretary of Defense to theater commanders. This act
also authorized the creation of speciﬁed and combined or uniﬁed
commands and provided the Chairman with voting power on the
Joint Chiefs of Staff.17
THE GOLDWATER-NICHOLS ACT OF 1986
The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization
Act of 1986 is the most comprehensive defense reorganization
package since the National Security Act of 1947. The act was the
fourth major revision of the 1947 National Security Act and the third
post-World War II reorganization of the Department of Defense.
With this act, the 99th Congress sought to strengthen civilian control
of the Department of Defense, improve military advice to civilian
leadership, clarify the authority and responsibilities of the combatant
commanders, improve strategy formulation and contingency
planning, and provide for more efﬁcient use of defense resources.18
One of the potentially far reaching changes contained in the
Goldwater-Nichols Act was the requirement for the President to
submit an annual report to Congress that detailed the national
security strategy of the United States.19 The report should provide a
comprehensive description and discussion of the following:

324

• The worldwide interest, goals, and objectives of the United
States that are vital to the national security of the United
States.
• The foreign policy, worldwide commitments, and national
defense capabilities of the United States necessary to deter
aggression and to implement the national security strategy of
the United States.
• The proposed short-term and long-term uses of political,
economic, military, and other elements of national power
of the United States to protect or promote the interests and
achieve the goals and objectives of the United States.
• The adequacy of the capabilities of the United States to
carry out the national security strategy of the United States,
including an evaluation of the balance among the capabilities
of all elements of national power of the United States to
support the implementation of the national security strategy.
• Such other measures as may be helpful to inform Congress on
matters relating to the national security strategy of the United
States.
• Each national security strategy report shall be transmitted in
both classiﬁed and unclassiﬁed form.20
The intent of the 99th Congress was to focus discussions and
debates on national security strategy by requiring the President
to codify a grand strategy in terms of national interests, goals,
objectives, and values; its coherence in terms of relating ends, ways,
and means; the integration of the element of national power; and its
time horizon.21 “In theory, at least to the reformers, a clearly written
strategy would serve the Congress better on the needs for resources
to execute the strategy, thus facilitating the annual authorization
and appropriation processes, particularly for the Department of
Defense.”22
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AN AMERICAN PERSPECTIVE ON NATIONAL
SECURITY STRATEGY
The Reagan administration developed and published the ﬁrst
two national security strategy reports during its ﬁnal 2 years. Both
reports provided the world a uniquely American view on national
security strategy. Since Congress did not pass the GoldwaterNichols Act until late 1986, the National Security Strategy report of
1987 covered only a limited period of time and reﬂected current U.S.
strategic thinking and direction.23 This ﬁrst report contained several
fundamental components now considered integral to any discussion
of U.S. national security strategy. The Reagan administration’s
ﬁrst report contained sections that outlined the current thinking
on American national security strategy. The sections were titled:
An American Perspective; Fundamentals of U.S. National Security
Strategy; U.S. Foreign Policy; U.S. Defense Policy; Executing the
Strategy; and Looking Forward to the 1990s.
In “An American Perspective,” the Reagan administration argued
that it had already “laid the foundation for a more constructive and
positive American role in world affairs by clarifying the essential
elements of U.S. foreign and defense policy.”24 Furthermore, the
administration suggested that it had also objectively reviewed and
adjusted U.S. policies to reﬂect the “dynamics of a complex and
ever-changing world.”25
In “Fundamentals of U.S. National Security Strategy,” the
administration highlighted the leadership role the United States
had assumed following the Second World War and argued that this
role would continue into the future. The 1987 report also established
the now familiar concept of identifying and using national interests
as a guiding principle of American strategy. It identiﬁed the ﬁve
U.S. interests as: The survival of the United States as a free and
independent nation, with its fundamental values and institutions
intact; A healthy and growing U.S. economy; The growth of freedom,
democratic institutions and free market economies throughout
the world, linked by a fair and open international trading system;
A stable and secure world, free of major threats to U.S. interests;
and The health and vigor of U.S. alliance relationships.26 The report
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detailed ﬁve major objectives in support of the articulated national
interests of the United States.27 It identiﬁed the Soviet Union as the
“most signiﬁcant threat to U.S. security and national interests.”28
It also recognized international terrorism as an additional threat,
“which is particularly insidious in nature and growing in scope.”29
This report also outlined three distinct elements of U.S. strategy
aimed at containing the Soviet Union. The ﬁrst, “U.S. Defense Policy,”
involved the forward deployment of military forces required to
deter and contain Soviet expansion. The second, “U.S. International
Economic Policy,” involved economic recovery programs for
Western Europe and Japan and established U.S. leadership in
establishing and managing the international monetary system,
while encouraging regional and global free-trade agreements. The
ﬁnal element, “U.S. Policy Toward the Third World,” included
both economic and security assistance to counter Soviet efforts to
establish Marxist-Leninist regimes.30
The section on U.S. Foreign Policy, described how in general
terms, the United States worked to sustain its foreign policy goals
by fostering the growth of democracy and global economic vitality.
This section focused on the continuity of basic goals, instruments
of foreign policy, international economic policy, and political and
informational elements of power. It also included a sub-section
describing America’s regional policies; however, these were focused
on the contributions of the military instrument of power.31
The largest section of the 1987 report, “U.S. Defense Policy,”
detailed the administration’s strategy for the military containment
of the Soviet Union. The tenets of the then current U.S. defense
strategy included taking advantage of U.S. strengths and Soviet
weaknesses, maintenance of strategic deterrence, arms control,
maintenance of conventional deterrence, space support of national
security, intelligence support of national security, and low intensity
conﬂict. Taken together, the sections detailing foreign policy and
defense policy demonstrated the administration’s strong emphasis
on military power for achieving U.S. goals and objectives and
protecting national interests.32
The 1987 Report concluded by restating the reasoning behind
identifying the Soviet Union as the principal threat to the United
States as well as global peace and stability. It clearly and succinctly
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highlighted the fundamental differences in economic, social, and
political beliefs, the Soviet expansionist policies, the unprecedented
Soviet military build-up and its threat to the United States and its
allies, and the link between the Soviet Union and the growth of
global terrorism. While the report also brieﬂy warned that the United
States must not neglect other destabilizing international threats and
problems which could seriously damage U.S. interests, it failed to
detail speciﬁc regions, nations, or threats.33
The ﬁrst National Security Strategy provided a clear view of current
American strategic thinking. The report described how the United
States viewed itself in the world. It contained a comprehensive
description of U.S. national interests, goals, and objectives
and provided a description of U.S. foreign policy, worldwide
commitments, and the national defense capabilities required for
the United States to the Soviets. While it provided a comprehensive
description of both the short-term and long-term uses of military
of power, it failed to articulate a methodology for integrating other
elements of national power into a comprehensive strategy.
This report reﬂected the Reagan administration’s strong
emphasis on the military, almost to the exclusion of the other
instruments. Taken as a whole, it detailed a comprehensive strategic
approach towards containing the Soviet Union. However, it failed to
fully integrate the other elements of national power into the strategic
equation and also failed to provide a true global perspective.
Therefore, the 1987 Report did not meet the intent of the GoldwaterNichols Act of providing a grand strategy for the United States.
The 1988 National Security Strategy report represented the ﬁrst
true grand strategy submitted to the Congress as a result of the
Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986. With the dual challenges of the
federal budget and international trade deﬁcits on the political
agenda,34 the Reagan administration made two major changes in
the 1987 report. The ﬁrst was to emphasize the role of all elements
of national power into a national strategy.35 The second was to
develop and present separate strategies for each region.36 This
report consisted of ﬁve sections: Historical Dimensions of U.S.
National Security Strategy; Fundamentals of U.S. National Security
Strategy; Power, Policy, and Strategy; Integrating Elements of
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Power into National Security Strategy; and Executing the Strategy.37
Nevertheless, the overarching strategy still rested on continuing the
policy of containing the Soviets.38
In “Historical Dimensions of U.S. National Security Strategy,” the
administration argued that U.S. security strategy had changed little
since World War II. It argued that U.S. core interests and objectives
had remained consistent and that the combination of the elements
of national power had always been important contributors to the
nation’s past, present, and future security.39
“Fundamentals of U.S. National Security Strategy” contained ﬁve
national interests.40 While the report made slight modiﬁcations of the
1987 report, the national interests articulated in the two documents
remained basically identical. This report also articulated a set of ﬁve
major objectives in support of stated American interests, and these
objectives also remained fundamentally the same as those contained
in the 1987 Report.41
The 1988 report also identiﬁed the Soviet Union as the principal
threat to United States and to global security interests. The report
did acknowledge that as a result of changes in leadership style,
the Soviet Union had succeeded in projecting a more favorable
international image and that proposed domestic reforms and foreign
policy initiatives had given rise to hopes for fundamental changes in
Soviet behavior. The report acknowledged that threats to American
and international interests also existed in the Middle East, Central
and South America, and Southeast Asia, as well as the continuing
threat created by the proliferation of nuclear weapons.42
The 1988 report contained two major additions. The ﬁrst was an
emphasis on the elements of national power to provide an integrated
strategy.43 In “Power, Policy, and Strategy,” the administration
provided a clear vision of how the nation could use the elements of
American national power to protect and further national interests.
This section also described how U.S. diplomatic, defense, and
economic policies could also contribute to achieving U.S. goals
and objectives.44 The second major addition was to outline a set of
separate strategies for each region of the world. In the section on
integrating elements of power into national security strategy, the
administration provided a concept for integrating the elements of
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U.S. national power into a strategy designed to achieve U.S. goals
and objectives on a regional basis.45
The second National Security Strategy report provided a clear and
comprehensive U.S. strategy. It contained the basic framework of
values, interests, and national security objectives still in use today.
It described how the United States intended to use the elements of
national power to achieve its stated security goals. Most signiﬁcantly,
it provided integrated strategies for achieving and sustaining global
goals and objectives. In the ﬁnal analysis, the 1988 Report met the
intent of Goldwater-Nichols by providing the Congress a grand
strategy for the United States.
A NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY OF ENGAGEMENT
AND ENLARGEMENT
The Clinton administration published its ﬁrst national security
report in June 1994, nearly 18 months into its ﬁrst term.46 This report
represented the ﬁrst true post-Cold War concept of U.S. security
strategy and was the ﬁrst signiﬁcant change in American security
strategy since 1987. It reﬂected a radically altered global landscape,
the organization of the executive branch under the Clinton
administration, and the existing political climate in Washington,
DC, and the nation.47
The 1994 National Security Strategy report contained four sections:
Introduction; Advancing Our Interests Through Engagement and
Enlargement; Integrated Regional Approaches; and Conclusions.
It reﬂected a clear change in the direction and thinking of how the
United States should work to achieve its national security goals and
objectives. It also established three central goals, which were to be in
all seven Clinton administration National Security Strategy Reports:
to sustain American security with military forces that are ready
to ﬁght; bolster America’s economic revitalization; and promote
democracy abroad.48
In the introductory section, the new administration
acknowledged that a new era had dawned. The “end of the Cold
War and the dissolution of the Soviet empire brought about a
radically transformed security environment” and a “corresponding
period of great promise, but also great uncertainty.”49 It articulated
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that the United States was the preeminent global power and that
its leadership in the world had never been more important. This
section also highlighted the rise of transnational terrorism, narcotics
trafﬁcking, environmental degradation, rapid population growth,
and refugee ﬂows as threats to global and U.S. security.50
The largest and arguably most important section of the 1994
report was “Advancing Our Interests Through Engagement and
Enlargement.” This part of the strategy detailed the administration’s
direction and strategic thinking. It stressed the need to use preventive
diplomacy and selected engagement as the primary tools for achieving
U.S. goals and objectives. This section also contained a sub-section
highlighting the administration’s tangible accomplishments over its
ﬁrst 17 months in ofﬁce.51 This report also reﬂected a much broader
deﬁnition of “security” than used by earlier administrations. With
the new strategic environment and the lack of clear military threats
to the nation’s physical security, the administration deﬁned security
as “protecting our people, our territory, and our way of life.”52 The
strategy aimed at taking advantage of the “opportunities to make
the nation more safe and prosperous, as well as protecting it from a
new class of security threats.”53
The 1994 report contained only three fundamental national
security goals: enhancing U.S. security; promoting prosperity at
home; and promoting democracy.54 “There is a simple elegance
in using only three national security goals to integrate all of the
governments efforts to advance U.S. interests.”55 “Integrated
Regional Approaches” highlighted the administration’s approach
towards the world’s regions by providing broad regional objectives.
It articulated that U.S. policy toward each of the “world’s regions
reﬂects our overall strategy tailored to its unique challenges and
opportunities.” This section highlighted the application of U.S.
strategy to each of the world’s regions—“our broad objectives
and thrust, rather than an exhaustive list of all our policies and
interests.”56 This approach failed to provide a detailed strategy
for integrating the elements of national power required to secure
regional U.S. goals and objectives.
The 1994 National Security Strategy Report reﬂected a major shift
in U.S. security thinking and direction. It contained a comprehensive
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description of the national security interests, goals, and objectives
of the United States and provided a description of the foreign
policy, worldwide commitments, and national defense capabilities
necessary to deter near-term and long-term threats. It also provided
a thorough description of the short-term and long-term uses of
the elements of national power to protect and promote American
interests. Finally, it described the necessary balance between the
elements of national power required to achieve U.S. security goals
and objectives. In the ﬁnal analysis, through the dual strategy of
preventive diplomacy and selective engagement, the 1994 National
Security Strategy report met the intent of the Goldwater-Nichols Act
by providing a grand strategy.
A NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY FOR A NEW CENTURY
The Clinton administration published its second National
Security Strategy report in October 1998. This report reﬂected
the administration’s recognition of increased global economic
interdependence, the Balanced Budget Agreement, the results of the
1997 Quadrennial Defense Review, and an increasing awareness of the
challenges presented by domestic terrorism.57 It contains four basic
sections: Introduction; Advancing U.S. National Interests; Integrated
Regional Approaches; and Conclusions.58 The 1998 report was similar
in both structure and substance to the 1997 National Security Strategy
report and retained the three core U.S. objectives of enhancing U.S.
security, bolstering America’s economic prosperity, and promoting
democracy abroad.59 In general, differences between the two reports
were of matters of emphasis and degree.60
In the introductory section, the Clinton administration clearly
established the national and international security environments
which have and will continue to undergo signiﬁcant changes. “The
security environment in which we live is dynamic and uncertain,
replete with a host of threats and challenges that have the potential
to grow more deadly, but also offer unprecedented opportunities
to avert those threats and advance our interests.”61 It described
the challenges and opportunities of globalization, highlighted the
importance of continued U.S. engagement, and outlined how the
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administration would implement the strategy to achieve the three
core objectives of U.S. national security.
“Advancing U.S. National Interests” is the most important and far
reaching section of the report. The overall strategy remained based
on three national objectives: enhancing security; bolstering economic
prosperity; and promoting democracy abroad.62 It also established
the precedence for categorizing U.S. national interests as either vital
interests, important national interests, or humanitarian and other
interests.63 This section also outlined current and future threats
to U.S. interests: regional or state-centered threats; transnational
threats; spread of dangerous technologies; foreign intelligence
collection; and failed states.64 Finally, it highlighted the Clinton
administration’s continued focus on strategy implementation built
around the concepts of shaping the international environment,
responding to threats and crises, preparing now for an uncertain
future, and promoting prosperity.65 Each of these areas contained an
array of policy tools and objectives designed to achieve U.S. national
security.
Similar to the 1994 Report, the section on integrating regional
approaches highlighted the administration’s approach towards the
world’s regions by providing broad regional objectives. However,
this report provided a more coherent approach to attaining and
maintaining U.S. goals by outlining the administration’s strategy
of enhancing security, promoting prosperity, and promoting
democracy in each region.66
The 1998 National Security Strategy report reﬂected the continuing
trend of major shifts in U.S. national security thinking. This report
contained a comprehensive description of U.S. national security
interest, goals, and objectives. This included categorizing U.S.
interests as vital, important, or humanitarian and other. It provided
a detailed description of the foreign policy, national defense
capabilities, and worldwide commitments necessary to achieve U.S.
goals and objectives. It demonstrated a more focused and integrated
regional approach when compared to the 1994 report and, in the
ﬁnal analysis, provided Congress a grand strategy for the United
States.
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A NEW AMERICAN PERSPECTIVE ON NATIONAL
SECURITY STRATEGY
The Bush administration published its 2002 National Security
Strategy report in September 2002. It clearly reﬂected the new
administration’s views on U.S. national security, unparalleled U.S.
power, the changing strategic environment, and the terrorist attack
on the World Trade Center on September 11, 2001. This report
contained nine sections67 that outline the administration’s national
security strategy. It represented a fundamental break with the
strategic thinking and direction of the United States. This strategy
seeks to increase security and economic development by using
unrivaled U.S. power and inﬂuence to expand freedom and open
societies around the world. The underlying theme of the strategy
is clearly captured in Bush’s introductory letter: “The United States
will use this moment of opportunity to expand the beneﬁts of
freedom across the globe. We will actively work to bring the hope of
democracy, development, free market, and free trade to every corner
of the world.”68
The 2002 report deviates from the precedence of articulating clear
national interests as the guiding principle for U.S. strategy. Instead,
it offers three goals for U.S. national security that are identiﬁed at the
end of the following quote:
The U.S. national security strategy will be based on a distinctly American
internationalism that reﬂects the union of our values and our national
interests. The aim of the strategy is to help make the world not just safer
but better. Our goals on the path to progress are clear: political and
economic freedom, peaceful relations with other nations, and respect for
human dignity.69

This report identiﬁes rogue nations and transnational terrorist
networks and their supporters as the principal threat to U.S. and
global security interests. It outlines a strategy for defending the
United States against these enemies and for defending and preserving
peace on a global scale. This strategy is built on the foundation of
strengthening, maintaining, and developing new alliances against
rogue nations and global terrorism. It also recognizes that the United
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States will be the lead nation in this campaign, and that it must and
will shoulder this burden.
The section on “Working With Others to Defuse Regional
Conﬂicts” argues that “concerned nations must remain actively
engaged in critical regional disputes to avoid escalation and
minimize human suffering” and “that since the United States is a
concerned nation, it will be involved in regional disputes, along with
friends and allies, to alleviate suffering and restore stability.”70 It
recognizes that the United States has ﬁnite resources and establishes
two strategic principles for U.S. involvement. The ﬁrst principle is
“the United States should invest time and resources into building
international relationships and institutions that can help manage
local crises when they emerge.” The second principle is “the United
States should be realistic about its ability to help those who are
unwilling or unready to help themselves. Where and when people
are ready to do their part, we will be willing to move decisively.”71
This section identiﬁes the Israeli-Palestinian conﬂict, South Asia,
Indonesia, parts of Latin America, and Africa as areas of importance
to U.S. and global security.
The section on “Igniting a New Era of Global Economic
Growth through Free Markets and Free Trade” outlines the Bush
administration’s strategy for enhancing a strong world economy.
This strategy outlines seven policies designed to generate higher
productivity and sustained economic growth and details the U.S.
plan for enhancing global trade by providing a ten-point strategy for
promoting free trade.72
The 2002 National Security Strategy report is profoundly different
from earlier reports in its tone. Two statements and one theme not
only demonstrate this fundamental shift in U.S. strategic thinking
and tone, but they are also frequently highlighted by segments
of the world community who see the United States attempting to
establish global hegemony. The two statements are contained in the
document’s opening section, “Overview of America’s International
Strategy.” The opening assertion that the “United States possesses
unprecedented―and unequaled―strength and inﬂuence in the
world”73 frequently is combined with the statement that “the aim of
this strategy is to help make the world not just safer, but better.”74
When one views these two statements through the lens of the
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international community and combined with recent and ongoing
U.S. military operations, it is difﬁcult to argue that the United States
prefers multilateral over unilateral action.
A new emphasis on and broader deﬁnition of “preventive war”
or “preemptive attack” remains the most controversial aspect of the
report. The strategy proposes expanding the accepted concept of
true preemption—striking ﬁrst against an imminent, speciﬁc, and
near certain attack—to the far broader concept of striking ﬁrst to
prevent a longer-term threat from even developing. (And in fact,
the United States has conducted two major preventive military
operations to date.) This broader deﬁnition of “preventive war”
violates accepted international norms developed to prevent these
destabilizing approaches to conﬂict resolution. It also runs the risk
of establishing a new international precedent that other nations may
adopt.
In broad terms, the current Bush administration strategy has a
“reality versus rhetoric” mismatch that is unsustainable in its current
form. Continued reliance on the military instrument of power,
combined with the broader deﬁnition of “preemptive attack,” is
simply unsustainable from economic, political, and especially
military aspects. This current mismatch points to a potential lack
of balance in the ends, ways, and means construct that enables the
successful execution of a national security strategy.
The 2002 National Security Strategy report reﬂects another clear
shift in U.S. security thinking and direction. This change was once
again driven by the changing character of the threats facing the
United States. While it is more descriptive than previous National
Security Strategy reports, it does provide a comprehensive set of U.S.
national interests, goals, and objectives. It provides a description of
the foreign policy, worldwide commitments, and national defense
capabilities of the United States required to deter near-term and
long-term threats. This report also provides a description of the
short-term and long-term uses of the elements of U.S. national
power. It recognizes that the United States has limits to its national
resources and provides a strategic balance between the various
elements of national power in order to achieve U.S. security goals
and objectives. In the end, while this report is different in form and
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structure from past reports, it meets the intent of Goldwater-Nichols
and provides a grand strategy to the Congress of the United States.
WHAT DOES THE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY
ACCOMPLISH?
The National Security Strategy report serves three primary
purposes. First, it serves as a strategic communications document;
second, it is a unifying document for the executive branch; and third,
it serves as the fundamental statement of the President’s agenda.
As a strategic communications document, the National Security
Strategy report fulﬁlls two primary purposes. The ﬁrst is to
communicate a grand strategy to the Congress. This strategy should
provide the basis for the development of a common understanding
between the executive and legislative branches on the strategic
environment, the administration’s intent, the basis for determining
the allocation of national resources, and the uses of the elements
of national power to achieve U.S. goals and objectives.75 Second, it
communicates the direction of U.S. national policy to a wide range
of international and domestic audiences. International audiences
include allies, friends, and neutral nations, as well as existing
and potential adversaries. Domestic audiences include political
supporters and opponents, all of the various special interest groups,
the defense and nondefense industrial base, as well as the American
public.76
As a unifying document for the executive branch, it aims at creating
an internal consensus on foreign, defense, diplomatic, and economic
strategy. “Every new and second-term administration faces this
challenge as it transitions from campaign to governance, particularly
if foreign policy has not been a major issue in the campaign.”77 This
consensus theoretically is accomplished through the National
Security Council and the interagency processes as the report is
developed, staffed, and approved. As the fundamental statement of
the president’s overall agenda, the annual National Security Strategy
report represent the cornerstone of an administration’s strategic
direction, encompassing the allocation of national resources and
the uses of the elements of national power to protect U.S. national
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interest and lead to the attainment of global and domestic U.S. goals
and objectives.
While the Goldwater-Nichols Act requires the submission of an
annual National Security Strategy report, the track record is decidedly
mixed. Arguments have been made to revise Goldwater-Nichols to
require a biannual submission of the report during the second and
fourth years of an administration.
Three trends become readily apparent when studying the various
national security strategy reports and their development. First,
incoming administrations have limited time to prepare their ﬁrst
report. This already difﬁcult timeframe can be complicated further if
the incoming President has not ﬁnalized his cabinet, or the Congress
has yet to act on the incoming administration’s nominations. Second,
the intense iterative nature of the interagency process itself has
resulted in signiﬁcant delays in submitting the report to Congress.
Finally, a biannual process would provide all participants involved
in the process the time necessary to assess the effectiveness of the
current national security strategy and study alternative approaches
prior to restarting the current annual process. These points provide
the basic evidence necessary to consider revising Goldwater-Nichols
and requiring the submission of a biannual National Security Strategy
report.
CONCLUSIONS
Several conclusions about the development of U.S. national
security strategy can be drawn from this chapter. First, there is no
overarching consensus on the appropriate grand strategy for the
United States. This is due to the necessary political processes and
compromises resident in any democratic form of government. “After
all, grand strategy is really the idea of allocating resources to create
in both the short-term and long-term various instruments of power,
instruments with which the nation then provides for its defense and
the furtherance of its aims in the world.”78
Second, since the publication of the ﬁrst National Security Strategy
report in 1987, the United States has undergone several fundamental
changes in strategic thinking and direction. These adjustments have
been driven by changes in administrations as well as changes in
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the international and national security environments. Third, while
different administrations have made adjustments to U.S. goals and
objectives, our national interests have stood the test of time and
remain consistent, even in the face of radically different international
and national security environments.
Finally, even though the “most evolved democracy in the world
has the most cumbersome national security decisionmaking process,
inefﬁciency is the price the founding fathers imposed for domestic
accountability.”79 This process has stood the test of time and
protected U.S. national interests through some dramatic changes in
the international and national landscapes.
ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 13
1. Robert H. Dorff, “A Primer in Strategy Development,” Joseph Cerami and
James Holcomb, eds., U.S. Army War College Guide To Strategy, Carlisle Barracks,
PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2001, pp. 14-15.
2. Michael J. Hogan, A Cross of Iron: Harry S. Truman and the Origins of the National
Security State, 1945-1954, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998, p. 3.
3. Ibid., p. 2.
4. Ibid., p. 464.
5. Ibid., p. 465.
6. Ibid.
7. Don M. Snider, “The National Security Strategy: Documenting Strategic
Vision,” Joseph Cerami and James Holcomb, eds., U.S. Army War College Guide To
Strategy, Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2001, p. 129.
8. Hogan, pp. 23-67.
9. Ibid.
10. Melvyn P. Lefﬂer, A Preponderance of Power: National Security, The Truman
Administration and the Cold War, Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press, 1992,
p. 175.
11. Ibid.
12. Ibid., p. 176.
13. Ibid.
14. Congressional Record, Daily ed., September 15, 1950, p. 15124.
15. Frank N. Trager, “The National Security Act of 1947: Its Thirtieth
Anniversary,” Air University Review, November-December 1977, p. 6.

339

16. Public Law 85-599, U.S. Code Congressional and Administrative News,
85th Congress, 2nd Session, Vol. 1, 1959, 592, §2.
17. Ibid.
18. Douglas C. Lovelace, Jr., “The DoD Reorganization Act of 1986: Improving
The Department Through Centralization and Integration,” Douglas T. Stuart, ed.,
Organizing for National Security, Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute,
2000, p. 66.
19. Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986,
Conference Report (99-824), p. 5.
20. 50 U.S.C. 402, Title I of the National Security Act of 1947.
21. Snider, p. 128.
22. Ibid.
23. Ibid., p. 131.
24. “National Security Strategy of the United States,” January 1987, p. 1.
25. Ibid., p. 1.
26. Ibid., p. 5.
27. For a detailed look at the Major Objectives in Support of U.S. Interests, see
“National Security Strategy of the United States,” January 1987, pp. 4-7.
28. Ibid., p. 6.
29. Ibid., p. 7.
30. Ibid., p. 6.
31. Ibid., pp. 9-18.
32. Ibid., pp. 19-32.
33. Ibid., pp. 6-7.
34. Snider, p. 131.
35. Ibid.
36. Ibid.
37. “National Security Strategy of the United States,” January 1988, p. iii.
38. Ibid., p. 1.
39. The Reagan administration added the element of geography to the other
four basic elements of national power. “National Security Strategy of the United
States,” January 1988, p. 2.
40. Ibid., p. 3.
41. Ibid., pp. 3-5.
42. Ibid., pp. 35-40.

340

43. Snider, p. 131.
44. “National Security Strategy of the United States,” January 1988, pp. 7-23.
45. Ibid.
46. See Snider, pp. 133-134, for a description of the reasons for the delay.
47. Ibid., p. 134.
48. “National Security Strategy of the United States,” January 1994, p. i.
49. Ibid., pp. 1-3.
50. Ibid.
51. Ibid., pp. 5-18.
52. Snider, p. 135.
53. Ibid.
54. “National Security Strategy of the United States,” January 1994, p. 5.
55. Snider, p. 135.
56. “National Security Strategy of the United States,” July 1994, p. 21.
57. Snider, p. 136.
58. “National Security Strategy of the United States,” January 1998, p. i.
59. Ibid., p. iii.
60. Snider, p. 136.
61. “National Security Strategy of the United States,” January 1998, p. 1.
62. Ibid., p. 6.
63. For a complete description of the three categories, see “A National Security
Strategy for a New Century,” October 1998, pp. 5-6.
64. Ibid., pp. 6-7.
65. Ibid., pp. 8-31.
66. Ibid., pp. 37-57.
67. “The National Security Strategy of the United States of America,” October
2002, p. vii.
68. Ibid., p. iv.
69. Ibid., p. 1.
70. Ibid., p. 9.
71. Ibid.
72. For a description of these seven policies, see “The National Security
Strategy of the United States,” October 2002, p. 17. For a description of the ten
points, see ibid., pp. 18-20.

341

73. Ibid., p. 1.
74. Ibid.
75. Snider, p. 130.
76. Ibid.
77. Ibid.
78. Ibid., p. 138.
79. Gabriel Marcella, “National Security and the Interagency Process: Forward
into the 21st Century,” Joseph Cerami and James Holcomb, eds., U.S. Army War
College Guide To Strategy, Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2001, p.
124.

342

CHAPTER 14
THE HUMAN DIMENSION OF TRANSFORMATION
Colonel Robert E. Scurlock, Jr.
War is a special activity, different and separate from any other pursued
by man. This would still be true no matter how wide its scope, and
though every able-bodied man in the nation were under arms. An army’s
military qualities are based on the individual who is steeped in the
spirit and essence of this activity; who trains the capacities it demands,
rouses them, and makes them his own; who applies his intelligence to
every detail; who gains ease and conﬁdence through practice, and who
completely immerses his personality in the appointed task.
Carl Von Clausewitz, On War
As we prepare for the future, we must think differently and develop
the kinds of forces and capabilities that can adapt quickly to new
challenges and to unexpected circumstances. We must transform not
only the capabilities at our disposal but also the way we think, the
way we train, the way we exercise, and the way we ﬁght. We must
transform not only our armed forces but also the Department that serves
them by encouraging a culture of creative and prudent risk taking.
We must promote an entrepreneurial approach to developing military
capabilities, one which encourages people to be proactive, not reactive,
and anticipates threats before they emerge.
Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld
Transformation Planning Guidance
April 2003
. . . the essential nature of war has not changed. Wars are fought by men,
and there has been no discernible difference in the fundamental nature
of man over the past ﬁve thousand years of recorded history. Because the
nature of man has not changed, neither has his basic objective when he
turns to war: the employment of lethal instruments to force his will upon
other men with opposing points of view.
Colonel N.T. Dupuy,
Understanding War, 1987
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The transformation of the U.S. military and the Department
of Defense (DoD) represents a complex process which has been
evolving since the end of the Cold War. Successful transformation
will require a cultural change that focuses on producing forces
that, when integrated with all elements of national power, will
achieve desired effects to defeat any enemy’s capabilities. The
Army Transformation Roadmap suggests that the nation requires
a joint force that can meet the strategic mandates established by
the National Security Strategy (NSS) and further elaborated in
the Defense Planning Guidance, the Quadrennial Defense Review, the
Transformation Planning Guidance, and the Joint Operations Concepts.1
These documents provide the framework and concepts to determine
the future path the military seeks, but it is the human dimension of
transformation―the educated, well-trained, values-oriented service
member―that will have the greatest impact on the transformation
process. Technology is an enabler and a catalyst for change, but it is
the practitioner of war that will determine how the technology will be
employed to achieve desired effects and that will affect the cultural
changes required to adapt to the changing security environment.
Transformation is commonly used to describe changes in
organizations and equipment, but it has greater impact on the culture
and members of the force. It is less important to change the things
that forces use to make war than it is to change the way forces think
about the effects they produce when using them. Transformation
is an intellectual process and must begin with the mind of the
leader. The leader must understand the emerging environment as
projected in Joint Vision 2020, Defense Planning Guidance, and other
assessments, and must comprehend the adjustments that will be
required to operate effectively in that environment. If the services
ﬁeld new equipment and adopt new organizations but continue to
think about the application of force in the old ways, then there is no
material advantage. According to the DoD Planning Guidance:
Transformation is a process that shapes the changing nature of military
competition and cooperation through new combinations of concepts,
capabilities, people, and organizations that exploit our nation’s
advantages and protect against our asymmetric vulnerabilities to sustain
our strategic position, which helps underpin peace and stability in the
world.2
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Transformation is incomplete if the focus is primarily on
technology or organizational change rather than leadership and
service culture. The numerous transformation documents at DoD
and Army level clearly articulate all the components required
for change. How does the nation ensure transformation remains
on course? What are the proper transformational concepts? The
changes in the strategic environment in the post-Cold War era, the
predominance of the information age, and the introduction of new
technologies such as precision munitions, stealth aircraft, advanced
sensors, and digitization of the battleﬁeld demand that the joint force
transform to meet potential capabilities of future adaptive enemies.
The intent of this chapter is to examine transformation in terms of
the human dimension, provide some recent examples of how the
transformation concepts have evolved, and offer recommendations
to ensure the transformation effort proceeds on a logical path.
Transformation is a strategic process that should rest on sound
strategic theory and principles. Its concepts derive from historical
lessons learned. When examining insights garnered from previous
conﬂicts, it is difﬁcult to isolate how military actions affected
political objectives without a holistic view of the factors involved.
Colin Gray, in his book, Modern Strategy, asserts that “there is an
essential unity to all strategic experience in all periods of history
because nothing vital to the nature and function of war and
strategy changes.”3 Gray presents 17 dimensions of strategy that
provide an excellent framework to understand past conﬂicts and
their implications for transformation. The human dimension and
strategic culture are essential to gaining an understanding of this
process. Gray posits, “Tactical achievement has meaning only in
terms of operational intention and strategic effect.”4 As statesmen
and military leaders glean lessons learned from case studies as well
as recent operations, they need to avoid focusing on tactical level
successes and shortcomings. Instead, they need to evaluate case
studies holistically and focus on the human dimension and strategic
culture of both their forces and those of the enemy.
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TRANSFORMATION CONCEPTS
Neither policies nor machines will determine the history of tomorrow.
Man is the measure of all things . . . This, then, is the ultimate battleﬁeld:
the hearts and minds of men.
Hanson W. Baldwin
Joint Publication 3-16, p. III-1

The Joint Staff and Joint Forces Command, with input from
the services, developed the Joint Operations Concepts to support the
Defense Planning Guidance. The intent of this initiative was to provide
the services with a series of concepts to form the framework for how
joint forces might operate in the future. The Joint Operating Concepts,
the joint functional concepts, and the enabling concepts attempt
to reﬁne this framework to guide the integration of a broad range
of military capabilities. A kluge of services does not make a force
joint. People make it joint by internalizing the joint concepts. These
concepts represent an effort to link the “strategic guidance with the
integrated application of joint force capabilities.”5 The major cultural
shift in this concept is that the joint forces focus on defeating a broad
range of potential enemy capabilities across the spectrum of military
operations and not on any one speciﬁc threat. This conception of
future combat operations requires a transformation in the fashion
in which the United States conducts joint military operations. The
continuous transformation process outlined in the Joint Operations
Concepts is the tool the DoD will use to assess proposed systems, deﬁne
required capabilities, and validate joint warﬁghting requirements.
It has major implications on the “development and acquisition of
future capabilities across doctrine, organization, training, materiel,
leadership and education, personnel, and facilities.”6
This concept is an attempt to overcome service parochialism
and organizational culture in order to achieve the interdependence
of joint forces. To defeat future potential capabilities that enemies
might possess, this joint warﬁghting concept postulates that
the future joint force must be fully integrated, expeditionary,
networked, decentralized, adaptable, decision-superior, and lethal.
By adapting the forces to counter potential enemy capabilities,
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the concept envisions a force that can “achieve full spectrum
dominance―the ability to sense, understand, decide, and act faster
than any adversary in any situation.”7 Hence, the effectiveness of
the joint force ultimately hinges on the human dimension which
comprises the sensors, the decisionmakers, and the ones employing
the capabilities to achieve the desired effects.
The Army’s transformation strategy is to transform the Army
culture through leadership and adaptive institutions, develop
capabilities by conducting experimentation, analysis, and capabilities
assessments in collaboration with the other services and Joint Forces
Command, and then build the transformational capabilities into
the joint force through training, exercises, and simulations, as well
as evaluating these capabilities in real world operations whenever
possible.8 This approach requires a global joint expeditionary land
force that is ready, deployable, and designed to ﬁght as part of the
joint force on land, so the Army must focus on how it will contribute
to winning the joint warﬁght―not on moving the old force faster.9
This concept forces the services to depend on each other. These
collaborative efforts enhance trust and cooperation. Both are part of
the human dimension.
TRANSFORMATION PROCESSES
A transformed mindset is one that can handle the chaotic and uncertain
situations created by the collapse of political, economic, and security
systems. Leaders must be able to operate in countries that have no
effective governments, where the enemy and front lines are not easily
identiﬁable, and rules of engagement are conﬂicting. Our forces are
expected to deal with terrorists, drug trafﬁckers, warlords, militant
fundamentalists, and paramilitary units―and still be able to overcome
large maneuver formations and formidable defense systems.
Brigadier General (Ret) David L. Grange

In accordance with the Joint Operations Concept, the Army’s
transformation plan is to develop modular brigade-sized force
packages that can provide the combatant commander with a tailored
force, supported with the required capabilities designed to produce
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effects against enemy capabilities instead of a speciﬁc threat. These
force packages are organized into maneuver and support units of
action, with the command and control units of employment. These
units are tailorable to allow the Joint Task Force Commander the
capability to assemble and ﬁght with powerful, lethal, agile units as
part of a joint force to produce the desired effects against the enemy.
This requires a balance of capabilities, resources, and risk. Hence,
given the interdependency among the services, thinking “joint” is
essential to mission success.
The concept of effects-based operations is an effort to provide
a framework to achieve an effect on the human dimension of the
enemy. According to the U.S. Joint Forces Command, “Effects-Based
Operations (EBO) is a process for obtaining a desired strategic
outcome, or effect, on the enemy through the synergistic and
cumulative application of the full range of military and nonmilitary
capabilities at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels.”10 This
approach recognizes that technology alone is not the driving force in
campaigns. Only people can make EBO coherent.
Decision support tools such as the Operational Net Assessment
and the Collaborative Information Environment serve as a ready
source of information for the combat commanders and can
assist staffs much like eavesdropping on radio nets to gain an
understanding of what is happening on the battleﬁeld to anticipate
possible requirements of support without hindering operations of
the element in the ﬁeld. The same is true with joint intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance efforts. These efforts must provide
the commanders and staffs not in direct contact the ability to monitor,
gain understanding of the situation, and anticipate requirements
and changes to the plan without distracting the element in contact.
Such tools allow the commander to gain situational awareness and
visualize the battleﬁeld without being obtrusive on the subordinate
element engaged in the ﬁght. Commanders must avoid centralized
control “from afar” because this will have a detrimental effect on the
immediate action and will undermine the initiative and conﬁdence
in the networked sensor system to assist the element in contact. The
informational picture given does not present the full situation that
the commander on the ground has since he is aware of the human
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and psychological factors which interact with the force. It is the
uncertainty and friction that he must overcome to defeat the enemy.
Understanding the limitations of technology is a critical component
of usage. Hence the leader is the centerpiece of the process because
he/she must utilize the input from these decisionmaking tools and
apply his/her experience, intuition, and understanding of the human
dimensions to make a determination on what actions to take.
When today’s technology is working properly, it allows the
commander to maintain situational awareness and exercise battle
command from great distances and while on the move. The
commander’s presence forward is still as critical to battleﬁeld
success as it was during the days of Frederick the Great, Napoleon,
Grant, Lee, and Patton, among others.11 A senior commander in
Operation IRAQI FREEDOM stated in a recent lecture that he felt
he needed to meet face to face with his commanders routinely. He
felt his “physical presence forward” was the best way to gain a
“common view of the enemy,” a personal assessment of the friendly
situation on the ground, and to ensure his commanders had a clear
understanding of his intent for future operations. More importantly,
he stated he felt he could gain a better sense of the fatigue, morale,
conﬁdence, and other psychological factors that may have been
affecting his commanders and soldiers.12 Decision support tools and
other technologies are enablers in the battle command process, but
they cannot replace the importance of the physical presence of the
commander on the battleﬁeld or the value of human interaction in
understanding and overcoming the psychological friction in war.
When the services introduce new technologies, they are rarely
mature enough to exploit their full potential capability for the
battleﬁeld. User innovation in employing the new technology,
providing feedback to reﬁne the technology and its application,
and the continued assessment and improvement of employment
techniques provide the most dramatic results. A historical example
of the innovative use of technology designed for one purpose
effectively employed in another role is the German 88mm Air Defense
Artillery gun, which the Germans employed as a ﬁeld expedient
anti-tank weapon throughout World War II. A recent example of
such a development is the Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM)
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now used to conduct precision ﬁres. This new capability resulted
from an innovative approach to employing the Global Positioning
System, originally designed as a military navigational aid. The Air
Force adapted it for use as a guidance system, matched with small,
powerful computer chips and a moveable ﬁn system that allowed the
munitions to “ﬂy” within three meters of the desired target in an allweather environment.13 Once developed, the Air Force adapted it for
use from multiple delivery systems. This innovative approach to use
a “spin-off” technology to develop new capabilities, combined with
the creative approach to maximize its employment, allowed forces
to achieve effects with fewer rounds while causing less collateral
damage.
The challenge in this process is to balance the capital investment
directed toward the future force with the resources needed for
the current force. Some technologies or concepts may provide the
opportunity to advance capabilities for the current force. There are
systems in place to devote valuable resources toward such “highrisk, high-payoff technologies” based on “urgency of warﬁghter
needs and the maturity of enabling technologies.”14 A recent article
based on a new report to Congress argued that, “the Pentagon is
producing and even ﬁelding billions of dollars’ worth of weapons
that have not been adequately tested. . . .”15 Such large expenditures
suggest the need for concern in maintaining a balance of resource
expenditure for current technology versus testing, evaluating, and
improving these systems to provide the capabilities required for
future forces. The senior leadership uses judgment and counsel to
determine the proper balance of what soldiers need today versus
what capabilities future forces will need to provide for national
security. The experienced, well-grounded professionals are what
will make this process successful. Military leaders must constantly
remind the defense community that technology is not a “golden
key” to success at any level. Service personnel are the hedge against
the friction and fog of war that prevails during a campaign.
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LEADERSHIP AND CULTURE
In the volatile, uncertain, complex and ambiguous environment we face
for the foreseeable future, if we were to choose merely one advantage
over our adversaries it would certainly be this: to be superior in the
art of learning and adaptation. This is the imperative for a culture of
innovation in the U.S. Army.
Brigadier General David A. Fastabend

To provide the combatant commander a cohesive modular
force with the required capabilities, the Army must focus on its
core competencies which are to train and equip soldiers, to grow
leaders, and to provide relevant and ready land power capability to
the combatant commander and the joint team.16 The Army already
has initiated actions to transform its culture through actions such
as force stabilization and unit manning initiatives. To avoid the
formation of ad hoc units, the establishment of cohesive teams that
work and train together is key. These initiatives will allow the core
elements of the Army’s modular force packages, the units of action,
and units of employment to maintain cohesive teams with welldeveloped tactics, techniques, and procedures. These teams learn
each others’ strengths and weaknesses through tough, realistic
training and exercises in order to maximize their strengths and
minimize weaknesses. This will increase conﬁdence in leaders,
systems, and themselves to provide combatant commanders with
capabilities required on the battleﬁeld.
Leader development and joint professional military education
are critical components in assuring the seamless integration of the
joint force. Focusing on leader development is necessary to adjust
to a volatile, complex, uncertain, changing environment and the
possibility of rapidly adapting enemies that U.S. forces may face in
the future. The educated and well-trained leader, whom the Army
encouraged to be innovative and ﬂexible, is a basic requirement to
focus Army culture on defeating competent and adaptive enemies,
while integrating his force’s capabilities into the joint warﬁghting
team. As Williamson Murray points out:
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Perhaps the most important enabler of transformation and innovation
in the past has been the culture of the military organizations that have
grappled with an uncertain and ambiguous future, a future made more
complex and difﬁcult by tactical, operational, and technological changes,
the impact of which are almost impossible to predict under peacetime
conditions. . . . If the American military does not desire to repeat the
mistakes of the past, then it needs to create a learning culture, where
intellectual preparation is as prized as tactical preparation.17

This view is equally true today. An educated and learning culture
is especially important as the Army works through organizational
change, while confronting adaptive enemies. Soldiers are employing
sophisticated equipment and are facing increasingly more complex
tasks. They must be able to work with joint, interagency, and
multinational partners across the spectrum of operations in a
changing security environment. It is the human dimension―the
educated, well-trained, values-oriented service member―in this
process that will determine the success of transformation to meet
these demands.
TRAINING, EXERCISES, WARGAMING AND SIMULATIONS
Everyone has now seen that we ﬁght as a joint team. Therefore, how can
we best go about improving upon our already existing training to further
bring in the notion and the concepts of joint? Here is our ultimate end
state of training transformation: no individual, no unit, no staff would
ever deploy into combat without ﬁrst having experienced the rigors and
the stress of their joint responsibilities in a robust and realistic training
environment.
Dr. Paul W. Mayberry
Deputy Undersecretary of Defense for Readiness

The services conduct numerous exercises and simulations to
hone their skills and reﬁne tactics, techniques, and procedures.
These events provide the opportunity to evaluate different forms
of operations against a variety of enemy forces under a wide range
of environments. Conducting tough, realistic training has been
a hallmark of the U.S. military as well as a major contributor to
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recent successes. The Combat Training Centers, with their aggressor
forces and difﬁcult terrain, provide a unique testing and training
environment. Conducting joint training to “train as we ﬁght” will
be a critical factor in developing soldiers who can employ the
capabilities required by future combatant commanders.
When examining the enemy and his potential capabilities, U.S.
forces need to ensure that “Red teaming” provides a thinking,
adapting adversary that resembles not only the enemy of today
but those expected in the future. The Red forces must not be mirror
images of U.S. forces with the same values and expected behaviors.
Moreover, training should include a level of realism that forces
soldiers to appreciate the impact of casualty evacuation, extended
operations that press the limits of the maintenance and resupply
systems, refugee control, large numbers of enemy prisoners of war,
consequence management from exposure to a weapon of mass
destruction, loss of critical assets, and the loss of key leadership.
Forces should exercise these events so leaders can think through
solutions and work through issues before having to perform these
functions on the battleﬁeld. Too often these events are omitted
from training because they are time consuming and difﬁcult.
Additionally, weather extremes, harsh terrain, and complex and
urban environments should be among the variables used in training
to evaluate systems and concepts.
There are limits to how well simulations can replicate the human
dimension involved in warﬁghting, but they provide for larger force
involvement in a terrain and resource constrained environment.
Simulations provide a method to work through various scenarios in a
combination of live, constructive, or virtual environments to achieve
training objectives. An example of this effort is the Joint National
Training Capability, which will combine training at the various
major service training areas. This will allow service components to
ﬁght as a joint team through networked systems and synchronized
efforts, with the aim of achieving joint training objectives and testing
various joint capabilities.18
There are new developments in the embedded training
technology and automated teaching software systems known as
intelligent tutoring systems. These technologies would either be
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built into new systems or developed in stand-alone systems that
replicate the equipment that soldiers use. These systems will allow
training in various scenarios without major resource expenditure
by using digital terrain representations. The goal for these new
systems is to allow individual and collective mission planning and
rehearsal.19 These systems allow for soldiers to progress at their own
pace commensurate with their level of skill and experience. This
contributes to providing a learning culture by giving soldiers the
tools to hone their skills and prepare for future operations.
There is no substitute for actual maneuver and live-ﬁre training
to train forces and validate concepts and doctrine. The German
experience in the interwar years prior to World War II provides
a historical example commonly used to demonstrate effective
transformation. The Versailles Treaty placed severe restrictions on
German military manpower, equipment, and planning headquarters.
Despite these restrictions, the Germans were able to develop a doctrine
that incorporated mechanization and air power, and emphasized
rapid operations. They also enhanced their ability to operate in a
more decentralized fashion by placing radios in a large number of
their tanks. They had superior training programs, conducted ﬁeld
exercises and maneuvers, and conducted war gaming. There was the
full participation and open, honest sharing of ideas that encouraged
innovation, and thorough evaluation of lessons learned that enabled
their transformation to be successful at the tactical level.20 They
effectively adapted their tactics, techniques, and procedures based
on lessons learned and validation of concepts in actual combat
operations over the two years prior to their invasion of France and
the Soviet Union. Had they used a framework similar to Gray’s 17
dimensions to view their experiences holistically, they might have
avoided strategic failure. The United States continually should assess
and reassess both friendly and potential enemy capabilities and not
lose focus on the strategic factors of transformation. Otherwise it
may make the same mistakes as the Germans, who emphasized
transformation at the tactical level but failed to put enough effort on
the strategic implications of transformation.

354

CASE STUDIES THAT SUPPORT CURRENT CONCEPT
DEVELOPMENT
The key organizational transformation for the Army is the
construct of modular, brigade-sized units of action. These units
are intended to be self-sufﬁcient, highly-trained and skilled in their
core competencies with the ability to leverage current technology,
and adept at using emerging technology. This core element may
require capabilities not resident in the unit of action. To minimize
the negative effects of creating an ad hoc unit, the sooner the task
organization can occur and the unit can train, rehearse, and operate
together, the sooner the team can form up and prepare for combat.
The team will perform much more effectively, if it can conduct
situational training exercises to ensure its members know how to
integrate their skills and capabilities into the effort, and can validate
its tactics, techniques, and procedures.
An example of a capability not resident in a unit of action
might be military dog teams. This capability proved valuable in
Kosovo and Afghanistan for both explosive detection and crowd
control. Linguistic and cultural expertise is another capability that
is difﬁcult to have resident in a unit of action. Prior to entering into
a conﬂict, it is beneﬁcial to conduct mission readiness exercises to
prepare soldiers for the kinds of situations they might encounter.
This helps familiarize them with language differences and how to
deal with the local population. This proved of great value in Iraq,
when intelligence initially identiﬁed a target at one location. Then
after soldiers seized that target and questioned those at that location,
they discovered the target was just a few houses away. Without the
ability to communicate effectively with the local population, the
mission could have failed completely. Instead, because of the quick
thinking of the leader and the integration of the language capability,
units achieved success.
The above incident highlights the need for effectively engaging
and gaining the trust and conﬁdence of the local population. In
Kosovo, small units spent much time familiarizing themselves with
the local population in small villages. Patrols immediately would
recognize new people or trusted local inhabitants would point out
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the “bad people” so units could preempt them. Many locals in Iraq
have identiﬁed improvised explosive devices before they could
harm U.S. soldiers or pointed out troublemakers before they could
instigate further trouble. This trust must go both ways, as guerrillas
may end up targeting those who are assisting U.S. forces, which has
been happening in Operations IRAQI FREEDOM and ENDURING
FREEDOM. Infusion of human interaction on the battleﬁeld is crucial
to strategic success.21
Additionally, the Army needs to conserve valuable resources
by not trying to homogenize itself into a force with the most
technological and expensive weapons now. Soldiers need the right
weapons and equipment to provide sufﬁcient capabilities required
by the combatant commander, but there needs to be a balance of
resources consumed in mass production now rather than waiting
for technology to mature and the equipment reﬁnement process to
work. The slow ﬁelding timelines and the long lag time required to
produce new systems may cause a lack of adequate resources to ﬁeld
the force with updated equipment in the future.
The efforts to transform concepts, capabilities, people, and
organizations need to remain ﬂexible, adaptable, and versatile. These
areas need to provide a broad range of capabilities that are rapidly
developed, rigorously tested, experimented with, and evaluated by
the users under realistic conditions. Capabilities should be modiﬁed
to ﬁx deﬁciencies and updated to incorporate any new technological
improvements. If the Army can ﬁeld these items to a small number
of units of action and continually improve them when certain items
need to be ﬁelded in mass to deal with a future major crisis, then the
Army could produce and ﬁeld the best, most trusted, most advanced
pieces of equipment available at the time.
An example is the current body armor. Units like the 75th Ranger
Regiment started using ceramic body armor in the late 1980s and
early 1990s. The initial versions had only a front ceramic plate and
the vest came up high on the neck. After use in many training events
and exercises, the rangers discovered they had difﬁculty ﬁring their
weapon in the prone position because of the way the armor cut
into the neck. In addition, the rangers needed back plates to protect
the vital areas of gunners in vehicles or those ﬁring crew served
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weapons, where their backs were exposed. Once Operation IRAQI
FREEDOM began, U.S. forces were on the fourth or ﬁfth generation
of improvements. The large amounts of armor vests ﬁelded today
have the beneﬁt of the iterative improvements which resulted from
ranger-user input. This demonstrates the importance of involving
the user, the human dimension, early and continually throughout
the process.
There are numerous examples in recent operations that suggest
how to adapt lessons learned into the current design of units of
action. The initial deployment of forces into Kosovo for Operation
JOINT GUARDIAN II contained elements of a mechanized
brigade combat team, task organized with an airborne battalion.
The command and control element, Task Force Falcon, combined
a division staff element with the brigade combat team staff, and
incorporated unit and individual augmentation, as well as unit
liaisons from multinational units to ﬁll various staff functions. Task
Force Falcon coordinated the efforts of the numerous multinational
forces by assigning forces to areas of operations best suited to their
mobility, capabilities, and cultural compatibility. Troops from
Russia, Poland, Greece, and Italy operated throughout the American
sector. Russian and U.S. soldiers conducted joint patrols at the
squad level on different occasions and built trust among the Serbian
and Albanian civilian populations. This required technical and
procedural interoperability considerations such as communications
and battle drill rehearsals, so the units could function as a team in
response to hostile actions. The human interaction and innovation of
junior leaders assisted in identifying required capabilities to form a
cohesive multinational team that produced the desired effects in this
culturally diverse situation.
The battalion task forces that occupied the American-led sector
were task organized with airborne and Bradley infantry companies,
M1A1 equipped armor companies, Paladin-equipped artillery
batteries, combat engineer companies, and various elements of
combat support and combat service support elements based on
requirements in their areas of operation. In addition, Task Force 1-26
Infantry established Camp Montieth out of a former Serbian artillery
camp, which was a smaller base camp adjacent to Gnjilane, the
largest city in that sector. Forces on Camp Montieth consisted of over
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26 different units to include Navy Seabees, an Army, Navy, and Air
Force Explosive Ordnance Disposal composite detachment, and a
host of combat support and combat service support units with camp
command and control under Task Force 1-26 Infantry. This ad hoc
task force continued to change structure and rotate forces in and out
throughout its 6-months tour. Units performed numerous functions
which were not in their normal core competencies. Composite
squads ensured that proper expertise was available to provide the
manpower to maintain the presence patrols required to secure a
safe and stable environment that would allow the United Nations
and the numerous nongovernmental and humanitarian assistance
organizations to complete their missions. This is similar to the
techniques used to complete normal combat engineer functions with
a limited number of engineers. For example, in normal operations
a core of engineer subject matter experts guide and supervise other
nonengineer soldiers in the execution of engineer-related tasks.
Additionally, 1-26th Infantry had just completed an organizational
change and major weapons systems transitions while preparing for
operations in Kosovo and while deployed to Kosovo. In early 1999,
the battalion transitioned from M2A1 Bradley Fighting Vehicles to
M2A2 enhanced Bradley Fighting Vehicles and converted to the
Limited Conversion Division XXI (LCD XXI) conﬁguration, which
resulted in the loss of one maneuver company. The unit transitioned
from the M60 machinegun to the new M240B machinegun in
September of 1999, while conducting stability and support operations
in Kosovo. The unit transitioned numerous senior leaders during
the preparation, deployment, and initial execution of operations, to
include the commander and all ﬁeld grade ofﬁcers. The ﬂexibility and
adaptability accompanied by intense training and lessons learned
during initial execution of assigned missions helped elements of
this diverse task force form into a cohesive team. The stabilization
and unit manning initiatives that the Army is implementing today
will mitigate the risks associated with turbulence in the manning,
equipping, and organizing of a unit while preparing to deploy or
while undergoing complex military operations.22
Some of the nuances of this operation were the integration of live
digital transmission from an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) ﬂown
out of Camp Able Sentry in Macedonia directly into the tactical
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operations center of Task Force 1-26 Infantry. The rudimentary means
to direct its ﬂight once the UAV was airborne was by telephone to
the operator in Macedonia. This new technology allowed the force
to monitor more of the sector during the short ﬂight times when
the UAV was available. With signiﬁcant improvement in UAV
technology since its use in 1999, these systems have now become
an integral source of technology in both Operations ENDURING
FREEDOM and IRAQI FREEDOM. This unit also had a tactical
local area network established within 10 days of establishing Camp
Montieth. The networking of forces with the main base at Camp
Bondsteel provided redundant communications to the limited radio
reception that resulted from the mountainous terrain and extended
distances the units operated in. The network allowed soldiers limited
internet and electronic mail access as well. Although the network
was established with emerging technology with limited bandwidth,
it allowed the Army to develop capabilities into major innovations
in how forces operate today. Ongoing operations now employ chat
rooms, email, and net meeting capability to assist with command
and control.
Operation URGENT FURY in Grenada provides an example
of how organizations can ignore problems and overlook their
failures to provide professed capabilities. Individuals, who wrote
after action reports that presented a critical view of intelligence
failures and portrayed the military in a negative light, were
threatened with career-ending evaluations for presenting their
negative perspectives.23 In the age of Network-Centric warfare
and the information age with use of the internet, young soldiers
and leaders are conducting informal correspondence with other
military members through email and unofﬁcial chat rooms. They
are able to pass on their valuable experiences and lessons learned in
a more personal and immediate forum. Although there are dangers
in propagating unsanctioned interpretations of lessons learned, it is
important to get all members involved in the process to achieve the
best results. The services need honest, constructive input on how to
improve unit capabilities to achieve desired effects in the future.
An example of an existing standing joint task force headquarters
that can provide lessons learned from previous operations and
exercises is the forward deployed U.S. Army Southern European
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Task Force in Vicenza, Italy. Although predominately an Army
manned headquarters, it is structured to provide the European
Command (EUCOM) commander with the Joint Task Force core
that is prepared to accept joint and multinational elements as well as
individual augmentees to ﬁll critical positions when mobilized. The
Southern European Task Force headquarters established the Southern
European Task Force Infantry Brigade, and received the requirement
to be prepared to provide a Joint Task Force headquarters deployable
within 72 hours in January 1994. In August of 1994 it deployed
and became the nucleus for the Joint Task Force for Operation
SUPPORT HOPE in Rwanda. Since this initial deployment as the
core of a Joint Task Force headquarters, Southern European Task
Force has conducted annual Battle Command Training Program
training exercises, in addition to numerous real-world deployments,
integrating joint forces, and integrating augmentees which allowed
them to develop tactics, techniques and procedures, and formulate
relationships with joint and multinational units and organizations.
The concept development for a Standing Joint Forces Headquarters
can use the lessons learned from the numerous experiences of units
like Southern European Task Force. The cohesive core staff element
with the habitual relationships developed over time reduced the
negative effect of building an ad hoc team to deal with a crisis
situation.
CONCLUSION
The human dimension will have the greatest impact on the
transformation process. Transformation is an intellectual process
for which technology is an enabler and a catalyst for change. The
practitioner of war is the one who innovates and determines how
these technologies will be employed to produce the desired effects
on enemy capabilities. The key to this cultural change required for
transformation is in educating and training leaders, encouraging
innovation and full participation in the process by all members
of the services. The leadership with the experience, intuition, and
understanding of the human dimension will make the systems of
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war successful. It will require honest and realistic evaluation of
organizational changes and doctrine, acceptance of new technologies,
and adoption of new processes, while maintaining ﬂexibility and
adaptability to adjust to a changing environment and potentially
changing enemy capabilities.
The Army appears to be moving in the right direction with
the modular brigade construct that intends to form cohesive core
teams, reduce ad hoc formations, and implement force stabilization
and unit manning initiatives. Human interaction on the battleﬁeld
by interoperable forces using innovative approaches for achieving
effects remains the key to success. People, organizations, and doctrine
determine how the joint forces will transform. Those involved in
the transformation process can learn valuable lessons from past
conﬂicts. The evaluation of each case study should be viewed
holistically, based on the framework of sound strategic theory and
principles, so the correct lesson can be extracted from the complex
context of speciﬁc events. Immature technologies and developing
concepts presented in the above case studies demonstrate how user
innovation and continual reassessment of lessons learned can evolve
into future concepts and capabilities.
RECOMMENDATIONS
DoD should conduct continual reassessment of strategic aims; the
technologies available to conduct the war; and the tactics, techniques,
and procedures used to prosecute the war. More importantly, joint
forces must be able to maintain the ﬂexibility and agility to make
timely changes to affect the outcome of the war. The United States
needs to focus on learning the right lessons from its past conﬂicts by
examining not only what went right, but also by examining what
went wrong and what adjustments potential adversaries have made
as a result of U.S. actions. The human dimension of transformation
is the critical factor in this process. The institutional Army has
developed effective educated, well-trained, values-oriented service
members, and this must continue despite the high operational
tempo. The services need to create a learning organizational culture
that encourages innovation and the willingness to take prudent
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risks. Forces need to be able to apply the required capabilities, at the
right time and place to produce the required effects to defeat future
enemy capabilities.
The joint force needs to invest more in the human dimension
versus focusing on high-dollar platforms. It needs to ﬁnd a way
to reduce the weight and bulk of the soldiers’ load since they are
required to carry more high technology equipment, almost all of
which requires batteries. It needs to develop effective hybrid fueled
vehicles or some similar more fuel efﬁcient variant. These vehicles
need to be more durable and require less maintenance to reduce
the logistics tail required to support their effort, which will assist in
reducing the forward footprint. Forces need to identify capabilities
not immediately required in the area of operations, bringing in
only what is needed and calling forward resources as the situation
requires, reducing force protection and sustainment requirements.
This change in thinking requires the trust and conﬁdence that
engaged forces will receive the necessary capabilities and resources
in time to produce the desired effects. The continued effort in training
and operating as a joint force, with a focused effort in developing
innovative solutions and encouraged by a military with a learning
culture, will ensure this process remains on a logical path.
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